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
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PROOF THAT INVOLUNTARY INCOME TAXES ON YOUR LABOR ARE SLAVERY



DEDICATION

And I [God] will come near you for judgment;
I will be a swift witness
Against sorcerers [drugs],
Against adulterers,
Against perjurers [who file the WRONG tax form, the 1040 as an American National],
Against those who exploit wage earners and widows and orphans.
And against those who turn away an alien [or [NONRESIDENT ALIEN, Form #09.081](#)]
Because they do not fear Me,"
Says the Lord of hosts.
[Mal. 3:5, Bible, NKJV]

"But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism [SLAVERY!], it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.--Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States."

[Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, 1776; <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript>]

"Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor [as absolutely owned PRIVATE property], is generally admitted; and no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his will..."
[The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 10 Wheat 66, 6 L.Ed. 268 (1825)]

"Liberty [LACK of slavery] means responsibility. That's why most men dread it."
[George Bernard Shaw]

"Freedom, liberty, and sovereignty are NOT spectator sports."
[SEDM]

"The price of freedom is eternal vigilance on EVERYONE'S part, not just OUR part."
[SEDM]

"The right to work in useful employment, and to receive the [FULL] fruits thereof, is a natural and fundamental right under our system of free enterprise."
[Battaglia v. Moore, 128 Colo. 326, 332 (Colo. 1953)]

"But the right to work for a wage, or to hire another, is among the fundamental liberties of the country, and they cannot be arbitrarily narrowed or taken away."
[Gulf States Paper Corporation v. Carmichael, 17 F.Supp. 225, 229 (M.D. Ala. 1936)]

"You were bought at a price; do not become slaves of men."
[[1 Cor. 7:23](#), Bible, NKJV]

"Do you not know that to whom you present yourselves slaves to obey, you are that one's slaves whom you obey, whether of sin leading to death, or of obedience leading to righteousness?"
[[Rom. 6:16](#), Bible, NKJV]

"That is does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, is too clear for argument. Slavery implies involuntary servitude—a state of bondage; the ownership of mankind as a chattel, or at least the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property, and services. This amendment was said in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall, 36, to have been intended primarily to abolish slavery, as it had been previously known in this country, and that it equally forbade Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie trade,

when they amounted to slavery or involuntary servitude and that the use of the word 'servitude' was intended to prohibit the use of all forms of involuntary slavery, of whatever class or name."
[Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896)]

"It is not open to doubt that Congress may enforce the 13th Amendment by direct legislation, punishing the holding of a person in slavery or in involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime. In the exercise of that power Congress has enacted these sections denouncing peonage, and punishing one who holds another in that condition of involuntary servitude. This legislation is not limited to the territories or other parts of the strictly national domain, but is operative in the states and wherever the sovereignty of the United States extends. We entertain no doubt of the validity of the legislation, or its applicability to the case of any person holding another in a state of peonage, and this whether there be a municipal ordinance or state law sanctioning such holding. It operates directly on every citizen of the Republic, wherever his residence may be."
[Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 25 S.Ct. 429, 49 L.Ed. 726 (1905)]

"Is this not the fast [act of faith, worship, and OBEDIENCE] that I [God] have chosen [for believers]:
To loose the bonds of wickedness,
To undo the heavy burdens,
To let the oppressed go free,
And that you break every yoke [franchise, contract, tie, dependency, or "benefit" with the government]?"
[Isaiah 58:6, Bible, NKJV]

"The Spirit of the Lord God is upon Me,
Because the Lord has anointed Me
To preach good tidings to the poor;
He has sent Me to heal the brokenhearted,
To proclaim liberty to the [government] captives
And the opening of the prison [government FARM, Form #12.020] to those who are bound;
To proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord,
And the day of vengeance of our God;"
[Isaiah 61:1-2, Bible, NKJV]

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1 Introduction

The most fundamental right of all in our republic is self-ownership and control over your body as your absolutely owned PRIVATE property. Without that, no other freedom is possible. The central mission of this ministry is to educate people about this fundamental truth because without legal education, we are ALL slaves:

*"...it is not good for a soul to be without [LEGAL] knowledge,"
[Prov. 19:2, Bible, NKJV]*

*"My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge."
[Hosea 4:6, Bible, NKJV]*

*"...we should no longer be [presumptuous] children, tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the trickery of men, in the cunning craftiness of deceitful plotting, but speaking the truth in love, may grow up in all things into Him who is the head—Christ."
[Eph. 4:14, Bible, NKJV]*

*"One who turns his ear from hearing the law [God's law or man's law], even his prayer is an abomination."
[Prov. 28:9, Bible, NKJV]*

*"If a nation expects to be ignorant and free... it expects what never was and never will be."
[Thomas Jefferson]*

*"Only the educated are free. "
[Epictetus, Discourses]*

*"Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and people who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."
[James Madison]*

*"This Book of the Law [God's Law] shall not depart from your mouth, but you shall meditate in it day and night, that you may observe to do according to all that is written in it. For then you will make your way prosperous, and then you will have good success. Have I not commanded you? Be strong and of good courage; do not be afraid, nor be dismayed, for the LORD your God is with you wherever you go."
[Joshua 1:8-9, Bible, NKJV]*

*"Is this not the fast [act of faith, worship, and OBEDIENCE] that I [God] have chosen [for believers]:
To loose the bonds of wickedness,
To undo the heavy burdens,
To let the oppressed go free,
And that you break every yoke [franchise, contract, tie, dependency, or "benefit" with the government]?"
[Isaiah 58:6, Bible, NKJV]*

*"The Spirit of the Lord God is upon Me,
Because the Lord has anointed Me
To preach good tidings to the poor;
He has sent Me to heal the brokenhearted,
To proclaim liberty to the [government] captives
And the opening of the prison [government FARM, Form #12.020] to those who are bound;
To proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord,
And the day of vengeance of our God;"
[Isaiah 61:1-2, Bible, NKJV]*

The subject of slavery, coercion, and duress are contentious. Throughout history, slavery has been implemented both personally and institutionally with the sanction of the state and the courts. This memorandum will examine mainly state sanctioned slavery, coercion, and duress, because they are anathema to freedom and liberty.

This short memorandum will therefore attempt to provide court admissible proof of the following:

1. Your labor is your PRIVATE, absolutely owned property.
2. NO ONE can tax your labor without your consent in some form, which consent you should always specify must come in writing signed by the party receiving said benefit and never impliedly.
3. All just powers derive from the CONSENT of the governed, as the Declaration of Independence indicates.

4. Real “law” DOES NOT require your consent in some form, whether EXPRESS or IMPLIED. It operates INDEPENDENT of your consent. Thus, the only real “law” is the common law and the criminal law. Everything else requires consent or agreement or acquiescence in some form.
5. You absolutely own yourself. That concept is the BEGINNING of the notion of freedom and liberty, in fact. As the absolute owners of yourself and your property:
 - 5.1. YOU get to choose what system of law you want to use to protect that absolute and PRIVATE ownership.
 - 5.2. YOU and ONLY YOU get to define BY WHAT METHOD you give your consent.
 - 5.3. YOU are the only one who can write definitions that adversely affect, transfer, or convert your own status or that of your property. This ability is an extension, in fact, of the “right to exclude” aspect of ownership itself.
6. The method of choice for corrupt and covetous courts to make your labor taxable is to make your consent IMPLIED rather than EXPRESS. This is a violation of rule 3.2 if you informed the government that the only method of giving consent MUST be fully informed consent.
7. There are TWO choices of law when it comes to protecting your private property:
 - 7.1. The CIVIL statutory law, which attaches to you through your voluntary choice of civil domicile.
 - 7.2. The constitution, the common law, and equity, which attach to you by default if you choose not to have a civil domicile.
8. Domicile:
 - 8.1. You don’t need a civil domicile to receive protection of your absolutely owned PRIVATE property from the state. The constitution and the common law or equity ALONE are sufficient. The civil statutory law is optional.
 - 8.2. Domicile is the basis for income taxation and for enforcing the civil statutory law.
 - 8.3. Domicile requires your consent.
 - 8.4. When civil domicile is compelled, it becomes a vehicle to introduce slavery into society.
 - 8.5. The method of choice for those who want to be truly free and sovereign is to eschew domicile and the civil law and stick with the common law and equity alone.
9. The method of obfuscating these critical facts is to equivocate NATIONALITY and DOMICILE so as to make you falsely believe that they are always synonymous. This has the practical effect of:
 - 9.1. Falsely making the civil statutory law appear MANDATORY.
 - 9.2. Repealing or rendering ineffectual the common law as a remedy for self protection.
 - 9.3. Making everyone into “harlots” fornicating with Caesar.

At this time, there are three main sources of involuntary servitude and slavery in our present legal system:

1. Involuntary taxation of labor as absolutely owned private property.
2. Imputing consent through action or impliedly, rather than in writing alone. The most common application of this is through:
 - 2.1. Compelled domicile. Courts making domicile an issue of FACT rather than of CHOICE or equivocating NATIONALITY with DOMICILE so that a false presumption of domicile can be inferred.
 - 2.2. Unknowingly connecting property to a “trade or business” on a tax return, and thus in effect donating the property to a public use, a public purpose, and a public office.
3. Government ID with a civil status or “residence” or domicile bundled with it. We call this “weaponization of the government” on our website.

No treatment of the subject of human slavery by the legal profession and the government would be complete without addressing all of the above subjects, which this memorandum will attempt to do.

This memorandum is a deep subject with vast implications that can affect everyone in society. It has value only to the extent that it provides evidence and weapons useful in court to defeat the slavery it describes. We are not aware of anyone else who has attempted to implement anything like this document in our twenty years of studying the subject of freedom. It is a work in progress and we solicit your constructive suggestions on how to consistently improve it so that our readers may liberate themselves from the slavery it describes.

If you would like to see a U.S. Supreme Court Appeal Petition you can use as a template to litigate this issue if someone won’t allow you to exclude your personal labor from a tax return, see:

[U.S. Supreme Court Petition-My Labor Not Taxable](https://sedm.org/Litigation/07-Appeals/SCPetition-LaborNotTaxable.docx), Litigation Tool #07.008
<https://sedm.org/Litigation/07-Appeals/SCPetition-LaborNotTaxable.docx>

1 **2 A warning to others NOT to charge for this information**

2 At one time, this document was part of our Member Subscriptions program in which a suggested donation was involved. We
3 later decided to make it entirely free. Below was our announcement and reason for doing so:

4 *Form #05.055 just changed from Member Subscription to free!*

5 <https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/ProofIncomeTaxLaborSlavery.pdf>

6 *This is the FOUNDATION of our mission statement. Putting it behind a paywall is Pharisaical and hypocritical.*

7 *Not unlike the "Pay to Play" social compact:*

8 <https://sedm.org/the-pay-to-play-social-compact/>

9 *Instead, here is God's command relating to whether there should be money involved in obtaining this document:*

10 *"Is this not the fast that I have chosen:*
11 *To loose the bonds of wickedness,*
12 *To undo the heavy burdens,*
13 *To let the oppressed go free,*
14 *And that you break every yoke?*
15 *7 Is it not to share your bread with the hungry,*
16 *And that you bring to your house the poor who are cast out;*
17 *When you see the naked, that you cover him,*
18 *And not hide yourself from your own flesh?*
19 *8 Then your light shall break forth like the morning,*
20 *Your healing shall spring forth speedily,*
21 *And your righteousness shall go before you;*
22 *The glory of the Lord shall be your rear guard.*
23 *9 Then you shall call, and the Lord will answer;*
24 *You shall cry, and He will say, 'Here I am.'"*
25 *[Isaiah 58:6-9, Bible, NKJV]*

26 *The above scripture is listed in the dedication at the beginning of the document.*

27 *It will also likely get much more peer review and improve faster by doing that. And see far more use in the*
28 *courtroom.*

29 *What do you think would have happened if Moses had charged the Israelites with an admission ticket to leave*
30 *Egypt for the promised land? Or what would have happened if Noah charged people for a ticket to board the*
31 *ark? Isn't that essentially what the Pharisee lawyers in the District of Criminals are doing with the civil statutory*
32 *code and the domicile scam?*

33 *God cannot bless it unless the walk and the talk match, as the above scripture proves.*
34 *[SEDM, 2/8/24; <https://sedm.org/forums/topic/form-05-055-removed-from-member-subscriptions-and-made-free/>]*
35

36 **3 "Wages" on a tax return are not a representation of PRIVATE property, but a**
37 **PRESUMED DONATION of labor to PUBLIC USE**

38 For the purposes of this document, STATUTORY "wages" appearing on a tax return such as that on line 1a below are NOT
39 a representation of one's LABOR as absolutely owned PRIVATE property:

40 **Figure 1: "Wages" block of 1040NR Return**

| | | | | |
|---|-----------|---|-----------|--|
| Income Effectively Connected With U.S. Trade or Business | 1a | Total amount from Form(s) W-2, box 1 (see instructions) | 1a | |
| | b | Household employee wages not reported on Form(s) W-2 | 1b | |
| | c | Tip income not reported on line 1a (see instructions) | 1c | |
| | d | Medicaid waiver payments not reported on Form(s) W-2 (see instructions) | 1d | |
| | e | Taxable dependent care benefits from Form 2441, line 26 | 1e | |
| | f | Employer-provided adoption benefits from Form 8839, line 29 | 1f | |

41

Line 1a—Total Amount From Form(s) W-2, Box 1

See *Line 1a—Total Amount From Form(s) W-2, Box 1*, in the Instructions for Form 1040 for the types of income includible on line 1a of Form 1040-NR.

Exception. Enter on line 1a of Form 1040-NR only the wages, salaries, tips, and other compensation reported in box 1 of Form(s) W-2 **effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business**. Only U.S. source income is included on line 1a as effectively connected wages. Don't include any income on line 1a of Form 1040-NR that isn't treated as effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business

Instructions for Form 1040-NR (2023)

even if it is listed in *Line 1a* of the Instructions for Form 1040.



If you received scholarship or fellowship grants that weren't reported to you on Form W-2, you will now report these amounts on Schedule 1, line 8r. See the instructions for Schedule 1, line 8r, later.

The above block 1a identifies these statutory “wage” earnings as “Income Effectively Connected With U.S. Trade or Business”, which means DONATED to a public use, a public office, and a public purpose by the OWNER, which is you. YOU, not the PAYER, are the one who effectively connects such earnings under 26 U.S.C. §872. As the ABSOLUTE OWNER of the earnings from your own human labor, ONLY YOU can determine the CIVIL STATUS of your property or connect or classify it as a privilege rather than a RIGHT by connecting it to a “trade or business”. See:

Your Exclusive Right to Declare or Establish Your Civil Status, Form #13.008
<https://sedm.org/Forms/13-SelfFamilyChurchGovnce/RightToDeclStatus.pdf>

Congress, third parties, and even the IRS have NO AUTHORITY to unilaterally change the civil status of your PRIVATE property to make it into STATUTORY “income”, “gross income”, or even statutory “wages” without your consent. That would be THEFT:

1 "In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from Article I of the Constitution may have proper force and effect,
2 save only as modified by the [Sixteenth] Amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes
3 essential to distinguish between what is and what is not "income," as the term is there used; and to apply the
4 distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any
5 definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which
6 alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.
7 (emphasis added).
8 [Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920)]

9 Only the CONSTITUTION can define "income" within a constitutional state per the above. Not even YOU can do that on a
10 tax return by simply CALLING what you earn "income" or "effectively connected income". If Congress can't do it per the
11 above, you certainly can't do it either. What you earn must FIRST be "income" in a constitutional sense before it can be
12 "Income effectively connected with U.S. Trade or Business". And what is that definition? Here's the answer:

13 "The Sixteenth Amendment declares that Congress shall have power to levy and collect taxes on income, "from
14 [271 U.S. 174] whatever source derived," without apportionment among the several states and without regard to
15 any census or enumeration. It was not the purpose or effect of that amendment to bring any new subject within
16 the taxing power. Congress already had power to tax all incomes. But taxes on incomes from some sources had
17 been held to be "direct taxes" within the meaning of the constitutional requirement as to apportionment. Art. 1, §
18 2, cl. 3, § 9, cl. 4; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601. The Amendment relieved from that
19 requirement, and obliterated the distinction in that respect between taxes on income that are direct taxes and
20 those that are not, and so put on the same basis all incomes "from whatever source derived." Brushaber v. Union
21 P. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17. "Income" has been taken to mean the same thing as used in the Corporation Excise
22 Tax Act of 1909, in the Sixteenth Amendment, and in the various revenue acts subsequently passed. Southern
23 Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335; Merchants' L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 219. After full
24 consideration, this Court declared that income may be defined as gain derived from capital, from labor, or
25 from both combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital. Stratton's Independence v.
26 Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415; Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
27 189, 207. And that definition has been adhered to and applied repeatedly. See, e.g., Merchants' L. & T. Co. v.
28 Smietanka, supra; 518; Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U.S. 527, 535; United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 169;
29 Miles v. Safe Deposit Co., 259 U.S. 247, 252-253; United States v. Supplee-Biddle Co., 265 U.S. 189, 194; Irwin
30 v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 167; Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S. 628, 633. In determining what constitutes
31 income, substance rather than form is to be given controlling weight. Eisner v. Macomber, supra, 206. [271 U.S.
32 175]"
33 [Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174, (1926)]

34 They aren't asking you on the tax return what you earned for your own labor. They are asking you in block 1a on the 1040NR
35 return whether you want to donate the FRUIT of that ABSOLUTELY OWNED PRIVATE PROPERTY in the form of labor
36 to a public use, a public purpose, and public office by entering it on the tax return so that you can take "trade or business"
37 deductions against it under 26 U.S.C. §162 in order to qualify for PRIVILEGES such a Social Security, Medicare, etc. THAT,
38 our readers, is something you SHOULD not and MAY not do as a member of this ministry. It is VOLUNTARY servitude
39 that is a product of a legally uninformed or corrupted mind.

40 The statutory term "trade or business" is then defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26) as "the functions of a public office. The
41 only people who can lawfully engage in such an ACTIVITY are those lawfully elected or appointed to office under rules
42 prescribed in Title 5 of the U.S. Code. Private humans CANNOT lawfully engage in this activity and it is a CRIME to
43 IMPERSONATE such an officer, even with your consent. 18 U.S.C. §912. The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that
44 Congress cannot IMPLEMENT such an excise taxable activity within the exclusive jurisdiction of a constitutional state in
45 order to tax it, which ironically is EXACTLY what you are actually HELPING the IRS to do by putting ANYTHING on a
46 tax return that is subject to "trade or business" deductions under 26 U.S.C. §162, INCLUDING statutory "wages" under
47 I.R.C. Subtitle C.

48 "Thus, Congress having power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
49 with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt, provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to pilots, licenses to
50 trade with the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper for the exercise of that great and extensive
51 power; and the same observation is applicable to every other power of Congress, to the exercise of which the
52 granting of licenses may be incident. All such licenses confer authority, and give rights to the licensee. But very
53 different considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and
54 trade Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States.
55 No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the
56 Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The
57 power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the
58 same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution,
59 with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes
60 by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches
61 every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But, it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot

1 authorize [meaning LICENSE with an SSN or TIN, Form #04.205, [https://sedm.org/Forms/04-Tax/2-](https://sedm.org/Forms/04-Tax/2-Withholding/WhyTINIllegal.pdf)
2 [Withholding/WhyTINIllegal.pdf](https://sedm.org/Forms/04-Tax/2-Withholding/WhyTINIllegal.pdf)] a trade or business [Form #05.001, [https://sedm.org/Forms/05-](https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/TradeOrBusScam.pdf)
3 [MemLaw/TradeOrBusScam.pdf](https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/TradeOrBusScam.pdf)] within a State in order to tax it."
4 [License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866)]

5 This document is therefore NOT an attempt to claim:

- 6 1. That STATUTORY "wages" defined in 26 U.S.C. §3401(a) are NOT taxable or even reportable. At the point of filling
7 out W-4, you donated your earnings to the government under 26 U.S.C. §3402(p). At that point, they became PUBLIC
8 property, and of course Uncle has the right to control, tax, and regulate such property under Article 4, Section 3, Clause
9 2 of the Constitution beyond the point of VOLUNTARY donation.
- 10 2. That Anything voluntarily connected to a "trade or business" as defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26) by PAYEE and
11 OWNER such as "wages" is NOT taxable. If you are STUPID enough to make yourself a government whore and peon
12 by doing so, you should definitely follow the rules set by your covetous parens patriae who is now your new "god" in
13 violation of the first four commandments of the Ten Commandments in Exodus 20. See:

[Socialism: The New American Civil Religion](https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/SocialismCivilReligion.pdf), Form #05.016
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/SocialismCivilReligion.pdf>

14 There are lots of lower court cases declaring in obiter dicta that it is frivolous to declare that "wages are not income". All
15 such claims to date by any court that we are aware of are "judicial grandstanding" not connected to the issue directly decided
16 by any case. Some of these cases are listed below:

[Flawed Tax Arguments to Avoid](https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/FlawedArgsToAvoid.pdf), Form #08.004, Section 9.2
<https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/FlawedArgsToAvoid.pdf>

17 In effect, corrupt judges are marketing more lemmings to jump off the government cliff in order to fund their fat retirement
18 check. This is a conflict of interest in criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. §208, 28 U.S.C. §144, and 28 U.S.C. §455 if you can
19 prove they knew these things and yet did them anyway. Now do you know why judges feign ignorance on such issues and
20 why they are Third Rail Issues? This issue, however, has already been settled by a previous, more HONEST and
21 HONORABLE supreme court:

22 *The [Sixteenth Amendment](#) authorizes the taxation without apportionment of "incomes, from whatever source*
23 *derived." Income has been defined as "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,"*
24 *[Stratton's Independence v. Howbert](#), 231 U.S. 399, 34 S.Ct. 136, 140, 58 L.Ed. 285, "including profit gained*
25 *through sale or conversion of capital," [Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.](#), 247 U.S. 179, 38 S.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed. 1054;*
26 *[Eisner v. Macomber](#), 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 193, 64 L.Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570. The gain is, however, not*
27 *taxable until it is realized. [North American Oil Consol. v. Burnet](#), 286 U.S. 417, 52 S.Ct. 613, 76 L.Ed. 1197.*
28 *Furthermore, a gain from capital must be derived from it, not merely accruing to it. [Eisner v. Macomber](#), *supra*.*
29 *In the case just cited Mr. Justice Pitney, after quoting the foregoing definition, said, [252 U.S. 189, at page 207,](#)*
30 *[40 S.Ct. 189, 193, 64 L.Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570](#)*
31 *[[Stapler v. U.S.](#), 21 F.Supp. 737, U.S. Dist. Ct. EDPA (1937)]*

32 *"The claim that salaries, wages and compensation for personal services are to be taxed as an entirety and*
33 *therefore must be returned by the individual who has performed the services which produced the gain, is*
34 *without support either in the language of the Act or in the decisions of the courts construing it. Not only this,*
35 *but it is directly opposed to provisions of the Act and to regulations of the Treasury Department which either*
36 *prescribe or permit that compensation for personal services be not taxed as an entirety and be not returned by*
37 *the individual performing the services.* It is to be noted that by the language of the Act it is not "salaries, wages
38 or compensation for personal service" that are to be included in gross income. *That which is to be included is*
39 *"gains, profits and income derived" from salaries, wages or compensation for personal service. Salaries, wages*
40 *or compensation for personal service are not to be taxed as an entirety unless in their entirety they are gains,*
41 *profits and income. Since, also, it is the gain, profit or income to the individual that is to be taxed, it would*
42 *seem plain that it is only the amount of such salaries, wages or compensation as is gain, profit or income to*
43 *the individual, that is, such amount as the individual beneficially receives, for which he is to be taxed."*
44 *[[Lucas v. Earl](#), 281 U.S. 111, 112-13 (1930)]*

45 You as the absolute owner of yourself and your PRIVATE property are the only one who can write definitions that interfere
46 with the use, enjoyment, or control of that property or the people who want to use it. Until you donate that property to the
47 government and thereby make it PUBLIC property, you continue to have the unalienable PRIVATE right to exclude any and
48 all others, including governments, from using, benefitting from, or controlling it in any way that property. If you haven't
49 donated it, you can use it to control THEM instead of them using it to control YOU. For proof, see:

Any claims contrary to what is in this document are just SOPHISTRY to maliciously trick you out of your property and STEAL from you. That sophistry is effected by the legal profession using legal deception as follows:

4 What is a “Slave”?¹

What is a slave? A SLAVE IS A HUMAN BEING:

1. Who can be connected with any statutory status in civil franchises or civil law to which public rights attach without their EXPRESS consent. This is a Fifth Amendment taking without compensation, a violation of the right to contract and associate, and a conversion of PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property.
2. Who can't ABSOLUTELY own PRIVATE PROPERTY. Instead, ownership is either exclusively with the government or is QUALIFIED ownership in which the REAL owner is the government and the party holding title has merely equitable interest or “qualified ownership” in the fruits.
3. Who is SOMEONE ELSE'S PROPERTY. That property is called a STATUTORY “person”, “taxpayer” (under the tax code), “driver”, “spouse” (under the family code) and you volunteered to become someone else's property by invoking these statuses, which are government property. All such “persons” are public officers in the government. [Form #05.042](#).
4. Who is compelled to economic or contractual servitude to anyone else, including a government. All franchises are contracts. [Form #05.030](#).
5. Who is compelled to share any aspect of ownership or control of any property with the government. In other words, is compelled to engage in a “moiety” and surrender PRIVATE rights illegally and unconstitutionally.
6. Whose ownership of property was converted from ABSOLUTE to QUALIFIED without their EXPRESS written and informed consent.
7. Who is not allowed to EXCLUDE government from benefitting from or taxing property held as ABSOLUTE title.
8. Who is EXCLUDED from holding Title to property as ABSOLUTE or outside the “State”, where “State” means the GOVERNMENT (meaning a CORPORATION FRANCHISE, [Form #05.024](#)) and not a geographic place.
9. Who the government REFUSES its constitutional duty to protect the PRIVATE rights or property of ([Form #12.038](#)) or undermines or interferes with REMEDIES that protect them from involuntary conversion of ownership from ABSOLUTE to QUALIFIED.
10. Who is compelled to associate PUBLIC property with PRIVATE property, namely Social Security Numbers or Taxpayer Identification Numbers and thereby accomplish a conversion of ownership. SSNs and TINs are what the FTC calls a “franchise mark” ([Form #05.012](#)).
11. Whose reservation of rights under U.C.C. §1-308 or §1-207 is interfered with or ignored and thereby is compelled to contract with and become an agent or officer of a government ([Form #05.042](#)) using a government application form ([Form #12.023](#)).
12. Who isn't absolutely equal ([Form #05.033](#)) to any and every government or who is compelled to become unequal or a franchisee ([Form #05.030](#)). The basis of ALL your freedom is EQUALITY of rights, as held by the U.S. Supreme Court. See [Form #12.021, Video 1](#).

Questions:

1. Is there any difference between BEING someone else's property and BEING COMPELLED TO HOLD [A PUBLIC OFFICE \(a franchise, \[Form #05.030\]\(#\)\)](#) that is someone else's property 24 hours a day, seven days a week?
ANSWER: NO!
2. If government will not issue ID to [NONRESIDENTS](#) or EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE PEOPLE not engaged in [franchises](#) and who don't have an SSN or TIN, haven't they effectively outlawed private property?
ANSWER: YES!

¹ Source: *SEDM Ministry Introduction*, Form #12.014, pp. 121-126; <https://sedm.org/Ministry/MinistryIntro.pdf>.

3. If you can only own property as a public officer in the government engaged in a franchise, and all public officers represent the government, then can you as a PRIVATE human being realistically own ANYTHING?
ANSWER: NO!
4. If the [Declaration of Independence](#) and the Courts universally agree that PRIVATE rights protected by the Constitution are “unalienable”, which means they cannot lawfully be sold or bargained away, then how could you lawfully contract them away to procure the “benefits” of a government franchise?
ANSWER: YOU CAN’T. YOU HAVE BEEN DECEIVED! ONLY THOSE [DOMICILED](#) ON FEDERAL TERRITORY NOT PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION CAN DO SO!

Conclusions:

1. No man is free if he does not ABSOLUTELY own PRIVATE property that cannot be taxed or regulated. “Property tax” is an oxymoron.
2. You are a tenant on the de facto government’s land and an [uncompensated public servant](#) of the [de facto government \(Form #05.043\)](#) and not God. This is a violation of the FIRST commandment to serve God with all your heart, mind, soul, and PROPERTY. [Matt. 22:36-40, Exodus 20:3-11](#).
 - 2.1. Hence, we are a pagan idol worshipping heathen. Our Christian religion has been dis-established through government DECEPTION and in violation of the First Amendment.
 - 2.2. The De Facto government and not God gets the “First Fruits”, because churches get their tithes AFTER taxes are withheld. God gets what is LEFT, not what is RIGHT! [Prov. 3:9](#).
3. The [de facto government](#) absolutely owns EVERYTHING, because it owns all [public offices](#) and you are a public officer if you are using their LICENSE called the [Social Security Number](#) or [Taxpayer Identification Number](#).
4. All lawful governments are instituted to protect PRIVATE rights and PRIVATE property. There is no PRIVATE property left, so there is no DE JURE government left.
5. The Constitution is TOILET PAPER and you are your public servants’ door mat. [The Constitution makes YOU “Caesar” \(Form #12.006\)](#), but your public servants have put themselves in charge and turned the Public Trust into a SHAM Trust in pursuit of what the Bible calls “filthy lucre”.
6. The only thing the law or the [de facto FRANCHISE courts](#) protect are the criminal activities of their fellow SHAM trustees. See [What is “law”?, Form #05.048](#).
7. The public servants have taken over the house, YOUR HOUSE, and put their Master, YOU, in the barn with the horses. This is called a “dulocracy”.
8. Any labels or “[civil statuses](#)” you associate with yourself are merely different positions you have within the government corporation as an uncompensated “[employee](#)” paid with “[benefits](#)” that aren’t even an enforceable property interest in a real Article III court. See [Proof That There Is a “Straw Man”, Form #05.042](#).

YOU OUGHT TO BE MAD AS HELL NOW THAT YOU KNOW THE TRUTH.

WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO ABOUT IT?

5 Definitions Of Slavery

5.1 Merriam Webster: Slavery

slavery

noun

slav-ery slā-v(ə-)rē

Synonyms of slavery

1 a: the practice of slaveholding

b : the state of a person who is held in forced servitude

c : a situation or practice in which people are entrapped (as by debt) and exploited

... the unit has freed more than 26,000 workers nationwide from **debt slavery**. Under the practice, common in the Amazon, poor laborers are lured to remote spots where they rack up debts to plantation owners who charge exorbitant prices for everything from food to transportation.—Vivian Sequera

Many members of my own family, including my mother and father, fled their work as sharecroppers in the South. They left for good reason: the profession offered no future and was little more than **wage slavery**.—Will Allen

2: submission to a dominating influence

slavery to habit

3: DRUDGERY, TOIL

5.2 Britannica: The Law of Slavery

The law of slavery

Sources of slavery law

By definition slavery must be sanctioned by the society in which it exists, and such approval is most easily expressed in written norms or laws. Thus it is not accidental that even the briefest code of a relatively uncomplicated slave-owning society was likely to contain at least a few articles on slavery.

Both slave-owning and slave societies that were part of the major cultural traditions borrowed some of their laws about slavery from the religious texts of their respective civilizations. Principles regarding slavery that proved to be either unprofitable or unworkable were among the first to be discarded. An obvious example is provided by the [biblical law](#) that Hebrew slaves were to be manumitted after six years (Exodus 21:2; [Deuteronomy 15:12](#)). A similar general recommendation that slaves be freed after six years in bondage was adhered to by many Islamic slave-owning societies; it helps to account for the ferocity and frequency of their slave raids, for they had a need for constant replenishment of their slave supplies. In [Christian](#) slave societies, on the other hand, the principle that the [tenure](#) of slavery should be limited was almost completely ignored.

Practically every society that possessed slaves wrote about them in its laws, and thus only a few codes can be mentioned here. The ancient Mesopotamian laws of [Eshnunna](#) (c. 1900 BCE) and the [Code of Hammurabi](#) had a number of articles devoted to slavery, as did the Pentateuch. In ancient [India](#) the Laws of Manu of the 1st century BCE contained numerous laws on slaves.

Little is known about the Athenian law of slavery, but the [Roman law](#) of slavery was extraordinarily elaborate. Roman law was summed up in the great Pandects of [Justinian](#) of 533 CE, and some of its slave norms later found their way into the [Byzantine](#) Ecloga (which incorporated Syrian norms as well) of 726 CE and, more deliberately, into the Procheiron Nomos of 867–879 CE. Romano-Byzantine norms also found their way into the Bulgarian Court Law for the People (“Zakon Sudnyi Liudem”) of the end of the 9th century and the 13th-century Ethiopian Fetha Nagast.

5.3 Legal Dictionary: Involuntary Servitude²

Involuntary Servitude

[Slavery](#); the condition of an individual who works for another individual against his or her will as a result of force, coercion, or imprisonment, regardless of whether the individual is paid for the labor.

The term *involuntary servitude* is used in reference to any type of slavery, peonage, or compulsory labor for the satisfaction of debts. Two essential elements of involuntary servitude are involuntariness, which is compulsion to act against one's will, and servitude, which is some form of labor for another. Imprisonment without forced labor is not involuntary servitude, nor is unpleasant labor when the only direct penalty for not performing it is the withholding of money or the loss of a job.

The importation of African slaves to the American colonies began in the seventeenth century. By the time of the American Revolution, the slave population had grown to more than five hundred thousand people, most concentrated in the southern colonies. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution did not specifically refer to slavery in the document they drafted in 1787, but

² Source:: Legal Dictionary; <https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Involuntary+Servitude>.

1 they did afford protection to southern slaveholding states. They included provisions prohibiting Congress from outlawing the
2 slave trade until 1808 and requiring the return of fugitive slaves.

3 Between 1820 and 1860, political and legal tensions over slavery steadily escalated. The U.S. Supreme Court attempted to
4 resolve the legal status of African Americans in *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857). The
5 Court concluded that Congress was powerless to extend the rights of U.S. citizenship to African Americans.

6 With the secession of southern states and the beginning of the Civil War in 1860 and 1861, the Union government was under
7 almost complete control of free states. In 1865 Congress enacted the [Thirteenth Amendment](#), which the Union states ratified.
8 Section 1 of the amendment provides that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
9 whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
10 jurisdiction." Section 2 gives Congress the authority to enforce the provisions of section 1.

11 The Thirteenth Amendment makes involuntary servitude unlawful whether the compulsion is by a government or by a private
12 person. The penalty for violation of the amendment must be prescribed by law. Although the principal purpose of the
13 amendment was to abolish African slavery, it also abolished other forms of compulsory labor similar to slavery, no matter
14 what they are called. For example, it abolished bond service and peonage, forms of compulsory service based on a servant's
15 indebtedness to a master.

16 An individual has a right to refuse or discontinue employment. No state can make the quitting of work a crime, or establish
17 criminal sanctions that hold unwilling persons to a particular labor. A state may, however, withhold unemployment or other
18 benefits from those who, without [Just Cause](#), refuse to perform available gainful work.

19 A court has the authority to require a person to perform affirmative acts that the person has a legal duty to perform. It has
20 generally been held, however, that this power does not extend to compelling the performance of labor or personal services,
21 even in cases where the obligated party has been paid in advance. The remedy for failure to perform obligated labor is
22 generally limited to monetary damages. A court may, without violating the Thirteenth Amendment, use its [Equity](#) authority
23 to enjoin, or prevent, a person from working at a particular task. Equity authority is the power of a court to issue injunctions
24 that direct parties to do or refrain from doing something. A court also may prevent an artist or performer who has contracted
25 to perform unique services for one person on a given date from performing such services for a competitor.

26 The Thirteenth Amendment does not interfere with the enforcement of duties a citizen owes to the state under the [Common](#)
27 [Law](#). Government may require a person to serve on a petit or [Grand Jury](#), to work on public roads or instead pay taxes on
28 those roads, or to serve in the militia. Compulsory military service (the draft) is not a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment,
29 nor is compulsory labor on work of national importance in lieu of military service, assigned to conscientious objectors.

30 Forced labor, with or without imprisonment, as a punishment upon conviction of a crime is a form of involuntary servitude
31 allowed by the Thirteenth Amendment under its "punishment-for-crime" exception.

32 Cross-references

33 [Celia, a Slave; Dred Scott v. Sandford; Emancipation Proclamation; Fugitive Slave Act of 1850; Selective Service System.](#)

34 West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.

35 **5.4 Merriam Webster: Human Trafficking³**

36 *human trafficking*

37 *noun*

38 *: organized criminal activity in which human beings are treated as possessions to be controlled and exploited (as*
39 *by being forced into prostitution or involuntary labor)*

³ SOURCE: Merriam-Webster Dictionary: Human trafficking; <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/human%20trafficking>.

6 Nature of Human Labor as PRIVATE PROPERTY and Government's Right to Convert it to PUBLIC property

The following subsections will establish that your human labor is your private property, that government cannot control or tax your human labor without your consent, and that the government must follow defined rules if they want to convert any part of your human labor to PUBLIC or GOVERNMENT property, all of which involve your consent in some form.

6.1 Human Labor is Property

Human labor is property owned by the laborer, who also owns himself or herself. Below is a definition of "property":

*Property. That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which **belongs exclusively to one**. In the strict legal sense, **an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government**. *Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State*, 65 Misc.Rep. 263, 121 N.Y.S. 536. The term is said to extend to every species of valuable right and interest. More specifically, ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing. The highest right a man can have to anything; being used to refer to that right which one has to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no way depends on another man's courtesy.*

*The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal, everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. **It extends to every species of valuable right and interest, and includes real and personal property, easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments, and includes every invasion of one's property rights by actionable wrong.** *Labberton v. General Cas. Co. of America*, 53 Wash.2d. 180, 332 P.2d. 250, 252, 254.*

*Property embraces everything which is or may be the subject of ownership, whether a legal ownership, or whether beneficial, or a private ownership. *Davis v. Davis*. TexCiv-App., 495 S.W.2d. 607. 611. Term includes not only ownership and possession but also the right of use and enjoyment for lawful purposes. *Hoffmann v. Kinealy, Mo.*, 389 S.W.2d. 745, 752.*

*Property, within constitutional protection, denotes group of rights inhering in citizen's relation to physical thing, as right to possess, use and dispose of it. *Cereghino v. State By and Through State Highway Commission*, 230 Or. 439, 370 P.2d. 694, 697.*

*Goodwill is property. *Howell v. Bowden, TexCiv. App.*. 368 S.W.2d. 842, &18; as is an insurance policy and rights incident thereto, including a right to the proceeds, *Harris v. Harris*, 83 N.M. 441,493 P.2d. 407, 408.*

Criminal code. "Property" means anything of value. including real estate, tangible and intangible personal property, contract rights, choses-in-action and other interests in or claims to wealth, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food and drink, electric or other power. Model Penal Code. Q 223.0. See also Property of another, infra. Dusts. Under definition in Restatement, Second, Trusts, Q 2(c), it denotes interest in things and not the things themselves. [Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 1095]

Human labor is, in fact, the ultimate origin of most other forms of property:

"The property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. ... to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property."
[Butcher's Union v. Crescent City 111 U.S. 746 (1884)]

"Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, is generally admitted; and no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his will..."
[The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 10 Wheat 66, 6 L.Ed. 268 (1825)]

6.2 Property Rights are the FOUNDATION of all other rights!⁴

It is no accident that a nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to justice for all protects property rights. Property is the foundation of every right we have, including the right to be free. Every right claim, after all, is a claim to some thing — either a defensive claim to keep what one is holding or an offensive claim to something someone else is holding. John Locke, the philosophical father of the American Revolution and the inspiration for Thomas Jefferson when he drafted the Declaration of Independence, stated the issue simply: “Lives, Liberties, and Estates, which I call by the general Name, *Property*.” And James Madison, the principal author of the Constitution, echoed those thoughts when he wrote, “as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.”

Much moral and legal confusion would be avoided if we understood that all of our rights — all of the things to which we are “entitled” — can be reduced to property. That would enable us to separate genuine rights — things to which we hold title — from specious “rights” — things to which other people hold title, which we may want for ourselves. It was the genius of the old common law, grounded in reason and custom, that it grasped that point. And the common law judges understood a pair of corollaries as well: property, broadly conceived, separates one individual from another; and individuals are independent or free to the extent that they have sole or exclusive dominion over what they hold. Indeed, Americans go to work every day to acquire property just so they can be independent.

The Constitution protects property rights through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses and, more directly, through the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause: “nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” There are two basic ways government can take property:

- (1) outright, by condemning the property and taking title; and
- (2) through regulations that take uses, leaving the title with the owner — so-called regulatory takings.

In the first case, the title is all too often taken not for a public but for a private use; and rarely is the compensation received by the owner just. In the second case, the owner is often not compensated at all for his losses; and when he is, the compensation is again inadequate.

Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has chipped away at the problem of uncompensated regulatory takings, requiring compensation in some cases; but its decisions were largely ad hoc, leaving most owners to bear the losses themselves. Thus, owners today can get compensation when the title is actually taken, as just noted; when the property is physically invaded by government order, either permanently or temporarily; when regulation for other than health or safety reasons takes all or nearly all of the value of the property; and when government attaches conditions to permits that are unreasonable, disproportionate, or unrelated to the purpose behind the permit requirement. But despite those modest advances, toward the end of its October 2004 term, the Court decided three property rights cases in which the owners had legitimate complaints, and in all three, the owners lost. One of those cases was *Kelo v. City of New London*, in which the city condemned Ms. Kelo’s property only to transfer it to another private party that the city believed could make better use of it. In so doing, the Court simply brushed aside the “public use” restraint on the power of government to take private property. The upshot, however, was a public outcry across the nation and the introduction of reforms in over 40 states. But those reforms varied substantially, and nearly all leave unaddressed the far more common problem of regulatory takings.

At bottom, then, the Court has yet to develop a principled and comprehensive theory of property rights, much less a comprehensive solution to the problem of government takings. For that, Congress (or the Court) is going to have to turn to first principles, much as the old common law judges did. We need to begin, then, not with the public law of the Constitution as presently interpreted, but with the private law of property.

At the heart of the approach to property on this site is the notion that the essence of the property right is the right to exclude government from using or benefitting from the use, and that if that right is taken away, then the government becomes the REAL owner and you are merely an “equitable owner”. So long as regulatory takings are limited to HARMFUL uses, then they are permissible. When such takings transfer “beneficial uses” or uses that produce revenue,

⁴ SOURCE: *Laws of Property*, Form #14.018, Section 3; <https://sedm.org/Forms/14-PropProtection/LawsOfProperty.pdf>.

then they are not permissible. Every other source of regulatory authority must originate from the consent of the original private owner. In most cases, that consent is given through a government application of some kind or another. And in nearly all cases, that consent is procured illegally and through duress through “weaponization of the government” as defined in:

SEDM Disclaimer, Section 4.30: Weaponization of Government
<https://sedm.org/disclaimer.htm>

More at:

Property Rights and the Constitution, Cato Institute
<https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policy-makers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/property-rights-constitution>

6.3 Human labor is PRIVATE PROPERTY

The U.S. Supreme Court has declared human labor as private property protected by the Constitution:

“The right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the essence of that personal freedom and opportunity which it was the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to secure.”
[Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 34 (1915)]

“Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property — partaking of the nature of each — is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property, chief among which is that of personal employment by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property.”
[Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 2 (1915)]

*“It has been well said that, “The property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the others from employing whom they think proper.” Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, Bk. I, Chap. 10.”*
[Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884)]

“‘Life,’ said Mr. Justice Swayne in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 127, 21 L.Ed. 425, ‘is the gift of God, and the right to preserve it is the most sacred of the rights of man. Liberty is freedom from all restraints but such as are justly imposed by law. Beyond that line lies the domain of usurpation and tyranny. Property is everything which has an exchangeable value, and the right of property includes the power to dispose of it according to the will of the owner. Labor is property, and, as such, merits protection. The right to make it available is next in importance to the rights of life and liberty. It lies, to a large extent, at the foundation of most other forms of property.’ ”
[In re Marshall, 9th Cir. 102 F. 323, 324 (1900)]

Note this case and the previous one were issued AFTER the 16th Amendment in 1913. There was no change to the property right in labor and the right to make a living did not then (or any time later) come under the tax power of Congress!

The purpose of creating government is to PROTECT PRIVATE property:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these [EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE, God-given] rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”
[Declaration of Independence, 1776]

The VERY FIRST step in protecting PRIVATE rights and PRIVATE property is to prevent such property from being converted to PUBLIC property or PUBLIC rights without the consent of the owner. In other words, the VERY FIRST step in protecting PRIVATE rights is to protect you from the GOVERNMENT’S OWN theft. This is the origin of why we say that the most important function government performs is to keep PRIVATE and PUBLIC separate and to NEVER allow them to be confused or mixed together. We cover this in:

Obviously, if a government becomes corrupted and refuses to protect PRIVATE rights or recognize them or even tries to STEAL them without the consent of the owner, there is absolutely no reason you can or should want to hire them to protect you from ANYONE ELSE.

Taxation involves the institutionalized process by which PRIVATE property is converted to PUBLIC property so that it can be used to support the government. How ironic it is that the process of PAYING for government protection involves the OPPOSITE purpose for which governments are created—converting PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property, often without the consent of the owner, for the purposes of delivering the OPPOSITE, which is PREVENTING PRIVATE property from being converted to PUBLIC property!

The only way around this conundrum is for CIVIL statutory protection to be voluntary and optional, which in fact it is. If you don't like the "civil services" delivered by the civil statutory code and don't want to pay for them, then you can retain your private status and invoke only the common law for your protection instead. That is the purpose of our Path to Freedom, Form #09.015 process, in fact.

6.4 Lawful methods for converting PRIVATE property into PUBLIC property⁵

Next, we must carefully consider all the rules by which EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE property is lawfully converted into PUBLIC property subject to government control or civil regulation. These rules are important, because the status of a particular type of property as either PRIVATE or PUBLIC determines whether either COMMON LAW or STATUTORY LAW apply respectively.

In general, only by either accepting physical property from the government or voluntarily applying for and claiming a status or right under a government franchise can one procure a PUBLIC status and be subject to STATUTORY civil law. If one wishes to be governed ONLY by the common law, then they must make their status very clear in every interaction with the government and on EVERY government form they fill out so as to avoid connecting them to any statutory franchise. Below is an example from a U.S. Department of Justice guide for prosecuting "sovereign citizens" that proves WHY this is the case:

"What evidence refutes a good faith defense will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is often helpful to focus on evidence that shows the defendant knew the law but disregarded it or was simply defying it. For instance, evidence that the defendant received proper advice from a CPA or tax preparer, or that the defendant failed to consult legitimate sources about his or her understanding of the tax laws can be helpful. To refute claims that wages are not income, that the defendant did not understand the meaning of "wages," or that the defendant is a state citizen but not a citizen of the United States, look for loan applications during the prosecution period. Tax defiers and sovereign citizens never seem to have a problem understanding the definition of income on a loan application. They also do not hesitate to check the "yes" box to the question "are you a U.S. citizen." Any evidence that the defendant accepted Government benefits, such as unemployment, Medicare, social security, or the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend will also be helpful to refute the defendant's claims that he or she is not a citizen subject to federal laws."
[Prosecuting Tax Defier and Sovereign Citizen Cases—Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Attorneys Bulletin, Volume 61, No. 2, March 2013, p. 48;
SOURCE: <http://famguardian.org/Publications/USAttyBulletins/usab6102.pdf>]

The bottom line is that if you accept a government benefit, they PRESUME the right to rape and pillage absolutely ANYTHING you own. Our Path to Freedom, Form #09.015 process, by the way, makes the use of the above OFFENSE by the government in prosecuting you IMPOSSIBLE. The exhaustive list of attachment forms we provide which define the terms on all government forms they could use as evidence to prove the above also defeat the above tactic by U.S. Attorneys. Also keep in mind that the above tactic is useful against the GOVERNMENT as an offensive weapon. If your property is private, you can loan it to THEM with FRANCHISE conditions found in Form #06.027. If they argue that you can't do it to them, indirectly they are destroying the main source of THEIR jurisdiction as well. Let them shoot themselves in the foot in front of the jury!

Below is a detailed list of the rules for converting PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property:

⁵ SOURCE: *Laws of Property*, Form #14.018, Section 12.10; <https://sedm.org/Forms/14-PropProtection/LawsOfProperty.pdf>.

1. The purpose for establishing governments is mainly to protect private property. The Declaration of Independence affirms this:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --"
[Declaration of Independence, 1776]

2. Government protects private rights by keeping "public [government] property" and "private property" separate and never allowing them to be joined together. This is the heart of the separation of powers doctrine: separation of what is private from what is public with the goal of protecting mainly what is private. See:

Government Conspiracy to Destroy the Separation of Powers, Form #05.023
<http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm>

3. All property BEGINS as private property. The only way to lawfully change it to public property is through the exercise of your unalienable constitutional right to contract. All franchises qualify as a type of contract, and therefore, franchises are one of many methods to lawfully convert PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property. The exercise of the right to contract, in turn, is an act of consent that eliminates any possibility of a legal remedy of the donor against the donee:

"Voluntati non fit injuria.
He who consents cannot receive an injury. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2279, 2327; 4 T. R. 657; Shelf. on mar. & Div. 449.

Consensus tollit errorem.
Consent removes or obviates a mistake. Co. Litt. 126.

Melius est omnia mala pati quam malo consentire.
It is better to suffer every wrong or ill, than to consent to it. 3 Co. Inst. 23.

Nemo videtur fraudare eos qui sciunt, et consentiunt.
One cannot complain of having been deceived when he knew the fact and gave his consent. Dig. 50, 17, 145."
[Bouvier's Maxims of Law, 1856;
SOURCE: <http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm>]

4. In law, all rights are "property".

Property. *That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government. Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 65 Misc.Rep. 263, 121 N.Y.S. 536. The term is said to extend to every species of valuable right and interest. More specifically, ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing. The highest right a man can have to anything; being used to refer to that right which one has to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no way depends on another man's courtesy.*

The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal, everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and interest, and includes real and personal property, easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments, and includes every invasion of one's property rights by actionable wrong. Labberton v. General Cas. Co. of America, 53 Wash.2d. 180, 332 P.2d. 250, 252, 254.

Property embraces everything which is or may be the subject of ownership, whether a legal ownership, or whether beneficial, or a private ownership. Davis v. Davis. TexCiv-App., 495 S.W.2d. 607. 611. Term includes not only ownership and possession but also the right of use and enjoyment for lawful purposes. Hoffmann v. Kinealy, Mo., 389 S.W.2d. 745, 752.

Property, within constitutional protection, denotes group of rights inhering in citizen's relation to physical thing, as right to possess, use and dispose of it. *Cereghino v. State By and Through State Highway Commission, 230 Or. 439, 370 P.2d. 694, 697.*
[Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 1095]

By protecting your constitutional rights, the government is protecting your PRIVATE property. Your rights are private property because they came from God, not from the government. Only what the government creates can become public

property. An example is corporations, which are a public franchise that makes officers of the corporation into public officers.

5. The process of taxation is the process of converting “private property” into a “public use” and a “public purpose”. Below are definitions of these terms for your enlightenment.

Public use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, “public use” is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a “public advantage” or “public benefit” accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. *Montana Power Co. v. Bokma, Mont., 457 P.2d. 769, 772, 773.*

Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient. *Ringe Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186.* The term may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience. A “public use” for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in population and new modes of communication and transportation. *Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 245 A.2d. 579, 586.*

See also Condemnation; Eminent domain.
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1232]

“Public purpose. In the law of taxation, eminent domain, etc., this is a term of classification to distinguish the objects for which, according to settled usage, the government is to provide, from those which, by the like usage, are left to private interest, inclination, or liberality. **The constitutional requirement that the purpose of any tax, police regulation, or particular exertion of the power of eminent domain shall be the convenience, safety, or welfare of the entire community and not the welfare of a specific individual or class of persons [such as, for instance, federal benefit recipients as individuals].** “Public purpose” that will justify expenditure of public money generally means such an activity as will serve as benefit to community as a body and which at same time is directly related function of government. *Pack v. Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 Tenn. 503, 387 S.W.2d. 789, 794 .*

The term is synonymous with governmental purpose. As employed to denote the objects for which taxes may be levied, it has no relation to the urgency of the public need or to the extent of the public benefit which is to follow; **the essential requisite being that a public service or use shall affect the inhabitants as a community, and not merely as individuals.** A public purpose or public business has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political division, as, for example, a state, the sovereign powers of which are exercised to promote such public purpose or public business.”
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1231, Emphasis added]

6. The federal government has no power of eminent domain within states of the Union. This means that they cannot lawfully convert private property to a public use or a public purpose within the exclusive jurisdiction of states of the Union:

“The United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a State or elsewhere, except in cases where it is delegated, and the court denies the faculty of the Federal Government to add to its powers by treaty or compact.”
[*Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 508-509 (1856)*]

7. The Fifth Amendment prohibits converting private property to a public use or a public purpose without just compensation if the owner does not consent, and this prohibition applies to the Federal government as well as states of the Union. It was made applicable to states of the Union by the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.

Fifth Amendment - Rights of Persons

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
[United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment]

If the conversion of private property to public property is done without the express consent of the party affected by the conversion and without compensation, then the following violations have occurred:

7.1. Violation of the Fifth Amendment “takings clause” above.

7.2. “Conversion” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §654.

7.3. Theft.

8. Because taxation involves converting private property to a public use, public purpose, and public office, then it involves eminent domain if the owner of the property did not expressly consent to the taking:

Eminent domain. The power to take private property for public use by the state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of public character. *Housing Authority of Cherokee National of Oklahoma v. Langley, Okl., 555 P.2d. 1025, 1028. Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution.*

In the United States, the power of eminent domain is founded in both the federal (Fifth Amend.) and state constitutions. However, the Constitution limits the power to taking for a public purpose and prohibits the exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation to the owners of the property which is taken. The process of exercising the power of eminent domain is commonly referred to as “condemnation”, or, “expropriation”.

The right of eminent domain is the right of the state, through its regular organization, to reassert, either temporarily or permanently, its dominion over any portion of the soil of the state on account of public exigency and for the public good. Thus, in time of war or insurrection, the proper authorities may possess and hold any part of the territory of the state for the common safety; and in time of peace the legislature may authorize the appropriation of the same to public purposes, such as the opening of roads, construction of defenses, or providing channels for trade or travel. Eminent domain is the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity. It gives a right to resume the possession of the property in the manner directed by the constitution and the laws of the state, whenever the public interest requires it.

See also Adequate compensation; Condemnation; Constructive taking; Damages; Expropriation; Fair market value; Just compensation; Larger parcel; Public use; Take.
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 470]

9. The Fifth Amendment requires that any taking of private property without the consent of the owner **must** involve compensation. The Constitution must be consistent with itself. The taxation clauses found in Article 1, Section 8, Clauses 1 and 3 cannot conflict with the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment contains no exception to the requirement for just compensation upon conversion of private property to a public use, even in the case of taxation. This is why all taxes must be indirect excise taxes against people who provide their consent by applying for a license to engage in the taxed activity: The application for the license constitutes constructive consent to donate the fruits of the activity to a public use, public purpose, and public office.
10. There is only ONE condition in which the conversion of private property to public property does NOT require compensation, which is when the owner donates the private property to a public use, public purpose, or public office. To wit:

“Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, -life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;’ and to ‘secure,’ not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property [or income] which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor’s injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor’s benefit [e.g. SOCIAL SECURITY, Medicare, and every other public “benefit”]; second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.”
[Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892)]

The above rules are summarized below:

Table 1: Rules for converting private property to a public use or a public office

| # | Description | Requires consent of owner to be taken from owner? |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | The owner of property justly acquired enjoys full and exclusive use and control over the property. This right includes <u>the right to exclude government uses</u> or ownership of said property. | Yes |
| 2 | He may not use the property to injure the equal rights of his neighbor. For instance, when you murder someone, the government can take your liberty and labor from you by putting you in jail or your life from you by instituting the death penalty against you. Both your life and your labor are “property”. Therefore, the basis for the “taking” was a violation of the equal rights of a fellow sovereign “neighbor”. | No |
| 3 | He cannot be compelled or required to use it to “benefit” his neighbor. That means he cannot be compelled to donate the property to any franchise that would “benefit” his neighbor such as Social Security, Medicare, etc. | Yes |
| 4 | If he donates it to a public use, he gives the public the right to control that use. | Yes |
| 5 | Whenever the public needs require, the public may take it without his consent upon payment of due compensation. E.g. “eminent domain”. | No |

11. The following two methods are the ONLY methods involving consent of the owner that may be LAWFULLY employed to convert PRIVATE property into PUBLIC property. Anything else is unlawful and THEFT:

11.1. DIRECT CONVERSION: Owner donates the property by conveying title or possession to the government.⁶

11.2. INDIRECT CONVERSION: Owner assumes a PUBLIC status as a PUBLIC officer in the HOLDING of title to the property.⁷ All such statuses and the rights that attach to it are creations and property of the government, the use of which is a privilege. The status and all PUBLIC RIGHTS that attach to it conveys a “benefit” for which the status user must pay an excise tax. The tax acts as a rental or use fee for the status, which is government property.

12. You and ONLY you can authorize your private property to be donated to a public use, public purpose, and public office. No third party can lawfully convert or donate your private property to a public use, public purpose, or public office without your knowledge and express consent. If they do, they are guilty of theft and conversion, and especially if they are acting in a quasi-governmental capacity as a “withholding agent” as defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(16).

12.1. A withholding agent cannot file an information return connecting your earnings to a “trade or business” without you actually occupying a “public office” in the government BEFORE you filled out any tax form.

12.2. A withholding agent cannot file IRS Form W-2 against your earnings if you didn’t sign an IRS Form W-4 contract and thereby consent to donate your private property to a public office in the U.S. government and therefore a “public use”.

12.3. That donation process is accomplished by your own voluntary self-assessment and ONLY by that method. Before such a self-assessment, you are a “nontaxpayer” and a private person. After the assessment, you become a “taxpayer” and a public officer in the government engaged in the “trade or business” franchise.

12.4. In order to have an income tax liability, you must complete, sign, and “file” an income tax return and thereby assess yourself:

“Our system of taxation is based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not distraint.”
[Flora v. U.S., 362 U.S. 145 (1960)]

By assessing yourself, you implicitly give your consent to allow the public the right to control that use of the formerly PRIVATE property donated to a public use.

⁶ An example of direct conversion would be the process of “registering” a vehicle with the Department of Motor Vehicles in your state. The act of registration constitutes consent by original ABSOLUTE owner to change the ownership of the property from ABSOLUTE to QUALIFIED and to convey legal title to the state and qualified title to himself.

⁷ An example of a PUBLIC status is statutory “taxpayer” (public office called “trade or business”), statutory “citizen”, statutory “driver” (vehicle), statutory voter (registered voters are public officers).

1 A THEFT of property has occurred on behalf of the government if it attempts to do any of the following:

- 2 1. Circumvents any of the above rules.
- 3 2. Blurs, confuses, or obfuscates the distinction between PRIVATE property and PUBLIC property.
- 4 3. Refuses to identify EXACTLY which of the mechanisms identified in item 10 above was employed in EACH specific
- 5 case where it:
- 6 3.1. Asserts a right to regulate the use of private property.
- 7 3.2. Asserts a right to convert the character of property from PRIVATE to PUBLIC.
- 8 3.3. Asserts a right to TAX what you THOUGHT was PRIVATE property.

9 The next time someone from the government asserts a tax obligation, you might want to ask them the following very insightful

10 questions based on the content of this section:

- 11 1. Please describe at EXACTLY what point in the taxation process my earnings were LAWFULLY converted from
- 12 EXCLUSIVELY PRIVATE to PUBLIC and thereby became SUBJECT to civil statutory law and government
- 13 jurisdiction. Check one or more. If none are checked, it shall CONCLUSIVELY be PRESUMED that no tax is owed:
- 14 1.1. ____ When I was born?
- 15 1.2. ____ When I became a CONSTITUTIONAL citizen?
- 16 1.3. ____ When I changed my domicile to a CONSTITUTIONAL and not STATUTORY “State”?
- 17 1.4. ____ When I indicated “U.S. citizen” or “U.S. resident” on a government form, and the agent accepting it
- 18 FALSELY PRESUMED that meant I was a STATUTORY “national and citizen of the United States” per 8
- 19 U.S.C. §1401 rather than a CONSTITUTIONAL “citizen of the United States”?
- 20 1.5. ____ When I disclosed and used a Social Security Number or Taxpayer Identification Number to my otherwise
- 21 PRIVATE employer?
- 22 1.6. ____ When I submitted my withholding documents, such as IRS Forms W-4 or W-8?
- 23 1.7. ____ When the information return was filed against my otherwise PRIVATE earnings that connected my
- 24 otherwise PRIVATE earnings to a PUBLIC office in the national government?
- 25 1.8. ____ When I FAILED to rebut the false information return connecting my otherwise PRIVATE earnings to a
- 26 PUBLIC office in the national government?
- 27 1.9. ____ When I filed a “taxpayer” form, such as IRS Forms 1040 or 1040NR?
- 28 1.10. ____ When the IRS or state did an assessment under the authority of 26 U.S.C. §6020(b)?
- 29 1.11. ____ When I failed to rebut a collection notice from the IRS?
- 30 1.12. ____ When the IRS levied monies from my EXCLUSIVELY private account, which must be held by a PUBLIC
- 31 OFFICER per 26 U.S.C. §6331(a) before it can lawfully be levied?
- 32 1.13. ____ When the government decided they wanted to STEAL my money and simply TOOK it, and were protected
- 33 from the THEFT by a complicit Department of Justice, who split the proceeds with them?
- 34 1.14. ____ When I demonstrated legal ignorance of the law to the government sufficient to overlook or not recognize
- 35 that it is impossible to convert PRIVATE to PUBLIC without my consent, as the Declaration of Independence
- 36 requires?
- 37 2. How can the conversion from PRIVATE to PUBLIC occur without my consent and without violating the Fifth
- 38 Amendment Takings Clause?
- 39 3. If you won’t answer the previous questions, how the HELL am I supposed to receive constitutionally mandated
- 40 “reasonable notice” of the following:
- 41 3.1. EXACTLY what property I exclusively own and therefore what property is NOT subject to government taxation
- 42 or regulation?
- 43 3.2. EXACTLY what conduct is expected of me by the law?
- 44 4. EXACTLY where in your publications is the first question answered and why should I believe it if even you refuse to
- 45 take responsibility for the accuracy of said publications?
- 46 5. EXACTLY where in the statutes and regulations is the first question answered?
- 47 6. How can you refuse to answer the above questions if your own mission statement says you are required to help people
- 48 obey the law and comply with the law?

49 **7 Jurisdiction to Tax YOUR OWN Human Labor as PRIVATE PROPERTY**

50 The following subsections will address the jurisdiction of national and state governments to tax your human labor as private

51 property without your consent. It will also address when and how that consent is manifested.

7.1 Income Taxation in Relation to Property⁸

1. The income tax is NOT EVER a tax on YOUR property, which is PRIVATE property. This was decided in *Pollock v. Farmers' Loan Trust Co.*, 158 U.S. 601, 634, 637, 15 S.Ct. 912, 39 L.Ed. 1108 (1895).

"The Supreme Court held in the early case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 634, 637, 15 S.Ct. 912, 39 L.Ed. 1108 (1895), that a tax on capital or principal is a direct tax which must be apportioned among the states in proportion to the population as shown by the census, because of the requirements of the above provisions of Article I. A direct tax on corpus or principal without such apportionment is unconstitutional, and this cannot be avoided by merely calling it a tax on income. See Richardson v. United States, 294 F.2d 593, 596 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 802, 82 S.Ct. 640, 7 L.Ed.2d 549 (1962); Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 982, 75 S.Ct. 570, 99 L.Ed. 764 (1955), rehearing denied, 349 U.S. 948, 75 S.Ct. 870, 99 L.Ed. 1274."
[Harkness v. United States, 469 F.2d 310, 324 (Fed. Cir. 1972)]

2. One own's labor is property.

"Once earned, those unpaid wages became property to which the employees were entitled."
[Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co., 23 Cal.4th 163, 168 (Cal. 2000)]

One converts one's own labor (property) into another form of property (money). This is not a "transfer" of property. So, a federal tax on such conversion of property from one form or another is inescapably a tax on the OWNERSHIP of the property, thus an unconstitutional direct tax unapportioned on the PROPERTY. More at:

[Proof that Involuntary Income Taxes on Your Labor are Slavery](https://sedm.org/product/proof-that-involuntary-income-taxes-on-your-labor-are-slavery-form-05-055/), Form #05.055**

<https://sedm.org/product/proof-that-involuntary-income-taxes-on-your-labor-are-slavery-form-05-055/>

3. An employee's remuneration for labor is principal in that it is the sum of the employer's obligation, and the BASIS for any interest the employer may become obligated to pay if (for instance) the employer pays late or for some reason ends up owing back pay to the employee.

"Principal" has been defined as "[t]he capital sum of a debt or obligation, as distinguished from interest or other additions to it." Black's Law Dictionary 1192 (6th ed. 1990). In other words, it is the "sum of money owed as a debt, upon which interest is calculated." The American Heritage Dictionary 985 (2d college ed. 1985). It refers to the aggregate amount of an obligation. See Black's Law Dictionary 1073 (5th ed. 1979) ("principal" refers to the total amount of debt due, e.g., the face value of a mortgage or promissory note)."
[Miller v. Marshall City. and Cty. Bd. of Super, 641 N.W.2d 742, 748 (Iowa 2002)]

4. The income tax is instead an excise tax on "profit" derived from privileged activities. In that sense "Income" has been defined to be SEPARATE and APART, and DIFFERENT from the capital corpus, or principal. See the above case.
5. Privileges subject to excise taxation must be legislatively granted and therefore owned by the government. As such, they are PUBLIC property. IN that sense, the income tax BEHAVES as a "use" or "rental" fee on PUBLIC property not unlike using a rental car.
6. Income taxation has two main components:
 - 6.1. Withholding. Done by third parties.
 - 6.2. Assessment. Done mainly by you, but can be adjusted by the IRS after submitting a return.
7. Withholding is not an imposition of tax. Although money withheld is transferred into the federal treasury, the worker or business associate receives a corresponding CREDIT for that amount. The CREDIT is also a form of property and can be applied to the eventual tax liability (even a liability of \$0). Of course the employee would prefer to get the money back in exchange for the credit, but he must go through the IRS in order to redeem the CREDIT the IRS has awarded him and convert that credit back into the preferred form of property.
 - 7.1. Only the individual who is the taxpayer can do this, he cannot sell or transfer his CREDIT to another person.
 - 7.2. The employee at all times retains his property, albeit in different forms.
 - 7.3. The party in temporary custody of the withholding credit before it is applied to a specific tax is a BAILIFF and TRUSTEE on behalf of the worker.
 - 7.4. The IRS classifies all income tax withholding as Tax Class 5, which means GIFTS.
8. To get back money withheld, one can:
 - 8.1. Pursue a refund of the credit from the IRS.

⁸ SOURCE: *Laws of Property*, Form #14.018, Section 10; <https://sedm.org/Forms/14-PropProtection/LawsOfProperty.pdf>.

8.2. Seek reimbursement from the employer who withheld the amount as “tax”. At no point was the labor converted into public property. The labor was converted to money, and some of the money was converted into a CREDIT which remains the private property of the employee held in trust by the IRS.

9. When it comes to ASSESSEMENT:

9.1. That is where the CREDIT is either converted (in whole or in part) back to money given to the employee or it is applied toward whatever tax liability the taxpayer has.

9.2. Whatever is converted from private property to public property is determined by the taxpayer with his self-assessment, then assessed by the IRS. Whatever amount the taxpayer pays is converted to public funds by his voluntary actions.

9.3. No one is forced to have “United States person” status under 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(30) and no one is forced to receive federally-connected income. If one does, it comes with terms and conditions that includes some or all income being subject to federal tax.

10. Even AFTER the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, taxes on one's own labor have always been DIRECT TAXES that are unconstitutional and also a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude.

“That narrow view of what a direct tax might be persisted for a century. In 1880, for example, we explained that “direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate.” Springer, supra, at 602. In 1895, we expanded our interpretation to include taxes on personal property and income from personal property, in the course of striking down aspects of the federal income tax. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618, 15 S.Ct. 912, 39 L.Ed. 1108 (1895). That result was overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment, although we continued to consider taxes on personal property to be direct taxes. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218–219, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920).” [Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 571 (2012)]

This is the SCOTUS in 2012, admitting that SCOTUS determined in 1895 that a tax on PERSONAL PROPERTY is a DIRECT TAX, and that in spite of the 16th Amendment, the SCOTUS CONTINUED to consider taxes on PERSONAL PROPERTY to be DIRECT TAXES. THIS IS GOLD. Your remuneration for labor is unquestionably PERSONAL PROPERTY. But they call it income, in order to pretend it isn't your personal property!!

7.2 The Internal Revenue Code does NOT recognize one’s own HUMAN labor as property

A lawful income tax based on the Sixteenth Amendment has always been a tax on “profit”. So how can profit result from the equal exchange of money for labor that cost money to produce? It may surprise the reader to learn that the Internal Revenue Code does NOT even recognize one’s own labor as PROPERTY!:

[26 C.F.R. §1.61-6 - Gains derived from dealings in property.](#)

[§1.61-6 Gains derived from dealings in property.](#)

(a) In general.

Gain realized on the sale or exchange of property is included in gross income, unless excluded by law. For this purpose property includes tangible items, such as a building, and intangible items, such as goodwill. Generally, the gain is the excess of the amount realized over the unrecovered cost or other basis for the property sold or exchanged. The specific rules for computing the amount of gain or loss are contained in section 1001 and the regulations thereunder. When a part of a larger property is sold, the cost or other basis of the entire property shall be equitably apportioned among the several parts, and the gain realized or loss sustained on the part of the entire property sold is the difference between the selling price and the cost or other basis allocated to such part. The sale of each part is treated as a separate transaction and gain or loss shall be computed separately on each part. Thus, gain or loss shall be determined at the time of sale of each part and not deferred until the entire property has been disposed of. This rule may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1.

A, a dealer in real estate, acquires a 10-acre tract for \$10,000, which he divides into 20 lots. The \$10,000 cost must be equitably apportioned among the lots so that on the sale of each A can determine his taxable gain or deductible loss.

Example 2.

B purchases for \$25,000 property consisting of a used car lot and adjoining filling station. At the time, the fair market value of the filling station is \$15,000 and the fair market value of the used car lot is \$10,000. Five years later B sells the filling station for \$20,000 at a time when \$2,000 has been properly allowed as depreciation thereon. B's gain on this sale is \$7,000, since \$7,000 is the amount by which the selling price of the filling station exceeds the portion of the cost equitably allocable to the filling station at the time of purchase reduced by the depreciation properly allowed.

(b) Nontaxable exchanges. Certain realized gains or losses on the sale or exchange of property are not "recognized", that is, are not included in or deducted from gross income at the time the transaction occurs. Gain or loss from such sales or exchanges is generally recognized at some later time. Examples of such sales or exchanges are the following:

(1) Certain formations, reorganizations, and liquidations of corporations, see sections 331, 333, 337, 351, 354, 355, and 361;

(2) Certain formations and distributions of partnerships, see sections 721 and 731;

(3) Exchange of certain property held for productive use or investment for property of like kind, see section 1031;

(4) A corporation's exchange of its stock for property, see section 1032;

(5) Certain involuntary conversions of property if replaced, see section 1033;

(6) Sale or exchange of residence if replaced, see section 1034;

(7) Certain exchanges of insurance policies and annuity contracts, see section 1035; and

(8) Certain exchanges of stock for stock in the same corporation, see section 1036.

(c) Character of recognized gain. Under Subchapter P, Chapter 1 of the Code, relating to capital gains and losses, certain gains derived from dealings in property are treated specially, and under certain circumstances the maximum rate of tax on such gains is 25 percent, as provided in section 1201. Generally, the property subject to this treatment is a "capital asset", or treated as a "capital asset". For definition of such assets, see sections 1221 and 1231, and the regulations thereunder. For some of the rules either granting or denying this special treatment, see the following sections and the regulations thereunder:

(1) Transactions between partner and partnership, section 707;

(2) Sale or exchange of property used in the trade or business and involuntary conversions, section 1231;

(3) Payment of bonds and other evidences of indebtedness, section 1232;

(4) Gains and losses from short sales, section 1233;

(5) Options to buy or sell, section 1234;

(6) Sale or exchange of patents, section 1235;

(7) Securities sold by dealers in securities, section 1236;

(8) Real property subdivided for sale, section 1237;

(9) Amortization in excess of depreciation, section 1238;

(10) Gain from sale of certain property between spouses or between an individual and a controlled corporation, section 1239;

(11) Taxability to employee of termination payments, section 1240.

26 C.F.R. §1.1001-1 - Computation of gain or loss.

1 §1.1001-1 Computation of gain or loss.

2 (a) General rule.

3 Except as otherwise provided in subtitle A of the Code, the gain or loss realized from the conversion of property
4 into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is
5 treated as income or as loss sustained. The amount realized from a sale or other disposition of property is the
6 sum of any money received plus the fair market value of any property (other than money) received. The fair market
7 value of property is a question of fact, but only in rare and extraordinary cases will property be considered to
8 have no fair market value. The general method of computing such gain or loss is prescribed by section 1001 (a)
9 through (d) which contemplates that from the amount realized upon the sale or exchange there shall be withdrawn
10 a sum sufficient to restore the adjusted basis prescribed by section 1011 and the regulations thereunder (i.e., the
11 cost or other basis adjusted for receipts, expenditures, losses, allowances, and other items chargeable against
12 and applicable to such cost or other basis). The amount which remains after the adjusted basis has been restored
13 to the taxpayer constitutes the realized gain. If the amount realized upon the sale or exchange is insufficient to
14 restore to the taxpayer the adjusted basis of the property, a loss is sustained to the extent of the difference between
15 such adjusted basis and the amount realized. The basis may be different depending upon whether gain or loss is
16 being computed. For example, see section 1015(a) and the regulations thereunder. Section 1001(e) and
17 paragraph (f) of this section prescribe the method of computing gain or loss upon the sale or other disposition of
18 a term interest in property the adjusted basis (or a portion) of which is determined pursuant, or by reference, to
19 section 1014 (relating to the basis of property acquired from a decedent), section 1015 (relating to the basis of
20 property acquired by gift or by a transfer in trust), or section 1022 (relating to the basis of property acquired
21 from certain decedents who died in 2010). 26 C.F.R. §1.1001-1 - Computation of gain or loss.

22 Below is the only explanation we are aware of that describes why one's OWN labor is not listed in the above definition of
23 "property" as in relation to "profit" or "income":

- 24 1. The "citizen", "resident", and "nonresident alien" engaged in a "trade or business" made "LIABLE TO" rather than
25 "LIABLE FOR" the income tax in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(a) are all fictions of law, legislative creations of congress, and
26 therefore PROPERTY of Congress. They are NOT human beings, but public offices or at least AGENTS of the
27 national government. See:

28 How State Nationals Volunteer to Pay Income Tax, Form #08.024

29 <https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/HowYouVolForIncomeTax.pdf>

- 30 2. Since the "taxpayers" listed in item 1 are all fictions and not humans, they can only render services to others as agents
31 of their principal, rather than as human beings.
32 3. Since human beings have to VOLUNTEER to be any of the above, then constitutional rights cannot be an issue. Under
the common law maxims of law, anything you consent to cannot form the basis for an injury under the constitution or
the common law.

33 *"Volunt non fit injuria.*

34 *He who consents cannot receive an injury. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2279, 2327; 4 T. R. 657; Shelf. on mar. & Div. 449.*

35 *Consensus tollit errorem.*

36 *Consent removes or obviates a mistake. Co. Litt. 126.*

37 *Melius est omnia mala pati quam malo concentire.*

38 *It is better to suffer every wrong or ill, than to consent to it. 3 Co. Inst. 23.*

39 *Nemo videtur fraudare eos qui sciunt, et consentiunt.*

40 *One cannot complain of having been deceived when he knew the fact and gave his consent. Dig. 50, 17, 145."*

41 *[Bouvier's Maxims of Law, 1856;*

42 *SOURCE: <http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviereMaxims.htm>]*

43 We therefore caution ALL those who want to REMOVE their consent when filing a tax return to do the following to avoid
44 the above problem. These procedures are MANDATORY for all members when filing any form with any government:

- 45 1. State that the government form you are using is not guaranteed for its accuracy and does not define the context or
46 meaning for any of the terms on it. See:

47 Reasonable Belief About Income Tax Liability, Form #05.007

48 <https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/ReasonableBelief.pdf>

- 49 2. State that because the government refuses responsibility for the accuracy or even the context of the terms on their form,
then:

2.1. NONE of the terms may be interpreted in a CIVIL STATUTORY context.

- 2.2. Terms on the form must therefore be interpreted in ONLY under a CONSTITUTIONAL and COMMON LAW and PRIVATE context where you as the submitter retain all constitutional and natural rights (“all rights reserved”).
3. Include a MANDATORY definition of all key terms with whatever GOVERNMENT form you submit.
4. State on the GOVERNMENT form the definition pertains to that the form is:

“False, fraudulent, and nonfactual if my definitions or any of my attachments are removed, redacted, or destroyed.”

5. Don’t say in your attachment or definitions what you are NOT, but rather what you ARE. This is because it is impossible in most cases and even a waste of time to prove a NEGATIVE. For instance, DON’T say:
- 5.1. You are NOT a civil statutory person.
- 5.2. You are NOT a civil statutory “citizen”.
- 5.3. You are NOT a civil statutory “resident”.
6. Instead, define key civil status terms that are privileged, such as “person”, “citizen”, “resident”, etc to all mean the same thing, which is someone who is not:
- 6.1. Domiciled within the forum.
- 6.2. Purposefully availing themselves of commerce in the forum involving OTHER people’s money.
- 6.3. Legally or politically associating with or members of any political body.
- 6.4. An agent of anyone, but rather acting in a private capacity.
7. An example of the previous step is found on our 1040NR Attachment, Form #09.077 as follows:

Section 8: Definitions

7. The term “taxpayer” in this case means someone who:

7.1. CONSENTS or ASSENTS to ABSOLUTELY nothing any government does or wants to do AND

7.2. Is a private human protected by the Bill of Rights the entirety of whose property is private and who retains constitutional remedies for all his rights and property while standing on land protected by the constitution (law of LAND, as opposed to LAW OF CIVIL STATUS).

[1040NR Attachment, Form #09.077; <https://sedm.org/Forms/09-Procs/1040NR-Attachment.pdf>]

We must remember that the ability to define ANYTHING on the part of government in their “void for vagueness” civil statutory “codes” can originate ONLY from having an ownership interest in the affected property.⁹ Those asking for money back that was stolen from them and continues to be their absolutely owned private property are NOT handling or asking for permission to use or have PUBLIC or GOVERNMENT property. They are asking for property they OWN back. They also have a right to set conditions on anyone in temporary possession of the PRIVATE property of others that accidentally came into their hands by giving notice, which is what the above form does.

California Civil Code Section 2224

“One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he or she has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it.”

“The United States, we have held, cannot, as against the claim of an innocent party, hold his money which has gone into its treasury by means of the fraud of its agent. While here the money was taken through mistake without element of fraud, the unjust retention is immoral and amounts in law to a fraud of the taxpayer’s rights. What was said in the State Bank Case applies with equal force to this situation. ‘An action will lie whenever the defendant has received money which is the property of the plaintiff, and which the defendant is obligated by natural justice and equity to refund. The form of the indebtedness or the mode in which it was incurred is immaterial.’”

[Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 261, 55 S.Ct. 695, 700, 79 L.Ed. 1421]

We emphasize that the term “innocent party” in the last quote above is someone who did NOT consent to any civil statutory status or anything the government wants. All your remedies to get property back that was stolen by the government or

⁹ See: *Laws of Property*, Form #14.018, Section 13; <https://sedm.org/Forms/14-PropProtection/LawsOfProperty.pdf>.

mistakenly transferred to them by legally ignorant zombies will instantly vanish the minute you admit to consenting to any civil status they created and therefore own. The following article describes the stance one must have in demanding a return of stolen funds in order to NOT acquire a civil status that surrenders all your constitutional rights:

Using the Laws of Property to Respond to a Federal or State Tax Collection Notice, Form #14.015
<https://sedm.org/using-the-laws-of-property-to-respond-to-a-federal-or-state-tax-collection-notice/>

7.3 Origin of the power to regulate or tax is PROFIT, not PRIVATE PROPERTY

In *Munn v. Illinois*, the U.S. Supreme Court identified the origin of the authority of the national government to regulate or tax as follows:

“When Sir Matthew Hale, and the sages of the law in his day, spoke of property as affected by a public interest, and ceasing from that cause to be juris privati solely, that is, ceasing to be held merely in private right, they referred to

[1] property dedicated [DONATED] by the owner to public uses, or

[2] to property the use of which was granted by the government [e.g. Social Security Card], or

[3] in connection with which special privileges were conferred [licenses].

Unless the property was thus dedicated [by one of the above three mechanisms], or some right bestowed by the government was held with the property, either by specific grant or by prescription of so long a time as to imply a grant originally, the property was not affected by any public interest so as to be taken out of the category of property held in private right.”

[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 139-140 (1876)]

The court also stated that the power of regulation, and by implication taxation, CEASES if the property is privately and absolutely owned and does NOT involve “an advantage over others”, meaning a “profit”.

“The compensation which the owners of [PRIVATE] property, not having any special rights or [PUBLIC] privileges from the government in connection with it, may demand for its use, or for their own services in union with it, forms no element of consideration in prescribing regulations [or taxation] for that purpose.

[. . .]

“It is only where some right or privilege [which are GOVERNMENT PROPERTY] is conferred by the government or municipality upon the owner, which he can use in connection with his property, or by means of which the use of his property is rendered more valuable to him, or he thereby enjoys an advantage over others, that the compensation to be received by him becomes a legitimate matter of regulation. Submission to the regulation of compensation in such cases is an implied condition of the grant, and the State, in exercising its power of prescribing the compensation, only determines the conditions upon which its concession shall be enjoyed. When the privilege ends, the power of regulation ceases.”

[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)]

Notice the use of the word “concession”. The state is SELLING CIVIL services to others. They can’t force anyone to be a “customer”. By “civil services”, we mean:

4.6 Civil Service

The term “civil service” or “civil service fee” relates to any and all activities of “government” OTHER than:

- 1. Police.*
- 2. Military.*
- 3. Jails.*
- 4. Criminal court.*
- 5. Common law court.*

“civil service” and “civil service fee” includes any attempt or act to:

- 1. Establish or enforce a [domicile \(Form #05.002\)](#)*

2. Procure [consent \(Form #05.003\)](#) of any kind to alienate rights that are supposed to be INALIENABLE per the Declaration of Independence.
3. PRESUME [consent \(Form #05.003\)](#) to surrender INALIENABLE PRIVATE RIGHTS by virtue of submitting, accepting, or receiving any application for a government benefit, license, or franchise. See [Form #12.023](#).
4. Convert PRIVATE property or PRIVATE rights to PUBLIC property, PUBLIC offices, or excise taxable franchises. See [Form #12.025](#). Government's FIRST and most important duty is to at all times maintain TOTAL separation between PRIVATE and PUBLIC and NEVER to allow them to convert one to another. Every attempt to convert one to the other represents a criminal financial conflict of interest that turns the PUBLIC trust into a SHAM trust.
5. Offer or enforce the civil statutory code.
6. Offer or enforce [civil franchises \(see Form #05.030\)](#).

[SEDM Disclaimer, Section 4.6; https://sedm.org/disclaimer.htm#4.6_Civil_Service]

So long as the property at issue, which in this case is labor as absolutely owned PRIVATE, constitutionally protected property, is not CONSENSUALLY connected to a government privilege or “civil service” and does not receive an advantage, “benefit”, or PROFIT directly traced causally with evidence to the government as a “benefactor” or the Petitioner, it is beyond the reach of the taxation and regulation power of the government. This inference is also consistent with the following maxims of law and equity on the subject of “profit” or “benefit”:

*“Cujus est commodum ejus debet esse incommodum.
He who receives the benefit should also bear the disadvantage.”*

*“Que sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus.
He who derives a benefit from a thing, ought to feel the disadvantages attending it. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1433.”*
[Bouvier's Maxims of Law, 1856;
SOURCE: <http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm>]

At NO TIME has the Petitioner EVER manifested either implied or express consent to be a customer of government civil services as described herein or to donate their private labor as property to a public use, a public purpose, or a public office. Neither has the Petitioner as the absolute owner of himself ever consented to call his privately owned labor “compensation for services” as an agent or instrumentality of the national government subject to its regulation. The burden of proving the contrary rests with the Respondent in this case. A failure to satisfy that burden of proof requires the RETURN of any and all tax withholdings, liens, levies, and penalties connected with the taxation of labor as private property. All such alleged “taxation” constitutes THEFT of private property. A criminal complaint of THEFT by both the Respondent and the Judge in this case stands unless and until this burden of proof is affirmatively and conclusively satisfied with evidence and not mere presumption.

An entire memorandum of law on the subject of this section is available for free at:

[Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Franchises.pdf>](https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Franchises.pdf)

7.4 “compensation for services” in 26 U.S.C. §61 does not mean YOUR earnings from Labor

26 U.S.C. §61 defines “gross income” as follows:

[26 U.S. Code §61 - Gross income defined](#)

(a)General definition

Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items:

(1)Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items;

(2)Gross income derived from business;

(3)Gains derived from dealings in property;

(4)Interest;

- (5)Rents;
- (6)Royalties;
- (7)Dividends;
- (8)Annuities;
- (9)Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
- (10)Pensions;
- (11)Income from discharge of indebtedness;
- (12)Distributive share of partnership gross income;
- (13)Income in respect of a decedent; and
- (14)Income from an interest in an estate or trust.

(b)Cross references

For items specifically included in gross income, see part II (sec. 71 and following). For items specifically excluded from gross income, see part III (sec. 101 and following).

(Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 17; Pub. L. 98-369, div. A, title V, § 531(c), July 18, 1984, 98 Stat. 884; Pub. L. 115-97, title I, § 11051(b)(1)(A), Dec. 22, 2017, 131 Stat. 2089.)

Since the constitutional definition of “income” described in section 7.8, as confirmed by paragraph (3) above, then the phrase “(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items;” can only mean PROFIT in connection with the rendering of services, not ALL earnings from your labor in connection with your own personal tax liability.

Proof that “compensation for services” cannot mean your own earnings from labor in the context of your own income liability includes the following U.S. Supreme Court rulings:

“As was said in *Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert*, 231 U.S. 399, 415: “Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.” Understanding the term in this natural and obvious sense, it cannot be said that a conversion of capital assets invariably produces income.”
[*Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co.*, 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918)]

“By analogy, *Murphy* contends a damage award for personal injuries — including nonphysical injuries — is not income but simply a return of capital — “human capital,” as it were. See Gary S. Becker, *Human Capital* (1st ed. 1964); Gary S. Becker, “The Economic Way of Looking at Life,” 43-45 (Nobel Lecture, Dec. 9, 1992).”
[*Murphy v. I.R.S.*, 460 F.3d. 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2006)]

“We must reject in this case, as we have rejected in cases arising under the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 (*Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co.*, ante, 179, and *Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co.*, ante, 189) the broad contention submitted in behalf of the Government that all receipts — everything that comes in — are income within the proper definition of the term “gross income,” and that the entire proceeds of a conversion of capital assets, in whatever form and under whatever circumstances accomplished, should be treated as gross income. ”
[*Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe*, 247 U.S. 330, 335 (1918)]

There is no valid basis for treating “human capital” any differently than any other form of capital in determining whether there was “income” or a mere return of capital. If anything, human capital should be treated with greater (not less) deference than financial or other physical capital.

7.5 Thirteenth Amendment Prohibits Involuntary Servitude and Peonage

United States Constitution
Thirteenth Amendment
Slavery And Involuntary Servitude

SECTIONS 1 AND 2. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Origin and Purpose

On January 1, 1863, President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation¹ declaring, based on his war powers, that within named states and parts of states in rebellion against the United States “all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of States, are, and henceforward shall be free” The Proclamation did not allude to slaves held in the loyal states, and, moreover, there were questions about the Proclamation’s validity. Not only was there doubt concerning the President’s power to issue his order at all, but also there was a general conviction that its effect would not last beyond the restoration of the seceded states to the Union.² Because the power of Congress was similarly deemed not to run to legislative extirpation of the “peculiar institution,”³ a constitutional amendment was then sought. After first failing to muster a two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives, the amendment was forwarded to the states on February 1, 1865, and ratified by the following December 18.⁴

In selecting the text of the Amendment, Congress “reproduced the historic words of the ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwest Territory, and gave them unrestricted application within the United States.”⁵ By its adoption, Congress intended, said Senator Trumbull, one of its sponsors, to “take this question [of emancipation] entirely away from the politics of the country. We relieve Congress of sectional strifes”⁶ An early Supreme Court decision, rejecting a contention that the Amendment reached servitudes on property as it did on persons, observed in dicta that the “word servitude is of larger meaning than slavery, . . . and the obvious purpose was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery.”

Although the Court was initially in doubt whether persons other than African-Americans could share in the protection afforded by the Amendment, it did continue to say that, although “[N]egro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to make it void.”⁷

“This Amendment . . . is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances. By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.”⁸ These words of the Court in 1883 have generally been noncontroversial and have evoked little disagreement in the intervening years. The “force and effect” of the Amendment itself has been invoked only a few times by the Court to strike down state legislation which it considered to have reintroduced servitude of persons, and the Court has not used section 1 of the Amendment against private parties.⁹ In 1968, however, the Court overturned almost century-old precedent and held that Congress may regulate private activity in exercise of its section 2 power to enforce section 1 of the Amendment.

Certain early cases suggested broad congressional powers,¹⁰ but the *Civil Rights Cases*¹¹ of 1883 began a process, culminating in *Hodges v. United States*,¹² that substantially curtailed these powers. In the former decision, the Court held unconstitutional an 1875 law¹³ guaranteeing equality of access to public accommodations. Referring to the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court conceded that “legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and circumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit. And such legislation may be primary and direct in its character; for the amendment is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States.” Appropriate legislation under the Amendment, the Court continued, could go beyond nullifying state laws establishing or upholding slavery, because the Amendment “has a reflex character also, establishing and decreeing universal civil and political freedom throughout the United States,” and thereby empowering Congress “to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.”¹⁴

These badges and incidents as perceived by the Court, however, were those that Congress in its 1866 legislation¹⁵ had sought “to secure to all citizens of every race and color, and without regard to previous servitude, those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”¹⁶ But the Court could not see that the refusal of accommodations at an inn or a place of public amusement, without any sanction or support from any state law, could inflict upon such person any manner of servitude or form of slavery, as those terms were commonly understood. “It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make. . . .”¹⁷

1 Then, in *Hodges v. United States*,¹⁸ the Court set aside the convictions of three men for conspiring to drive several African-
2 Americans from their employment in a lumber mill. The Thirteenth Amendment operated to abolish, and to authorize
3 Congress to legislate to enforce abolition of, conditions of enforced compulsory service of one to another, and no attempt to
4 analogize a private impairment of freedom to a disability of slavery would suffice to give the Federal Government jurisdiction
5 over what was constitutionally a matter of state remedial law.

6 *Hodges* was overruled by the Court in a far-reaching decision that concluded that the 1866 congressional enactment,¹⁹ far
7 from simply conferring on all persons the *capacity* to buy and sell property, also prohibited private denials of the right through
8 refusals to deal,²⁰ and that this statute was fully supportable by the Thirteenth Amendment. “Surely Congress has the power
9 under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority
10 to translate that determination into effective legislation. Nor can we say that the determination Congress has made is an
11 irrational one. . . . Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free exercise of those rights, were
12 substitutes for the slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes from white communities became a substitute for the Black Codes.
13 And when racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin,
14 then it too is a relic of slavery. . . . At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the Thirteenth
15 Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live. If
16 Congress cannot say that being a free man means at least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the
17 Nation cannot keep.”²¹

18 The Thirteenth Amendment, then, could provide the constitutional support for the various congressional enactments against
19 private racial discrimination that Congress had previously based on the Commerce Clause.²² Because the 1866 Act contains
20 none of the limitations written into the modern laws, it has a vastly extensive application.²³

21 **FOOTNOTES:**

22
23 ¹ 12 Stat. 1267. On September 22, 1862, Lincoln had issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, which announced
24 his intention to issue the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863.

25 ² The legal issues were surveyed in Welling, *The Emancipation Proclamation*, 130 No. Amer. Rev. 163 (1880). See also J.
26 Randall, *Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln* 371–404 (rev. ed. 1951); Allen C. Guelzo, *Lincoln’s Emancipation*
27 *Proclamation: The End Of Slavery In America* (2004); and Frank J. Williams, “Doing Less” and “Doing More”: The President
28 and the Proclamation—Legally, Militarily, and Politically, in Harold Holzer, Edna Greene Medford, and Frank J. Williams,
29 *The Emancipation Proclamation: Three Views* (2006).

30 ³ K. Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution: Slavery In The Ante-Bellum South* (1956).

31 ⁴ The congressional debate on adoption of the Amendment is conveniently collected in 1 B. Schwartz, *Statutory History Of*
32 *The United States: Civil Rights* 25–96 (1970).

33 ⁵ *Bailey v. Alabama*, 219 U.S. 219, 240 (1911). During the debate, Senator Howard noted that the language was “the good
34 old Anglo-Saxon language employed by our fathers in the ordinance of 1787, an expression which has been adjudicated upon
35 repeatedly, which is perfectly well understood both by the public and by judicial tribunals. . . .” *Cong. Globe*, 38th Cong., 1st
36 Sess. 1489 (1864).

37 ⁶ *Cong. Globe* at 1313–14.

38 ⁷ *Slaughter-House Cases*, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69, 71–72 (1873). This general applicability was again stated in *Hodges v.*
39 *United States*, 203 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1906), and confirmed by the result of the peonage cases, discussed under the next topic.

40 ⁸ *Civil Rights Cases*, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).

41 ⁹ In *Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.*, 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968), the Court left open the question whether the Amendment itself,
42 unaided by legislation, would reach the “badges and incidents” of slavery not directly associated with involuntary servitude,
43 and it continued to reserve the question in *City of Memphis v. Greene*, 451 U.S. 100, 125–26 (1981). See *Plessy v. Ferguson*,

1 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Justice Harlan dissenting). The Court drew back from the possibility in *Palmer v. Thompson*, 403
2 U.S. 217, 226–27 (1971).

3 ¹⁰ *United States v. Rhodes*, 27 F. Cas. 785 (No. 16,151) (C.C. Ky. 1866) (Justice Swayne on circuit); *United States v.*
4 *Cruikshank*, 25 Fed.Cas. 707, (No. 14,897) (C.C.D. La. 1874) (Justice Bradley on circuit), *aff'd* on other grounds, 92 U.S.
5 542 (1876); *United States v. Harris*, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883); *Blyew v. United States*, 80 U.S. 581, 601 (1871) (dissenting
6 opinion, majority not addressing the issue).

7 ¹¹ 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

8 ¹² 203 U.S. 1 (1906). *See also* *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537, 542–43 (1896); *Corrigan v. Buckley*, 271 U.S. 323, 331
9 (1926); *Hurd v. Hodge*, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948).

10 ¹³ Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.

11 ¹⁴ *Civil Rights Cases*, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).

12 ¹⁵ Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), now 42 U.S.C. §§1981–82.

13 ¹⁶ *Civil Rights Cases*, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).

14 ¹⁷ 109 U.S. at 24.

15 ¹⁸ 203 U.S. 1 (1906), *overruled by* *Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.*, 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968).

16 ¹⁹ Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). The portion at issue is now 42 U.S.C. §1982.

17 ²⁰ *Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.*, 392 U.S. 409, 420–37 (1968). Justices Harlan and White dissented from the Court’s
18 interpretation of the statute. *Id.* at 449. Chief Justice Burger joined their dissent in *Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park*, 396 U.S.
19 229, 241 (1969). The 1968 Civil Rights Act forbidding discrimination in housing on the basis of race was enacted a brief
20 time before the Court’s decision. Pub. L. No. 90–284, 82 Stat. 81, 42 U.S.C. § 3601–31.

21 ²¹ *Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.*, 392 U.S. 409, 440–43 (1968). *See also* *City of Memphis v. Greene*, 451 U.S. 100, 124–26
22 (1981).

23 ²² *E.g.*, federal prohibition of racial discrimination in public accommodations, found lacking in constitutional basis under the
24 Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in the *Civil Rights Cases*, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), was upheld as an exercise of the
25 commerce power in *Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States*, 379 U.S. 241 (1965), and *Katzenbach v. McClung*, 379 U.S.
26 294 (1965).

27 ²³ The 1968 statute on housing and the 1866 act are compared in *Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.*, 392 U.S. 409, 413–17 (1968).
28 The expansiveness of the 1866 statute and of congressional power is shown by *Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park*, 396 U.S. 229
29 (1969) (1866 law protects share in a neighborhood recreational club which ordinarily went with the lease or ownership of
30 house in area); *Runyon v. McCrary*, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (guarantee that all persons shall have the same right to make and
31 enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white persons protects the right of black children to gain admission to private, commercially
32 operated, nonsectarian schools); *Johnson v. Railway Express Agency*, 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975) (statute affords a federal
33 remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race); *McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.*, 427
34 U.S. 273, 285–96 (1976) (statute protects against racial discrimination in private employment against whites as well as
35 nonwhites). *See also* *Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n*, 410 U.S. 431 (1973). The Court has also concluded that
36 pursuant to its Thirteenth Amendment powers Congress could provide remedial legislation for African-Americans deprived
37 of their rights because of their race. *Griffin v. Breckenridge*, 403 U.S. 88, 104–05 (1971). Conceivably, the reach of the 1866
38 law could extend to all areas in which Congress has so far legislated and to other areas as well, justifying legislative or judicial
39 enforcement of the Amendment itself in such areas as school segregation.

7.6 Earnings from YOUR human labor have NEVER been “income” TO YOU from a Constitutional Perspective and are NOT an “article of commerce”

"The property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. ... to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property."
[Butcher's Union v. Crescent City 111 U.S. 746 (1884)]

"Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, is generally admitted; and no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his will..."
[The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 10 Wheat 66, 6 L.Ed. 268 (1825)]

"But the by-law, if enforced, would not be inconsistent with the statute. [HN5](#) The section of the statute should receive a reasonable construction, and when this is placed upon it, we doubt if any court could properly hold that if a member was an officer of the association, and was paid a compensation for his services, such payment would be "receiving money as profit or otherwise." The object of the statute, no doubt, was to prevent the corporation from making dividends of profits among the members, as do corporations organized for pecuniary profit; and while the statute might subserve a useful purpose if construed in this manner, we fail to perceive any benefit which would result if member of the association, who happened to fill an office, should be deprived of receiving compensation for his labor as an officer. [HN6](#) Compensation for labor can not be regarded as profit, within the meaning of the law. The word "profit," as ordinarily used, means the gain [\[**13\]](#) made upon any business or investment—a different thing altogether from mere compensation for labor."
[Commercial League Association of America v. People ex. rel. Needles, Auditor, 90 Ill. 166 (1878)]

"One does not derive income by rendering services and charging for them."
[Edwards v. Keith, 231 Fed. 110]

"If there is no gain there is no income... Congress has taxed income not compensation."
[Conner v. U.S., 303 F.Supp. 1187 (1969) on page 1191]

"It certainly was not the intention of the legislature to levy a tax upon honest toil and labor."
[Wilby v. Mississippi, 47 Miss. 767]

"The word "profit" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (3rd ed.) as "The advance in the price of goods sold beyond the cost of purchase. The gain made by the sale of produce or manufactures, after deducting the value of the labor, materials, rents, and all expenses, together with the interest of the capital employed." There is a clear distinction between "profit" and "wages" or compensation for labor. "Compensation for labor can not be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law. The word 'profit', as ordinarily used, means the gain made upon any business or investment -- a different thing altogether from mere compensation for labor." The Commercial [\[**5\]](#) League Association of America v. The People ex rel. Thomas B. Needles, Auditor, 90 Ill. 166. "Reasonable compensation for labor or services rendered is not profit." [Laureldale Cemetery Association v. Matthews, 354 Pa. 239, 47 A.\(2d\) 277.](#)"
[Oliver v. Halstead, 196 Va. 992 (1955)]

"A state may not... impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal constitution."
[Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, at 113 (1943)]

"Execution of process and the performance of duty by constituted officers must not be thwarted. But these agents, servants of a Government and a society whose existence and strength comes from these constitutional safeguards, are serving law when they respect, not override, these guarantees. The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot thus be converted into a crime."
[Miller v. US, 230 F.2d. 486 (1956)]

More on the subject of this section can be found at:

1. [Sovereignty Forms and Instructions Online](https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/wages.htm), Form #10.004, Cites by Topic: "income"
<https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/wages.htm>
2. [Sovereignty Forms and Instructions Online](https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/wages.htm), Form #10.004, Cites by Topic: "wages"
<https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/wages.htm>

7.7 Income Taxes are Based on Domicile, and NOT Nationality

"While there must be inherent difficulties in the decisiveness of proofs of domicile, the test itself is a certain one; and, inasmuch as every person, by universal accord, must have a domicile, either of birth or acquired, and can have but one, in the present state of society, it would seem that not only would less wrong be done, but less

inconvenience would be experienced, by making domicile the test of liability to taxation, than by the attempt to fix some other necessarily more doubtful criterion.”
[Barhydt v. Cross, 156 Iowa 271, 279-280 (1912)]

“The obligation of one domiciled within a state to pay taxes there, arises from unilateral action of the state government in the exercise of the most plenary of sovereign powers, that to raise revenue to defray the expenses of government and to distribute its burdens equably among those who enjoy its benefits. Hence, domicile in itself establishes a basis for taxation. Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the state, and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws, are inseparable from the responsibility for sharing the costs of government. See [Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville](#), 245 U.S. 54, 58; [Maguire v. Trefry](#), 253 U.S. 12, 14, 17; [Kirtland v. Hotchkiss](#), 100 U.S. 491, 498; [Shaffer v. Carter](#), 252 U.S. 37, 50. The Federal Constitution imposes on the states no particular modes of taxation, and apart from the specific grant to the federal government of the exclusive 280*280 power to levy certain limited classes of taxes and to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, it leaves the states unrestricted in their power to tax those domiciled within them, so long as the tax imposed is upon property within the state or on privileges enjoyed there, and is not so palpably arbitrary or unreasonable as to infringe the Fourteenth Amendment. [Kirtland v. Hotchkiss](#), *supra*.

Taxation at the place of domicile of tangibles located elsewhere has been thought to be beyond the jurisdiction of the state, [Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky](#), 199 U.S. 194; [Frick v. Pennsylvania](#), 268 U.S. 473, 488-489; but considerations applicable to ownership of physical objects located outside the taxing jurisdiction, which have led to that conclusion, are obviously inapplicable to the taxation of intangibles at the place of domicile or of privileges which may be enjoyed there. See [Foreign Held Bond Case](#), 15 Wall. 300, 319; [Frick v. Pennsylvania](#), *supra*, p. 494. And the taxation of both by the state of the domicile has been uniformly upheld. [Kirtland v. Hotchkiss](#), *supra*; [Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville](#), *supra*; [Blodgett v. Silberman](#), 277 U.S. 1; [Maguire v. Trefry](#), *supra*; compare [Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota](#), 280 U.S. 204; [First National Bank v. Maine](#), 284 U.S. 312.

The present tax has been defined by the Supreme Court of Mississippi as an excise and not a property tax, [Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson](#), 126 Miss. 34; 88 So. 4; [Knox v. Gulf, M. & N.R. Co.](#), 138 Miss. 70, 104 So. 689, but in passing on its constitutionality we are concerned only with its practical operation, not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which may be applied to it. See [Educational Films Corp. v. Ward](#), 282 U.S. 379, 387; [Pacific Co. v. Johnson](#), 285 U.S. 480; [Shaffer v. Carter](#), *supra*, pp. 54-55.

It is enough, so far as the constitutional power of the state to levy it is concerned, that the tax is imposed 281*281 by Mississippi on its own citizens with reference to the receipt and enjoyment of income derived from the conduct of business, regardless of the place where it is carried on. The tax, which is apportioned to the ability of the taxpayer to bear it, is founded upon the protection afforded to the recipient of the income by the state, in his person, in his right to receive the income, and in his enjoyment of it when received. These are rights and privileges incident to his domicile in the state and to them the economic interest realized by the receipt of income or represented by the power to control it, bears a direct legal relationship. It would be anomalous to say that although Mississippi may tax the obligation to pay appellant for his services rendered in Tennessee, see [Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville](#), *supra*; [Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota](#), *supra*, still, it could not tax the receipt of income upon payment of that same obligation. We can find no basis for holding that taxation of the income at the domicile of the recipient is either within the purview of the rule now established that tangibles located outside the state of the owner are not subject to taxation within it, or is in any respect so arbitrary or unreasonable as to place it outside the constitutional power of taxation reserved to the state. [Maguire v. Trefry](#), *supra*; see [Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville](#), *supra*.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi found it unnecessary to pass upon the validity of so much of the statute, added by the amendment of 1928, as exempted domestic corporations from the tax on income derived from activities outside the state. It said that if the amendment were valid, appellant could not complain; if invalid, he would still be subject to the tax, since the act which it amended, § 11, c. 132, Laws of 1924, would then remain in full force, and under it individuals and domestic corporations are taxed alike. [Knox v. Gulf, M. & N.R. Co.](#), *supra*.

282*282 But the Constitution, which guarantees rights and immunities to the citizen, likewise insures to him the privilege of having those rights and immunities judicially declared and protected when such judicial action is properly invoked. Even though the claimed constitutional protection be denied on non-federal grounds, it is the province of this Court to inquire whether the decision of the state court rests upon a fair or substantial basis. If

1 unsubstantial, constitutional obligations may not be thus avoided. See *Ward v. Love County*, 253 U.S. 17, 22;
2 *Enterprise Irrigation District v. Canal Co.*, 243 U.S. 157, 164; *Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Commission*,
3 274 U.S. 651, 655. Upon one of the alternative assumptions made by the court, that the amendment is
4 discriminatory, appellant's constitutional rights were infringed when the tax was levied upon him, and state
5 officers acting under the amendment refrained from assessing the like tax upon his corporate competitors. See
6 *Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett*, 284 U.S. 239, 246. If the Constitution exacts a uniform application
7 of this tax on appellant and his competitors, his constitutional rights are denied as well by the refusal of the state
8 court to decide the question, as by an erroneous decision of it, see *Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co.*, 244
9 U.S. 499, 508, 512 et seq.; *Smith v. Cahoon*, 283 U.S. 553, 564, for in either case the inequality complained of is
10 left undisturbed by the state court whose jurisdiction to remove it was rightly invoked. The burden does not rest
11 on him to test again the validity of the amendment by some procedure to compel his competitors to pay the tax
12 under the earlier statute. *Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Bennett*, supra, p. 247. See *Cumberland Coal Co. v.*
13 *Board of Revision*, 284 U.S. 23. We therefore conclude that the purported non-federal ground put forward by the
14 state court for its refusal to decide the constitutional question was unsubstantial and 283*283 illusory, and that
15 the appellant may invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to decide the question.
16 [*Lawrence v. State Tax Commission*, 286 U.S. 276 (1932); SOURCE:
17 https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10241277000101996613]

18 7.8 Constitutional “Income” is PROFIT to YOU, not ALL EARNINGS or Any of Your Labor

19 During the Congressional Debates over the Sixteenth Amendment in 1909 before it was sent to the states for ratification,
20 there were lots of assurances that the tax would never reach men and women and instead apply mainly to businesses that do
21 not have constitutional rights.

22 *“The income tax seeks to reach the unearned wealth of the country and to make it pay its share.”*
23 [45 Cong.Rec. 4420 (1909): Definition of “Income”]

24

25 *“Mr. CUMMINS (Iowa). Our people are separated into three classes: The men who work, who are laying up*
26 *out of their earnings provision for the future, and on whom the hand of the taxgatherer should be laid most lightly;*
27 *the owners of land, the farmers and other landowners, whom it is universally acknowledged that it was the*
28 *intention of the fathers of the Constitution to protect by the provisions regarding the apportionment of Direct*
29 *Taxes; and the possessors of the stored-up wealth of the country, which is being invested in the corporations that*
30 *are doing the business of the country. And by the simple course of dropping out from this income-tax measure*
31 *the parts that are unconstitutional under the decision of the Supreme Court, that are unjust according to the*
32 *acknowledged judgment of all students of the income tax, that are incapable of enforcement within such a time*
33 *as to relieve the deficiency that may be before us and by saving the tax upon the stored-up wealth of the country*
34 *invested in corporations, called an ‘excise,’ we shall have accomplished the great object of the income tax.”*
35 [44 Cong.Rec. 4006 (1909)]

36

37 *“Mr. BARTLETT of Georgia. Therefore the decision, [Pollock] in effect, puts the dollar of the millionaire beyond*
38 *the pale of being equitably taxed according to his wealth, unless a constitutional amendment be*
39 *invoked...However, there should be some method by which the untold wealth and riches of this Republic may be*
40 *compelled to bear their just burdens of government and contribute an equitable share of their incomes to supply*
41 *the Treasury with needed taxes.*

42 *“As I see it, the fairest of all taxes is of this nature [a tax on gains, profits and unearned income], laid according*
43 *to wealth, and its universal adoption would be a benign blessing to mankind. The door is shut against it, and the*
44 *people must continue to groan beneath the burdens of tariff taxes and robbery under the guise of law.”*
45 [44 Cong.Rec. 4414 (1909)]

46

47 *“Mr. HEFLIN. An income tax seeks to reach the unearned wealth of the country and to make it pay its share.”*
48 [44 Cong.Rec. 4420 (1909)]

49 You can read the above debates at:

| |
|---|
| <p><i>Congressional Debates of Proposed Sixteenth Amendment</i>, Family Guardian Fellowship https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/History/Congress/1909-16thAmendCongrRecord.pdf</p> |
|---|

After the states ratified the Sixteenth Amendment and Congress sought to enact it into law, here was the promise of the amendment in the Congressional Record:

*"Mr. Brandegee. **Mr. President, what I said was that the amendment exempts absolutely everything that a man makes for himself.** Of course it would not exempt a legacy which somebody else made for him and gave to him. If a man's occupation or vocation—for vocation means nothing but a calling—if his calling or occupation were that of a financier it would exempt everything he made by underwriting and by financial operations in the course of a year that would be the product of his effort. **Nothing can be imagined that a man can busy himself about with a view of profit which the amendment as drawn would not utterly exempt.**"*
[50 Cong.Rec. p. 3839, 1913]

Below are a legal authorities after the Sixteenth Amendment was enacted proving that to this day, the income tax remains an excise tax upon corporate profit ONLY:

"We must reject in this case, as we have rejected in cases arising under the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 (Doyle, Collector, v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U.S. 179, 38 Sup.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed.--), the broad contention submitted on behalf of the government that all receipts—everything that comes in—are income within the proper definition of the term 'gross income,' and that the entire proceeds of a conversion of capital assets, in whatever form and under whatever circumstances accomplished, should be treated as gross income. Certainly the term 'income' has no broader meaning in the 1913 act than in that of 1909 (see Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 416, 417 S., 34 Sup.Ct. 136), and for the present purpose we assume there is not difference in its meaning as used in the two acts."
[[Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335, 38 S.Ct. 540 \(1918\)](#)]

"The conclusion reached in the Pollack case.. recognized the fact that taxation on income was, in its nature, an excise..."
[Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., [240 U.S. 1](#), 16-17 (1916)]

"As repeatedly pointed out by this court, the Corporation Tax Law of 1909..imposed an excise or privilege tax, and not in any sense, a tax upon property or upon income merely as income. It was enacted in view of the decision of Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & T. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 29 L.Ed. 759, 15 Sup.St.Rep. 673, 158 U.S. 601, 39 L.Ed. 1108, 15 Sup.Ct.Rep. 912, which held the income tax provisions of a previous law to be unconstitutional because amounting in effect to a direct tax upon property within the meaning of the Constitution, and because not apportioned in the manner required by that instrument."
[U.S. v. Whiteridge, [231 U.S. 144](#), 34 S.Sup.Ct. 24 (1913)]

*"The Sixteenth Amendment declares that Congress shall have power to levy and collect taxes on income, "from [271 U.S. 174] whatever source derived," without apportionment among the several states and without regard to any census or enumeration. It was not the purpose or effect of that amendment to bring any new subject within the taxing power. Congress already had power to tax all incomes. But taxes on incomes from some sources had been held to be "direct taxes" within the meaning of the constitutional requirement as to apportionment. Art. 1, § 2, cl. 3, § 9, cl. 4; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601. The Amendment relieved from that requirement, and obliterated the distinction in that respect between taxes on income that are direct taxes and those that are not, and so put on the same basis all incomes "from whatever source derived." Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17. **"Income" has been taken to mean the same thing as used in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, in the Sixteenth Amendment, and in the various revenue acts subsequently passed. Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335; Merchants' L. & T. Co. v. Smetanka, 255 U.S. 509, 219. After full consideration, this Court declared that income may be defined as gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital. Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415; Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207. And that definition has been adhered to and applied repeatedly. See, e.g., Merchants' L. & T. Co. v. Smetanka, supra; 518; Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U.S. 527, 535; United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 169; Miles v. Safe Deposit Co., 259 U.S. 247, 252-253; United States v. Supplee-Biddle Co., 265 U.S. 189, 194; Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 167; Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S. 628, 633. In determining what constitutes income, substance rather than form is to be given controlling weight. Eisner v. Macomber, supra, 206. [271 U.S. 175]"***
[Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., [271 U.S. 170](#), 174, (1926)]

"... the definition of income approved by the Court is:

"The gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profits gained through sale or conversion of capital assets."
[[Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40 S.Ct. 189, 9 A.L.R. 1570 \(1920\)](#)]

"The Treasury Department cannot, by interpretative regulations, make income of that which is not income within the meaning of the revenue acts of Congress, nor can Congress, without apportionment, tax as income that which is not income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. *Eisner v. Macomber*, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570; *M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States*, 305 U.S. 267, 59 S.Ct. 186, 83 L.Ed. 167." [*Helvering v. Edison Bros. Stores*, 133 F.2d. 575 (1943)]

And the definition of 'income' approved by this Court is:

"The gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include profits gained through sale or conversion of capital assets.' *Eisner v. Macomber*, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40 S.Ct. 189, 193 (64 L.Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570).

It is thus very plain that the statute imposes the income tax on the proceeds of the sale of personal property to the extent only that gains are derived therefrom by the vendor, and we therefore agree with the Solicitor General that since no gain was realized on this investment by the plaintiff in error no tax should have been assessed against him. [*Goodrich v. Edwards*, 255 U.S. 527 (1921)]

The [Sixteenth Amendment](#) authorizes the taxation without apportionment of "incomes, from whatever source derived." Income has been defined as "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined," *Stratton's Independence v. Howbert*, 231 U.S. 399, 34 S.Ct. 136, 140, 58 L.Ed. 285, "including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital," *Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.*, 247 U.S. 179, 38 S.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed. 1054; *Eisner v. Macomber*, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 193, 64 L.Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570. The gain is, however, not taxable until it is realized. *North American Oil Consol. v. Burnet*, 286 U.S. 417, 52 S.Ct. 613, 76 L.Ed. 1197. Furthermore, a gain from capital must be derived from it, not merely accruing to it. *Eisner v. Macomber*, *supra*. In the case just cited Mr. Justice Pitney, after quoting the foregoing definition, said, 252 U.S. 189, at page 207, 40 S.Ct. 189, 193, 64 L.Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570 [*Stapler v. U.S.*, 21 F.Supp. 737, U.S. Dist. Ct. EDPA (1937)]

"The claim that salaries, wages and compensation for personal services are to be taxed as an entirety and therefore must be returned by the individual who has performed the services which produced the gain, is without support either in the language of the Act or in the decisions of the courts construing it. Not only this, but it is directly opposed to provisions of the Act and to regulations of the Treasury Department which either prescribe or permit that compensation for personal services be not taxed as an entirety and be not returned by the individual performing the services. It is to be noted that by the language of the Act it is not "salaries, wages or compensation for personal service" that are to be included in gross income. That which is to be included is "gains, profits and income derived" from salaries, wages or compensation for personal service. Salaries, wages or compensation for personal service are not to be taxed as an entirety unless in their entirety they are gains, profits and income. Since, also, it is the gain, profit or income to the individual that is to be taxed, it would seem plain that it is only the amount of such salaries, wages or compensation as is gain, profit or income to the individual, that is, such amount as the individual beneficially receives, for which he is to be taxed." [*Lucas v. Earl*, 281 U.S. 111, 112-13 (1930)]

More on the subject of this section can be found at:

1. *What is "income"?*, Family Guardian Fellowship
<https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Evidence/WhatIsIncome.htm>
2. *What is income, Some Basics*, Attorney Larry Becraft
<https://home.hiwaay.net/~becraft/WhatIsIncome.html>
3. *Sovereignty Forms and Instructions Online*, Form #10.004, Cites by Topic: "income"
<https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/income.htm>
4. *Constitutional Income: Do You Have Any?*, Phil Hart
<http://www.constitutionalincome.com/>

8 Your right to NOT consent to taxes on your labor

The following subsections shall prove that you have a right to NOT consent to taxes on your own human labor.

8.1 You have a constitutional right to AVOID and not Pay for “benefits”

Invito beneficium non datur.

No one is obliged to accept a benefit against his consent. Dig. 50, 17, 69. But if he does not dissent he will be considered as assenting. Vide Assent.

Potest quis renunciare pro se, et suis, juri quod pro se introductum est.

A man may relinquish, for himself and his heirs, a right which was introduced for his own benefit. See 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 83.

Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se inducto.

Any one may renounce a law introduced for his own benefit. To this rule there are some exceptions. See 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 83.

[Bouvier's Maxims of Law, 1856;

SOURCE: <http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm>]

Civil domicile comes with both “benefits” and corresponding civil OBLIGATIONS, which include the duty to pay income taxes. But what happens when you DON’T want or don’t need those benefits, or worst yet, think they are not “benefits” at all, but an injury? Can a government force you to pay for them? The answer is NO!

There is an important legal principle that individuals have the right to refuse benefits that they do not want or that would burden them. This principle is grounded in the constitutional right to liberty and property, and has been recognized by courts in various contexts.

For example, in the case of *Rust v. Sullivan*, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Supreme Court held that the government could impose restrictions on the use of federal funds by family planning clinics, including prohibiting the use of such funds for abortion services, without violating the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the restrictions did not impose an undue burden on the clinics' freedom of speech, because the clinics were free to decline the government funding if they disagreed with the restrictions.

Similarly, in the case of *Sherbert v. Verner*, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the government could not deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who refused to work on Saturdays, the Sabbath day of her faith, because doing so would burden her free exercise of religion. The Court held that the burden on the government to accommodate the plaintiff's religious beliefs was not undue, and that the government could not deny benefits to individuals based on their religious beliefs.

In general, the principle that individuals have the right to refuse unwanted benefits is rooted in the idea of personal autonomy and freedom of choice, which are fundamental principles of the American legal system. While there may be limitations on this right in certain circumstances, such as when the refusal of a benefit would harm others or violate important public policies, the principle is generally recognized as an important protection for individual liberty and property rights.

More on the subject of this section can be found at:

1. *Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises*, Form #05.030
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Franchises.pdf>
2. *The Government “Benefits” Scam*, Form #05.040**
<https://sedm.org/product/the-government-benefits-scam-form-05-040/>

8.2 Compelled Civil Domicile (or its “benefits”) is Slavery

Any civil duty imposed upon you that you do not consent to amounts to slavery. In law, such “duties” are called “civil obligations”:

OBLIGATIO. Lat. In Roman law, a legal bond which obliges the performance of something in accordance with the law of the land. Ortolan, Inst. 2, P. 1179. It corresponded nearly to our word contract. The legal relation existing between two certain persons whereby one (the creditor) is authorized to demand of the other (the debtor) a certain performance which has a money value. In this sense obligatio signifies not only the duty of the debtor, but also the right of the creditor. The fact establishing such claim and debt, as also the instrument evidencing it, is termed “obligation.” Mackeld. Rom. Law, O 360.

***That legal relation subsisting between two persons by which one is bound to the other for a certain performance.** The passive relation sustained by the debtor to the creditor is likewise called an "obligation". Sometimes, also, the term "obligatio" is used for the causa obligationis, and the contract itself is designated an "obligation." There are passages in which even the document which affords the proof of a contract is called an "obligation." Such applications, however, are but a loose extension of the term, which, according to its true idea, is only properly employed when it is used to denote the debt relationship, in its totality, active and passive, subsisting between the creditor and the debtor. Tomk. & J.Mod.Rom.Law, 301. [Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223]*

OBLIGATIO CIVILIS. An obligation enforceable by action, whether it derives its origin from the jus civile, as the obligation engendered by formal contracts or the obligation enforceable by bilaterally penal suits, or from such portion of the jus gentium as had been completely naturalized in the civil law and protected by all its remedies, such as the obligation engendered by formless contracts. [Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223]

OBLIGATIO EX CONTRACTU. An obligation arising from contract, or an antecedent jus in personam. In this there are two stages,—first, a primary or sanctioned personal right antecedent to wrong, and, afterwards, a secondary or sanctioning personal right consequent on a wrong. Poste's Gaius' Inst. 359. [Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1223]

For the purpose of the above definitions, the "law of the land" is not the civil statutory law. That is the law of the voluntary civil status of people ON specific land. By that we mean people with a DOMICILE on specific physical land, which then gives rise to a CIVIL STATUS of "citizen", "resident", and "person".

*In Udny v. Udny (1869), L.R., 1 H. L. Sc. 441, the point decided was one of inheritance, depending upon the question whether the domicile of the father was in England or in Scotland, he being in either alternative a British subject. Lord Chancellor Hatherley said: **'The question of naturalization and of allegiance is distinct from that of domicile.'** Page 452. Lord Westbury, in the passage relied on by the counsel for the United States, began by saying: **'The law of England, and of almost all civilized countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or conditions,—one by virtue of which he becomes the subject [NATIONAL] of some particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance, and which may be called his political status; another by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political status.'** And then, while maintaining that the civil status is universally governed by the single principle of domicile (domicilium), the criterion established by international law for the purpose of determining civil status, and the basis on which 'the personal rights of the party—that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy, or intestacy—must depend,' he yet distinctly recognized that a man's political status, his country (patria), and his 'nationality,—that is, natural allegiance,—'may depend on different laws in different countries.' Pages 457, 460. He evidently used the word 'citizen,' not as equivalent to 'subject,' but rather to 'inhabitant'; and had no thought of impeaching the established rule that all persons born under British dominion are natural-born subjects. [United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898) ; SOURCE: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3381955771263111765]*

The only "law" that identifies itself as "the law of the land" is, in fact, the Constitution itself. The criminal law and the common law, however, would also fit in this category because both attach to people standing on specific land, whether they consent or not. Anything which proceeds from your consent, whether express or implied, is not treated as "law" for the purposes of this discussion, as explained in the following:

What is "law"?, Form #05.048
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhatIsLaw.pdf>

For this discussion of the implications of how OBLIGATIONS are created, we rely on the California Civil Code. Section **22.2** of the California Civil Code ("CCC") shows that the **common law** shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this State. CCC sections **1427** and **1428** establish that **obligations** are **legal duties** arising either from **contract of the parties**, or **the operation of law**.

CCC section **1708** states that the **obligations imposed by operation of law** are only to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his or her rights. See for yourself below:

California Civil Code - CIV
DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES OF LAW
(Heading added by Stats. 1951, Ch. 655, in conjunction with Sections 22, 22.1, and 22.2)

22.2. The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule of decision in all the courts of this State. (Added by Stats. 1951, Ch. 655.)

California Civil Code - CIV
DIVISION 3. OBLIGATIONS [1427 - 3272.9]
(Heading of Division 3 amended by Stats. 1988, Ch. 160, Sec. 14.)
PART 1. OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL [1427 - 1543] (Part 1 enacted 1872.) TITLE 1.
DEFINITION OF OBLIGATIONS [1427 - [1428.]] (Title 1 enacted 1872.)

1427. An obligation is a legal duty, by which a person is bound to do or not to do a certain thing.

(Enacted 1872.)

California Civil Code - CIV
DIVISION 3. OBLIGATIONS [1427 - 3272.9]
(Heading of Division 3 amended by Stats. 1988, Ch. 160, Sec. 14.)
PART 1. OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL [1427 - 1543] (Part 1 enacted 1872.)
TITLE 1. DEFINITION OF OBLIGATIONS [1427 - [1428.]] (Title 1 enacted 1872.)
[1428.] Section Fourteen Hundred and Twenty-eight. An obligation arises either from:

One — The contract of the parties; or,

Two — The operation of law. An obligation arising from operation of law may be enforced in the manner provided by law, or by civil action or proceeding.

(Amended by Code Amendments 1873-74, Ch. 612.)

California Civil Code - CIV
DIVISION 3. OBLIGATIONS [1427 - 3272.9]
(Heading of Division 3 amended by Stats. 1988, Ch. 160, Sec. 14.)
PART 3. OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED BY LAW [1708 - 1725]
(Part 3 enacted 1872.)

1708. Every person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his or her rights.

(Amended by Stats. 2002, Ch. 664, Sec. 38.5. Effective January 1, 2003.)

THUS, there are only two ways to incur an obligation:

1. Bound by contract:
 - 1.1. private (which may be set under common law, or civil law); or
 - 1.2. public (encompassing the whole body of civil law).
2. Bound by operation of law (without contract) upon injury of person or property of another, **or infringing upon any of his or her rights.**

By notifying a public servant that you retain your rights, you engage their fiduciary duty to act in accordance with the constitutional protections against government interference with your life.

Since no legislator is granted the right to enact statutes against your inalienable rights, there can be NO statute conferring authority upon any public servant to compel performance upon or from you, as such would be a trespass against your inalienable rights.

"Under basic rules of construction, statutory laws enacted by legislative bodies cannot impair rights given under a constitution. 194 B.R. at 925. "
[In re Young, 235 B.R. 666 (Bankr.M.D.Fla., 1999)]

Such trespass is would therefore b actionable in either:

1. A common law court of record which guarantees a trial by jury for any matter where damages may exceed \$20 or
2. Administrative courts governed by civil law.

In either case, the injured party must present a verified¹⁰ claim. Thus, the burden of proof imposed upon the government in demonstrating the authority to ENFORCE any alleged CIVIL STATUTORY obligation is:

1. That you had a contract or agreement with them. In the case of the CIVIL statutory codes, that means that they must demonstrate that you demonstrated consent to obey the civil statutory law in a form ONLY YOU can prescribe based on your absolute ownership of yourself. If you prohibited implied consent and mandated only WRITTEN express consent, they then cannot PRESUME implied consent through domicile or otherwise.
2. That you injured them INDEPENDENT of any consensual contract.

A government that enforces civilly WITHOUT demonstrating evidence of consent that only you can define the form of then becomes guilty of:

1. Slavery and involuntary in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
2. Criminal peonage, if they are enforcing a financial obligation.
3. Human trafficking. They are trying to recruit you into slavery.
4. Identity theft. See:

Government Identity Theft, Form #05.046

<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/GovernmentIdentityTheft.pdf>

5. Criminally "simulating legal process", by which they impose a civil law system upon you that you are not entitled to the benefits of and never consented to participate in.

More on the subject of this section can be found at:

1. Proof of Claim: Your Main Defense Against Government Greed and Corruption, Form #09.073
<https://sedm.org/Forms/09-Procs/ProofOfClaim.pdf>
2. Lawfully Avoiding Government Obligations Course, Form #12.040
<https://sedm.org/LibertyU/AvoidGovernmentObligations.pdf>

8.3 Civil Statutes are Unnecessary and Only regulate PUBLIC/Government conduct

For the purpose of this memorandum, a "civil status" is a civil statutory identity which carries with it both rights and corresponding obligations. Such statuses are created by the legislature within the definitions section of civil statutory codes. Examples of civil statutory statuses include but are not limited to:

1. Citizen.
2. Resident.
3. Person.
4. Driver (under the Vehicle Code).
5. Spouse (under the Family Code).

What all of the above have in common is that:

1. They are created by the government and therefore PROPERTY of the government.
2. They convey or recognize PRIVILEGES.

¹⁰ Verification. Confirmation of correctness, truth, or authenticity, by affidavit, oath, or deposition.
[Sheeley v. Justice of Santa Clara, 215 Cal.App.2d. 47, 48. (Black's Law 5th) [Emphasis added]]

3. Because they are government property, they form a part of what is called “publici juris” and their use by you is subject to the supervision and control of the CIVIL courts.
4. If you pursue the “benefits”, meaning PRIVILEGES, attached to these civil statuses, you must also accept the OBLIGATIONS that in effect “pay for” the delivery of those “benefits”. In that sense, there is somewhat of a “tacit procuration” or agreement “sub silentio”:

“Procuration.. Agency; proxy; the act of constituting another one’s attorney in fact. The act by which one person gives power to another to act in his place, as he could do himself. Action under a power of attorney or other constitution of agency. Indorsing a bill or note “by procuration” is doing it as proxy for another or by his authority. The use of the word procuration (usually, per procuratione, or abbreviated to per proc. or p. p.) on a promissory note by an agent is notice that the agent has but a limited authority to sign.

An express procuration is one made by the express consent of the parties. An implied or tacit procuration takes place when an individual sees another managing his affairs and does not interfere to prevent it. Procurations are also divided into those which contain absolute power, or a general authority, and those which give only a limited power. Also, the act or offence of procuring women for lewd purposes. See also Proctor.”
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, pp. 1086-1087]

“SUB SILENTIO. Under silence; without any notice being taken. Passing a thing sub silentio may be evidence of consent.”
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1593]

“Qui tacet consentire videtur.

He who is silent appears to consent. Jenk. Cent. 32.”

[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856;

SOURCE: <http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm>]

5. If you try to separate the PRIVILEGES from the OBLIGATIONS attached to the status, you are, in effect, stealing, misusing government property, and behaving IRRESPONSIBLY.
6. They represent a position, OFFICE, or at least an agency within the government that CREATED or GRANTED the privilege legislatively.

For the MOST important example of a “tacit procuration”, examine the following holding of the U.S. Supreme Court describing the CONSEQUENCES of pursuing the PRIVILEGES of becoming a STATUTORY “citizen”, “person” by choosing a civil domicile:

*When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain. “A body politic,” as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, “is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.” This does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights which are purely and exclusively private, Thorpe v. R. & B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 143; but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government, and 125*125 has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. From this source come the police powers, which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 583, “are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, . . . that is to say, . . . the power to govern men and things.”*

[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876),

SOURCE: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6419197193322400931]

Likewise, the same court also described the consequences pursuing PRIVILEGES associated with a franchise participant such as a “driver”, “spouse”, licensee, etc:

“The conditions upon which the privilege shall be enjoyed being stated or implied in the legislation authorizing its grant, no right is, of course, impaired by their enforcement. The recipient of the privilege, in effect, stipulates [consents by their BEHAVIOR] to comply with the conditions. It matters not how limited the privilege conferred, its acceptance implies an assent to the regulation of its use and the compensation for it.”
[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)]

So based on the above, domicile and franchises both operate essentially as “The Matrix” that draws you into being “regulated” and controlled by an OUT-OF-CONTROL government in the following manner:

“To be governed is to be watched over, inspected, spied on, directed, legislated, regimented, closed in, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, assessed, evaluated, censored, commanded; all by creatures that have neither the right, nor wisdom, nor virtue . . .

To be governed means that at every move, operation, or transaction one is noted, registered, entered in a census, taxed, stamped, priced, assessed, patented, licensed, authorized, recommended, admonished, prevented, reformed, set right, corrected. Government means to be subjected to tribute, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolized, extorted, pressured, mystified, robbed; all in the name of public utility and the general good.

Then, at the first sign of resistance or word of complaint, one is repressed, fined, despised, vexed, pursued, hustled, beaten up, garroted, imprisoned, shot, machine-gunned, judged, sentenced, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed, and to cap it all, ridiculed, mocked, outraged, and dishonored. That is government, that is its justice and its morality! . . . O human personality! How can it be that you have cowered in such subjection for sixty centuries?”

[Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (born A. D. 1809 – died A. D. 1865)]

Domicile and franchises therefore function as what the courts call “springes”:

Springe *noun*

1: a noose fastened to an elastic body to catch small game

2: [SNARE](#), [TRAP](#)

Word History

Etymology

Middle English spreng, springe; akin to Old English springan to spring

First Known Use

13th century, in the meaning defined at [sense 1](#)

Time Traveler

The first known use of springe was in the 13th century.

[Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/springe>]

Now do you know why we put the following warning on the opening page of our website?

“People of all races, genders, political beliefs, sexual orientations, and nearly all religions are welcome here. All are treated equally under [REAL “law”](#). The only way to remain truly free and equal under the civil law is to avoid seeking government civil services, benefits, property, [special or civil status](#), exemptions, privileges, or special treatment. All such pursuits of government services or property require [individual and lawful consent to a franchise](#) and the surrender of [inalienable constitutional rights](#) AND [EQUALITY](#) in the process, and should therefore be AVOIDED. The rights and equality given up are the “cost” of procuring the “benefit” or property from the government, in fact. Nothing in life is truly “free”. Anyone who claims that such “benefits” or property should be free and cost them nothing is a thief who wants to use the government as a means to STEAL on his or her behalf. All [just rights](#) spring from responsibilities/obligations under the [laws of a higher power](#). If that higher power is God, you can be [truly and objectively free](#). If it is government, you are [guaranteed to be a slave](#) because they can lawfully set the cost of their property as high as they want as a Merchant under the U.C.C. [If you want it really bad from people with a monopoly, then you will get it REALLY bad. Bend over.](#) There are NO constitutional limits on the price government can charge for their monopoly services or property. Those who want no responsibilities can have no [real/PRIVATE rights](#), but only privileges dispensed to wards of the state which are disguised to LOOK like unalienable rights. Obligations and rights are two sides of the same coin, just like self-ownership and personal responsibility. For the biblical version of this paragraph, read [1 Sam. 8:10-22](#). For the reason God answered Samuel by telling him to allow the people to have a king, read [Deut. 28:43-51](#), which is God’s curse upon those who allow a king above them. [Click Here](#) (<https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Evidence/HowScCorruptOurRepubGovt.htm>) for a detailed description of the legal, moral, and spiritual consequences of violating this paragraph.”

[SEDM Opening Page; <http://sedm.org>]

8.4 Pursuing ONLY Common Law instead of CIVIL STATUTORY law Remedies is not Anarchistic, but the pursuit of Freedom WITH Personal Responsibility

The most basic aspect of [property ownership \(Form #14.018\)](#), including self-ownership, is the right to control the CIVIL laws which protect that ownership interest. In the legal field, this right is called “choice of law”. The exercise of this right includes the right to declare one’s [civil status \(Form #13.008\)](#) under the First Amendment right to associate or not associate, to dictate the forum that such rights are vindicated in, and to dictate the CIVIL laws which implement the protection. It is your right to exercise that unalienable right by declaring that you are a [“non-resident non-person” \(Form #05.020\)](#) to any and all state and federal statutes and that your conduct is limited and protected ONLY by the Constitution, the criminal law, the common law, and the Holy Bible, New King James Version as documented in [Laws of the Bible, Litigation Tool #09.001](#). These choice of law rules are documented in [Choice of Law, Litigation Tool #01.010](#). Every attempt to escape these choice of law rules by any alleged governmental actor is therefore stipulated by all parties to this agreement and by every court as:

1. Non-governmental activity.
2. Purely private commercial activity under the Clearfield Doctrine.
3. An implied waiver of official, judicial, and sovereign immunity by ALL parties affected.
4. An attempt to act as a [De Facto Government \(Form #05.043\)](#).

The following authorities prove that it is perfectly lawful to eschew civil statutory remedies in favor of constitutional and common law remedies in responding to tax collection efforts:

1. [Choice of Law, Litigation Tool #01.010](#)
<https://sedm.org/Litigation/01-General/ChoiceOfLaw.pdf>
2. [Rebutted False Arguments About the Common Law](#), Form #08.025
<https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/RebuttedFalseArgumentsAboutCommonLaw.pdf>
3. [Problems with Atheistic Anarchism Course](#), Form #08.020
 - 3.1. SLIDES: <https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/ProbsWithAtheistAnarchism.pdf>
 - 3.2. VIDEO: <http://youtu.be/n883Ce1lML0>

9 How the content of this memorandum has been hidden as a Third Rail Issue

A number of tactics have been used to conceal the content of this pamphlet in the law itself. For instance:

1. The term “income” is not directly defined in the Internal Revenue Code. The constitution defines it, and it means PROFIT, not ALL EARNINGS or GROSS RECEIPTS. See:

[Sovereignty Forms and Instructions Online](#), Form #10.004, Cites by Topic: “income”
<https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/income.htm>
2. The definition of “gross income” in the 1939 Internal Revenue Code defined “gross income” as “GAINS, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service”, but “gains and profits” phraseology was conspicuously removed from 26 U.S.C. §61 in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, which is the definition of “gross income” in its present form:

Internal Revenue Code of 1939

“SEC. 22. GROSS INCOME.

*“(a) GENERAL DEFINITION. — ‘Gross income’ includes **gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service** . . . of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever. . . .” (Emphasis added.)*

The U.S. Supreme Court commented on the above:

“This Court has frequently stated that this language was used by Congress to exert in this field “the full measure of its taxing power.” Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334; Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216, 223; Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9; Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 166.”

3. The closest thing to a definition of “income” is in the regulations:

[TITLE 26](#) > [Subtitle A](#) > [CHAPTER 1](#) > [Subchapter J](#) > [PART I](#) > [Subpart A](#) > § 643
[§ 643. Definitions applicable to subparts A, B, C, and D](#)

(b) **Income**

For purposes of this subpart and subparts B, C, and D, the term “income”, when not preceded by the words “taxable”, “distributable net”, “undistributed net”, or “gross”, means the amount of income of the estate or trust for the taxable year determined under the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local law. Items of gross income constituting extraordinary dividends or taxable stock dividends which the fiduciary, acting in good faith, determines to be allocable to corpus under the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local law shall not be considered income.

4. The definition of “gross income” in 26 U.S.C. §61 does not include “wages” within the definition.

[26 U.S. Code § 61 - Gross income defined](#)

(a) GENERAL DEFINITION

Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items:

(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items;

(2) Gross income derived from business;

(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;

(4) Interest;

(5) Rents;

(6) Royalties;

(7) Dividends;

(8) Annuities;

(9) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;

(10) Pensions;

(11) Income from discharge of indebtedness;

(12) Distributive share of partnership gross income;

(13) Income in respect of a decedent; and

(14) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.

(b) CROSS REFERENCES

For items specifically included in gross income, see part II (sec. 71 and following). For items specifically excluded from gross income, see part III (sec. 101 and following).

(Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 17; Pub. L. 98–369, div. A, title V, § 531(c), July 18, 1984, 98 Stat. 884; Pub. L. 115–97, title I, § 11051(b)(1)(A), Dec. 22, 2017, 131 Stat. 2089.)

5. “Compensation for services” is mentioned in 26 U.S.C. §61 above as includible in “gross income” but it is never defined in the Internal Revenue Code. And it can’t include YOUR human labor in the context of YOUR tax liability.

6. Throughout the Internal Revenue Code, the closest thing to labor is “personal services”, which is defined NOT as “labor”, but privileged earnings in connection with a “trade or business”. See:

Sovereignty Forms and Instructions Online, Form #10.004, Cites by Topic: “personal services”
<https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/income.htm>

Though it seems that I.R.C. §61(a)(1) was deliberately written ambiguously in order to deceive the public for purposes of maximizing revenue, Congress apparently knew better than to explicitly define “income” to include compensation for services in IRC §61(a) because Congress **has no lawful power** to change the definition of “income” from its meaning in the Sixteenth Amendment to the federal constitution. The United States Supreme Court in *Eisner v. Macomber* (1920) explained this:

“In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from Article I of the Constitution may have proper force and effect, save only as modified by the [Sixteenth] Amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not "income," as the term is there used; and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised. (emphasis added).
[Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920)]

The *Eisner* court went on (at 207) to define the term “income”:

“Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,” provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case (pp. 183, 185).”

The *Eisner* court recognized that the Sixteenth Amendment did not extend the taxing power to new subjects:

“The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the Amendment was adopted. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, under the Act of August 27, 1894, c. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553, it was held that taxes upon rents and profits of real estate and upon returns from investments of personal property were in effect direct taxes upon the property from which such income arose, imposed by reason of ownership; and that Congress could not impose such taxes without apportioning them among the States according to population, as required by Art. I, § 2, cl. 3, and § 9, cl. 4, of the original Constitution.

Afterwards, and evidently in recognition of the limitation upon the taxing power of Congress thus determined, the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted, in words lucidly expressing the object to be accomplished: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." As repeatedly held, this did not extend the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the States of taxes laid on income. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17-19; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112 et seq.; Peck Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 172-173.

The United States Tax Court in 2019 acknowledged that the *Eisner* definition is still the controlling definition for the term “income”:

*“The issue in Eisner v. Macomber was the taxability of a stock dividend (raising questions admittedly different from those in this case and in Alpenglow), and the Supreme Court did indeed observe in Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431, that the definition in Eisner v. Macomber “was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions.” However, even after Glenshaw Glass, one can still say: “Implicit in this construction [in Eisner v. Macomber of “income” as it is used in the Sixteenth Amendment] is the concept that gain is an indispensable ingredient of ‘income,’ and it is this concept which provides the standard by which we must determine whether the tax * * * is a tax on ‘income’ within the meaning of the 16th amendment.” Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 653, 680 (1959) (Train, J., dissenting; emphasis in original), aff’d, 277 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1960). Again, Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207, held that “the essential matter * * * [is] a gain, a profit”, and this “essential” point is hardly dictum.”*
*[N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants Inc. v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. No. 4, at *30-31 (U.S.T.C. Oct. 23, 2019)]*

As the Tax Court stated, it is **mandatory** under the Sixteenth Amendment that taxation of income take account of the **basis** in a capital asset, so that only a **gain is subject to tax, not gross receipts**.

There is no imposition of tax without clear and unequivocal language in the taxing statute. Also “earnings” are not necessarily income or taxable even where there is a “trade or business” nexus.

10 Judicial remedy for the position described in this memorandum

Below is the case before we came along that probably comes closest (but not nearly close enough) to preserving the issue of whether gross receipts for labor are income:

It is not disputed that Taxpayers failed to report as income wages received during the 1976 and 1977 taxable years. They argue that compensation for labor is not constitutionally subject to the federal income tax, that an individual's labor is capital in which he or she possesses a property right, that an individual has the right to exchange that property for other property, i.e. money, and that such a transaction is an equal exchange which does not give rise to any profit. "

*[**3] Taxpayers' argument that compensation for labor is not constitutionally subject to the federal income tax is without merit. There is no constitutional impediment to levying an income tax on compensation for a taxpayer's labors. E.g., Hanson v. Commissioner, P 80,197 T.C.M. (P-H) at 900 (1980); Brooks v. Commissioner, P 80,206 T.C.M. (P-H) at 940 (1980). Furthermore, § 61(a) of the Code defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived, including . . . compensation for services." In sum, the sixteenth amendment authorizes the imposition of a tax upon income without apportionment among the states, and under the statute, the term "income" includes the compensation a taxpayer receives in return for services rendered. Taxpayers' argument that wages received for services are not taxable as income is clearly frivolous. Broughton v. United States, 632 F.2d. 706, 707 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 930, 67 L. Ed. 2d 363, 101 S. Ct. 1390 (1981); Hayward v. Day, 619 F.2d. 716, 717 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969, 64 L.Ed.2d. 830, 100 S.Ct. 2951 (1980); see [**4] United States v. Francisco, 614 F.2d. 617, 619 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 922, 64 L.Ed.2d. 278, 100 S. Ct. 1861 (1980).*

*"For the 1976 tax year Taxpayers submitted a federal income tax return that had double asterisks inserted in each space where an income figure is required to be reported. A statement attached to the return stated that these double asterisks indicated that Taxpayers objected to the reporting of their income on a variety of constitutional grounds.
[Funk v. Commissioner, 687 F.2d. 264, 265 (8th Cir. 1982)]*

Although the above case looks like it rebuts the idea that taxes on you for your labor are unconstitutional, in fact:

1. The litigant never presented evidence proving their claim.
2. The litigant never rebutted the Form W-2 filed against them. If you rebut the W-2, you FORCE the court to address whether earnings from labor are taxable. This can be done, for instance, by filing a tax return.
3. The caselaw presented in rebuttal was not needed because the court was just PRETENDING to consider the argument. Note they reference cases where SCOTUS denied cert. Why did SCOTUS deny cert? Because there was nothing wrong with the lower court's ruling, only with the obiter dicta. The taxpayer failed to present evidence that supported his argument.

Note that a taxpayer may simply decline to report anything determined to not be gross income on their tax return. They don't have to explain why it is NOT statutory "gross income". The government has to prove why it IS. Below is how our 1040NR attachment accomplishes this:

Section 3: Income Effectively Connected With U.S. Trade/Business (blocks 8-23)

5. Any amounts in this section connected with my personal labor are not listed, such as W-2 earnings, because there is not and never has been a statutory definition of "gross income" under 26 U.S.C. §61 or elsewhere that EXPRESSLY includes my own personal labor. Thus, my labor is PURPOSEFULLY EXCLUDED under the rules of statutory construction and interpretation. The Recipient has the burden of proving otherwise. That burden of proof BEGINS by reading and rebutting, line by line, the following document under PENALTY OF PERJURY with your full legal birthname as required by 26 U.S.C. §6065: Proof that Involuntary Income Taxes on Your Labor are Slavery, Form #05.055; <https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/ProofIncomeTaxLaborSlavery.pdf>. By filing this tax return, I am shifting the burden of proof to you and away from me pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6201(d). Any attempt to PRESUME rather than supply court admissible evidence to disprove is a violation of due process and THEFT by presumption on your part. I DO NOT, by the way, dispute that artificial entities who are not human beings can SELL the labor of their workers for profit, which 26 U.S.C. §61 calls "compensations for services". I emphasize, however, that I am NOT filing this tax return as an artificial entity or fiction in this case. RATHER, I am filing as a HUMAN BEING protected by the Thirteenth Amendment. Any attempt to tax labor as property in MY scenario would constitute a DIRECT UNAPPORTIONED tax upon PROPERTY (labor) in violation of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and T. Co, 157 U.S. 429 and Pollock .v Farmers' Loan and Trust Co, 158 U.S. 601. THAT kind of tax is STILL unconstitutional, even after the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment. Even to this day, the U.S. Supreme Court as acknowledged that the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes income tax ONLY on PROFITS, and not GROSS RECEIPTS. My human labor as the filer of this tax return is NOT an article of

commerce and is not even allowed to be included in calculating profit, or else I am merely a SLAVE and CHATTEL of the national government.
[1040NR Attachment, Form #09.077, Section 5; <https://sedm.org/Forms/09-Procs/1040NR-Attachment.pdf>]

Unlike many litigants before who have attempted to contest the treatment of remuneration for one's own labor as "income" for tax purposes WITHOUT filing a return, a better approach is to file a valid federal and state income tax returns on which one simply declines to report as statutory "gross income" their remuneration for their own labor. By doing so, they thereby rebut the prima facie evidence (namely a W-2 form filed by their employer) that indicated they had received "gross income" for federal and state income tax purposes from their employer.

It is the failure to rebut this prima facie evidence that has spelled the doom of every litigant before who argued that "wages are not income". For decades, federal courts in such cases have deceptively pretended to consider such arguments then rejected such arguments as "frivolous" or without merit; never informing the hapless litigant that his argument had been rejected not because remuneration for labor is necessarily gross income as a matter of law, but because the litigant had waived that issue by failing to file a valid return or failing to otherwise rebut the prima facie evidence (typically, the form W-2) that said his remuneration for his labor constitutes "gross income".

By filing, you can rebut the prima facie evidence of "gross income"; and thereby effectively "opt out" of income taxes on your remuneration for your labor by exercising you lawful right to decline to opt into such taxation of her remuneration for labor. Unlike litigants in every other case we found in the history of American income tax jurisprudence, you should not waive this issue and the issue is then relevant to any decision rendered about your scenario.

We remind the reader that in a tax case, one must exhaust administrative remedies. Filing a valid return does that. Not filing a return and then litigating the issue DOES NOT. You can't raise NEW issues in court that do not already appear in your administrative record. The issues must FIRST be raised administratively in the tax return filing, not in court without filing.

Since the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, you can shift the burden to IRS in court as far as an information return, but only if you cooperated with their requests for information at administrative level. So, you have to file a return or you are dead in court. See 26 U.S.C. §6201(d).

Prior to the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 you couldn't really even do that, though the burden is properly on the government claiming an item is INCLUDED in gross income IF the taxpayer has filed a valid return that says it is NOT included. This is what nobody ever seemed to do until we came along. And we refuse to take their devious bait and start arguing why it is NOT income. It is usually an IMPOSSIBILITY to prove a negative anyway:

"It is difficult and unfair to require a party to prove a negative fact. See United States v. Corte-Rivera, 454 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2006). "
*[Bank of Am. v. WestTrop Ass'n, No. 2:16-cv-1451-KJD-DJA, at *9 (D. Nev. Mar. 9, 2020)]*

Our argument is that the government has not yet proved that it IS "income" (profit) in a constitutional sense. The burden of proving the POSITIVE is theirs, and presumptions are not proof, but rather a violation of due process:

" '... [I]n case of doubt statutes levying taxes are construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.' "
[Larson v. Duca 213 Cal.App.3d. 324, 329, 261 Cal.Rptr. 559 (1989)]

Our argument is that the courts MISCONSTRUE the meaning of "gross income", which requires that we explain the court's error. This does not mean we take on the burden of proving the receipt of money is NOT income. Our burden is met by showing that the trial court ERRED by CONSTRUING "gross income" to necessarily include gross receipts without offering any evidence or authorities to back up their unconstitutional presumption of same in violation of due process of law.

If an appeals court makes the same error, the issue to be decided is:

Is it proper for gross receipts paid for labor to NECESSARILY be construed as statutory "gross income"?

Courts are not legislative bodies. They cannot define terms because by doing so, they are exercising legislative functions reserved exclusively to the Legislative Branch. Judges can CONSTRUE statutory terms that are undefined, but they must rely on the legislative history to do so. There is NO legislative history AT ALL that shows Congress ever intended to tax

your own human labor in your own case. Letting them skate by this obstacle and not challenging it invites the following CURSE upon all who do this:

"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner."

Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression [sound familiar?].

There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals."

[. . .]

In what a situation must the poor subject be in those republics! The same body of magistrates are possessed, as executors of the laws, of the whole power they have given themselves in quality of legislators. They may plunder the state by their general determinations; and as they have likewise the judiciary power in their hands, every private citizen may be ruined by their particular decisions."

[The Spirit of Laws, Charles de Montesquieu, Book XI, Section 6, 1758; SOURCE:
http://famguardian.org/Publications/SpiritOfLaws/sol_11.htm]

Always remember the difference between what they CAN tax by your CONSENT and what they ACTUALLY DO tax in clear and unequivocal statutory language. The two are very different things. Congress can tax federally connected labor, but Congress must still do so in clear and unequivocal language in the statutes. Whatever is subject to tax that is NOT specified in this way is a violation of due process of laws and the rules of statutory construction:

"When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484-485 (1987) ("It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term"); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 392-393, n. 10 ("As a rule, 'a definition which declares what a term 'means' . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated'"); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 502 (1945); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 294 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1935) (Cardozo, J.); see also 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.07, p. 152, and n. 10 (5th ed. 1992) (collecting cases). That is to say, the statute, read "as a whole," post at 998 [530 U.S. 943] (THOMAS, J., dissenting), leads the reader to a definition. That definition does not include the Attorney General's restriction -- "the child up to the head." Its words, "substantial portion," indicate the contrary."
[Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)]

"As a rule, 'a definition which declares what a term "means" . . . **excludes** any meaning that is not stated.'" [Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979), n. 10]

"It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392, and n. 10 (1979). Congress' use of the term "propaganda" in this statute, as indeed in other legislation, has no pejorative connotation.[19] **As judges, it is our duty to [481 U.S. 485] construe legislation as it is written, not as it might be read by a layman, or as it might be understood by someone who has not even read it.**" [Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484 (1987)]

Even being a federal officer doesn't make you a slave. You are still entitled to due process which requires a clearly imposed tax enforced within the limits of statutory definitions under the rules of statutory construction and interpretation. There simply isn't any clear language that imposes subtitle A tax on anyone's labor except compensation paid to President of the United States and federal judges, as found in the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, Section 22. The fact that Congress spelled that out in the 1939 IRC proves our point.

The fact that earnings are NOT "income" in a constitutional sense and yet are taxed under Subtitle A of IRC proves that it's NOT an "income tax" they are enforcing. It's a tax on "taxable income". If it's a tax on "taxable income" rather than constitutional "income", then it can only apply where the constitution DOES NOT apply. And if it's based on domicile, that place doesn't even include D.C., which is still protected by the constitution. Therefore, it's a tax on offices of or fictions within the government who have no constitutional protections, or to payments from the government that come with a reserved property right. The following video on our site talks about this:

The constitution is irrelevant to the obligations of any contract. Simple as that. Including EMPLOYMENT or an OFFER of "benefits". It's purely just private commerce in which the government is not acting like a government relating to citizens and residents in a constitutional sense. In this capacity, they aren't acting as a de jure government, but purely in private commercial terms under the Clearfield Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court. See:

1. *De Facto Government Scam*, Form #05.043
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/DeFactoGov.pdf>
2. *Catalog of U.S. Supreme Court Doctrines*, Litigation Tool #10.020, Section 3
<https://sedm.org/Litigation/10-PracticeGuides/SCDoctrines.pdf>

In effect, they are Trojans bearing gifts. BEWARE of Trojans bearing expensive gifts called "benefits" which really turn out to traps you have to pay for anyway.

1 These considerations explain why they designed a system of manufacturing usually FALSE evidence in the form of
2 information returns, and DUPING people into allowing it to stand as evidence of liability, even though these hearsay reports



3 are, in fact, evidence of NOTHING other than a payment that may or may not be constitutional “income”. See:

[Correcting Erroneous Information Returns](https://sedm.org/Forms/04-Tax/0-CorrErrInfoRtns/CorrErrInfoRtns.pdf), Form #04.001
<https://sedm.org/Forms/04-Tax/0-CorrErrInfoRtns/CorrErrInfoRtns.pdf>

11 It is Judicial COMMUNISM to Not Address or to AVOID these issues in Court

[TITLE 50 > CHAPTER 23 > SUBCHAPTER IV > Sec. 841.](#)
[Sec. 841. - Findings and declarations of fact](#)

The Congress finds and declares that the Communist Party of the United States [consisting of the IRS, DOJ, and a corrupted federal judiciary], although purportedly a political party, is in fact an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the [de jure] Government of the United States [and replace it with [a de facto government ruled by the judiciary](#)]. It constitutes an authoritarian dictatorship [IRS, DOJ, and corrupted federal judiciary in collusion] within a [constitutional] republic, demanding for itself the rights and [FRANCHISE] privileges [including immunity from prosecution for their wrongdoing in violation of [Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the Constitution](#)] accorded to political parties, but denying to all others the liberties [Bill of Rights] guaranteed by the Constitution [Form #10.002]. Unlike political parties, which evolve their policies and programs through public means, by the reconciliation of a wide variety of individual views, and submit those policies and programs to the electorate at large for approval or disapproval, the policies and programs of the Communist Party are secretly [by corrupt judges and the IRS in complete disregard of, Form #05.014, the tax franchise "codes", Form #05.001] prescribed for it by the foreign leaders of the world Communist movement [the IRS and Federal Reserve]. Its members [the Congress, which was terrorized to do IRS bidding by the framing of [Congressman Trafficant](#)] have no part in determining its goals, and are not permitted to voice dissent to party objectives. Unlike members of political parties, members of the Communist Party are recruited for indoctrination [in the public FOOL system by homosexuals, liberals, and socialists] with respect to its objectives and methods, and are organized, instructed, and disciplined [by the IRS and a corrupted judiciary] to carry into action slavishly the assignments given them by their hierarchical chieftains. Unlike political parties, the Communist Party [thanks to a corrupted federal judiciary] acknowledges no constitutional or statutory limitations upon its conduct or upon that of its members [ANARCHISTS!, Form #08.020]. The Communist Party is relatively small numerically, and gives scant indication of capacity ever to attain its ends by lawful political means. The peril inherent in its operation arises not from its numbers, but from its failure to acknowledge any limitation as to the nature of its activities, and its dedication to the proposition that the present constitutional Government of the United States ultimately must be brought to ruin by any available means, including resort to; force and violence [or using income taxes]. Holding that doctrine, its role as the agency of a hostile foreign power [the Federal Reserve and the American Bar Association (ABA)] renders its existence a clear present and continuing danger to the security of the United States. It is the means whereby individuals are seduced [illegally KIDNAPPED via identity theft!, Form #05.046] into the service of the world Communist movement [using FALSE information returns and other PERJURIOUS government forms, Form #04.001], trained to do its bidding [by FALSE government publications and statements that the government is not accountable for the accuracy of, Form #05.007], and directed and controlled [using FRANCHISES illegally enforced upon NONRESIDENTS, Form #05.030] in the conspiratorial performance of their revolutionary services. Therefore, the Communist Party [and a judiciary that ACTS like communists] should be outlawed.

12 Sample State Court Pleading Demanding Refund of Amounts Withheld in Connection with Human Labor of the Petitioner

It is still true that income taxation of labor as property within the exclusive jurisdiction of a constitutional state of the Union is an unconstitutional, direct, unapportioned tax, even after the Sixteenth Amendment. Only profit DERIVED from labor sold by civil "persons" OTHER than those performing the physical labor becomes taxable profit. The following sample pleading provides a strong position for those who want to get a refund of amounts withheld on their earnings from labor paid by a company and wrongfully identified on a Form W-2 as the earnings of a statutory "employee" who does not consent to the benefits of a statutory "employee" and wants all their money back.

12.1 Synopsis of this case

This case is a petition under the state and federal constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the English common law to recover absolutely owned private property illegally withheld by and illegally transmitted to the state as income tax withholdings on a Form W-2. It is not a petition under any PRIVILEGE of civil statutory state law. All such privileges and the "benefits" they confer DESTROY constitutional rights and replace them with privileges under the Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court and thereby ENSLAVE rather than PROTECT the Petitioner.

The implication of the Thirteenth Amendment is that people own themselves and their labor. The most basic aspect of property ownership (Form #14.018), including self-ownership, is the right to control the CIVIL laws which protect that ownership interest. In the legal field, this right is called "choice of law". The exercise of this right includes the right to declare one's civil status (Form #13.008) under the First Amendment right to associate or not associate, to dictate the forum that such rights are vindicated in, and to dictate the CIVIL laws which implement the protection.

As the exclusive, absolute owner of himself and all of his PRIVATE earnings from human labor, Petitioner invokes his absolute, natural, constitutional right to determine the CIVIL laws which protect himself and his property. In other words, he determines the choice of law in this dispute and not this court or the Respondent by virtue of such absolute ownership. An ownership interest in the PRIVATE, absolutely owned property protected, in fact, is the ONLY rational source of choice of law or the ability to even WRITE civil laws to begin with. The choice of law in this dispute shall therefore be that described by the following:

Choice of Law, Litigation Tool #01.010

<https://sedm.org/Litigation/01-General/ChoiceOfLaw.pdf>

Every attempt to escape these choice of law rules by this court or the Respondent is stipulated by all parties using, controlling, owning, or receiving the benefit of the property that is the subject of this suit, including this court as:

1. Non-governmental activity.
2. Purely private commercial activity under the Clearfield Doctrine.
3. An implied waiver of official, judicial, and sovereign immunity by ALL parties affected.
4. An attempt to act as a De Facto Government (Form #05.043).
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/DeFactoGov.pdf>
5. Consent to the following contractual provisions protecting said property:

Injury Defense Franchise and Agreement, Form #06.027

<https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/InjuryDefenseFranchise.pdf>

The right to MAKE such a stipulation arises from the absolute ownership of the labor that produced the money in wrongful custody of the Respondent and thereby STOLEN by Company. In this scenario, the state is a bailee, transferee, and trustee over such property and the Petitioner as absolute owner hereby invokes that ownership interest to make rules against the trustee for the beneficial use and custody of said property until it is returned to him under terms that only he can specify as the absolute owner.

California Civil Code Section 2224

"One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he or she has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it."

I remind the Petitioner and this court that the MAIN purpose of establishing government is the protection of absolutely owned, PRIVATE property of real physical PEOPLE per the Declaration of Independence. The result of implementing that protection is that all public officers such as the Respondent and this court, have an implied, fiduciary duty as trustees of the public trust to respect and protect absolutely owned private property even WITHOUT the protection of the civil statutory law. A breach of that fiduciary duty is evidenced by the behavior of the Petitioner in this case, which is a needless burden upon this court if they would have accepted and executed that fiduciary duty as their oath of office requires.

"As expressed otherwise, the powers delegated to a public officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officer."¹¹ Furthermore, the view has been expressed that all public officers, within whatever branch and whatever level of government, and whatever be their private vocations, are trustees of the people, and accordingly labor under every disability and prohibition imposed by law upon trustees relative to the making of personal financial gain from a discharge of their trusts.¹² That is, a public officer occupies a fiduciary relationship to the political entity on whose behalf he or she serves.¹³ and owes a fiduciary duty to the public.¹⁴ It has been said that the

¹¹ State ex rel. Nagle v. Sullivan, 98 Mont. 425, 40 P.2d. 995, 99 A.L.R. 321; Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 115 A.2d. 8.

¹² Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, 249 Ga. 543, 291 S.E.2d. 524. A public official is held in public trust. Madlener v. Finley (1st Dist), 161 Ill.App.3d. 796, 113 Ill.Dec. 712, 515 N.E.2d. 697, app gr 117 Ill.Dec. 226, 520 N.E.2d. 387 and revd on other grounds 128 Ill.2d. 147, 131 Ill.Dec. 145, 538 N.E.2d. 520.

¹³ Chicago Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill.2d. 555, 37 Ill.Dec. 291, 402 N.E.2d. 181, appeal after remand (1st Dist) 107 Ill.App.3d. 222, 63 Ill.Dec. 134, 437 N.E.2d. 783.

¹⁴ United States v. Holzer (CA7 Ill), 816 F.2d. 304 and vacated, remanded on other grounds 484 U.S. 807, 98 L.Ed. 2d 18, 108 S.Ct. 53, on remand (CA7 Ill) 840 F.2d. 1343, cert den 486 U.S. 1035, 100 L.Ed. 2d 608, 108 S.Ct. 2022 and (criticized on other grounds by United States v. Osser (CA3 Pa) 864 F.2d. 1056) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Little (CA5 Miss) 889 F.2d. 1367) and (among conflicting authorities on other grounds noted in United States v. Boylan (CA1 Mass), 898 F.2d. 230, 29 Fed.Rules.Evid.Serv. 1223).

fiduciary responsibilities of a public officer cannot be less than those of a private individual.¹⁵ Furthermore, it has been stated that any enterprise undertaken by the public official which tends to weaken public confidence and undermine the sense of security for individual [PRIVATE] rights is against public policy.¹⁶ [63C American Jurisprudence 2d, Public Officers and Employees, §247 (1999)]

The FIRST order of business for this court is therefore to declare under the CONSTITUTION and the Bill of Rights and not under the civil statutory law exactly WHEN and HOW the absolutely owned, constitutionally protected PRIVATE property in the form of labor was lawfully and consensually converted to PUBLIC property and PUBLIC rights protected by statutes INSTEAD of the CONSTITUTION.

1. The Petitioner never consented to such a conversion from PRIVATE to PUBLIC. He has instead at every point:
 - 1.1. Reserved his constitutional rights.
 - 1.2. Required all forms of consent to be EXPRESS and in writing rather than IMPLIED.
 - 1.3. Not consensually invoked the PRIVILEGES of a civil domicile as a national or “residence” as an alien under the civil statutes of the forum.
 - 1.4. Not sought or accepted any civil statutory status to civil which obligations might attach, including but not limited “citizen”, “resident”, “person”, “taxpayer”, etc.
 - 1.5. Repeatedly and continually exercised his absolute, unqualified ownership over his human labor and property as private property protected ONLY by the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the English common law, and the criminal law and NEVER the civil statutory laws of the Petitioner.
 - 1.6. Defined ALL terms on government forms he was compelled to submit as EXCLUDING any civil statutory context. This prevents him from being viewed as “purposefully availing himself” of commerce with the legislatively foreign “state” that he is not a member of or a customer of.
2. The Petitioner was threatened with not being hired or fired for NOT signing a Form W-4 instead of the more proper Form W-8. This makes any actions of the Company beyond this point duress that is voidable and hereby DEMANDED to be voided.
3. The Petitioner does not seek and will not accept ANYTHING from ANY government from a civil perspective. Thus, he is not a “customer” of government civil services, privileges, or civil statutory protection and therefore need not PAY for such things.
4. The Company has NO AUTHORITY to CONVERT the PRIVATE earnings of the Petitioner to a public use, a public purpose, or a public office WITHOUT the consent of the Petitioner as absolute owner.
5. The Respondent government has no authority to convert said PRIVATE property and labor to a public use, a public purpose, and/or a public office without the consent of the owner in a form that only HE can determine, which by the way DOES NOT include ANY form of “implied” consent. That would be a breach of fiduciary duty of the government to protect PRIVATE property that is the original reason for even establishing government.
6. The only rational and lawful way to REACH or CONVERT the property from PRIVATE to PUBLIC is therefore to CONVERT the civil status of the owner or FOOL the owner using sophistry and civil statutory law into converting the civil status of the property himself by giving it a name derived from the civil statutory protection franchise. The owner in this case, however, has done and REFUSES to do either of these two things. See:

Excluded Earnings and People, Form #14.019
<https://sedm.org/Forms/14-PropProtection/ExcludedEarningsAndPeople.pdf>

Taxation, after all, is the institutionalized process of converting PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property WITH the express consent of the owner in order to provide fund services and privileges VOLUNTARILY sought by the Petitioner. Government MAY NOT at any point CHANGE the choice of law by invoking any civil statutory provision to avoid their constitutional obligation to protect private property. This includes such things as the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §2201(a) or an equivalent state version. Congress has no authority to legislatively undermine a constitutional right by doing so. Thus, such acts to SILENCE the court in declaring the PRIVATE, constitutionally protected status of the property that is the subject of this suit are null and void.

“Under basic rules of construction, statutory laws enacted by legislative bodies cannot impair rights given under a constitution. 194 B.R. at 925. ”
[In re Young, 235 B.R. 666 (Bankr.M.D.Fla., 1999)]

¹⁵ Chicago ex rel. Cohen v. Keane, 64 Ill.2d. 559, 2 Ill.Dec. 285, 357 N.E.2d. 452, later proceeding (1st Dist) 105 Ill.App.3d. 298, 61 Ill.Dec. 172, 434 N.E.2d. 325.

¹⁶ Indiana State Ethics Comm’n v. Nelson (Ind App), 656 N.E.2d. 1172, reh gr (Ind App) 659 N.E.2d. 260, reh den (Jan 24, 1996) and transfer den (May 28, 1996).

Unquestionably, the origin of ALL civil statutory authority of any government is to GRANT or CREATE privileged civil statuses such as “person”, “taxpayer”, “citizen”, “resident”, etc., to fool or bribe people into volunteering for such civil statuses with the PUBLIC RIGHTS that attach to such statuses, and to thereby acquire regulatory and taxing authority over them as OFFICERS of the government granting the franchise status:

*The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may contract, the forms and solemnities with which their contracts shall be executed, the rights and obligations arising from them, and the mode in which their validity shall be determined and their obligations enforced; and also to regulate the manner and conditions upon which property situated within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and transferred. The other principle of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory. Story, Confl. Laws, c. 2; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 2, c. 2. The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions. "Any exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit," says Story, "is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding [723*723](#) such persons or property in any other tribunals." Story, Confl. Laws, sect. 539.*

But as contracts made in one State may be enforceable only in another State, and property may be held by non-residents, the exercise of the jurisdiction which every State is admitted to possess over persons and property within its own territory will often affect persons and property without it. To any influence exerted in this way by a State affecting persons resident or property situated elsewhere, no objection can be justly taken; whilst any direct exertion of authority upon them, in an attempt to give ex-territorial operation to its laws, or to enforce an ex-territorial jurisdiction by its tribunals, would be deemed an encroachment upon the independence of the State in which the persons are domiciled or the property is situated, and be resisted as usurpation.

Thus the State, through its tribunals, may compel persons domiciled within its limits to execute, in pursuance of their contracts respecting property elsewhere situated, instruments in such form and with such solemnities as to transfer the title, so far as such formalities can be complied with; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no manner interferes with the supreme control over the property by the State within which it is situated. [Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444](#); [Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148](#); [Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25](#); [Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464](#).

*So the State, through its tribunals, may subject property situated within its limits owned by non-residents to the payment of the demand of its own citizens against them; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty of the State where the owners are domiciled. Every State owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-residents deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its citizens. It is in virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the property of the non-resident situated within its limits that its tribunals can inquire into that non-resident's obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then be carried only to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property. If the non-resident [724*724](#) have no property in the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals can adjudicate. [[Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 \(1878\)](#)]*

It is, however, an UNLAWFUL and immoral exercise of state power to:

1. Compel people to adopt a civil statutory status of any kind.
2. PRESUME the existence of consent to convert the property from PRIVATE to PUBLIC. This includes:
 - 2.1. Conclusive statutory presumptions:

To sustain the validity of this irrebuttable presumption, it is argued, with apparent conviction, that under the prima facie presumption originally in force there had been a loss of revenue, and decisions holding that particular gifts were not made in contemplation of death are cited. This is very near to saying that the individual, innocent of evasion, may be stripped of his constitutional rights in order to further a more thorough enforcement of the tax against the guilty, a new and startling doctrine, condemned by its mere statement, and distinctly repudiated by this court in the [Schlesinger \(270 U.S. 240, 46 S.Ct. 260, 43 A.L.R. 1224\)](#) and [Hoeper \(284 U.S. 217, 52 S.Ct. 120\)](#) Cases involving similar situations. Both emphatically declared that such rights were superior to this supposed necessity.

The government makes the point that the conclusive presumption created by the statute is a rule of substantive law, and, regarded as such, should be upheld; and decisions tending to support that view are cited. The [\[285 U.S.](#)

312, 329] earlier revenue acts created a prima facie presumption, which was made irrebuttable by the later act of 1926. A rebuttable presumption clearly is a rule of evidence which has the effect of shifting the burden of proof, Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43, 31 S. Ct. 136, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463; and it is hard to see how a statutory rebuttable presumptions is turned from a rule of evidence into a rule of substantive law as the result of a later statute making it conclusive. In both cases it is a substitute for proof; in the one open to challenge and disproof, and in the other conclusive. However, whether the latter presumption be treated as a rule of evidence or of substantive law, it constitutes an attempt, by legislative fiat, to enact into existence a fact which here does not, and cannot be made to, exist in actuality, and the result is the same, unless we are ready to overrule the Schlesinger Case, as we are not; for that case dealt with a conclusive presumption, and the court held it invalid without regard to the question of its technical characterization. This court has held more than once that a statute creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 238, et seq., 31 S.Ct. 145; Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 5-6, 49 S.Ct. 215.

'It is apparent,' this court said in the Bailey Case (219 U.S. 239 , 31 S. Ct. 145, 151) 'that a constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a statutory presumption any more than it can be violated by direct enactment. The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions.'

If a legislative body is without power to enact as a rule of evidence a statute denying a litigant the right to prove the facts of his case, certainly the power cannot be made to emerge by putting the enactment in the guise of a rule of substantive law.

[285 U.S. 312, 330] Second. The provision in question cannot be sustained as imposing a gift tax, (1) because the intent of Congress to enact the provision as an incident of the death tax and not as a gift tax is unmistakable; and (2) because, if construed as imposing a gift tax, it is in that aspect still so arbitrary and capricious as to cause it to fall within the ban of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. [Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932)]

2.2. Invoking IMPLIED consent such as that connected with domicile where there are no public property or privileges “in the hands” of the Petitioner that might be the origin of the authority to grant or impose any kind of franchise rules, regulations, or taxation of the beneficial use of PUBLIC property.

The ability to unilaterally engage in all the above requires the CONSENSUAL and beneficial use of public property, privileges, or public rights:

“The distinction between public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in our precedents. Nor is it necessary to do so in the present cases, for it suffices to observe that a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise “between the government and others.” Ex parte Bakelite Corp., supra, at 451, 49 S.Ct., at 413. In contrast, “the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined,” Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 51, 52 S.Ct., at 292, is a matter of private rights. Our precedents clearly establish that only controversies in the former category may be removed from Art. III courts and delegated to legislative [FRANCHISE] courts or administrative agencies for their determination. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450, n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 1266, n. 7, 51 L.Ed.2d. 464 (1977); Crowell v. Benson, supra, 285 U.S., at 50-51, 52 S.Ct., at 292. See also Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv.L.Rev. 894, 917-918 (1930).FN24 Private-rights disputes, on the other hand, lie at the core of the historically recognized judicial power.”

[...]

Although Crowell and Raddatz do not explicitly distinguish between rights created by Congress [PUBLIC RIGHTS] and other [PRIVATE] rights, such a distinction underlies in part Crowell's and Raddatz' recognition of a critical difference between rights created by federal statute and rights recognized by the Constitution. Moreover, such a distinction seems to us to be necessary in light of the delicate accommodations required by the principle of separation of powers reflected in Art. III. The constitutional system of checks and balances is designed to guard against “encroachment or aggrandizement” by Congress at the expense of the other branches of government. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 122, 96 S.Ct., at 683. But when Congress creates a statutory right [a “privilege” or “public right” in this case, such as a “trade or business”], it clearly has the discretion, in defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies; it may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate that right must do so before particularized tribunals created to perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right. FN35 Such provisions do, in a sense, affect the exercise of judicial power, but they are also incidental to Congress' power to define the right that it has created. No comparable justification exists, however, when the right being adjudicated is not of congressional creation. In such a situation, substantial inroads into functions that have traditionally been performed by the Judiciary cannot be characterized merely as incidental extensions of Congress' power to define rights that it has created. Rather, such inroads suggest unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial power of the United States, which our Constitution reserves for Art. III courts. [Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1983)]

3. Refuse to recognize or interfere with any attempt by the Petitioner to REJECT any and all benefits, privileges, or protections of the civil statutory law. This then turns the civil statutory law into a WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION of potentially any and every private or constitutional right:

Hominum caus jus constitutum est. Law is established for the benefit of man.

Invito beneficium non datur. No one is obliged to accept a benefit against his consent. Dig. 50, 17, 69. But if he does not dissent he will be considered as assenting. Vide Assent.

Potest quis renunciare pro se, et suis, juri quod pro se introductum est. A man may relinquish, for himself and his heirs, a right which was introduced for his own benefit. See 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 83.

Privatum incommodum publico bono peusatur. Private inconvenience is made up for by public benefit.

Privilegium est beneficium personale et extinguitur cum person. A privilege is a personal benefit and dies with the person. 3 Buls. 8.

Que sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus. He who derives a benefit from a thing, ought to feel the disadvantages attending it. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1433.

Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se inducto. Any one may renounce a law introduced for his own benefit. To this rule there are some exceptions. See 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 83.

[Bouvier's Maxims of Law, 1856;

<https://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm>]

4. To unilaterally decide that something “benefits” the Petitioner absent EXPRESS consent of the Petitioner. Government is NOT the customer, Petitioner as a HUMAN BEING is. The CREATURE cannot be greater than its CREATOR, the Sovereign People! The “customer” of government CIVIL SERVICES is always right, and especially if he the Petitioner doesn’t like the product government is offering and identifies it as an INJURY rather than PROTECTION¹⁷.

*Having thus avowed my disapprobation of the purposes, for which the terms, State and sovereign, are frequently used, and of the object, to which the application of the lost of them is almost universally made; it is now proper that I should disclose the meaning, which I assign to both, and the application, 455*455 which I make of the latter. In doing this, I shall have occasion incidently to evince, how true it is, that States and Governments were made for man; and, at the same time, how true it is, that his creatures and servants have first deceived, next vilified, and, at last, oppressed their master and maker.*
[Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)]

“They [Congress] are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose. To consider the latter phrase not as describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent power to do any act they please which may be good for the Union, would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power completely useless. It would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States [ANARCHY!]; and as they would be the sole judges of the good or evil for what a “benefit” is, it would be also a power to do whatever evil they please.... Certainly no such universal power was meant to be given them. It was intended to lace them up straightly within the enumerated powers and those without which, as means, these powers could not be carried into effect.

[Thomas Jefferson: Opinion on National Bank, 1791. ME 3:148; SOURCE:

<http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Politics/ThomasJefferson/jeff1020.htm> and

<http://thefederalistpapers.org/founders/jefferson/thomas-jefferson-opinion-on-national-bank-1791>]

The collective “State” can have no more authority than the people it derives that delegated authority from as INDIVIDUALS under the concept of equal protection and equal treatment under REAL law. Only through voluntary enfranchisement can that equality be DESTROYED to create an abusive and malicious hierarchy of the kind we have now. Any other approach imputes superior or supernatural powers to the government and thus makes the state into an unconstitutional CIVIL RELIGION in violation of the First Amendment. That civil religion is described in:

Socialism: The New American Civil Religion, Form #05.016

<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/SocialismCivilReligion.pdf>

¹⁷ For a definition of “civil services”, see: Sovereignty and Freedom Points and Authorities, Litigation Tool #10.018, Section 1.6; <https://sedm.org/Litigation/10-PracticeGuides/PointsAuth.pdf>.

5. Execute involuntary economic sanctions or civil statutory penalties against PRIVATE NONRESIDENTS for REFUSING or NOT CONSENTING to any and all civil statutory statuses or the privileges or obligations that come with civil such statuses.

5.1. The cost of the obligations far exceed their corresponding economic “benefit”. See 26 U.S.C. §6671(b), which targets only privileged officers of the government and not private humans protected by the constitution.

5.2. In this scenario, government identifying number function ILLEGALLY as a de facto license to represent a governmental office, to locate property INVOLUNTARILY connected to the office, and an excuse to STEAL, lien, or levy private property that was never consensually connected to the de facto office. See:

About SSNs and TINs on Government Forms and Correspondence, Form #05.012
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/AboutSSNsAndTINs.pdf>

6. Refuse to issue government ID to PRIVATE NONRESIDENTS who avoid ALL civil statutory statuses by avoiding CIVIL DOMICILE. This is a life-threatening deprivation of the ability to conduct commerce necessary to sustain human life.

7. Bundle anything and everything they want with the PRIVILEGE of obtaining government ID in a process I call “weaponization of government”. This is a violation of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court that can destroy ANY and EVERY constitutional right and substitute nothing but civil statutory privileges in their place. The result is literal SLAVERY to the state. See:

Sovereignty and Freedom Points and Authorities, Litigation Tool #10.018, Section 1.30
<https://sedm.org/Litigation/10-PracticeGuides/PointsAuth.pdf>

The obvious intended purpose of the Bill of Rights and the constitution generally is to maintain the absolute separation between PUBLIC and PRIVATE and to ensure that the two never become connected except through explicit, proven consent in the form that only the OWNER of the PRIVATE right can legitimately dictate. This is exhaustively proven in:

Separation Between Public and Private Course, Form #12.025
<https://sedm.org/LibertyU/SeparatingPublicPrivate.pdf>

This suit is therefore not an attempt to enjoin or interfere with the lawful collection of any income tax. What could be better than a tax on ONLY the government, its PUBLIC officers, or its PUBLIC property in a free republic where everyone else is PRIVATE and has no PUBLIC property or CIVIL privileges? What could be better than a tax on public officers called “taxpayers”, “citizens”, and “residents” that can only serve in the District of Columbia “and not ELSEWHERE” per 4 U.S.C. §72? See:

Challenge to Income Tax Enforcement Authority Within Constitutional States of the Union, Form #05.052
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/ChallengeToIRSEnforcementAuth.pdf>

This case IS, however, about abusing public funds to in effect CRIMINALLY BRIBE people to illegally occupy and execute the duties of an office within any government using “benefits” in order to illegally expand the government and the tax base. All such efforts produce de facto officers and a de facto government they work for, corrupt the voting population, and corrupt the jury pool with conflicts of interest¹⁸:

“With respect to the words general welfare, I have always regarded them as qualified by the detail of powers connected with them. To take them in a literal and unlimited sense would be a metamorphosis of the Constitution into a character which there is a host of proofs was not contemplated by its creator.”

“If Congress can employ money indefinitely to the general welfare, and are the sole and supreme judges of the general welfare, they may take the care of religion into their own hands; they may appoint teachers in every State, county and parish and pay them out of their public treasury; they may take into their own hands the education of children, establishing in like manner schools throughout the Union; they may assume the provision of the poor; they may undertake the regulation of all roads other than post-roads; in short, every thing, from the highest object of state legislation down to the most minute object of police, would be thrown under the power of Congress.... Were the power of Congress to be established in the latitude contended for, it would subvert the very foundations, and transmute the very nature of the limited Government established by the people of America.”

¹⁸ See: De Facto Government Scam, Form #05.043; <https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/DeFactoGov.pdf>.

1 *"If Congress can do whatever in their discretion can be done by money, and will promote the general welfare,*
2 *the government is no longer a limited one possessing enumerated powers, but an indefinite one subject to*
3 *particular exceptions."*
4 *[James Madison. House of Representatives, February 7, 1792, On the Cod Fishery Bill, granting Bounties]*

6 *Congress has not unlimited powers to provide for the general welfare, but only those specifically enumerated.*

7 *They are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose.*
8 *To consider the latter phrase not as describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent*
9 *power to do any act they please which may be good for the Union, would render all the preceding and subsequent*
10 *enumerations of power completely useless. It would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of*
11 *instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States; and as they would*
12 *be the sole judges of the good or evil, it would be also a power to do whatever evil they please.... Certainly no*
13 *such universal power was meant to be given them. It was intended to lace them up straightly within the enumerated*
14 *powers and those without which, as means, these powers could not be carried into effect.*

15 *That of instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States; and, as they*
16 *would be the sole judges of the good or evil, it would be also a power to do whatever evil they please.*
17 *[Thomas Jefferson: Opinion on National Bank, 1791. ME 3:148; SOURCE:*
18 *<http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Politics/ThomasJefferson/jeff1020.htm> and*
19 *<http://thefederalistpapers.org/founders/jefferson/thomas-jefferson-opinion-on-national-bank-1791>]*

21 *"It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the*
22 *debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States," amounts to an unlimited*
23 *commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general*
24 *welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than*
25 *their stooping to such a misconstruction. Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress*
26 *been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have*
27 *had some color for it... For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and*
28 *all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than*
29 *first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars... But what would have*
30 *been thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the*
31 *specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited power of providing for the*
32 *common defense and general welfare? (Federalists #41)*
33 *[Federalist #41. Saturday, January 19, 1788, James Madison]*

35 **"To lay with one hand the power of government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it**
36 **on favored individuals.. is none the less robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation.**
37 **This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative forms."**
38 *[Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1874)]*

40 *"A tax, in the general understanding of the term and as used in the constitution, signifies an exaction for the*
41 *support of the government. The word has never thought to connote the expropriation of money from one group*
42 *for the benefit of another."*
43 *[U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)]*

44 If the above doesn't describe a literal ANARCHY on the part of any government, the Petitioner doesn't know what DOES.
45 The result of that anarchy is described in:

| |
|---|
| <p><i>Your Irresponsible, Lawless, Anarchist Beast Government</i>, Form #05.054 https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/YourIrresponsibleLawlessGov.pdf</p> |
|---|

46 The ONLY way to avoid all the constitutional infirmities of the above malicious metamorphosis of the constitution is to make
47 all statutory "taxpayers", "citizens", and "residents" into public officers, to make "privileges", "public rights", and "benefits"
48 into their pay, and to fool people in states of the Union into becoming in effect "resident agents" of a public office domiciled
49 in the District of Columbia. This, in fact, is exactly how the income tax works federally. The states have merely imitated
50 this design in their own case to avoid the same infirmities. That process of volunteering is exhaustively proven in:

How State Nationals Volunteer to Pay Income Tax, Form #08.024
<https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/HowYouVolForIncomeTax.pdf>

For a dramatization of the dilemma that is the central theme of this case, see:

Devil's Advocate: Lawyers, SEDM
<http://sedm.org/what-we-are-up-against/>

This court is a PREDATOR and not a PROTECTOR if it refuses to address this central issue. All efforts to avoid these issues are a constitute criminal conspiracy against the PRIVATE, constitutional rights of the Petitioner. Any aspect of this pleading and especially those in this section which is NOT expressly disproven with evidence is hereby established as an admission and agreement under Federal Rule of Evidence 8(b)(6). Silence is agreement under the rules established by the Petitioner in the use of his PRIVATE property, his services, and in being COMPELLED to educate the Petitioner and this court about their duties under the constitution to protect absolutely owned, constitutionally but not statutorily protected PRIVATE property.

12.2 Enclosure by reference

The entire basis for this case is documented in the following free memorandum of law incorporated by reference into this pleading:

Proof that Involuntary Income Taxes on Your Labor are Slavery, Form #05.055
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/ProofIncomeTaxLaborSlavery.pdf>

It is the duty of the Petitioner to incorporate the above, because if he doesn't, he will later be disbarred of raising any of the issues it describes on subsequent appeal.

Any and all OTHER documents linked from this Petition are also hereby incorporated by reference into this pleading in this filing as well as all future appeals.

12.3 Legal/Civil Status, Standing, and Choice of Law of Petitioner

This suit is being filed IN PERSONAM rather than IN REM. The "person" filing it is a CONSTITUTIONAL person and NOT a STATUTORY "person" and office created and owned by the national government. Any attempt to convert this action from a constitutional action involving a constitutional "person" and Plaintiff into a CIVIL STATUTORY "person" under the Internal Revenue Code, a "res", is hereby declared to be:

1. A deprivation of the main "benefit" of the constitution as a trust indenture, which is private property, according to the Declaration of Independence. Only private, constitutionally protected "persons" under the Bill of Rights can exercise this "benefit".
2. A fraud upon this court and the Plaintiff.
3. A criminal conspiracy against the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff by the Respondent and this Court in violation of 18 U.S.C. §241.
4. An act of criminal identity theft by the Respondent and this corrupt court against the Plaintiff. See:
 - 4.1. *Identity Theft Affidavit*, Form #14.020
https://sedm.org/Forms/14-PropProtection/Identity_Theft_Affidavit-f14039.pdf
 - 4.2. *Government Identity Theft*, Form #05.046
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/GovernmentIdentityTheft.pdf>

For the purposes of this action Petitioner has elected the following PRIVATE, constitutionally rather than statutorily protected civil status and standing:

1. NOT filing this action as an "in rem" proceeding against:
 - 1.1. The statutory "citizen" or "resident" res mentioned in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1 and made "liable TO" rather than "liable FOR" the income tax.
 - 1.2. The statutory "taxpayer" res and office defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(14). See:

1.2.1. *Who Are "Taxpayers" and Who Needs a "Taxpayer Identification Number"?*, Form #05.013

<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhoAreTaxpayers.pdf>

1.2.2. *Your Rights as a "Nontaxpayer"*, Form #08.008

<https://sedm.org/LibertyU/NontaxpayerBOR.pdf>

- 1.3. The "person" res defined in 26 U.S.C. §7343 as liable for criminal penalties or 26 U.S.C. §6671(b) liable for civil penalties. Both of these are officers within the national government per the definitions provided and do not include constitutionally protected private parties such as the Petitioner.
2. Not engaged in the excise taxable "trade or business" privilege, defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26).
3. Cannot lawfully engage in a statutory "trade or business" outside of the statutory geographical "United States" defined in 26 U.S.C. §§7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) and 4 U.S.C. §110(d)a WITHOUT violating 4 U.S.C. §72.
4. Nonresident, not domiciled within, and not representing any entity domiciled within to the statutory geographical "United States" defined in 26 U.S.C. §§7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) and 4 U.S.C. §110(d).
5. Nonresident, not domiciled within, and not representing any entity domiciled within the "State of" California as defined in California Revenue and Taxation Code, Sections 17018 and 6017.
6. Not consensually engaged in any activity that is privileged or licensed with respect to the state in question which might give rise to authority to regulate or tax property in question.
7. Not representing a public office or political office or serving as a government agent or handling government property. A public officer, after all, is legally defined as someone in charge of the PROPERTY of the public.

"Public office. The right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government for the benefit of the public. Walker v. Rich, 79 Cal.App. 139, 249 P. 56, 58. An agency for the state, the duties of which involve in their performance the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power, either great or small. Yaselli v. Goff, C.C.A., 12 F.2d. 396, 403, 56 A.L.R. 1239; Lacey v. State, 13 Ala.App. 212, 68 So. 706, 710; Curtin v. State, 61 Cal.App. 377, 214 P. 1030, 1035; Shelmadine v. City of Elkhart, 75 Ind.App. 493, 129 N.E. 878. State ex rel. Colorado River Commission v. Frohmiller, 46 Ariz. 413, 52 P.2d. 483, 486. **Where, by virtue of law, a person is clothed, not as an incidental or transient authority, but for such time as de- notes duration and continuance, with Independent power to control the property of the public,** or with public functions to be exercised in the supposed interest of the people, the service to be compensated by a stated yearly salary, and the occupant having a designation or title, the position so created is a public office. State v. Brennan, 49 Ohio.St. 33, 29 N.E. 593. [Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1235]

12.4 Legal/Civil status and classification of property allegedly subject to taxation

The property that is the subject of this proceeding which is in the temporary possession of the Respondent is PRIVATE property ON LOAN and granted temporarily until returned to its rightful owner, the Petitioner. Possession and ownership are NOT synonymous under the laws of property. The terms of the grant or loan are documented in:

Injury Defense Franchise and Agreement, Form #06.027

<https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/InjuryDefenseFranchise.pdf>

The above agreement supersedes and controls the imposition of any and all civil statutory law, including but not limited to the state and national revenue codes. The authority to write such rules derives from the same source as the national government, under Constitution Article 4, Section 3, Clause 1 and also from absolute, constitutionally protected, ownership. It does NOT derive from civil statutory law attached to an office within the government called "citizen", "resident", or "person".

Any and all attempts to convert the legal status or ownership of the property that is the subject of this dispute is hereby declared to be done WITHOUT the express consent of the owner, under the influence of duress, and without rightful authority consistent with the following:

1. *W-8SUB*, Form #04.231-withholding forms that take the place of any and all others in relation to the property at issue. All others submitted UNDER DURESS.
<https://sedm.org/Forms/04-Tax/2-Withholding/W-8SUB.pdf>
2. *Correcting Erroneous Information Returns*, Form #04.001
<https://sedm.org/Forms/04-Tax/0-CorrErrInfoRtns/CorrErrInfoRtns.pdf>
3. *W-2CC*, Form #04.304
<https://sedm.org/Forms/04-Tax/3-Reporting/FormW-2CC-Cust/FormW-2CC.pdf>

4. 1099CC, Form #04.309
<https://sedm.org/Forms/04-Tax/3-Reporting/Form1099-CC-Cust/Form1099-CC.pdf>

Unless and until the party who earned the amount in question as PRIVATE, absolutely owner property consensually converts that property or a portion thereof to a public use, a public purpose, or a public office absent duress, the property must:

1. Be conclusively presumed to be private and constitutionally protected.
2. Be conclusively presumed beyond the rulemaking or taxing power of the Respondent. The ability to enact any law that impairs constitutional or private ownership REQUIRES at least a shared or qualified ownership of the property in question, or absolute ownership.
3. Be conclusively presumed to NOT have no shared or absolute ownership of any aspect of it in the Respondent.
4. Be conclusively presumed to be OUTSIDE “this State” in the California Revenue and Taxation Code, Section 17018, meaning in a federal area or enclave where the state and national governments might share concurrent jurisdiction.

Mere possession of the funds at issue does NOT constitute OWNERSHIP. Possession and ownership are NOT synonymous. The burden imposed upon the Respondent is therefore to prove that IN SPITE of their mere possession of the funds in question, the absolute owner of the property was lawfully and consensually converted to Respondent BEFORE they received it consistent with the rules of property documented in:

Separation Between Public and Private Course, Form #12.025
<https://sedm.org/LibertyU/SeparatingPublicPrivate.pdf>

12.5 Affidavit of Duress

Petitioner hereby certifies under penalty of perjury the existence of duress which gives rise to the compelled production of evidence by him of the existence of consent to renounce his nonresident status in favor of the privileges of being a STATUTORY domiciled “citizen” or “resident”:

1. Domicile is the main method of imputing STATUTORY “citizen” or “resident” status.
2. The main markers of domicile are:
 - 2.1. Statutory “RESIDENT” government identification.
 - 2.2. Registering to vote and sometimes ACTUALLY voting.
 - 2.3. Sending your children to public schools.
3. Petitioner seeks the civil status of:
 - 3.1. Nonresident.
 - 3.2. Transient foreigner.
 - 3.3. Transient foreigner.
 - 3.4. Stateless person.
 - 3.5. In transitu.
 - 3.6. Transient.
 - 3.7. Sojourner.
 - 3.8. Civilly dead.
 - 3.9. Idiot. See:

Are You an “Idiot”?, SEDM
<https://sedm.org/are-you-an-idiot-we-are/>

4. Consistent with his desires of the above NONRESIDENT civil status, Petitioner has:
 - 4.1. Not registered to vote, because he can’t do so without a domicile in the state. He was specifically told this when he went in to register. So he asked them to UNREGISTER him and got evidence of same.
 - 4.2. Attempted to procure government identification as a nonprivileged “nonresident”. The Department of Motor Vehicles in his state REFUSED to do so. They only issue RESIDENT state ID.
 - 4.3. Avoided getting a driver license, because it comes “bundled” with so many other privileges.
 - 4.3.1. The BUNDLING of things the applicant DOESN’T want with things he DOES want is what is called “weaponization of government”. This allows the government to in effect DESTROY ANY and EVERY constitutional or natural right of the Petitioner as described in:

Sovereignty and Freedom Points and Authorities, Litigation Tool #10.018, Section 1.30
<https://sedm.org/Litigation/10-PracticeGuides/PointsAuth.pdf>

- 4.3.2. PRIVILEGES that are BUNDLED with the driver license include:

- 4.3.3. A “permanent address” that he doesn’t want. Permanent address is relevant mainly to aliens, and he certainly isn’t an alien. Application forms use this INSTEAD of DOMICILE in the case of those who are nationals and not aliens such as himself.
- 4.3.4. Domicile, because he must provide proof of privileged RESIDENT status to get one and surrender all other state ID to do so. You can only have a domicile in ONE place at a time, and surrendering all other state driver licenses has the effect of ensuring this.
- 4.3.5. You must supply a PRIVILEGED Social Security Number to get the state driver license under Real ID standards. He does not want to participate in this franchise and is not even ELIGIBLE to participate and the state thereby compels him to participate in doing so. See:

[Why You Aren’t Eligible for Social Security](https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/SSNotEligible.pdf), Form #06.001
<https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/SSNotEligible.pdf>

There is no question that everyone should feel at least morally obligated to pay for every government service they consume, either directly or indirectly. If they proactively did that, there wouldn’t even be a need for the civil code or even courts that can FORCE them to do so.

On the other hand, those who don’t want government civil services or benefits and seek only CRIMINAL protection must have a way to opt out in fulfillment of their constitutional and natural right to:

1. Be LEFT ALONE as LEGAL JUSTICE requires. PRIVATE property and control over the government that it permits is the only way of ensuring that.

PAULSEN, ETHICS (Thilly's translation), chap. 9.

“Justice, as a moral habit, is that tendency of the will and mode of conduct which refrains from disturbing the lives and interests of others, and, as far as possible, hinders such interference on the part of others. This virtue springs from the individual’s respect for his fellows as ends in themselves and as his co equals. The different spheres of interests may be roughly classified as follows: body and life; the family, or the extended individual life; property, or the totality of the instruments of action; honor, or the ideal existence; and finally freedom, or the possibility of fashioning one’s life as an end in itself. The law defends these different spheres, thus giving rise to a corresponding number of spheres of rights, each being protected by a prohibition. . . . To violate the rights, to interfere with the interests of others, is injustice. All injustice is ultimately directed against the life of the neighbor; it is an open avowal that the latter is not an end in itself, having the same value as the individual’s own life. The general formula of the duty of justice may therefore be stated as follows: Do no wrong yourself, and permit no wrong to be done, so far as lies in your power; or, expressed positively: Respect and protect the right.”
[Readings on the History and System of the Common Law, Second Edition, Roscoe Pound, 1925, p. 2]

“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”

[Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)]

“Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.”
[James Madison, The Federalist No. 51 (1788)]

“Do not strive with [or try to regulate or control or enslave] a man without cause, if he has done you no harm.”
[Prov. 3:30, Bible, NKJV]

“With all [our] blessings, what more is necessary to make us a happy and a prosperous people? Still one thing more, fellow citizens--a wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government, and this is necessary to close the circle of our felicities.”

[Thomas Jefferson: 1st Inaugural, 1801. ME 3:320]

2. Not politically and legally ASSOCIATE as a CIVIL STATUTORY “citizen” or “resident” who has to SURRENDER constitutional rights in exchange for the PRIVILEGES of such membership by choosing a domicile. This is a First Amendment right.

“The right to associate or not to associate with others solely on the basis of individual choice, not being absolute, may conflict with a societal interest in requiring one to associate with others, or to prohibit one from associating with others, in order to accomplish what the state deems to be the common good. The Supreme Court, though rarely called upon to examine this aspect of the right to freedom of association, has nevertheless established certain basic rules which will cover many situations involving forced or prohibited associations. Thus, where a sufficiently compelling state interest, outside the political spectrum, can be accomplished only by requiring individuals to associate together for the common good, then such forced association is constitutional. But the Supreme Court has made it clear that compelling an individual to become a member of an organization with political aspects [such as a state or municipality], or compelling an individual to become a member of an organization which financially supports [through payment of taxes], in more than an insignificant way, political personages or goals which the individual does not wish to support, is an infringement of the individual's constitutional right to freedom of association. ²¹ The First Amendment prevents the government, except in the most compelling circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with its employees' freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not associate; it is not merely a tenure provision that protects public employees from actual or constructive discharge. ²² Thus, First Amendment principles prohibit a state from compelling any individual to associate with a political party, as a condition of retaining public employment. ²³ The First Amendment protects nonpolicymaking public employees from discrimination based on their political beliefs or affiliation. ²⁴ But the First Amendment protects the right of political party members to advocate that a specific person be elected or appointed to a particular office and that a specific person be hired to perform a governmental function. ²⁵ In the First Amendment context, the political patronage exception to the First Amendment protection for public employees is to be construed broadly, so as presumptively to encompass positions placed by legislature outside of “merit” civil service. Positions specifically named in relevant federal, state, county, or municipal laws to which discretionary authority with respect to enforcement of that law or carrying out of some other policy of political concern is granted, such as a secretary of state given statutory authority over various state corporation law practices, fall within the political patronage

¹⁹ § 539.

²⁰ *Lathrop v. Donohue*, 367 U.S. 820, 81 S.Ct. 1826, 6 L.Ed.2d. 1191 (1961), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871, 82 S.Ct. 23, 7 L.Ed.2d. 72 (1961) (a state supreme court may order integration of the state bar); *Railway Emp. Dept. v. Hanson*, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112 (1956), motion denied, 351 U.S. 979, 76 S.Ct. 1044, 100 L.Ed. 1494 (1956) and reh'g denied, 352 U.S. 859, 77 S.Ct. 22, 1 L.Ed.2d. 69 (1956) (upholding the validity of the union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act).

The First Amendment right to freedom of association of teachers was not violated by enforcement of a rule that white teachers whose children did not attend public schools would not be rehired. *Cook v. Hudson*, 511 F.2d. 744, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 10134 (5th Cir. 1975), reh'g denied, 515 F.2d. 762 (5th Cir. 1975) and cert. granted, 424 U.S. 941, 96 S.Ct. 1408, 47 L.Ed.2d. 347 (1976) and cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 165, 97 S.Ct. 543, 50 L.Ed.2d. 373, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 11246 (1976).

Annotation: Supreme Court's views regarding Federal Constitution's First Amendment right of association as applied to elections and other political activities, 116 L.Ed.2d. 997, § 10.

²¹ *Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois*, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d. 52, 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 673 (1990), reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050, 111 S.Ct. 13, 111 L.Ed.2d. 828 (1990) and reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050, 111 S.Ct. 13, 111 L.Ed.2d. 828 (1990) (conditioning public employment hiring decisions on political belief and association violates the First Amendment rights of applicants in the absence of some vital governmental interest).

²² *Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois*, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d. 52, 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 673 (1990), reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050, 111 S.Ct. 13, 111 L.Ed.2d. 828 (1990) and reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050, 111 S.Ct. 13, 111 L.Ed.2d. 828 (1990).

Annotation: Public employee's right of free speech under Federal Constitution's First Amendment—Supreme Court cases, 97 L.Ed.2d. 903.

First Amendment protection for law enforcement employees subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech, 109 A.L.R. Fed. 9.

First Amendment protection for judges or government attorneys subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech, 108 A.L.R. Fed. 117.

First Amendment protection for public hospital or health employees subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech, 107 A.L.R. Fed. 21.

First Amendment protection for publicly employed firefighters subjected to discharge, transfer, or discipline because of speech, 106 A.L.R. Fed. 396.

²³ *Aboud v. Detroit Bd. of Ed.*, 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d. 261, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2411, 81 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 55041 (1977), reh'g denied, 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2989, 53 L.Ed.2d. 1102 (1977); *Parrish v. Nikolits*, 86 F.3d. 1088 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1818, 137 L.Ed.2d. 1027 (U.S. 1997).

²⁴ *LaRou v. Ridlon*, 98 F.3d. 659 (1st Cir. 1996); *Parrish v. Nikolits*, 86 F.3d. 1088 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1818, 137 L.Ed.2d. 1027 (U.S. 1997).

²⁵ *Vickery v. Jones*, 100 F.3d. 1334 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1553, 137 L.Ed.2d. 701 (U.S. 1997).

Responsibilities of the position of director of a municipality's office of federal programs resembled those of a policymaker, privy to confidential information, a communicator, or some other office holder whose function was such that party affiliation was an equally important requirement for continued tenure. *Ortiz-Pinero v. Rivera-Arroyo*, 84 F.3d. 7 (1st Cir. 1996).

exception to First Amendment protection of public employees.²⁶ However, a supposed interest in ensuring effective government and efficient government employees, political affiliation or loyalty, or high salaries paid to the employees in question should not be counted as indicative of positions that require a particular party affiliation.²⁷“
[American Jurisprudence 2d, Constitutional law, §546: Forced and Prohibited Associations (1999)]

More on the above at:

Your Exclusive Right to Declare or Establish Your Civil Status, Form #13.008
<https://sedm.org/Forms/13-SelfFamilyChurchGovnce/RightToDeclStatus.pdf>

3. Not CONTRACT under the Social Compact to become party to the political collective who has no INDIVIDUAL rights but only rights as a member of the collective. The Bible forbids Christians from politically or legally associating in a way that would nullify the supremacy of God’s law over their lives. The constitutional prohibition against “impairing contracts” under Article 1, Section 10 certainly includes the right to AVOID being compelled to become party to the “social compact” in the form of the Private Membership Association (PMA) that is called the statutory civil code.

*“There is no more important provision in the Federal Constitution than the one which prohibits States from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and it is one of the highest duties of this court to take care the prohibition shall neither be evaded nor frittered away. Complete effect must be given *449 to it in all its spirit. The inviolability of contracts, and the duty of performing them, as made, are foundations of all well-ordered society, and to prevent the removal or disturbance of these foundations was one of the great objects for which the Constitution was framed.”*
[Murray v. City of Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 1877 WL 18506 U.S. (1877)]

“Independent of these views, there are many considerations which lead to the conclusion that the power to impair contracts, by direct action to that end, does not exist with the general government. In the first place, one of the objects of the Constitution, expressed in its preamble, was the establishment of justice, and what that meant in its relations to contracts is not left, as was justly said by the late Chief Justice, in *Hepburn v. Griswold*, to inference or conjecture. As he observes, at the time the Constitution was undergoing discussion in the convention, the Congress of the Confederation was engaged in framing the ordinance for the government of the Northwestern Territory, in which certain articles of compact were established between the people of the original States and the people of the Territory, for the purpose, as expressed in the instrument, of extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, upon which the States, their laws and constitutions, were erected. By that ordinance it was declared, that, in the just preservation of rights and property, ‘no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said Territory, that shall, in any manner, interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements bona fide and without fraud previously formed.’ The same provision, adds the Chief Justice, found more condensed expression in the prohibition upon the States against impairing the obligation of contracts, which has ever been recognized as an efficient safeguard against injustice; and though the prohibition is not applied in terms to the government of the United States, he expressed the opinion, speaking for himself and the majority of the court at the time, that it was clear ‘that those who framed and those who adopted the Constitution intended that the spirit of this prohibition should pervade the entire body of legislation, and that the justice which the Constitution was ordained to establish was not thought by them to be compatible with legislation of an opposite tendency.’ 8 Wall. 623. [99 U.S. 700, 765] Similar views are found expressed in the opinions of other judges of this court. In *Calder v. Bull*, which was here in 1798, Mr. Justice Chase said, that there were acts which the Federal and State legislatures could not do without exceeding their authority, and among them he mentioned a law which punished a citizen for an innocent act; a law that destroyed or impaired the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that made a man judge in his own case; and a law that took the property from A. and gave it to B. ‘It is against all reason and justice,’ he added, ‘for a people to intrust a legislature with such powers, and therefore it cannot be presumed that they have done it. They may command what is right and prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt, or punish innocence as a crime, or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private contract, or the right of private property. To maintain that a Federal or State legislature possesses such powers if they had not been expressly restrained, would, in my opinion, be a political heresy altogether inadmissible in all free republican governments.’ 3 Dall. 388.

²⁶ McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d. 1536, 12 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1833, 1996 Fed.App. 335P (6th Cir. 1996), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, (Feb. 13, 1997).

Law Reviews: Stokes, When Freedoms Conflict: Party Discipline and the First Amendment. 11 JL & Pol 751, Fall, 1995.

Pave, Public Employees and the First Amendment Petition Clause: Protecting the Rights of Citizen-Employees Who File Legitimate Grievances and Lawsuits Against Their Government Employers. 90 N.W. U LR 304, Fall, 1995.

Singer, Conduct and Belief: Public Employees’ First Amendment Rights to Free Expression and Political Affiliation. 59 U Chi LR 897, Spring, 1992.

As to political patronage jobs, see § 472.

²⁷ Parrish v. Nikolits, 86 F.3d. 1088 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1818, 137 L.Ed.2d. 1027 (U.S. 1997).

In *Ogden v. Saunders*, which was before this court in 1827, Mr. Justice Thompson, referring to the clauses of the Constitution prohibiting the State from passing a bill of attainder, an ex post facto law, or a law impairing the obligation of contracts, said: 'Neither provision can strictly be considered as introducing any new principle, but only for greater security and safety to incorporate into this charter provisions admitted by all to be among the first principles of our government. No State court would, I presume, sanction and enforce an ex post facto law, if no such prohibition was contained in the Constitution of the United States; so, neither would retrospective laws, taking away vested rights, be enforced. Such laws are repugnant to those fundamental principles upon which every just system of laws is founded.'

In the *Federalist*, Mr. Madison declared that laws impairing the obligation of contracts were contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to every principle of sound legislation; and in the *Dartmouth College Case* Mr. Webster contended that acts, which were there held to impair the obligation of contracts, were not the exercise of a power properly legislative, [99 U.S. 700, 766] as their object and effect was to take away vested rights. 'To justify the taking away of vested rights,' he said, 'there must be a forfeiture, to adjudge upon and declare which is the proper province of the judiciary.' Surely the Constitution would have failed to establish justice had it allowed the exercise of such a dangerous power to the Congress of the United States.

In the second place, legislation impairing the obligation of contracts impinges upon the provision of the Constitution which declares that no one shall be deprived of his property without due process of law; and that means by law in its regular course of administration through the courts of justice. Contracts are property, and a large portion of the wealth of the country exists in that form. Whatever impairs their value diminishes, therefore, the property of the owner; and if that be effected by direct legislative action operating upon the contract, forbidding its enforcement or transfer, or otherwise restricting its use, the owner is as much deprived of his property without due process of law as if the contract were impounded, or the value it represents were in terms wholly or partially confiscated.
[*Sinking Fund Cases*, 99 U.S. 700 (1878)]

More on this subject at:

Collectivism and How to Resist It Course, Form #12.024
<https://sedm.org/LibertyU/Collectivism.pdf>

Until all the above forms of duress are removed and it becomes just as convenient, inexpensive, and permissible to join the collective as to leave it without forcing someone into expensive litigation to preserve their rights, then the system is engineered mainly through economic coercion to make us all into CATTLE on the government plantation as described in:

How to Leave the Government Farm, Form #12.020
<https://sedm.org/how-to-leave-the-government-farm-form-12-020/>

The court is reminded of the fact that government ID is CRUCIAL to conducting every major commercial transaction. The lack of government ID in fact is therefore not only highly detrimental and inconvenient to conducting the commercial affairs of daily life, it can even be LIFE THREATENING and result in complete homelessness.

FORCING people to in effect ELECT a civil domicile or privileged "RESIDENCE" causes those who do not WANT to be privileged to be targeted with "economic sanctions" of the worst kind. It completely interferes with living a normal lifestyle. There is no authority within the constitution delegated to any government to abuse control over the issuance of government ID in order to:

1. Actively interfere with the ability to implement the MANDATE of the organic law to CIVILLY, LEGALLY, and POLITICALLY associate as the Petitioner INSISTS on doing:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.--Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government.
[*Declaration of Independence*, 1776; <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript/>]

DO NOT, by the way, claim that the Declaration of Independence is not “law”. It is published on the first page of Volume 1 the Statutes at Large and incorporated into the laws of the United States thereby. Only TRAITORS and anarchists would claim that it is not law. These traitors and anarchists are described in:

Problems with Atheistic Anarchism Course, Form #08.020
SLIDES: <https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/ProbsWithAtheistAnarchism.pdf>
VIDEO: <http://youtu.be/n883Ce1HML0>

2. Impute or enforce superior or supernatural rights or privileges to a government that the people do not individually possess. This turns government into an unconstitutional civil religion in which:
 - 2.1. The collective “state” is an object of idol worship. This is biblical idolatry which compels Christians to violate the first four commandments of the Ten Commandments in Exodus 20.
 - 2.2. Judges are priests.
 - 2.3. Courtrooms are churches.
 - 2.4. Attorneys are deacons.
 - 2.5. The “deacon” attorneys are “ordained” by the State Supreme Court with a “license to practice law”.
 - 2.6. Worship services are called “hearings”.
 - 2.7. The civil statutory code is the “bible” which prescribes the rules of “worship”.
 - 2.8. Obeying civil statutory obligations becomes an act of “worship”.
 - 2.9. Income tax becomes a “tithe” to the church. Biblical tithes are based on “increase” just like the Sixteenth Amendment is based on “profit”. See:

Tithing, Form #17.073
<https://sedm.org/Forms/17-Theology/Tithing.pdf>

The following document EXHAUSTIVELY PROVES that the above unconstitutional civil religion has been implemented in America in violation of the First Amendment:

Socialism: The New American Civil Religion, Form #05.016
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/SocialismCivilReligion.pdf>

3. Coerce or compel people to consent to any contract, including the Social Compact. This includes efforts to impute a “quasi contract” to any government interaction, such as the following, and ESPECIALLY if private Americans cannot use the same tactic against abusive governments under principles of equity:

“Even if the judgment is deemed to be colored by the nature of the obligation whose validity it establishes, and we are free to re-examine it, and, if we find it to be based on an obligation penal in character, to refuse to enforce it outside the state where rendered, see Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 292, et seq. 8 S.Ct. 1370, compare Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 S.Ct. 641, still the obligation to pay taxes is not penal. It is a statutory liability, quasi contractual in nature, enforceable, if there is no exclusive statutory remedy, in the civil courts by the common-law action of debt or indebitatus assumpsit. United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U.S. 250, 31 S.Ct. 155; Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492, 46 S.Ct. 180; Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227; and see Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, 542; Meredith v. United States, 13 Pet. 486, 493. This was the rule established in the English courts before the Declaration of Independence. Attorney General v. Weeks, Bunbury's Exch. Rep. 223; Attorney General v. Jewers and Batty, Bunbury's Exch. Rep. 225; Attorney General v. Hatton, Bunbury's Exch. Rep. [296 U.S. 268, 272] 262; Attorney General v. ___, 2 Ans.Rep. 558; see Comyn's Digest (Title 'Dett,' A, 9); 1 Chitty on Pleading, 123; cf. Attorney General v. Sewell, 4 M.&W. 77. ”
[Milwaukee v. White, 296 U.S. 268 (1935)]

4. Coerce or compel people to surrender ANY constitutional or natural right. See:

Unalienable Rights Course, Form #12.038
<https://sedm.org/LibertyU/UnalienableRights.pdf>

5. Compel people to procure or pay for any government service, privilege, or property they do not want and do not need. This Petitioner calls “weaponization of government”. See:

Sovereignty and Freedom Points and Authorities, Litigation Tool #10.018, Section 1.30
<https://sedm.org/Litigation/10-PracticeGuides/PointsAuth.pdf>

12.6 Writ of Quo Warranto Included in this action related to civil statutory enforcement against the Petitioner

12.6.1 Pursuit of LEGAL Justice is the goal: The right to be left alone by government CIVILLY

This suit hereby challenges the ability of both the court and the Respondent to impose the civil statutory code as a Private Membership Association, including the Internal Revenue Code and the state revenue codes, against the Plaintiff in the context of taxation, who is a nonmember of said association. It does so by invoking this action as a companion Writ of Quo Warranto

if this case continues to proceed under such codes. Such a writ challenges the ability of someone to LAWFULLY hold an office or agency within a specific government. In this case, that office or agency is the civil statutory status of “citizen”, “resident”, “person”, “taxpayer”, etc. All such civil statutory statuses are offices or agencies within a government legislatively created by their government grantor and therefore property of the grantor. They come with civil statutory obligations, and such obligations would constitute an unlawful taking of private property without consideration in violation of the Fifth Amendment if these offices were imposed against the consent of those who are compelled to fill them:

*"The term office' has no legal or technical meaning attached to it, distinct from its ordinary acceptations. An office is a public charge or employment; but, as every employment is not an office, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between employments which are and those which are not offices.... A public officer is one who has some duty to perform concerning the public; and he is not the less a public officer when his duty is confined to narrow limits, because it is the duty, and the nature of that duty, which makes him a public officer, and not the extent of his authority." 7 Bac. Abr. 280; Carth. 479.... Where an employment or duty is a continuing [***65] one, which is defined by rules prescribed by law and not by contract, such a charge or employment is an office, and the person who performs it is an officer....*
[Ricker's Petition, 66 N.H. 207 (1890)]

In filing this action, the Petitioner seeks only to enforce his right to simply be LEFT ALONE by the state from a CIVIL STATUTORY perspective, not taxed, and not regulated in the context of responsibly supporting and governing himself to the exclusion of all others as absolute owner of HIMSELF and all his earnings:

PAULSEN, *ETHICS* (Thilly's translation), chap. 9.

"Justice, as a moral habit, is that tendency of the will and mode of conduct which refrains from disturbing the lives and interests of others, and, as far as possible, hinders such interference on the part of others. This virtue springs from the individual's respect for his fellows as ends in themselves and as his co equals. The different spheres of interests may be roughly classified as follows: body and life; the family, or the extended individual life; property, or the totality of the instruments of action; honor, or the ideal existence; and finally freedom, or the possibility of fashioning one's life as an end in itself. The law defends these different spheres, thus giving rise to a corresponding number of spheres of rights, each being protected by a prohibition. . . . To violate the rights, to interfere with the interests of others, is injustice. All injustice is ultimately directed against the life of the neighbor; it is an open avowal that the latter is not an end in itself, having the same value as the individual's own life. The general formula of the duty of justice may therefore be stated as follows: Do no wrong yourself, and permit no wrong to be done, so far as lies in your power; or, expressed positively: Respect and protect the right."
[Readings on the History and System of the Common Law, Second Edition, Roscoe Pound, 1925, p. 2]

"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
[Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)]

"Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit."
[James Madison, The Federalist No. 51 (1788)]

"Do not strive with [or try to regulate or control or enslave] a man without cause, if he has done you no harm."
[Prov. 3:30, Bible, NKJV]

"With all [our] blessings, what more is necessary to make us a happy and a prosperous people? Still one thing more, fellow citizens--a wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government, and this is necessary to close the circle of our felicities."
[Thomas Jefferson: 1st Inaugural, 1801. ME 3:320]

12.6.2 Authority of enforcing this Writ without the civil statutory code

A Writ of Quo Warranto is a common law action, not a civil statutory action. It may be invoked without civil statutory authority or even a domicile in the forum. If the Plaintiff as nonresident is not subject to the civil statutory code, including

the tax code, then the common law and equity prevails and such authorities as the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §2201(a), as well as similar state statutes cannot thus limit the court's ability to enforce this quo warranto common law action.

12.6.3 Challenge of ability to impute or enforce obligations of membership involuntarily without domicile or consent

This quo warranto action challenges the ability of the state to treat the Petitioner as member of the body politic called a civil statutory "person", "citizen", "resident", "taxpayer", etc. against his consent. All such statuses are indicators of MEMBERSHIP in the body politic in the case of income taxation that come with civil statutory obligations. Income taxation is a POLITICAL matter reserved to the political branches of the government as held by the supreme court. Such membership is acquired by a VOLUNTARY domicile of a national (constitutional "citizen" by birth or naturalization) or residence of an alien (foreign national), neither of which the Petitioner has or seeks to have because they are privileges.

*"Thus, the Court has frequently held that domicile or residence, more substantial than mere presence in transit or sojourn, is an adequate basis for taxation, including income,^[8] property,^[9] and death^[10] taxes. Since the Fourteenth Amendment makes one a citizen of the state wherein he resides, the fact of residence creates universally recognized reciprocal duties of protection by the state and of allegiance and support by the citizen. **The latter obviously includes a duty to pay taxes, and their nature and measure is largely a political matter.** Of course, the situs of property may tax it regardless of the citizenship, domicile or residence of the owner, the most obvious illustration being a tax on realty laid by the state in which the realty is located.^[11] Also, the keeping of tangible^[12] or intangible^[13] personalty within a state may give it a similar taxable situs there (sometimes called a business or commercial situs or domicile). Certain activities or transactions carried on within a state, such as the use^[14] and sale^[15] of property, may give jurisdiction to tax whomsoever engages therein, and the use of highways may subject the use to certain types of taxation.^[16] These cases overlap with those in which incorporation by a state^[17] or permission to do business there^[18] forms the basis for proportionate taxation of a company, including its franchise, capital, income and property. Recent cases in which a taxable sale does not clearly take place within the taxing state, elements of the transaction occurring in different states, have presented peculiar difficulties,^[19] as have those where the party liable for a use tax does not use the product within the taxing state.^[20]*
[Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954)]

FOOTNOTES:

[8] Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12; Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276; New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19.

The collection of cases in footnotes 8 through 20 is not intended as a guide to their holdings but only as an illustration of the types of jurisdictional standards sanctioned at one time or another by the Court.

[9] Most of these cases deal with intangible property and apply the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491; Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U.S. 390; Hawley v. City of Malden, 232 U.S. 1; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U.S. 54; Citizens National Bank v. Durr, 257 U.S. 99; Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24; Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486. See Nevada Bank v. Sedgwick, 104 U.S. 111; Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 595; Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511, 521; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193; Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U.S. 730, 731.

[10] Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189; Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625; Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. 1; First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357; Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383; Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657; Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Kelly, 319 U.S. 94. See Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567; Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 400-405. Cf. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292; Pearson v. McGraw, 308 U.S. 313. See also Keeney v. Comptroller of New York, 222 U.S. 525, 537, which involved an excise tax on an inter vivos transfer of stocks and bonds.

[11] The Court has never had a case in which a state attempted a direct tax on land located in another state. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 204. Instead, the cases in point speak of the problem by way of dicta or deal with interests attached to the realty, such as incorporeal hereditaments. See Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210; State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 319; Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U.S. 421; Paddell v. City of New York, 211 U.S. 446; First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 326; Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422. Cf. Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385; Central R. Co. v. Jersey City, 209 U.S. 473.

[12] *Coe v. Errol*, 116 U.S. 517, 524; *Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor*, 165 U.S. 194, 226-227; *American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall*, 174 U.S. 70; *Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch*, 177 U.S. 149; *Carstairs v. Cochran*, 193 U.S. 10; *Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia*, 198 U.S. 299; *Hannis Distilling Co. v. Mayor and City Council*, 216 U.S. 285; *Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell*, 290 U.S. 158; *City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader*, 293 U.S. 112; *Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co.*, 336 U.S. 169. See *Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co.*, 17 How. 596; *St. Louis v. Ferry Co.*, 11 Wall. 423; *Morgan v. Parham*, 16 Wall. 471; *Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania*, 114 U.S. 196, 210-211; *Marye v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.*, 127 U.S. 117, 123; *Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania*, 141 U.S. 18, 22; *Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus*, 154 U.S. 421, 427-428; *Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson City*, 173 U.S. 592, 609, 613, 622 (bridge); *Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon*, 188 U.S. 82; *Fargo v. Hart*, 193 U.S. 490; *Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania*, 198 U.S. 341; *Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky*, 199 U.S. 194; *Thompson v. Kentucky*, 209 U.S. 340, 347; *Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co.*, 224 U.S. 362, 371-372; *Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Nevada*, 248 U.S. 165, 167; *Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright*, 249 U.S. 275; *Frick v. Pennsylvania*, 268 U.S. 473; *Treichler v. Wisconsin*, 338 U.S. 251; *Standard Oil Co. v. Peck*, 342 U.S. 382. Whether the property is sufficiently situated in the state to become part of the general mass of taxable property or whether it is merely in transit is frequently treated as an interstate commerce question rather than a jurisdictional one. E. g., *Brown v. Houston*, 114 U.S. 622, 632-633; *Pittsburg & Southern Coal Co. v. Bates*, 156 U.S. 577, 588-589; *Kelley v. Rhoads*, 188 U.S. 1; *General Oil Co. v. Crain*, 209 U.S. 211; *Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro*, 260 U.S. 366. As to the situs of personalty within various counties of a single state, see *Columbus Southern R. Co. v. Wright*, 151 U.S. 470.

[13] *Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank*, 19 Wall. 490, 499-500; *Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor*, 166 U.S. 185; *New Orleans v. Stempel*, 175 U.S. 309; *Bristol v. Washington County*, 177 U.S. 133; *State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National D'Escompte*, 191 U.S. 388; *Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans*, 205 U.S. 395; *Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors*, 221 U.S. 346; *Orient Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors*, 221 U.S. 358; *Wheeler v. Sohmer*, 233 U.S. 434; *Rogers v. Hennepin County*, 240 U.S. 184; *Iowa v. Slimmer*, 248 U.S. 115; *Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia*, 280 U.S. 83; *Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co.*, 293 U.S. 15; *Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox*, 298 U.S. 193; *New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves*, 299 U.S. 366; *First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota*, 301 U.S. 234. See *Railroad Co. v. Jackson*, 7 Wall. 262; *Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky*, 166 U.S. 171; *Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Bowland*, 196 U.S. 611, 619-620; *Buck v. Beach*, 206 U.S. 392; *Selliger v. Kentucky*, 213 U.S. 200; *Brooke v. City of Norfolk*, 277 U.S. 27. Cf. *Board of Assessors v. New York Life Ins. Co.*, 216 U.S. 517, 523. In some of these cases, the property would appear to be tangible as well as intangible in nature.

[14] This is generally discussed as an interstate commerce question. E. g., *Bowman v. Continental Oil Co.*, 256 U.S. 642; *Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n*, 285 U.S. 147; *Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query*, 286 U.S. 472; *Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace*, 288 U.S. 249; *Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc.*, 289 U.S. 249; *Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson*, 292 U.S. 86; *Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.*, 300 U.S. 577. See also footnote 20.

[15] *New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon*, 204 U.S. 152, 158-159. See *Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp.*, 313 U.S. 62; *McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co.*, 322 U.S. 327. Cf. *Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton*, 262 U.S. 506; *Graniteville Mfg. Co. v. Query*, 283 U.S. 376 (creation of promissory notes). See also foot note 19.

[16] *Kane v. New Jersey*, 242 U.S. 160; *Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett*, 276 U.S. 245; *Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring*, 286 U.S. 352; *Hicklin v. Coney*, 290 U.S. 169. See *Hendrick v. Maryland*, 235 U.S. 610; *Clark v. Poor*, 274 U.S. 554. Cf. *Sprout v. South Bend*, 277 U.S. 163; *Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey*, 283 U.S. 183; *Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.*, 306 U.S. 583; *Bode v. Barrett*, 344 U.S. 583.

[17] *Society for Savings v. Coite*, 6 Wall. 594, 607; *Delaware Railroad Tax*, 18 Wall. 206, 231; *Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky*, 166 U.S. 150; *Corry v. Mayor and Council of Baltimore*, 196 U.S. 466; *Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky*, 202 U.S. 409; *New York ex rel. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Miller*, 202 U.S. 584; *Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky*, 222 U.S. 63; *Kansas City, F. S. & M. R. Co. v. Botkin*, 240 U.S. 227, 232, 235; *Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles*, 242 U.S. 111, 118-119; *Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks*, 253 U.S. 325; *Schwab v. Richardson*, 263 U.S. 88; *Matson Navigation Co. v. State Board of Equalization*, 297 U.S. 441; *Schuyllkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania*, 302 U.S. 506, 514-516; *Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals*, 307 U.S. 313; *Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota*, 322 U.S. 292. See *Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co.*, 242 U.S. 394, 400-401; *Maxwell v. Bugbee*, 250 U.S. 525, 539-540; *State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich*, 316 U.S. 174. In many of these cases the company was also doing business in the state of incorporation.

[18] *State Railroad Tax Cases*, 92 U.S. 575, 603; *Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York*, 143 U.S. 305; *Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts*, 231 U.S. 68; *St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Arkansas*, 235 U.S. 350, 364; *Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Pennsylvania*, 238 U.S. 143; *Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain*, 254 U.S. 113; *Pullman Co. v. Richardson*, 261 U.S. 330; *Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n*, 266 U.S. 271; *Great Northern R. Co. v. Minnesota*, 278 U.S. 503; *Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean*, 301 U.S. 412, 424-427; *Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia*, 302 U.S. 22, 29-31; *Illinois Central R. Co. v. Minnesota*, 309 U.S. 157; *Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co.*, 311 U.S. 435; *International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation*, 322 U.S. 435; *International Harvester Co. v. Evatt*, 329 U.S. 416, 420-421; *Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone*, 337 U.S. 662, 667-668. See *Erie R. Co. v. Pennsylvania*, 21 Wall. 492; *Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Attorney General*, 125 U.S. 530, 548; *Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co.*, 142 U.S. 217, 227-228; *Central Pacific R. Co. v. California*, 162 U.S. 91, 126; *Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Missouri ex rel. Gottlieb*, 190 U.S. 412;

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 30, 38; Pullman Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 56, 61-63; Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 216 U.S. 146, 162-163; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280, 285; Provident Savings Life Assurance Society v. Kentucky, 239 U.S. 103; Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178, 187-188; International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135; Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66; Southern R. Co. v. Watts, 260 U.S. 519, 527; Baker v. Druesedow, 263 U.S. 137; Air-way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71, 81-82; Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 217-218; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U.S. 69; Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123; Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77; Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 526, 530-531. Cf. Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 1; St. Louis & E. St. L. E. R. Co. v. Missouri, 256 U.S. 314, 318; Rowley v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 293 U.S. 102; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 138-140; Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 423-424. The same principle applies to individuals engaged in business within the state. Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U.S. 1; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37; Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60. See also Haavik v. Alaska Packers Assn., 263 U.S. 510, where license and poll taxes were imposed on an individual who was working in Alaska but was not a resident or domiciliary there.

[19] Compare Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, with International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, and McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70.

[20] Compare Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 180-181, with General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335; Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359; Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373, and Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62.

The property spoken of above that is the subject of taxation is, by definition, PUBLIC property or PRIVATE property donated to a public use to procure the benefits of civil statutory protection that is a product of membership in the form of domicile. If the property were private or constitutionally protect instead of protected by the civil statutory law, then absolute ownership would permit the owner to exclude any and all uses or beneficial uses or even taxation by others, including governments.

12.6.4 How membership in the body politic is acquired and its effect

CIVIL STATUTORY "citizens" and "residents" are among those WITHIN the political branches as part of the "political matter" mentioned above in the Miller case. That is what it means, in fact, to have "a government OF the people, BY the people, and FOR the people" as Abraham Lincoln indicated in his famous Gettysburg Address. Below are further authorities in complete agreement with this conclusion of law.

"Citizenship and domicile are substantially synonymous. Residency and inhabitance are too often confused with the terms and have not the same significance. Citizenship implies more than residence. **It carries with it the idea of identification with the state [as a PUBLIC officer] and a participation in its functions.** As a citizen, one sustains social, political, and moral obligation to the state and possesses social and political rights under the Constitution and laws thereof. Harding v. Standard Oil Co. et al. (C.C.) 182 F. 421; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 7 S.Ct. 763, 32 L.Ed. 766; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 476, 15 L.Ed. 691." [Baker v. Keck, 13 F.Supp. 486 (1936)]

"Citizenship implies membership in a political society, the relation of allegiance and protection, **identification with the state** [as a PUBLIC officer], and a participation in its functions." [Panill v. Roanoke Times Co, 252 F. 910 (1918)]

"Citizen defined

Citizenship implies membership in a political society, the relation of allegiance and protection, **identification with the state, and a participation in its functions** [as a PUBLIC officer], and while a temporary absence may suspend the relation between a state and its citizen, **his identification with the state remains** where he intends to return. Panmill v. Roanoke Times Co., W.D.Va.1918, 252 F. 910. Aliens, Immigration, And Citizenship 678" [8 U.S.C.A. §1401, p. 18; SOURCE: <https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/USCitizen-8USCA1401-20090918.pdf>]

CIVIL domicile of a national is the method of ELECTING a membership and civil status WITHIN the government and thereby becoming a CIVIL STATUTORY "subject". One cannot register to even vote as such a member without a VOLUNTARY choice of domicile within the forum. "Nonresidents" such as the Petitioner are prohibited from registering to vote or actually voting. Thus, we have a "pay to play" social compact in which you have to PAY income tax before you

1 can participate in the state as its officer called CIVIL STATUTORY “citizen”, “resident”, or “person”. This is a strong
2 indication that income tax, for all intents and purposes, is a poll tax. See:

The “Pay to Play” Social Compact, SEDM
<https://sedm.org/the-pay-to-play-social-compact/>

3 The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the sole basis for income taxation at the state level is domicile. Domicile as a
4 national is therefore a form of VOLUNTARY membership. The implication is that you have to be a VOLUNTARY “club
5 member” in the political branches of the government to owe it:

6 **The obligation of one domiciled within a state to pay taxes there, arises**
7 **from unilateral action of the state government in the exercise of the most**
8 **plenary of sovereign powers, that to raise revenue to defray the expenses**
9 **of government and to distribute its burdens equably among those who**
10 **enjoy its benefits. Hence, domicile in itself establishes a basis for taxation.**
11 **Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the state, and the**
12 **attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws, are inseparable from**
13 **the responsibility for sharing the costs of government. See [Fidelity &](#)**
14 **[Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville](#), 245 U.S. 54, 58; [Maguire v. Trefry](#), 253**
15 **[U.S. 12, 14, 17](#); [Kirtland v. Hotchkiss](#), 100 U.S. 491, 498; [Shaffer v.](#)**
16 **[Carter](#), 252 U.S. 37, 50.**

17 *The Federal Constitution imposes on the states no particular modes of*
18 *taxation, and apart from the specific grant to the federal government of the exclusive 280*280 power to levy*
19 *certain limited classes of taxes and to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, it leaves the states unrestricted*
20 *in their power to tax those domiciled within them, so long as the tax imposed is upon property within the state or*
21 *on privileges enjoyed there, and is not so palpably arbitrary or unreasonable as to infringe the Fourteenth*
Amendment. [Kirtland v. Hotchkiss](#), supra.

22 *Taxation at the place of domicile of tangibles located elsewhere has been thought to be beyond the jurisdiction*
23 *of the state, [Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky](#), 199 U.S. 194; [Frick v. Pennsylvania](#), 268 U.S. 473, 488-*
24 *489; but considerations applicable to ownership of physical objects located outside the taxing jurisdiction, which*
25 *have led to that conclusion, are obviously inapplicable to the taxation of intangibles at the place of domicile or*
26 *of privileges which may be enjoyed there. See [Foreign Held Bond Case](#), 15 Wall. 300, 319; [Frick v. Pennsylvania](#),*
27 *supra, p. 494. And the taxation of both by the state of the domicile has been uniformly upheld. [Kirtland v.](#)*
28 *[Hotchkiss](#), supra; [Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville](#), supra; [Blodgett v. Silberman](#), 277 U.S. 1; [Maguire](#)*
29 *[v. Trefry](#), supra; compare [Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota](#), 280 U.S. 204; [First National Bank v. Maine](#),*
30 *284 U.S. 312.*

31 *The present tax has been defined by the Supreme Court of Mississippi as an excise and not a property tax,*
32 *[Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson](#), 126 Miss. 34; 88 So. 4; [Knox v. Gulf. M. & N.R. Co.](#), 138 Miss. 70, 104*
33 *So. 689, but in passing on its constitutionality we are concerned only with its practical operation, not its definition*
34 *or the precise form of descriptive words which may be applied to it. See [Educational Films Corp. v. Ward](#), 282*
35 *U.S. 379, 387; [Pacific Co. v. Johnson](#), 285 U.S. 480; [Shaffer v. Carter](#), supra, pp. 54-55.*

36 *It is enough, so far as the constitutional power of the state to levy it is concerned, that the tax is imposed 281*281*
37 *by Mississippi on its own citizens with reference to the receipt and enjoyment of income derived from the conduct*
38 *of business, regardless of the place where it is carried on. The tax, which is apportioned to the ability of the*
39 *taxpayer to bear it, is founded upon the protection afforded to the recipient of the income by the state, in his*
40 *person, in his right to receive the income, and in his enjoyment of it when received. **These are rights and privileges***
41 ***incident to his domicile** in the state and to them the economic interest realized by the receipt of income or*
42 *represented by the power to control it, bears a direct legal relationship. It would be anomalous to say that*
43 *although Mississippi may tax the obligation to pay appellant for his services rendered in Tennessee, see [Fidelity](#)*
44 *[& Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville](#), supra; [Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota](#), supra, still, it could not tax*
45 *the receipt of income upon payment of that same obligation. We can find no basis for holding that taxation of the*
46 *income at the domicile of the recipient is either within the purview of the rule now established that tangibles*
47 *located outside the state of the owner are not subject to taxation within it, or is in any respect so arbitrary or*
48 *unreasonable as to place it outside the constitutional power of taxation reserved to the state. [Maguire v. Trefry](#),*
49 *supra; see [Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville](#), supra.*

50 *The Supreme Court of Mississippi found it unnecessary to pass upon the validity of so much of the statute, added*
51 *by the amendment of 1928, as exempted domestic corporations from the tax on income derived from activities*
52 *outside the state. It said that if the amendment were valid, appellant could not complain; if invalid, he would still*

be subject to the tax, since the act which it amended, § 11, c. 132, Laws of 1924, would then remain in full force, and under it individuals and domestic corporations are taxed alike. *Knox v. Gulf, M. & N.R. Co., supra*.

282*282 But the Constitution, which guarantees rights and immunities to the citizen, likewise insures to him the privilege of having those rights and immunities judicially declared and protected when such judicial action is properly invoked. Even though the claimed constitutional protection be denied on non-federal grounds, it is the province of this Court to inquire whether the decision of the state court rests upon a fair or substantial basis. If unsubstantial, constitutional obligations may not be thus avoided. See *Ward v. Love County*, 253 U.S. 17, 22; *Enterprise Irrigation District v. Canal Co.*, 243 U.S. 157, 164; *Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Commission*, 274 U.S. 651, 655. Upon one of the alternative assumptions made by the court, that the amendment is discriminatory, appellant's constitutional rights were infringed when the tax was levied upon him, and state officers acting under the amendment refrained from assessing the like tax upon his corporate competitors. See *Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett*, 284 U.S. 239, 246. If the Constitution exacts a uniform application of this tax on appellant and his competitors, his constitutional rights are denied as well by the refusal of the state court to decide the question, as by an erroneous decision of it, see *Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co.*, 244 U.S. 499, 508, 512 et seq.; *Smith v. Cahoon*, 283 U.S. 553, 564, for in either case the inequality complained of is left undisturbed by the state court whose jurisdiction to remove it was rightly invoked. The burden does not rest on him to test again the validity of the amendment by some procedure to compel his competitors to pay the tax under the earlier statute. *Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Bennett, supra*, p. 247. See *Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision*, 284 U.S. 23. We therefore conclude that the purported non-federal ground put forward by the state court for its refusal to decide the constitutional question was unsubstantial and 283*283 illusory, and that the appellant may invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to decide the question. [*Lawrence v. State Tax Commission*, 286 U.S. 276 (1932); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10241277000101996613]

Notice from the above that it is a PRIVILEGE and not a RIGHT to have matters under the civil statutory law “adjudicated”:

“282*282 But the Constitution, which guarantees rights and immunities to the citizen, likewise insures to him the privilege of having those rights and immunities judicially declared and protected when such judicial action is properly invoked.”

Petitioner does NOT seek any privileges from this court. Enforcing such CIVIL STATUTORY privileges is a constitutional TORT against those nonresidents such as the Petitioner who have not consensually and voluntarily waived their constitutional rights in exchange for such PRIVILEGES. That VOLUNTARY waiver of PRIVATE constitutional rights in exchange for CIVIL STATUTORY privileges seems to be the ONLY authority for invoking the Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court in *Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority*, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936), in fact.

12.6.5 The right to UNVOLUNTEER

The court is reminded that DOMICILE is voluntary, that STATUTORY “citizenship” is synonymous with domicile in this case involving taxation, that STATUTORY “citizen” status is a product of domicile, and all the obligations attached to that VOLUNTARY CIVIL domicile can’t be voluntary unless this court ALSO recognizes the right of the Petitioner to UNVOLUNTEER:

“The citizen cannot complain, because he has voluntarily submitted himself to such a form of government. He owes allegiance to the two departments, so to speak, and within their respective spheres must pay the penalties which each exacts for disobedience to its laws. In return, he can demand protection from each within its own jurisdiction.”
[*United States v. Cruikshank*, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) [emphasis added]]

“Citizenship and domicile are substantially synonymous. Residency and inhabitation are too often confused with the terms and have not the same significance. Citizenship implies more than residence. **It carries with it the idea of identification with the state [as a PUBLIC officer] and a participation in its functions.** As a citizen, one sustains social, political, and moral obligation to the state and possesses social and political rights under the Constitution and laws thereof. *Harding v. Standard Oil Co. et al.* (C.C.) 182 F. 421; *Baldwin v. Franks*, 120 U.S. 678, 7 S.Ct. 763, 32 L.Ed. 766; *Scott v. Sandford*, 19 How. 393, 476, 15 L.Ed. 691.”
[*Baker v. Keck*, 13 F.Supp. 486 (1936)]

How, then, did you “voluntarily submit” yourself to such a form of government and thereby contract with that government for “protection”? If people fully understood how they did this, many of them would probably immediately withdraw their consent and completely drop out of the corrupted, inefficient, and usurious system of government we have, now wouldn’t

they? We have spent six long years researching this question, and our research shows that it wasn't your nationality as a "national" of a legislatively but not constitutionally foreign state pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(21) that made you subject to their civil laws. Well then, what was it?

It was your voluntary choice of domicile!

How do we know this? Look at the language above:

"The people of the United States resident within any State are subject to two governments"

There are therefore TWO prerequisites to becoming a "subject" under the civil statutory protection franchise:

1. You must have the civil status of "resident" under the statutes of the state, and that status is VOLUNTARY. If it is coerced, the First Amendment prohibition against compelled association and the prohibition against compelled contracting under the "social compact" is violated.
2. You must be DOMICILED within the state because you can't have a civil status WITHOUT such a domicile. Domicile, like civil statuses, is also voluntary and cannot be compelled.²⁸

In fact, the following types of Americans DO have the right to complain if:

1. The government calls "citizen" status voluntary but positively refuses to recognize or protect your right to NOT be a STATUTORY "citizen" while retaining your nationality and "national" status. This:
 - 1.1. Violates the First Amendment and effectively compels you to contract with the government for civil protection.
 - 1.2. Makes the statement on their part that "citizen" status is voluntary a FRAUD.
2. The government PRESUMES that domicile and residence are equivalent, in order to:
 - 2.1. Usurp civil jurisdiction over you that they do not otherwise have.
 - 2.2. Evade the requirement to satisfy their burden of proving on the record that you were "purposefully" and consensually availing yourself of commerce within their civil jurisdiction with people who wanted to be regarded as protected "citizens" or "residents" in the context of YOUR interactions with them. They aren't required to be "citizens" or "residents" for ALL PURPOSES, but only for those that they want to be.
3. The government refuses to recognize your right to be a STATUTORY "citizen" for some purposes but a statutory "non-resident non-person" for other purposes. Since you have a constitutional right to NOT contract and NOT associate, then you ought to be able to choose in each specific case or service offered by government whether you want that specific service, rather than being forced to be a "customer" of government for EVERYTHING if you sign up for ANYTHING. That's called an unconscionable or adhesion contract. The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that not being able to do this is a violation of what they call the "Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine".
4. You were treated as a statutory "citizen" without your consent.
5. You were PRESUMED to be a statutory citizen absent your express written consent.
6. You are PRESUMED to have a civil domicile within the jurisdiction of a court you are appearing before. In the case of federal courts, this presumption is usually false.
7. Your government opponent PRESUMES that STATUTORY citizens and CONSTITUTIONAL citizens are equivalent. They are NOT.
8. The government PRESUMES that because you are born or naturalized in a place, that you are a STATUTORY "citizen". This presumption is FALSE. Those born or naturalized are CONSTITUTIONAL citizens but not necessarily STATUTORY citizens subject to federal law.
9. The government does not provide a way on ALL of its forms to describe those who do NOT consent to statutory citizen status or ANY civil status subject to government law.
10. The government interferes with or refuses to protect your right to change your status to remove yourself from their civil jurisdiction.

The "citizen" the Supreme Administrative Court is talking about above is a statutory "citizen" and not a constitutional "citizen", and the only way you can become subject to statutory civil law is to have a domicile within the jurisdiction of the sovereign. Below is a legal definition of "domicile":

²⁸ See: Why Domicile and Becoming a "Taxpayer" Require Your Consent, Form #05.002, Section 11.16.

1 "domicile. A person's legal home. That place where a man has his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal
2 establishment, and to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning. Smith v. Smith, 206
3 Pa.Super. 310, 213 A.2d. 94. Generally, physical presence within a state and the intention to make it one's home
4 are the requisites of establishing a "domicile" therein. The permanent residence of a person or the place to which
5 he intends to return even though he may actually reside elsewhere. A person may have more than one residence
6 but only one domicile. The legal domicile of a person is important since it, rather than the actual residence,
7 often controls the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities and determines where a person may exercise the
8 privilege of voting and other legal rights and privileges."
9 [Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 485]

10 "This right to protect persons having a domicile, though not native-born or naturalized citizens, rests on the firm
11 foundation of justice, and the claim to be protected is earned by considerations which the protecting power is not
12 at liberty to disregard. Such domiciled citizen pays the same price for his protection as native-born or naturalized
13 citizens pay for theirs. He is under the bonds of allegiance to the country of his residence, and, if he breaks
14 them, incurs the same penalties. He owes the same obedience to the civil laws. His property is, in the same
15 way and to the same extent as theirs, liable to contribute to the support of the Government. In nearly all respects,
16 his and their condition as to the duties and burdens of Government are undistinguishable."
17 [Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)]

18 Notice the phrase "civil laws" above and the term "claim to be protected". What they are describing is a contract to procure
19 the protection of the government, from which a "claim" arises. Those who are not party to the domicile/protection contract
20 have no such claim and are immune from the civil jurisdiction of the government. In other words, they have no "civil status"
21 under the laws of that protectorate:

22 "There are certain general principles which control the disposition of this case. They are, in the main, well
23 settled; the difficulty lies in their application to the particular facts of the case in hand. It is elementary that
24 "every state has an undoubted right to determine the status, or domestic and social condition, of the persons
25 domiciled within its territory, except in so far as the powers of the states in this respect are restrained, or duties
26 and obligations imposed upon them by the constitution of the United States." Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 93.
27 Again, the civil status is governed universally by one single principle, namely, that of domicile, which is the
28 criterion established by law for the purpose of determining the civil status; for it is on this basis that the
29 personal rights of a party, — that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage,
30 succession, testacy, or intestacy, — must depend. Udeny v. Udeny, L.R., 1 H.L.Sc. 457.
31 [Woodward v. Woodward, 11 S.W. 892, 87 Tenn. 644 (Tenn., 1889)]

32 Another implication of the above is that if the STATES have the right to determine civil status, then the people AS
33 INDIVIDUALS from which all their power was delegated have the right to determine their OWN civil status. This right
34 derives from the right to contract and associate and every sovereignty has it. See:

Your Exclusive Right to Declare or Establish Your Civil Status, Form #13.008
<http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm>

35 In fact, there are two categories and four unique ways to become subject to the civil STATUTORY jurisdiction of a specific
36 government. These ways are:

- 37 1. Domicile by choice: Choosing a domicile within a specific jurisdiction.
- 38 2. Domicile by operation of law. Also called domicile of necessity:
 - 39 2.1. Representing an entity that has a domicile within a specific jurisdiction even though not domiciled oneself in said
40 jurisdiction. For instance, representing a federal corporation as a public officer of said corporation, even though
41 domiciled outside the federal zone. The authority for this type of jurisdiction is, for instance, Federal Rule of
42 Civil Procedure 17(b) .
 - 43 2.2. Becoming a dependent of someone else, and thereby assuming the same domicile as that of your care giver. For
44 instance, being a minor and dependent and having the same civil domicile as your parents. Another example is
45 becoming a government dependent and assuming the domicile of the government paying you the welfare check.
 - 46 2.3. Being committed to a prison as a prisoner, and thereby assuming the domicile of the government owning or
47 funding the prison.

48 In addition to the above, one can ALSO become subject involuntarily to the COMMON LAW and not CIVIL STATUTORY
49 jurisdiction of a specific court by engaging in commerce on the territory protected by a specific government and thereby
50 waiving sovereign immunity under:

- 51 1. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (F.S.I.A.), 28 U.S.C. §1605.

2. The Minimum Contacts Doctrine, which implements the Fourteenth Amendment. See *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) .
3. The Longarm Statutes of the state jurisdiction where you are physically situated at the time. For a list of such state statutes, see:
 - 3.1. [SEDM Jurisdictions Database](http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm), Litigation Tool #09.003
 - 3.2. [SEDM Jurisdictions Database Online](http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm), Litigation Tool #09.004** (Member Subscriptions)

We allege that if the above rules are violated then the following consequences are inevitable:

1. A crime has been committed. That crime is identity theft against a nonresident party and it involves using a person's legal identity as a "person" for the commercial benefit of someone else without their express consent. Identity theft is a crime in every jurisdiction within the USA. The [SEDM Jurisdictions Database](http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm), Litigation Tool #09.003 indicated above lists identity theft statutes for every jurisdiction in the USA.
2. If the entity disregarding the above rules claims to be a "government" then it is acting instead as a private corporation and must waive sovereign immunity and approach the other party to the dispute in EQUITY rather than law, and do so in OTHER than a franchise court. Franchise courts include U.S. District Court, U.S. Circuit Court, Tax Court, Traffic Court, and Family Court. Equity is impossible in a franchise court.

See also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943) ("**The United States does business on business terms**") (quoting *United States v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore*, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926)); *Perry v. United States*, *supra* at 352 (1935) ("**When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts [or franchises], it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals who are parties to such instruments. There is no difference . . . except that the United States cannot be sued without its consent**") (citation omitted); *United States v. Bostwick*, 94 U.S. 53, 66 (1877) ("**The United States, when they contract with their citizens, are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf**")"; *Cooke v. United States*, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) (**explaining that when the United States "comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there"**).

See Jones, 1 Cl.Ct. at 85 ("**Wherever the public and private acts of the government seem to commingle, a citizen or corporate body must by supposition be substituted in its place, and then the question be determined whether the action will lie against the supposed defendant**")"; *O'Neill v. United States*, 231 Ct.Cl. 823, 826 (1982) (sovereign acts doctrine applies where, "[w]here [the] contracts exclusively between private parties, the party hurt by such governing action could not claim compensation from the other party for the governing action"). The dissent ignores these statements (including the statement from *Jones*, from which case *Horowitz* drew its reasoning literally verbatim), when it says, *post* at 931, that the sovereign acts cases do not emphasize the need to treat the government-as-contractor the same as a private party. [*United States v. Winstar Corp.* 518 U.S. 839 (1996)]

Below are some interesting facts about domicile that we have discovered through our extensive research on this subject:

1. Domicile is based on where you currently live or have lived in the past. You can't choose a domicile in a place that you have never physically been to. Any attempt to do so would be fraud if you know that is what you are doing and therefore have "mens rea".
2. Domicile is a voluntary choice that only you can make. It acts as the equivalent of a "protection contract" between you and the government. All such contracts require your voluntary "consent", which the above definition calls "intent". That "intent" expresses itself as "allegiance" to the people and the laws of the place where you maintain a domicile.

*"Thus, the Court has frequently held that domicile or residence, more substantial than mere presence in transit or sojourn, is an adequate basis for taxation, including income, property, and death taxes. Since the Fourteenth Amendment makes one a citizen of the state wherein he resides, **the fact of residence creates universally reciprocal duties of protection by the state and of allegiance and support by the citizen. The latter obviously includes a duty to pay taxes, and their nature and measure is largely a political matter.** Of course, the situs of property may tax it regardless of the citizenship, domicile, or residence of the owner, the most obvious illustration being a tax on realty laid by the state in which the realty is located."*
[*Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland*, [347 U.S. 340](http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm) (1954)]

3. Domicile cannot be established without a coincidence of living or having lived in a place and voluntarily consenting to live there “permanently”.
4. Domicile is a protected First Amendment choice of political association. Since the government may not lawfully interfere with your right of association, they cannot lawfully select a domicile for you or interfere with your choice of domicile.
5. Domicile is what is called the “seat” of your property. It is the “state” and the “government” you voluntarily nominate to protect your property and your rights. In effect, it is the “weapon” you voluntarily choose that will best protect your property and rights, not unlike the weapons that early cavemen crafted and voluntarily used to protect themselves and their property.
6. Domicile is not just where you PHYSICALLY LIVE, but where you WANT TO LIVE and where you CONSENT TO LIVE AND BE CIVILLY PROTECTED. No one can dictate what you consent to and therefore no one can lawfully choose your domicile and therefore the place where you are a STATUTORY “taxpayer” EXCEPT you. See:

Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent, Form #05.002
<http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm>

7. In America, there are TWO separate and distinct jurisdictions one may have a domicile within, and only one of the two is subject to federal income taxation:
- 7.1. Federal territory. Called the “United States” in federal statutes.
- 7.2. States of the Union. Legislatively foreign states not subject to federal jurisdiction.

“It is clear that Congress, as a legislative body, exercise two species of legislative power: the one, limited as to its objects, but extending all over the Union: the other, an absolute, exclusive legislative power over the District of Columbia. The preliminary inquiry in the case now before the Court, is, by virtue of which of these authorities was the law in question passed?”
[Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821)]

8. Whether one is “foreign” or “alien” from a legislative perspective is determined by their civil DOMICILE, and NOT their NATIONALITY. One can be a national of the country United States*** by being born in a state of the Union, and yet be the following relative to the jurisdiction of the national government if domiciled outside of federal territory:
- 8.1. A statutory “non-resident non-person” if not engaged in a public office.
- 8.2. A statutory “nonresident alien” (per 26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1)(B)) if engaged in a public office. In this case, the OFFICE is the legal “person” that has a domicile on federal territory while the OFFICER filling said office has legislatively foreign domicile.
9. Those who are neither domiciled on federal territory nor representing an entity domiciled there are not subject to federal statutory civil law or income taxation as confirmed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b). These people are called any of the following in relation to the federal/national government:
- 9.1. Statutory “non-resident non-persons”
- 9.2. “nonresidents”.
- 9.3. “transient foreigners”.
- 9.4. “sojourners”.
- 9.5. “[stateless persons](#)” in relation to federal jurisdiction.
10. The government cannot lawfully coerce you to choose a domicile in a place. A government that coerced you into choosing a domicile in their jurisdiction is engaging in a “protection racket”, which is highly illegal. A coerced domicile is not a domicile of your choice and therefore lawfully confers no jurisdiction or rights upon the government:

“Similarly, when a person is prevented from leaving his domicile by circumstances not of his doing and beyond his control, he may be relieved of the consequences attendant on domicile at that place. In Roboz (USDC D.C. 1963) [Roboz v. Kennedy, 219 F.Supp. 892 (D.D.C. 1963), p. 24], a federal statute was involved which precluded the return of an alien's property if he was found to be domiciled in Hungary prior to a certain date. It was found that Hungary was Nazi-controlled at the time in question and that the persons involved would have left Hungary (and lost domicile there) had they been able to. Since they had been precluded from leaving because of the political privations imposed by the very government they wanted to escape (the father was in prison there), the court would not hold them to have lost their property based on a domicile that circumstances beyond their control forced them to retain.”
[Conflicts in a Nutshell, David D. Siegel and Patrick J. Borchers, West Publishing, p. 24]

11. Domicile is a method of lawfully delegating authority to a “sovereign” to protect you. That delegation of authority causes you to voluntarily surrender some of your rights to the government in exchange for “protection”. That protection comes from the civil and criminal laws that the sovereign passes, because the purpose of all government and all law is “protection”. The U.S. Supreme Court calls this delegation of authority “allegiance”. To wit:

1 "Allegiance and protection [by the government from harm] are, in this connection, reciprocal obligations. The
2 one is a compensation for the other; allegiance for protection and protection for allegiance."
3 [Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 166-168 (1874)]

- 4 12. All allegiance must be voluntary, which is why only consenting adults past the age of majority can have a legal
5 domicile. The following facts confirm this conclusion:
6 12.1. Minors cannot choose a domicile, but by law assume the domicile of their parents.
7 12.2. Incompetent or insane persons assume the domicile of their caregivers.
8 13. It is perfectly lawful to have a domicile in a place OTHER than the place you currently live. Those who find
9 themselves in this condition are called "transient foreigners", and the only laws they are subject to are the criminal laws
10 in the place they are at.

11 *"Transient foreigner. One who visits the country, without the intention of remaining."*
12 *[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1498]*

- 13 14. There are many complicated rules of "presumption" about how to determine the domicile of an individual:
14 14.1. You can read these rules on the web at:

28 Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), Domicile (2003)
<http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/Domicile-28CJS-20051203.pdf>

- 15 14.2. The reason that the above publication about domicile is so complicated and long, is that its main purpose is to
16 disguise the voluntary, consensual nature of domicile or remove it entirely from the decisions of courts and
17 governments so that simply being present on the king's land makes one into a "subject" of the king. This is not
18 how a republican form of government works and we don't have a monarchy in this country that would allow this
19 abusive approach to law to function.

20 *"Yet, it is to be remembered, and that whether in its real origin, or in its artificial state, allegiance, as well as*
21 *fealty, rests upon lands, and it is due to persons. Not so, with respect to Citizenship, which has arisen from the*
22 *dissolution of the feudal system and is a substitute for allegiance, corresponding with the new order of things.*
23 *Allegiance and citizenship, differ, indeed, in almost every characteristic. Citizenship is the effect of compact*
24 *[CONTRACT!]; allegiance is the offspring of power and necessity. Citizenship is a political tie; allegiance is*
25 *a territorial tenure. Citizenship is the charter of equality; allegiance is a badge of inferiority. Citizenship is*
26 *constitutional; allegiance is personal. Citizenship is freedom; allegiance is servitude. Citizenship is*
27 *communicable; allegiance is repulsive. Citizenship may be relinquished; allegiance is perpetual. With such*
28 *essential differences, the doctrine of allegiance is inapplicable to a system of citizenship; which it can neither*
29 *serve to controul, nor to elucidate.* And yet, even among the nations, in which the law of allegiance is the most
30 firmly established, the law most pertinaciously enforced, there are striking deviations that demonstrate the
31 invincible power of truth, and the homage, which, under every modification of government, must be paid to the
32 inherent rights of man.....*The doctrine is, that allegiance cannot be due to two sovereigns; and taking an oath*
33 *of allegiance to a new, is the strongest evidence of withdrawing allegiance from a previous, sovereign...."*
34 *[Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133 (1795); From the syllabus but not the opinion; SOURCE:*
35 *<http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/search/display.html?terms=choice%20or%20conflict%20and%20law&url=/s>*
36 *[upct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0003_0133_ZS.html](http://html/historics/USSC_CR_0003_0133_ZS.html)*
37

- 38 14.3. These rules of presumption relating to domicile may only lawfully act in the absence of express declaration of
39 your domicile provided to the government in written form or when various sources of evidence conflict with each
40 other about your choice of domicile.

41 "This [government] right of domicile, he continues, is not established unless the person makes sufficiently
42 known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration. Vatt. Law Nat. pp. 92, 93."
43 *[Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)]*

- 44 14.4. The purpose for these rules is basically to manufacture the "presumption" that courts can use to "ASSUME" or
45 "PRESUME" that you consented to their CIVIL STATUTORY jurisdiction, even if in fact you did not explicitly
46 do so. All such prejudicial presumptions which might adversely affect your Constitutionally guaranteed rights are
unconstitutional, according to the U.S. Supreme Court:

47 1) [8:4993] *Conclusive presumptions affecting protected interests:*

48 *A conclusive presumption may be defeated where its application would impair a party's constitutionally-protected*
49 *liberty or property interests. In such cases, conclusive presumptions have been held to violate a party's due*
50 *process and equal protection rights. [Vlandis v. Kline (1973) 412 U.S. 441, 449, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 2235; Cleveland*
51 *Bed. of Ed. v. LaFleur (1974) 414 U.S. 632, 639-640, 94 S.Ct. 1208, 1215-presumption under Illinois law that*
52 *unmarried fathers are unfit violates process]*

14.5. The purpose for these complicated rules of presumption is to avoid the real issue, which is whether you voluntarily consent to the civil jurisdiction of the government and the courts in an area, because they cannot proceed civilly without your express consent manifested as a voluntary choice of domicile. In most cases, if litigants knew that all they had to do to avoid the jurisdiction of the court was to not voluntarily select a domicile within the jurisdiction of the court, most people would become “transient foreigners” so the government could do nothing other than just “leave them alone”.

15. You can choose a domicile any place you want. The only requirement is that you must ensure that the government or sovereign who controls the place where you live has received “reasonable notice” of your choice of domicile and of their corresponding obligation to protect you.

The writers upon the law of nations distinguish between a temporary residence in a foreign country for a special purpose and a residence accompanied with an intention to make it a permanent place of abode. The latter is styled by Vattel [in his book The Law of Nations as] “domicile,” which he defines to be “a habitation fixed in any place, with an intention of always staying there.” Such a person, says this author, becomes a member of the new society at least as a permanent inhabitant, and is a kind of citizen of the inferior order from the native citizens, but is, nevertheless, united and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages. This right of domicile, he continues, is not established unless the person makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration. Vatt. Law Nat. pp. 92, 93. Grotius nowhere uses the word “domicile,” but he also distinguishes between those who stay in a foreign country by the necessity of their affairs, or from any other temporary cause, and those who reside there from a permanent cause. The former he denominates “strangers,” and the latter, “subjects.” The rule is thus laid down by Sir Robert Phillimore:

There is a class of persons which cannot be, strictly speaking, included in either of these denominations of naturalized or native citizens, namely, the class of those who have ceased to reside [maintain a domicile] in their native country, and have taken up a permanent abode in another. These are domiciled inhabitants. They have not put on a new citizenship through some formal mode enjoined by the law or the new country. They are de facto, though not de jure, citizens of the country of their [new chosen] domicile.
[Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)]

Notice the phrase “This right of domicile. . . is not established unless the person makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration.”

16. The process of notifying the government that you have nominated them as your protector occurs based on how you fill out usually government and financial forms such as:

16.1. Driver’s license applications. You cannot get a driver’s license in most states without selecting a domicile in the place that you want the license from. See:

Defending Your Right to Travel, Form #06.010

<http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm>

16.2. Voter registration. You cannot register to vote without a domicile in the place you are voting.

16.3. Jury summons. You cannot serve as a jurist without a domicile in the jurisdiction you are serving in.

16.4. Financial forms. Any form that asks for your “residence”, “permanent address”, or “domicile”.

16.5. Tax withholding forms.

17. Tax liability originates from one’s choice of legal domicile and the obligation to pay for “protection” that attaches to that domicile:

“domicile. A person’s legal home. That place where a man has his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning. Smith v. Smith, 206 Pa.Super. 310, 213 A.2d. 94. Generally, physical presence within a state and the intention to make it one’s home are the requisites of establishing a “domicile” therein. The permanent residence of a person or the place to which he intends to return even though he may actually reside elsewhere. A person may have more than one residence but only one domicile. The legal domicile of a person is important since it, rather than the actual residence, often controls the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities and determines where a person may exercise the privilege of voting and other legal rights and privileges.”
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 485]

“Thus, the Court has frequently held that domicile or residence, more substantial than mere presence in transit or sojourn, is an adequate basis for taxation, including income, property, and death taxes. Since the Fourteenth Amendment makes one a citizen of the state wherein he resides, the fact of residence creates universally reciprocal duties of protection by the state and of allegiance and support by the citizen. The latter obviously includes a duty to pay taxes, and their nature and measure is largely a political matter. Of course, the situs of property may tax it regardless of the citizenship, domicile, or residence of the owner, the most obvious illustration being a tax on realty laid by the state in which the realty is located.”
[Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954)]

18. The U.S. Supreme Court has, in fact, held that those WITHOUT a domicile within a jurisdiction and who are therefore nonresidents and who become the target of tax enforcement by a legislatively “foreign” jurisdiction that they are not domiciled within are the victims of EXTORTION, and possibly even crime:

"The power of taxation, indispensable to the existence of every civilized government, is exercised upon the assumption of an equivalent rendered to the taxpayer in the protection of his person and property, in adding to the value of such property, or in the creation and maintenance of public conveniences in which he shares -- such, for instance, as roads, bridges, sidewalks, pavements, and schools for the education of his children. If the taxing power be in no position to render these services, or otherwise to benefit the person or property taxed, and such property be wholly within the taxing power of another state, to which it may be said to owe an allegiance, and to which it looks for protection, the taxation of such property within the domicil of the owner partakes rather of the nature of an extortion than a tax, and has been repeatedly held by this Court to be beyond the power of the legislature, and a taking of property without due process of law. Railroad Company v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262; State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, 19 Wall. 490, 499; Delaware &c. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341, 358. In Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, it was held, after full consideration, that the taking of private property [199 U.S. 203] without compensation was a denial of due process within the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102; Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417; Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 519."
[Union Refrigerator Transit Company v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905)]

19. If you want to provide unambiguous legal notice to the state of your choice to disassociate with them and become a “transient foreigner” in the place where you live who is not subject to the civil laws, you can use the following free form:

Legal Notice of Change in Domicile/Citizenship Records and Divorce from the United States, Form #10.001
<http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm>

We emphasize that there is no method OTHER than domicile available in which to **consent** to the civil laws of a specific place. None of the following conditions, for instance, may form a basis for a prima facie presumption that a specific human being consented to be civilly governed by a specific municipal government:

1. Simply being born and thereby becoming a statutory “national” (per 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(21)) of a specific country is NOT an exercise of personal discretion or an express act of consent.
2. Simply living in a physical place WITHOUT choosing a domicile there is NOT an exercise of personal discretion or an express act of consent.

The subject of domicile is a complicated one. Consequently, we have written a separate memorandum of law on the subject if you would like to investigate this fascinating subject further:

Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent, Form #05.002
<http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm>

12.6.6 **Absent VOLUNTARY membership, the Bill of Right applies and replaces the civil statutory code**

By virtue of being on LAND protected by the constitution, Petitioner retains his constitutional private rights originating from “the LAW of the LAND” (the Constitution). By being LEGALLY BUT NOT PHYSICALLY WITHIN THE state as a corporate fiction called a statutory “citizen”, “resident”, “person”, etc. as a result of choosing a CIVIL domicile, he would be WAIVING said rights in exchange for privileges.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits. FN7 Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124 U.S. 581, 8 S.Ct. 631, 31 L.Ed. 527; Wall v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co., 244 U.S. 407, 411, 412, 37 S.Ct. 609, 61 L.Ed. 1229; St. Louis Malleable Casting Co. v. Prendergast Construction Co., 260 U.S. 469, 43 S.Ct. 178, 67 L.Ed. 351.
[Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936)]

Because he has not chosen and does not consent to choose a domicile, he retains such unalienable rights and the thereby avoids the civil statutory obligations associated with being a “subject” as documented in:

Enumeration of Inalienable Rights, Form #10.002
<https://sedm.org/Forms/10-Emancipation/EnumRights.pdf>

After one as a lemming consents to join this insane self-destructive social compact as a CIVIL “subject” by choosing a civil domicile or residence, here is the malicious treatment that awaits them:

“To be governed is to be watched over, inspected, spied on, directed, legislated, regimented, closed in, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, assessed, evaluated, censored, commanded; all by creatures that have neither the right, nor wisdom, nor virtue . . .

To be governed means that at every move, operation, or transaction one is noted, registered, entered in a census, taxed, stamped, priced, assessed, patented, licensed, authorized, recommended, admonished, prevented, reformed, set right, corrected. Government means to be subjected to tribute, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolized, extorted, pressured, mystified, robbed; all in the name of public utility and the general good.

Then, at the first sign of resistance or word of complaint, one is repressed, fined, despised, vexed, pursued, hustled, beaten up, garroted, imprisoned, shot, machine-gunned, judged, sentenced, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed, and to cap it all, ridiculed, mocked, outraged, and dishonored. That is government, that is its justice and its morality! . . . O human personality! How can it be that you have cowered in such subjection for sixty centuries?”

[Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (born A. D. 1809 – died A. D. 1865)]

The U.S. Supreme Court further declared that the main function of government is to create a system that in effect DESTROYS constitutional rights and substitutes in effect civil statutory privileges in their place by enticing people to acquire such VOLUNTARY forms of membership as domicile or residence and the STATUTORY civil status of “citizen” and “resident” that they give rise to:

*“When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain. “A body politic,” as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, “is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.” This does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights which are purely and exclusively private, Thorpe v. R. & B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 143; but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government, and 125*125 has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. From this source come the police powers, which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 583, “are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, . . . that is to say, . . . the power to govern men and things.” Under these powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good. In their exercise it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold. To this day, statutes are to be found in many of the States upon some or all these subjects; and we think it has never yet been successfully contended that such legislation came within any of the constitutional prohibitions against interference with private property. With the Fifth Amendment in force, Congress, in 1820, conferred power upon the city of Washington “to regulate . . . the rates of wharfage at private wharves, . . . the sweeping of chimneys, and to fix the rates of fees therefor, . . . and the weight and quality of bread,” 3 Stat. 587, sect. 7; and, in 1848, “to make all necessary regulations respecting hackney carriages and the rates of fare of the same, and the rates of hauling by cartmen, wagoners, carmen, and draymen, and the rates of commission of auctioneers,” 9 id. 224, sect. 2.*

From this it is apparent that, down to the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not supposed that statutes regulating the use, or even the price of the use, of private property necessarily deprived an owner of his property without due process of law. Under some circumstances they may, but not under all. The amendment does not change the law in this particular: it simply prevents the States from doing that which will operate as such a deprivation.

[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); SOURCE:

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6419197193322400931]

Conspicuously absent from the above is the ability of government to regulate, and by implication also tax, those who are NOT VOLUNTARY and domiciled civil statutory “citizens”, including CIVIL “nonresidents”, in relation to others. That civil statutory regulation can only occur by the criminal law, the common law, and the constitution and not civil statutory law and must be implemented under equitable rather than civil statutory methods.

The fact that people would, in effect, PAY an income tax as a bribe for the PRIVILEGE of surrendering potentially all of their constitutional rights in exchange for civil statutory privileges as a civil statutory “subject” is beyond comprehension. And to do so at the hands of a completely anarchistic institution that is totally unaccountable to the people it was allegedly created to “serve” is not only beyond comprehension, but constitutes a betrayal of the principles of the constitution itself. See below:

1. *Your Irresponsible, Lawless, Anarchist Beast Government*, Form #05.054
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/YourIrresponsibleLawlessGov.pdf>
2. *Government Corruption*, Form #11.401
<https://sedm.org/home/government-corruption/>

12.6.7 Without a VOLUNTARY act of political and legal association by virtue of domicile, Petitioner is a Nonresident Alien

Without an explicit, knowing, deliberate, voluntary act of political and legal association, the Petitioner remains a nonresident alien in the context of this tax action. He is a nonresident alien for both federal and state purposes. This inevitable result of not choosing a domicile is exhaustively proven in:

Proof that American Nationals are Nonresident Aliens, Form #09.081
<https://sedm.org/Forms/09-Procs/ProofAnNRA.pdf>

For an exhaustive rebuttal of all the government's fallacious arguments to evade protecting the right of the Petitioner to maintain nonresident alien status, see:

Rebutted False Arguments About the Nonresident Alien Position When Used by American Nationals, Form #08.031
<https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/RebArgNRA.pdf>

12.7 Choice of law: Application of the Constitution and the Sixteenth Amendment and the Common Law only are MANDATORY in this action

The Constitution, including the Sixteenth Amendment, is irrelevant to what happens on federal territory within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. This was acknowledged in the landmark case of *Downes v. Bidwell*:

"Indeed, the practical interpretation put by Congress upon the Constitution has been long continued and uniform to the effect [182 U.S. 244, 279] that the Constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase or conquest, only when and so far as Congress shall so direct. Notwithstanding its duty to 'guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government' (art. 4, 4), by which we understand, according to the definition of Webster, 'a government in which the supreme power resides in the whole body of the people, and is exercised by representatives elected by them,' Congress did not hesitate, in the original organization of the territories of Louisiana, Florida, the Northwest Territory, and its subdivisions of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin and still more recently in the case of Alaska, to establish a form of government bearing a much greater analogy to a British Crown colony than a republican state of America, and to vest the legislative power either in a governor and council, or a governor and judges, to be appointed by the President. It was not until they had attained a certain population that power was given them to organize a legislature by vote of the people. In all these cases, as well as in territories subsequently organized west of the Mississippi, Congress thought it necessary either to extend to Constitution and laws of the United States over them, or to declare that the inhabitants should be entitled to enjoy the right of trial by jury, of bail, and of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as other privileges of the bill of rights."
[*Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

The following case also acknowledged that the Thirteenth Amendment is the ONLY provision of the Constitution that can and does ALSO apply within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government over federal territory:

*"... the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases²⁹ provides authoritative guidance on the territorial scope of the term 'the United States' in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Insular Cases were a series of Supreme Court decisions that addressed challenges to duties on goods transported from Puerto Rico to the continental United States. Puerto Rico, like the Philippines, had been recently ceded to the United States. The Court considered the territorial scope of the term 'the United States' in the Constitution and held that this term as used in the uniformity clause of the Constitution was territorially limited to the states of the Union. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 ('[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.' (emphasis added)); see *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244, 251, 21 S.Ct. 770, 773, 45 L.Ed. 1088 (1901) ('[I]t can nowhere be inferred that the territories were considered a part of the United States. The Constitution was created by the people of the United States, as a union of States, to be governed solely by representatives of the States; ... In short, the Constitution deals with States, their people, and their representatives.'); *Rabang*, 35 F.3d at 1452. *Puerto Rico**

²⁹ *De Lima v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 1, 21 S.Ct. 743, 45 L.Ed. 1041 (1901); *Dooley v. United States*, 182 U.S. 222, 21 S.Ct. 762, 45 L.Ed. 1074 (1901); *Armstrong v. United States*, 182 U.S. 243, 21 S.Ct. 827, 45 L.Ed. 1086 (1901); and *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S.Ct. 770, 45 L.Ed. 1088 (1901).

1 was merely a territory "appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States
2 within the revenue clauses of the Constitution." Downes, 182 U.S. at 287, 21 S.Ct. at 787.

3 The Court's conclusion in Downes was derived in part by analyzing the territorial scope of the Thirteenth and
4 Fourteenth Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude "within the
5 United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added). The
6 Fourteenth Amendment states that persons "born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
7 jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. Const. amend
8 XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). The disjunctive "or" in the Thirteenth Amendment demonstrates that "there may
9 be places within the jurisdiction of the United States that are no[t] part of the Union" to which the Thirteenth
10 Amendment would apply. Downes, 182 U.S. at 251, 21 S.Ct. at 773. Citizenship under the Fourteenth
11 Amendment, however, "is not extended to persons born in any place 'subject to [the United States']
12 jurisdiction,' " but is limited to persons born or naturalized in the states of the Union. Downes, 182 U.S. at 251,
13 21 S.Ct. at 773 (emphasis added); see also id. at 263, 21 S.Ct. at 777 ("[I]n dealing with foreign sovereignties,
14 the term 'United States' has a broader meaning than when used in the Constitution, and includes all territories
15 subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal government, wherever located.").³⁰
16 [Valmonte v. I.N.S., 136 F.3d. 914 (C.A.2, 1998)]

17 Likewise, the constitution does not limit what happens to VOLUNTARY statutory "employees" under 5 U.S.C. §2105 either,
18 SO LONG as they are serving in the only place expressly authorized by 4 U.S.C. §72. To wit:

19 "The restrictions that the Constitution places upon the government in its capacity as lawmaker, i.e., as the
20 regulator of private conduct, are not the same as the restrictions that it places upon the government in its capacity
21 as employer. We have recognized this in many contexts, with respect to many different constitutional guarantees.
22 Private citizens perhaps cannot be prevented from wearing long hair, but policemen can. Kelley v. Johnson, 425
23 U.S. 238, 247 (1976). Private citizens cannot have their property searched without probable cause, but in many
24 circumstances government employees can. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (plurality opinion); id.,
25 at 732 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Private citizens cannot be punished for refusing to provide the
26 government information that may incriminate them, but government employees can be dismissed when the
27 incriminating information that they refuse to provide relates to the performance of their job. Gardner v.
28 Broderick, [497 U.S. 62, 95] 392 U.S. 273, 277 -278 (1968). With regard to freedom of speech in particular:
29 Private citizens cannot be punished for speech of merely private concern, but government employees can be fired
30 for that reason. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). Private citizens cannot be punished for partisan
31 political activity, but federal and state employees can be dismissed and otherwise punished for that reason. Public
32 Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947); Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973);
33 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616 -617 (1973)."
34 [Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990)]

35 By the way, Congress has NEVER "expressly authorized" the exercise of public offices connected to the "trade or business"
36 franchise documented in Title 26 of the U.S. Code within the exclusive jurisdiction of ANY constitutional state.³¹ This is
37 covered in:

Challenge to Income Tax Enforcement Authority Within Constitutional States of the Union, Form #05.052
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-Memlaw/ChallengeToIRSEnforcementAuth.pdf>

³⁰ Congress, under the Act of February 21, 1871, ch. 62, § 34, 16 Stat. 419, 426, expressly extended the Constitution and federal laws to the District of Columbia. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 261, 21 S.Ct. at 777 (stating that the "mere cession of the District of Columbia" from portions of Virginia and Maryland did not "take [the District of Columbia] out of the United States or from under the aegis of the Constitution.").

³¹ On this subject, the U.S. Supreme Court held: "'Thus, Congress having power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt, provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to pilots, licenses to trade with the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper for the exercise of that great and extensive power; and the same observation is applicable to every other power of Congress, to the exercise of which the granting of licenses may be incident. All such licenses confer authority, and give rights to the licensee. But very different considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But, it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize [meaning LICENSE with an SSN or TIN, Form #04.205, <https://sedm.org/Forms/04-Tax/2-Withholding/WhyTINIllegal.pdf>] a trade or business [Form #05.001, <https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/TradeOrBusScam.pdf>] within a State in order to tax it."

[License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866)]

Likewise, the Petitioner is NOT availing themselves of any civil statutory privilege within might give rise to an implied waiver of constitutional protections under the Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court:

The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:

[. . .]

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits. FN7 [Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General](#), 124 U.S. 581, 8 S.Ct. 631, 31 L.Ed. 527; [Wall v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co.](#), 244 U.S. 407, 411, 412, 37 S.Ct. 609, 61 L.Ed. 1229; [St. Louis Malleable Casting Co. v. Prendergast Construction Co.](#), 260 U.S. 469, 43 S.Ct. 178, 67 L.Ed. 351. [*Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority*, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936)]

FOOTNOTES:

FN7 Compare [Electric Co. v. Dow](#), 166 U.S. 489, 17 S.Ct. 645, 41 L.Ed. 1088; [Pierce v. Somerset Ry.](#), 171 U.S. 641, 648, 19 S.Ct. 64, 43 L.Ed. 316; [Leonard v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co.](#), 198 U.S. 416, 422, 25 S.Ct. 750, 49 L.Ed. 1108.

*"The words "privileges" and "immunities," like the greater part of the legal phraseology of this country, have been carried over from the law of Great Britain, and recur constantly either as such or in equivalent expressions from the time of Magna Charta. For all practical purposes they are synonymous in meaning, and originally signified a peculiar right or private law conceded to particular persons or places **whereby a certain individual or class of individuals was exempted from the rigor of the common law.** Privilege or immunity is conferred upon any person when he is invested with a legal claim to the exercise of special or peculiar rights, authorizing him to enjoy some particular advantage or exemption.[1]"*
[The Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship, Roger Howell, PhD, 1918, pp. 9-10;
SOURCE:
http://famguardian.org/Publications/ThePrivAndImmOfStateCit/The_privileges_and_immunities_of_state_c.pdf
f]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See Magill v. Browne, Fed.Cas. No. 8952, 16 Fed.Cas. 408; 6 Words and Phrases, 5583, 5584; A J. Lien, "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States," in Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, vol. 54, p. 31.

HOWEVER, Petitioner in this case states under penalty of perjury that:

1. The labor that is the subject of this action was rendered WITHIN the exclusive jurisdiction of a constitutional state.
2. The labor was NOT physically performed within a federal area or enclave subject to the concurrent or civilly overlapping jurisdiction of the state and federal governments.
3. The labor was NOR rendered as a federal statutory "employee" under 5 U.S.C. §2105 or any other civil statutory public fiction or "res" such as "person", "taxpayer", "citizen", "resident", etc.
4. At no time did the Petitioner ever voluntarily consent to be treated AS IF they were a federal statutory "employee" under 5 U.S.C. §2105, 26 U.S.C. §3401(c), or 26 C.F.R. §31.3401(c)-1.
5. The Petitioner in this action is not consensually availing themselves of any government "benefit" by virtue of the labor performed that might give rise to standing to recover the cost of rendering such "benefits".
6. It is a CRIME for a private party rendering PRIVATE labor that is constitutionally protected to impersonate a public officer or statutory "employee" described in 5 U.S.C. §2105 WITHOUT a lawful oath or appointment document. That crime is described in 18 U.S.C. §912.
7. For the court or Plaintiff to sanction treating the Plaintiff AS a civil statutory "employee", "person", "citizen", or "resident" in this case would make them party to the crime described in 18 U.S.C. §912.

8. This is a proceeding under the constitution and the English common law, and not a STATUTORY proceeding. As such, civil statutory law is inapposite to this proceeding unless the state demonstrates a PROPERTY INTEREST as OWNER of the amounts in question. Mere temporary POSSESSION of the funds at issue does NOT constitute "ownership" as legally defined.

THEREFORE, the State and Federal Constitutions DO in fact apply to and limit this action to the EXCLUSION of civil statutory law in this case. As the absolute and EXCLUSIVE owner of the PRIVATE property that is the subject of this proceeding, the Petitioner is the ONLY party who can determine the choice of law dictating this case or exclude the protections of the civil statutory codes from this proceeding as an exercise of his right to exclude any and all others from using or benefitting from his property.

Civil statutory law is "foreign" to this proceeding and has no bearing on this proceeding. Plaintiff is legislatively but not constitutionally "foreign" in relation to the government opposing party.

For further details on the choice of law in this proceeding, see:

Choice of Law, Litigation Tool #01.010
<https://sedm.org/Litigation/01-General/ChoiceOfLaw.pdf>

12.8 Tax returns in question

The following attachment accompanies any and all tax returns file in connection with this matter, which is incorporated by reference:

1040NR Attachment, Form #09.077
<https://sedm.org/Forms/09-Procs/1040NR-Attachment.pdf>

12.9 No concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over the geographic area in question

The separation of powers at the heart of the United States Constitution requires complete separation of the exclusive jurisdiction between the state and national governments.

*"We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8. As James Madison wrote, "[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite." The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). **This constitutionally mandated division of authority "was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties."** Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Ibid. " [U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)]*

"The people of the United States, by their Constitution, have affirmed a division of internal governmental powers between the federal government and the governments of the several states-committing to the first its powers by express grant and necessary implication; to the latter, or [301 U.S. 548, 611] to the people, by reservation, 'the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States.' The Constitution thus affirms the complete supremacy and independence of the state within the field of its powers. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295, 56 S.Ct. 855, 865. The federal government has no more authority to invade that field than the state has to invade the exclusive field of national governmental powers; for, in the oft-repeated words of this court in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725, 'the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government.' The necessity of preserving each from every form of illegitimate intrusion or interference on the part of the other is so imperative as to require this court, when its judicial power is properly invoked, to view with a careful and discriminating eye any legislation challenged as constituting such an intrusion or interference. See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448, 26 S.Ct. 110, 4 Ann.Cas. 737." [Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)]

Jurisdiction over income taxation within federal territories, possessions, and enclaves on the part of the national government is plenary and exclusive. Under the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §105, that jurisdiction is shared with the territory or possession itself but NEVER with Constitutional states. The term “the States”, in fact, is defined in 4 U.S.C. §110(d) to EXCLUDE states mentioned in the constitution and Constitutional states may not consent to be treated AS IF they are such “States” because this would:

1. Break down the constitutional separation of powers.
2. Create a criminal financial conflict of interest between the states and the national government.
3. Constitute a criminal conspiracy against the rights of parties in states of the Union.

The first attempt to break down this constitutional separation of powers occurred in 1939, with the enactment of the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 574, Chapter 59, April 12, 1939. It purported to authorize STATUTORY “States” under 4 U.S.C. §110(d) to concurrently tax public salaries of the national government. However, this act was NEVER codified because it was clearly unconstitutional. You can verify this yourself at:

Table of Popular Names (TOPN): Public Salary Tax Act, Legal Information Institute
https://www.law.cornell.edu/topn/public_salary_tax_act_of_1939

Further, it NEVER authorized CONSTITUTIONAL states to tax the same national public offices. Further, it never geographically authorized the exercise off national public offices within the exclusive jurisdiction of Constitutional states of the Union as mandated by 4 U.S.C. §72. Without such EXPRESS authorization, all such offices were limited in their exercise to the District of Columbia.

Thus, to this day, the income tax upon public offices called “trade or business” in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26) has never been expressly authorized within a constitutional state.

Additional supporting legal authorities on this subject can be found at:

State Income Taxes, Form #05.031
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/StateIncomeTax.pdf>

Exhaustive proof that there is no state or national authority to enforce income taxation within the exclusive jurisdiction of a constitutional state is contained in:

Challenge to Income Tax Enforcement Authority Within Constitutional States of the Union, Form #05.052
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-Memlaw/ChallengeToIRSEnforcementAuth.pdf>

12.10 Petitioner stated in his refund claims that Petitioner has a property right in his labor; and stated in the refund claims and the complaint that the correct tax is \$0; as a matter of law, State did not negate these claims and therefore agrees with them

Petitioner contended in his CONSTITUTIONAL rather than STATUTORY refund claim that Petitioner has a recognized property right in his labor. Petitioner also cited Supreme Court precedent that says if a federal tax is construed as a direct tax on property, it must be apportioned or it is unlawful. Petitioner incorporated that argument into Petitioner’s refund claim. Additionally, Petitioner asserted in his refund claims and in the complaint that the correct tax is and always was \$0.

It is axiomatic that one own’s labor is one’s **property** and that one has a right to exchange one’s own labor for other forms of property, without interference:

*“It has been well said that, “The property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the others from employing whom they think proper.” Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, Bk. I. Chap. 10.”*
[*Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.*, 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1884)]

1 *"'Life,' said Mr. Justice Swayne in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 127, 21 L.Ed. 425, 'is the gift of God,*
2 *and the right to preserve it is the most sacred of the rights of man. Liberty is freedom from all restraints but such*
3 *as are justly imposed by law. Beyond that line lies the domain of usurpation and tyranny. Property is everything*
4 *which has an exchangeable value, and the right of property includes the power to dispose of it according to the*
5 *will of the owner. Labor is property, and, as such, merits protection. The right to make it available is next in*
6 *importance to the rights of life and liberty. It lies, to a large extent, at the foundation of most other forms of*
7 *property. ' "*
8 *[In re Marshall, (1900) 9th Cir. 102 F. 323, 324]*

9 Congress has no general authority to infringe on anyone's right to receive payment in exchange for his or his own labor:

10 *"Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property — partaking of the nature of each —*
11 *is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal*
12 *employment by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property. If this*
13 *right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long-*
14 *established constitutional sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the*
15 *rich; for the vast majority of persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save by working for*
16 *money."*
17 *[Coppage v. Kansas, (1915) 236 U.S. 1, 14]*

18 *"The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce."*
19 *[15 U.S.C. §17]*

20 *"It is unreasonable and unprecedented to say the commerce clause confers upon Congress power to govern*
21 *relations between employers and employees in...local activities. Stout v. Pratt, 12 F. Supp. 864."*
22 *[Labor Board v. Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 99 (1937)]*

23 *"This Court has held that Congress cannot regulate relations between employers and employees engaged*
24 *exclusively in intrastate activities."*
25 *[Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 197, 240 (1938)]*

26 If Congress cannot even regulate employer-employee relations in intrastate activities under the commerce clause, it certainly
27 has no lawful power to impose an income tax generally on all payments for labor in relation in intrastate activities, such as
28 payments Company paid Petitioner for his labor in _____, California. As Petitioner argued in his refund claims, if a
29 federal tax is enforced so as to effectively constitute a direct tax on labor as property, the tax must be apportioned, in order
30 to avoid violating the federal constitution:

31 *"...the conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did not in any degree involve holding that income taxes generically*
32 *and necessarily came within the class of direct taxes on property, but on the contrary recognized the fact that*
33 *taxation on income was in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such unless and until it was concluded*
34 *that to enforce it would amount to accomplishing the result which the requirement as to apportionment of*
35 *direct taxation was adopted to prevent, in which case the duty would arise to disregard form and consider*
36 *substance alone and hence subject the tax to the regulation as to apportionment which otherwise as an excise*
37 *would not apply to it.*
38 *[Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., (1916) 240 U.S. 1, 16-17]*

39 *"If, by calling a tax indirect when it is essentially direct, the rule of protection [apportionment of direct taxes]*
40 *could be frittered away, one of the great landmarks defining the boundary between the nation and the states of*
41 *which it is composed, would have disappeared, and with it one of the bulwarks of private rights and private*
42 *property.*
43 *[Pollock v. Farmers' Loan Trust Co., (1895) 157 U.S. 429, 583]*

44 Lacking apportionment, the federal income tax cannot be construed as intended by Congress to impose a general direct tax
45 on property in the form of payments one receives for one's own labor, without thereby making the tax unconstitutional:

46 *"The plaintiff says that the statute as it is construed and administered is unconstitutional. He is not to be*
47 *defeated by the reply that the Government does not adhere to the construction by virtue of which alone it has*
48 *taken and keeps the plaintiff's money, if this court should think that the construction would make the act*
49 *unconstitutional. While it keeps the money it opens the question whether the act construed as it has construed*
50 *it can be maintained."*
51 *[Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)]*

52 Here, Franchise Tax Board (FTB) has taken (and keeps) Petitioner's money, apparently by virtue of its unlawful construction
53 of Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) §61(a) and California Revenue and Taxation Code (R&TC) §17071 that payments

1 Petitioner received for Petitioner's labor are ipso facto included in "gross income" and are thus subject to both federal and
2 state income taxes.

3 Franchise Tax Board (FTB)'s construction of the definition of "gross income" as necessarily including payments Petitioner
4 received for his labor cannot be maintained, as such construction necessarily makes the federal income tax an unconstitutional
5 direct tax on property without apportionment.

6 Franchise Tax Board (FTB) failed to negate Petitioner's claim of Petitioner's property right in payments Petitioner received
7 for his labor. Franchise Tax Board (FTB) **assumed** as a matter of law that any payments made to Petitioner by Company's
8 for Petitioner's labor constitute "income from whatever source derived" under I.R.C. §61(a) (defining the term "gross
9 income") and thus also "gross income" under R&TC §17071.

10 The trial court erred by assuming Petitioner's remuneration for labor constitutes "gross income" based solely on the facts that
11 Petitioner worked for Company's in _____, California and was paid for his labor.

12 This is contrary to the well-settled principle that one has a property right in one's own labor.

13 It is clear therefore from the facts before the trial court that payments Company's made to Petitioner for his labor are excluded
14 from "gross income"; that Petitioner's correct tax is \$0 as Petitioner claimed in the refund claims and in the complaint; and
15 that Franchise Tax Board (FTB)'s proposed assessment is therefore erroneous. On this basis alone, the order granting
16 summary judgment should be reversed.

17 **12.11 Petitioner is entitled to a construction of the term "gross income" that excludes Company's**
18 **payments to Petitioner for his labor**

19 In any case, federal law does not clearly and unequivocally establish that the payments company made to Petitioner for his
20 labor constitute "gross income". Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to a construction of the meaning of "gross income" that
21 excludes payments company made to Petitioner for his labor.

22 " '... [I]n case of doubt statutes levying taxes are construed most strongly against the government and in favor of
23 the taxpayer.' " *[Larson v. Duca (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d. 324, 329, 261 Cal.Rptr. 559]*

24
25 I.R.C. §61(a) states that

26 "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all **income** from whatever **source derived**."

27 As the term "income" is not defined in the I.R.C., Petitioner is entitled to a construction that **excludes his** remuneration for
28 labor from the definition of "gross income". On this basis alone, Petitioner should be awarded summary judgment.

29 In any case, the word "income" in I.R.C. §61(a) is used in its constitutional sense:

30 "Section 61(a) provides that gross income includes 'all income from whatever source derived.' This definition is
31 based upon the 16th Amendment and **the word 'income' is used in its constitutional sense.**" H.R. Rep. No. 1337,
32 *supra*, note 10, at A18. A virtually identical statement appears in S. Rep. No. 1622, *supra*, note 10, at 168. "
33 *[Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., (1955) 348 U.S. 426, 433 n.11]*

34 It is crucial to recognize the distinction between income and the **source** from which income might (or might not) be derived.
35 For example, a private business making a profit from selling the personal services of its workers (such as a law firm) would
36 have income *derived* from labor. In such a case, only the *profit* is income derived from the source (the services of others),
37 thus included in the meaning of "income from whatever source derived". But compensation paid to the private business is
38 gross receipts; it is *not* itself income derived from a source-it is only the source from which the income was derived. Logically,
39 the fruit of a tree cannot be the same thing as the tree.

40 "Income is a broad term which, for tax purposes, includes substantially all payments which have not been
41 specifically **excluded** by statutory **or decisional law from the meaning of "income."** See *Commissioner of*
42 *Internal Revenue v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 75 S.Ct. 473, 99 L.Ed. 483 (1955)* ".
43 *[United States v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., (1979) D. Md. 464 F. Supp. 1285, 1292]*

Remuneration for one's own labor is a conversion of one form of property for another, and thus is excluded from the meaning of "income from whatever source derived" by decisional law.

The gross receipts of a business are not gross income. *Helvering v. Syndicate Varieties*, (1944) (D.C. Cir.) 140 F.2d. 344, 345 (citing Treasury Regulations 94, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1936).

Had Petitioner made a profit by selling the labor/personal services of others, Petitioner would be entitled to deduct expenses, and only the **profit** derived from the compensation for those services would be considered income. The court cannot therefore construe all payments ("gross receipts") made to Petitioner for his labor (assuming arguendo that it constitutes "compensation for services") as itself being income derived from a source without violating Petitioner's right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the only permissible construction of I.R.C. §61(a)(1) is that "compensation for services" is not itself "income derived from a source" but is only a **source** from which income might (or might not) be derived.

Further, to construe "compensation for services" as itself being income derived from a source would have the effect of making the federal tax on such income into an unconstitutional direct tax on property without apportionment.

Though it seems that I.R.C. §61(a)(1) was deliberately written ambiguously in order to deceive the public for purposes of maximizing revenue, Congress apparently knew better than to explicitly define "income" to include compensation for services in I.R.C. §61(a) because Congress **has no lawful power** to change the definition of "income" from its meaning in the Sixteenth Amendment to the federal constitution:

The United States Supreme Court in explained this:

"In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from Article I of the Constitution may have proper force and effect, save only as modified by the [Sixteenth] Amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not "income," as the term is there used; and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised. (emphasis added). [Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920)]

The *Eisner* court went on (at 207) to define the term "income":

*"Income may be defined as the **gain** derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined," provided it be understood to include **profit gained** through a sale or **conversion of capital assets**, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case (pp. 183, 185)."*

The *Eisner* court recognized that the Sixteenth Amendment did not extend the taxing power to new subjects:

*"The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the Amendment was adopted. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan Trust Co., [158 U.S. 601](#), under the Act of August 27, 1894, c. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553, it was held that taxes upon rents and profits of real estate and upon returns from investments of personal property were in effect **direct taxes upon the property from which such income arose, imposed by reason of ownership**; and that **Congress could not impose such taxes without apportioning them** among the States according to population, as required by Art. I, § 2, cl. 3, and § 9, cl. 4, of the original Constitution.*

Afterwards, and evidently **in recognition of the limitation upon the taxing power of Congress** thus determined, the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted, in words lucidly expressing the object to be accomplished: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on **incomes, from whatever source derived**, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." As repeatedly held, **this did not extend the taxing power to new subjects**, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the States of taxes laid on income. *Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.*, [240 U.S. 1, 17-19](#); *Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.*, [240 U.S. 103, 112 et seq.](#); *Peck Co. v. Lowe*, [247 U.S. 165, 172-173](#). The United States Tax Court in 2019 acknowledged that the *Eisner* definition is still the controlling definition for the term "income":

"The issue in Eisner v. Macomber was the taxability of a stock dividend (raising questions admittedly different from those in this case and in Alpenglöw), and the Supreme Court did indeed observe in Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431, that the definition in Eisner v. Macomber "was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions." However, even after Glenshaw Glass, one can still say: "Implicit in this construction [in

Eisner v. Macomber of "income" as it is used in the Sixteenth Amendment] is the concept that **gain is an indispensable ingredient of 'income,'** and it is this concept which provides the **standard by which we must determine whether the tax * * * is a tax on 'income' within the meaning of the 16th amendment.**" Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 653, 680 (1959) (Train, J., dissenting; emphasis in original), *aff'd*, 277 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1960). Again, Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207, held that **"the essential matter * * * [is] a gain, a profit", and this "essential" point is hardly dictum."**)
[N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants Inc. v. Comm'r, 153 T.C. No. 4, at *30-31 (U.S.T.C. Oct. 23, 2019)]

As the Tax Court stated, it is **mandatory** under the Sixteenth Amendment that taxation of income take account of the **basis** in a capital asset, so that only a **gain is subject to tax, not gross receipts.**

"C. "Income" is gain. The taxation of "income" must take account of the "basis" in a capital asset and of the COGS of inventory--not merely as an exercise of "legislative grace" but as mandatory under the Sixteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Why?

A proper regard for * * * [the] genesis [of the Sixteenth Amendment], as well as its very clear language, requires also that this amendment shall not be extended by loose construction * * *. [I]t becomes essential to distinguish between what is and is not "income," as the term is there used, and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. * * * For the present purpose we require only a clear definition of the term "income," as used in common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the amendment * * *. After examining dictionaries in common use * * *, we find little to add to the succinct definition * * *, "Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined" * * *. "The N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants Inc. Tax Court held that when gross receipts are being taxed, it is not the taxpayer's income that is being taxed. Note that the Tax Court for these purposes makes no distinction between a taxpayer that is a business and a taxpayer that is an individual:

"Thus, these "mandatory exclusion[s]" of basis and COGS, which the Court of Appeals acknowledged in *Alpenglow*, arise not from any express constitutional rule about COGS or basis but rather from the very meaning of the "incomes" that the Sixteenth Amendment permits Congress to tax. "[T]he essential matter * * * [is] a gain, a profit". *Eisner v. Macomber*, 252 U.S. at 207; see also *Doyle*, 247 U.S. at 184-189 ("income" * * * convey[s] * * * the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities"). Congress taxes something other than a taxpayer's "income" when it taxes gross receipts without accounting for basis or COGS--and, I would hold, when it taxes gross receipts without accounting for the ordinary and necessary expenses that are incurred in the course of business and must be paid before one can be said to have gain."
[N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants Inc. v. Comm'r, 153 T.C. No. 4, at *27-29 (U.S.T.C. Oct. 23, 2019)]

"SEC. 22. GROSS INCOME.

"(a) GENERAL DEFINITION. — 'Gross income' includes **gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service** . . . of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

This Court has frequently stated that this language was used by Congress to exert in this field "the full measure of its taxing power." *Helvering v. Clifford*, 309 U.S. 331, 334; *Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co.*, 300 U.S. 216, 223; *Douglas v. Willcuts*, 296 U.S. 1, 9; *Irwin v. Gavit*, 268 U.S. 161, 166. "
[*Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.*, 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955)]

Thus, the Supreme Court recognized in 1955 that this definition of "gross income" at §22(a) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code reflected the "full measure" of Congressional taxing power. That provision made clear that gains, profits, and income *derived from* wages, salaries or compensation for personal service is gross income:

§22 (a) General Definition. — 'Gross income' includes **gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service**, of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever.

[1939 Internal Revenue Code, §22(a)]

1 If “wages, salaries or compensation for personal service are construed to **themselves** constitute “income derived from a
2 source”, then the “gains, profits and income derived from” language in the above provision would be **superfluous**. A statute
3 should be construed so that words and phrases are not “superfluous, void, or insignificant.” *TRW Inc. v. Andrews*, 534 U.S.
4 19, 31, 122 S.Ct. 441, 151 L.Ed.2d. 339 (2001). Therefore, wages, salaries or compensation for personal service must be
5 construed as the only possible sources from which a gain might be derived, and **none of them constitutes “income derived**
6 **from a source” in and of itself.**

7 Further, that provision at §22(a) also establishes that compensation received by certain federal officials, while still not being
8 income derived from a source, is **nevertheless** included in “gross income”:

9 “In the case of Presidents of the United States and judges of courts of the United States taking office after June
10 6, 1932, the compensation received as such shall be included in gross income; and all Acts fixing the
11 compensation of such Presidents and judges are hereby amended accordingly.”

12 This language in the above provision would be unnecessary if **all** compensation received for one’s labor is
13 necessarily income derived from a source, as such compensation would already be included in gross income by
14 virtue of the “all income from whatever source derived” language.

15 Therefore the “full measure” of Congressional taxing power includes the power to tax federally connected compensation and
16 therefore to include such compensation as “gross income”; but that “full measure” does **not** include the power to define **non-**
17 **federally connected remuneration for labor as “income derived from a source”.**

18 The term “compensation for services” is included in I.R.C. §61(a), but, assuming arguendo that the payments Petitioner
19 received constitute “compensation for services” the language is ambiguous as to whether compensation for services **itself**
20 constitutes gross income or is only a **source** from which income might (or might not) be derived.

21 The Treasury Regulation under I.R.C. §61(a) at 26 C.F.R. §1.61-2 states the following:

22 “Wages, salaries, commissions paid salesmen, **compensation for services on the basis of a percentage of**
23 **profits...are income** to the recipients unless excluded by law.”

24 [26 C.F.R. §1.61-2]

25 By omission, it is clear that “compensation for services” that is **not** on the basis of a percentage of **profits (i.e., income)** is
26 **not** income to the recipients. It would be unnecessary for Treasury to state that compensation for services **on the basis of**
27 **profits** is income if **all** compensation for services is already income anyway.

28 The “on the basis of a percentage of profits” language indicates that Congress and Treasury do not intend for all
29 “compensation for services” to necessarily be construed as “income”.

30 Franchise Tax Board (FTB) did not assert that the payments Company’s made to Petitioner were “compensation for services”
31 on the basis of a percentage of profits. Nor did the trial court conclude that Petitioner’s remuneration is income derived from
32 a source; the court simply assumed it is income derived from a source and skipped ahead to concluding it must therefore be
33 “gross income”.

34 In sum, there is no valid basis for construing “compensation for services” in I.R.C. §61(a) to include payments Company
35 made to Petitioner.

36 Petitioner is entitled to a construction of I.R.C. §61(a) that excludes payments made to Petitioner for his labor from the
37 meaning of “income derived from a source” and therefore excludes such remuneration from his “gross income”.

38 On that basis, summary judgment should be granted to Petitioner, with a finding that the correct tax is \$0 and that Petitioner
39 is therefore entitled to a refund of the \$_____ Petitioner established that he paid in his refund claims.

1 **12.12 State failed to establish that payments made to Petitioner by Company constitute “gross**
2 **income” to Petitioner under the applicable definition of “gross income” at I.R.C. §872(a)**

3 In any case, the undisputed facts show that Petitioner established “nonresident alien individual” federal income tax status
4 with the Internal Revenue Service for the _____ tax year. Petitioner is entitled to an inference that the individual’s income
5 tax status is nonresident alien. The trial court erred by failing to make this inference and thereby failing to apply the applicable
6 definition of “gross income” (assuming arguendo that the remuneration constitutes “income derived from a source”).

7 The applicable definition of “gross income” is found at I.R.C. Section 872(a):

8 *I.R.C. §872(a) General Rule —In the case of a nonresident alien individual, except where the context clearly*
9 *indicates otherwise, gross income includes only—*

10 *I.R.C. §872(a)(1) —gross income which is derived from sources within the United States and which is not*
11 *effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States, and*

12 *I.R.C. §872(a)(2) —gross income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within*
13 *the United States.*

14 Note that the remuneration must first qualify as “gross income” under the general meaning of the term at I.R.C. §61(a). **I.R.C.**
15 **§872(a)** establishes that for a nonresident alien individual, the gross income must have some connection with the United
16 States.

17 The I.R.C. provides a general definition for the term “United States” for all of the I.R.C.--but only when that term is used in
18 a geographical sense:

19 *I.R.C. §7701(a)(9) United States —The term “United States” when used in a geographical sense includes only*
20 *the States and the District of Columbia.*

21 As with all definitions of terms at I.R.C. Section 7701(a), the definition provided there does not apply where “otherwise
22 provided” or where that definition is “manifestly incompatible with the intent of “this title”.

23 Congress could have used the phrases “derived from sources located in the United States” and “engaged in a trade or business
24 located in the geographical United States” if it wanted to clearly express that “United States” was being used in its
25 geographical sense in 26 U.S.C. §872(a). Since there is no such language, Petitioner is entitled to a construction of the
26 meaning of “United States” as non-geographical. Tax statutes are construed strictly in favor of the taxpayer and against the
27 government. *Barker Bros., Inc. v. Los Angeles*, 10 Cal.2d. 603, 608 (Cal. 1938)

28 According to the United States Supreme Court, there are various possible meanings for the term “United States”, so it
29 necessarily depends on the context in which the term is used:

30 *“The term “United States” may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign*
31 *occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. It may designate the territory*
32 *over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, or it may be the collective name of the states which are*
33 *united by and under the Constitution.”*
34 *[Hooven Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 671-72 (1945)]*

35 In federal law and in federal courts, “United States” in a non-geographical sense is understood in many instances to refer to
36 the **federal government itself**. The United States in that context is an **entity**, not a physical location. Note how the court in
37 the citation below uses the term “United States” interchangeably with the term “the government” (clearly referring to the
38 **federal** government):

39 *“The United States bears the initial burden of proof in an action to collect taxes. *United States v. Stonehill*, 702*
40 *F.2d. 1288, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079, 104 S.Ct. 1440, 79 L.Ed.2d 761 (1984); *Palmer v.**
41 **Internal Revenue Service*, 116 F.3d. 1309, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). The government's burden can be met by the*
42 *presentation of federal tax assessments. *Stonehill*, 702 F.2d. at 1293. A presumption of correctness attaches to*
43 *the government's tax assessment, and introduction of the assessment establishes a prima facie case. *Id.* The*
44 *presumption arises when it is substantiated by a minimal evidentiary foundation. *Id.* The government's proffer of*
45 *some substantive evidence that the taxpayer received unreported income is sufficient. *Id.* ”*
46 *[U.S. v. Cowan, 535 F.Supp.2d. 1135, 1143 (D. Haw. 2008)]*

We can also see that Congress recognizes in the United States Code that the term “United States” when used in a non-geographical sense (an entity, not a place) may refer to the federal government, and/or parts thereof, such as at 28 USC §3002:

28 U.S.C. §3002

(15) “United States” means—

(A) a Federal corporation; an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or an instrumentality of the United States.

Again, tax statutes are construed strictly against the government. *Barker Bros. v. Los Angeles*, 10 Cal.2d. 603, 608 [76 P.2d 97]; Petitioner is therefore entitled to construe the meaning of “United States” in I.R.C. §872 as “federal government”.

FTB argues (RB page 15.) that Company issued a W-2 to Petitioner reporting that it paid Petitioner \$_____ in “Wages, tips, other compensation.” FTB argues that this proves the payment Petitioner received “is taxable income and subject to income tax” (*Ibid.*) merely because Petitioner “does not dispute that she received these payments for his work with Company” (RB 15.) “[n]or does Petitioner dispute that she received this compensation in exchange for services she provided (*Ibid.*)

It is certainly true that Petitioner does not dispute receiving \$_____ in remuneration from Company for his labor. However, as a matter of law, the mere fact that the remuneration was reported on Form W-2 by Company does not conclusively establish that the remuneration constitutes “income” or “gross income” to Petitioner or as FTB argues: “taxable income...subject to income tax” (*Ibid.*)

As a matter of law, a W-2 form is a return rendered to the Secretary under the provisions of I.R.C. §6041(a), which states (in pertinent part):

I.R.C. §6041(a) Payments Of \$600 Or More —

All persons engaged in a trade or business and making payment in the course of such trade or business to another person, of rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable gains, profits, and income (other than payments to which section 6042(a)(1), 6044(a)(1), 6047(e), 6049(a), or 6050N(a) applies, and other than payments with respect to which a statement is required under the authority of section 6042(a)(2), 6044(a)(2), or 6045), of \$600 or more in any taxable year, or, in the case of such payments made by the United States, the officers or employees of the United States having information as to such payments and required to make returns in regard thereto by the regulations hereinafter provided for, shall render a true and accurate return to the Secretary, under such regulations and in such form and manner and to such extent as may be prescribed by the Secretary, setting forth the amount of such gains, profits, and income, and the name and address of the recipient of such payment.

Thus, it is clear that, pursuant to I.R.C. §6041(a), Company, by issuing a Form W-2 reporting Petitioner’s remuneration, has represented on such form that such remuneration was paid “in the course of [a] trade or business” and that such remuneration constitutes “gains, profits, and income.”

A W-2 form, like a 1099 form, is an “informational return filed by a third party to the relationship between the IRS and the taxpayer, which reports income as that third party believes it to be...” *Daines v. Alcatel, S.A.*, 105 F.Supp.2d. 1153, 1155 (E.D. Wash. 2000).

Such representations on Form W-2 thus amount to the filer expressing his belief and providing a lay opinion as to conclusions of law; that does not conclusively establish the conclusion of law that Petitioner’s remuneration constitutes “gains, profits and income”. Nor does such representation conclusively establish that the remuneration was paid in the course of a “trade or business” a term of art in the I.R.C. (see I.R.C. §7701(a)(26). Congress at I.R.C. §6201(d) recognizes that a third-party informational return is not the final word on what a taxpayer’s taxable income is. As provided in I.R.C. §6201(d):

In any court proceeding, if a taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect to any item reported on an information return ... by a third party ... the [IRS] shall bear have the burden of producing reasonable and probative information concerning such deficiency in addition to such information return.

See also: *Daines v. Alcatel, S.A.*, 105 F.Supp.2d. 1153, 1155 (E.D. Wash. 2000) (“The Tax Court has held that a Form 1099 is insufficient, on its own, to establish a taxpayer’s taxable income. See *Estate of Gryder v. Commissioner*, T.C. Memo. 1993-141, 1993 WL 97427, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2298, T.C.M. (RIA) 93,141 (1993), citing *Portillo v. Commissioner*, 932 F.2d. 1128

(5th Cir.1991). *See also Portillo v. Commissioner*, 988 F.2d. 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1993) (a Form 1099 is "insufficient to form a rational foundation for the tax assessment against the [taxpayers in this case...Thus, while a Form 1099 can serve as the basis for the inception of an IRS investigation, it cannot and does not, on its own, create tax liability or establish how much income the taxpayer actually received.]

Although the *Daines* court was specifically addressing a 1099 form, a W-2 form is also an informational return under the provisions of I.R.C. §6041(a). Therefore, the same principle applies: a W-2 cannot on its own establish how much income the taxpayer actually received (or whether the amounts received actually constitute "income" or "income paid in the course of a trade or business.") because it amounts to witness testimony as to the witness's beliefs concerning conclusions of law.

This is substantively similar to the well-settled principle that a witness may not testify to conclusions of law. *See People v. Contreras*, D072316, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 19, 2018) ("Matters that go beyond common experience and require particular [specialized] knowledge may not properly be the subject of lay opinion testimony." (*People v. DeHoyos*, 57 Cal.4th. 79, 131 (2013).) In general, witnesses may not testify about issues of law or draw legal conclusions. (*People v. Torres*, 33 Cal.App.4th. 37, 45 (1995).) "Such legal conclusions do not constitute substantial evidence." (*Downer v. Bramet* (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d. 837, 841.)")

See also Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Zuckerman (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d. 1113, 1135-1136; *Hyatt v. Sierra Boat Co.* (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d. 325, 338-339.)"An opinion is not substantial evidence when it is based on speculative assumptions and on facts which are not otherwise proved."

Here, the FTB has presented no facts to prove that Petitioner's remuneration constitutes "gains, profits and income" or that it constitutes income "paid in the course of a trade or business". FTB relies on controverted lay opinion testimony (via the W-2 form) in an attempt to establish that those conclusions of law are applicable to Petitioner's remuneration for his labor. Such evidence is not substantial evidence.

Nevertheless, FTB argues that the W-2 itself establishes that Petitioner had "taxable income...subject to income tax", merely because Petitioner does not dispute that she received the amounts of payments for his labor reported by Company on form W-2.

Petitioner with his tax returns clearly controverted the W-2 filer's lay opinion/belief (couched as conclusions of law) that Petitioner's remuneration constitutes gains, profits or income paid in the course of a trade or business, in that Petitioner obviously excluded that remuneration from his "gross income" on his returns. *See: Ross v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, 169 F.2d. 483, 496 (1st Cir. 1948) ("Inasmuch as the tax incidence of so many transactions is as doubtful as it is, from the mere failure to report income **no more significant inference** should be drawn than the taxpayer's own **interpretation of the law.** ").

FTB does not bother explaining why the opinions/conclusions of law made by the filer of the original W-2 (that the remuneration constitutes "income" and that such "income" was paid in the course of a trade or business) should be given greater weight than Petitioner's contrary determinations and conclusions of law (represented on his returns). Indeed, FTB's position ignores these conclusions of law, reflecting FTB's preposterous position that income for federal tax purposes necessarily includes "money you earn by working" (RB page 15.).

FTB makes an ipse dixit argument that Petitioner's remuneration for his labor constitutes "compensation for services" (RB 15.) although FTB concedes that Petitioner was paid an hourly wage (RB 9.) FTB provides no explanation or authority whatsoever for equating Petitioner's hourly wages with "compensation for services" under I.R.C. §61(a). Therefore, FTB's argument that Petitioner's wages necessarily constitute "compensation for services" should be considered abandoned. (*See Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.*, 61 Cal.App.4th. 1480, 1488 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)).

In any case, there is no mention of "hourly wages" in I.R.C. §61(a). Congress repeatedly distinguishes wages from compensation for services in the IRC, making it clear that Congress did not intend wages to necessarily be equated with compensation for services. (*See I.R.C. §6041(a), §871(a), and §32(c)(2)(A)(i).*)

Similarly, in the predecessor provision to I.R.C. §61(a), i.e., §22(a) of the 1939 IRC, compensation paid to the President of the United States and federal judges is not referred to as "wages" nor is such compensation equated with the term "wages".

Treasury also clearly distinguishes wages from compensation for services in 26 C.F.R. §1.61-2.

Petitioner is thus entitled to a construction of “compensation for services” that excludes his hourly wages. See *Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain*, 192 U.S. 397, 416 (1904) (“Keeping in mind the well settled rule, that the citizen is exempt from taxation, unless the same is imposed by clear and unequivocal language, and that where the construction of a tax is doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of those upon whom the tax is sought to be laid, ”).

In any event, FTB points to I.R.C. §61(a), which, after stating that gross income generally means all income from whatever source derived...goes on to state “including...compensation for services”. (RB 14.)

FTB argues that I.R.C. §61(a) is “unambiguous” (RB 16.) and thus “includes compensation for services in gross income”. Thus, FTB concludes, Petitioner’s purported “compensation” is included in “gross income” and is taxable. (RB 14-15.)

Assuming arguendo that “wages” are necessarily included in “compensation for services”, FTB misconstrues I.R.C. §61(a) to necessarily include compensation for services as an example of “gross income” i.e., “income from whatever source derived.”

FTB’s misconstruction of I.R.C. §61(a) as applied to Petitioner’s remuneration for his labor would make the statute plainly unconstitutional. As already stated, “income” is a constitutional term that cannot be construed to necessarily include money Petitioner earned from working for Company See *McCullough v. Virginia*, 172 U.S. 102, 112 (1898) (“It is elementary law that every statute is to be read in the light of the Constitution. **However broad and general its language**, it cannot be interpreted as extending beyond those matters which it was within the **constitutional power of the legislature to reach.** ”)

A proper construction of I.R.C. §61(a) that presents no such constitutional infirmity is to construe “compensation for services” as not itself constituting income, but merely a *source* from which income (thus “gross income”) may be derived. See *Boos v. Barry*, 485 U.S. 312, 333 (1988) (“it is well established that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions if such a construction is fairly possible.”)

FTB’s superficial reading of I.R.C. §61(a) as necessarily including “compensation for services” in gross income is shown to be plainly contrary to the intent of Congress by examining the legislative history of the statutory definition of “gross income” (see *Greyhound Corporation v. United States*, 495 F.2d. 863, 868-69 (9th Cir. 1974) [“Resort may be had to explanatory legislative history, no matter how clear the statutory words may appear on **superficial examination**. *Harrison v. Northern Trust Co.*, 317 U.S. 476, 63 S.Ct. 361, 87 L.Ed. 407 (1943); *Northwestern Mutual Fire Ass’n. v. Commissioner*, 181 F.2d. 133, 135 (C.A. 9, 1950).”]

The U.S. Supreme Court in *Glenshaw Glass* (at 429 and 432-433 and footnote 11) compares the language of the current I.R.C. §61 with the language of its predecessor provision from the 1939 I.R.C. at §22(a). The court states (at 432) that “the definition of gross income (at I.R.C. §61) has been **simplified** (from the meaning at section 22(a) of the 1939 IRC) but **no effect** upon its **present broad scope was intended.**”

Thus, the simplified language of I.R.C. §61 did not narrow the scope of what is “gross income” nor did it **expand the scope** of what is “gross income” from the meaning provided in §22(a) of the 1939 IRC.

Thus, according to the U.S. Supreme Court in *Glenshaw Glass*, the language of §22(a) of the 1939 I.R.C. **may** (and in this case, **must still be applied**). Such application plainly reveals that FTB has **misconstrued** the “simplified” definition of “gross income” at I.R.C. §61(a).

It is perfectly clear from the language of I.R.C. §22(a) (as cited by the *Glenshaw Glass* court at 429) that wages and compensation for services do not themselves constitute income, but are only examples of sources from which income might be derived:

SEC. 22. GROSS INCOME.

“(a) **GENERAL DEFINITION.** — ‘Gross income’ includes gains, profits, and **income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service** . . . of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income **derived from any source** whatever. . . .”

1 Read literally, it is clear from §22(a) that wages are not themselves income, nor is compensation for services itself income;
2 they are only examples of sources from which income might be derived, regardless of how inconvenient this may be to FTB.
3 See *Busse v. C.I.R.*, 479 F.2d. 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 1973) (“It is not our understanding that a taxing statute is only to be read
4 literally when a literal reading favors the Government. * * *”)

5 Furthermore, Congress enacted a special provision at §22(a) of the 1939 I.R.C. that expressly includes the compensation of
6 Presidents of the United States and federal judges in “gross income”:

7 “...In the case of Presidents of the United States and judges of courts of the United States taking office after June
8 6, 1932, the compensation received as such **shall be included in gross income**; and all Acts fixing the
9 compensation of such Presidents and judges are hereby amended accordingly.”

10 Even in that case, such compensation is not purported to be income derived from a source; in that case the mere fact that the
11 federal government is the source of the compensation brings such compensation within the tax power of Congress by way of
12 the “needful rules and regulations” clause of the federal constitution with respect to the territory and other property belonging
13 to the United States (see Article IV Section 3, Clause 2 of the federal constitution).

14 That provision of §22(a) of the 1939 I.R.C. would be superfluous if *all* compensation for services necessarily constitutes
15 income, because such compensation would *already* be included in gross income by way of the general definition of gross
16 income at §22(a). See *Weaver v. City County of San Francisco*, No. C 03-01589 SI, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2004) (“Under
17 accepted canons of statutory interpretation, “one provision of a statute should not be interpreted in a manner that renders other
18 sections of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.” U.S. v. Fiorillo, 186 F.3d. 1136, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999)
19 (internal quotations and citations omitted).”)

20 Thus, it is clear that FTB misconstrues I.R.C. §61(a) so as to erroneously conclude that wages or compensation for services
21 themselves necessarily constitute income derived from a source; thus, FTB erroneously concludes that Petitioner’s earnings
22 in and of themselves necessarily constitute “gross income” under I.R.C. §61(a). FTB construes I.R.C. §61 overbroadly so as
23 to tax receipts that are not constitutionally taxable. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes in *Glenshaw Glass* (at 433) that
24 the language of the statute must show “a clear legislative attempt to bring the taxing power to bear upon...receipts
25 **constitutionally taxable**”.

26 It appears from §22(a) of the 1939 I.R.C. that compensation of Presidents of the United States and federal judges are the **only**
27 compensation for services that can be construed as themselves being receipts constitutionally taxable and thus included in
28 gross income. FTB has not established that Petitioner received compensation for performing services as the President of the
29 United States or as a federal judge. Therefore, FTB has not established facts sufficient to find Petitioner’s earnings are
30 themselves included in “gross income” under that special provision at §22(a) of the 1939 I.R.C. (still applicable law in terms
31 of defining “gross income”).

32 Absent some other specific provision of I.R.C. that includes Petitioner’s remuneration for his labor in Petitioner’s gross
33 income, Petitioner is entitled to an inference that his remuneration for labor is **excluded** from his gross income. FTB did not
34 argue to the trial court that any special provision of I.R.C. includes Petitioner’s remuneration in Petitioner’s gross income;
35 rather, FTB argued only that Petitioner’s earnings are included in gross income under the general definition of “gross income”
36 at I.R.C. §61(a) (“gross income means all income from whatever source derived...”). Yet FTB has failed to conclusively
37 prove that.

38 Therefore, Franchise Tax Board (FTB) failed to establish that payments made to Petitioner for his labor constitute “gross
39 income” to Petitioner, even assuming arguendo that the payments otherwise constitute “gross income”. Petitioner should be
40 awarded summary judgment that his tax is \$0 and that Petitioner is entitled to a refund of the \$_____ Petitioner
41 established that he paid in his refund claims.

42 **12.13 Facts to be decided by the jury**

- 43 1. Was the Petitioner the absolute owner of the labor that is the subject of this action?
44 1.1. Does the Respondent have any evidence that proves the Petitioner at any time surrendered any part of their
45 absolute ownership of their body and their labor to the Respondent by express or implied consent? (check one)
46 _____YES; _____NO.

1.2. Absent proof by the Respondent of a transfer of ownership of the labor or property rendered by the Petitioner, by what authority does the Respondent claim ownership or the right to control, tax, or regulate the services rendered as property? ANSWER: _____

2. Did the Respondent, by accepting the benefit and possession of absolutely owned property of the Petitioner with prior notice, incur an obligation to obey the following agreement governing this dispute?

Injury Defense Franchise and Agreement, Form #06.027
<https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/InjuryDefenseFranchise.pdf>

3. Was the labor performed on land within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State of _____? (check one) ____ YES; ____ NO.

3.1. If not, was it performed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government on federal territory? (check one) ____ YES; ____ NO.

3.2. If not, was the labor rendered abroad where the protections of the constitution do NOT apply? (check one) ____ YES; ____ NO.

3.3. If not, does the state enjoy subject matter or exclusive jurisdiction within a federal enclave or area within the state, if the work was performed in a federal enclave or area? (check one) ____ YES; ____ NO.

4. Did the protections of the Sixteenth Amendment apply to the labor that was rendered because it was rendered on land protected by the Constitution? (check one) ____ YES; ____ NO.

5. Did the Petitioner at any time knowingly and expressly waive the protections of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights in respect to his earnings by any of the following means:

5.1. Pursuing federal STATUTORY employment under 5 U.S.C. §2105? (check one) ____ YES; ____ NO.

5.2. Signing a contract that waives said rights? (check one) ____ YES; ____ NO.

6. Did the Respondent, by keeping absolutely owned private property earnings from the labor of the Petitioner, institute an unconstitutional taking of private property? (check one) ____ YES; ____ NO.

7. Did the Respondent, by keeping absolutely owned private property earnings from the labor of the Petitioner, institute involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, since the Petitioner never consented to work for the state? (check one) ____ YES; ____ NO.

8. Congress has NO CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY to establish excise taxable offices within the exclusive jurisdiction of the constitutional states. This would be an unconstitutional invasion in violation of Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution, as documented in:

Challenge to Income Tax Enforcement Authority Within Constitutional States of the Union, Form #05.052
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-Memlaw/ChallengeToIRSEnforcementAuth.pdf>

12.14 Law to be decided by the court

1. Is this action IN REM by virtue of quoting or using civil statutes against the Plaintiff or IN PERSONAM under the constitution Bill of Rights?

2. By what authority does this Court change the choice of law governing absolutely owned private property of the Plaintiff not owned by its principal (the government) or the Respondent?

3. As the absolute owner of the labor rendered by the Petitioner, does the Petitioner have SOLE discretion as far as the choice of law used in this action, being the common law and not civil statutory codes that are a privilege? (check one) ____ YES; ____ NO.

4. By what authority does the government claim the ability to control absolutely owned property of the Petitioner without evidence of consent to surrender some interest in it to the Respondent? ANSWER: _____

5. Do the protections of the Sixteenth Amendment upon the labor rendered require that the income tax is an excise tax upon the PROFITS from labor, and not the labor itself as property? (check one) ____ YES; ____ NO.

6. If the answer is no, by what authority does the Respondent turn an indirect excise into a direct tax upon labor as property without the necessary constitutional apportionment? ANSWER: _____

12.15 Petition is NOT an attempt to escape responsibility for paying for CRIMINAL, POLICE, and MILITARY protection by any legitimate de jure government

Petitioner emphasizes that this petition should in NO WAY be interpreted as an attempt to escape the EQUAL and UNIFORM tax per head that pays for CRIMINAL, POLICE, or MILITARY protection. These are all legitimate government functions. Neither is it an attempt to evade any responsibility whatsoever for damages connected with any injuries he may cause under

the common law under principles of equity. Under principles of equity, the following system of law is sufficient to pay for those services, and he consents wholeheartedly without compulsion to pay for these legitimate de jure functions of government:

4.1 Definitions of Specific Terms

4.1.31 Natural law

For the purposes of this website and ministry, the term "natural law" is synonymous with the following behavior by civil government:

1. ALL property is absolutely owned.

2. The protection of private property is not regarded by anyone in government as "making law" ([Litigation Tool #01.009](#)), but rather a fulfillment of the main purpose of establishing government and the oath that all public officers take when accepting office. The CIVIL statutes DO NOT protect PRIVATE property, but PUBLIC property that became public by donating PRIVATE property to a public use, a public purpose, and/or a public office. In that sense, the current civil government ONLY PROTECTS ITSELF and its own PUBLIC property, and NEVER YOU or ANY HUMAN BEING at least from a CIVIL perspective! See:

Why the Government is the Only Real Beneficiary of All Government Franchises, Form #05.051**
<https://sedm.org/product/why-the-government-is-the-only-real-beneficiary-of-all-government-franchises-form-05-051/>

3. [Civil statutes \(Form #05.037\)](#) are not called "law", but civil service franchise contracts.

4. Only voting and jury service are privileges that can be CIVILLY regulated by default. Any other thing that is a voluntary privilege must be expressly signed up for and PAID for in writing on the annual tax return filed at the beginning of each year and only lasts for one year.

5. Government ID's are NOT used to change your civil status to a "resident" or "domiciliary". You remain PRIVATE when using government ID. See:

Hot Issues: [Identification*](#), SEDM
<https://sedm.org/identification/>

6. No other [franchise or privilege \(Form #05.030\)](#) is or can be bundled with voting or jury service, such as [civil DOMICILE \(Form #05.002\)](#).

7. All government "civil services" must be requested IN WRITING at the beginning of each year and you only pay for what you ask for. The purpose of filing tax returns is to CONSENT to specific civil services you want and to pay for them in advance. Those who didn't pay for them may not receive them. See [SEDM Disclaimer, Section 4.6](#) for a definition of "civil service".

8. Everyone is subject to the criminal and common law, whether they consent or not.

9. Civil courts may not enforce civil statutory law upon any party UNLESS they expressly consented in writing to receive its benefits as public property. If they didn't, only the common law and criminal law applies. That consent shall appear on the tax return filed annually.

10. Administrative tax enforcement is NOT permitted and not necessary, since all civil services consumed are prepaid annually in advance. If you don't prepay, you don't get the service.

11. Every government agent is personally accountable for the accuracy and truthfulness of EVERYTHING he or she communicates to the public that might have an adverse affect on PRIVATE property or PRIVATE rights. Thus, they are PRESUMED to be communicating under penalty of perjury at all times. If they lie, they are civilly penalized. ANONYMOUS communication or collection letters are FORBIDDEN. All must be signed by a human being.

12. All government "benefits" are regarded as "civil services" that must be 100% paid annually for by those who consume them AS THEY ARE USED. Use of public funds for charity is FORBIDDEN.

13. The filing of [information returns \(Form #04.001\)](#) such as the W-2 and 1099 are forbidden and a criminal offense of impersonating a public office. They are unnecessary if civil services are consented to and paid for annually and you don't need to BE a public officer to consume civil services. Being a sponsor is sufficient to consume said services.

1 14. Consent must always be OVERT and in writing, and NEVER COVERT or implied through actions of any kind.
2 See:

Hot Issues: Invisible Consent, SEDM*
<https://sedm.org/invisible-consent/>

3 For a system of government that implements the above and builds upon existing organic and statutory law, and
4 which requires the least possible changes to the current system to implement, see:

Self Government Federation: Articles of Confederation, Form #13.002
<https://sedm.org/Forms/13-SelfFamilyChurchGovnce/SGFArtOfConfed.pdf>
5 *Sovereignty and Freedom Points and Authorities, Litigation Tool #10.018, Section 4.1.31;*
6 <https://sedm.org/Litigation/10-PracticeGuides/PointsAuth.pdf>

7 Under principles of equity and consistent with the above, Petitioner consents without court coercion to pay for any and all of
8 the above. That approach of reject any and all “benefits” of the civil statutory code as a Private Membership Association
9 (PMA) and yet still accepting responsibility under the common law, criminal law, and the Constitution is described as follows:

How to: The BEST Way to LAWFULLY Reject ANY and ALL Benefits in Court that is Unassailable, SEDM
<https://sedm.org/the-best-way-to-lawfully-reject-any-and-all-benefits-in-court-that-is-unassailable/>

10 **12.16 Conclusions**

11 Petitioner does NOT dispute that if he WAS CONSENSUALLY and lawfully serving in an excise taxable “function of a
12 public office” called a “trade or business” as defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26), then:

- 13 1. Everything he earned would be earned as an agent or officer of his national government principal rather than as a
14 human being.
- 15 2. He would NOT be protected by the Thirteenth Amendment, which only applies to human beings and not agents or
16 officers of the national government corporation.
- 17 3. Everything would be classified as “compensation for services” within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §61(a), because the
18 work performed would be services rendered by an artificial entity that has no constitutional rights.
- 19 4. ALL of the earnings would be “profit” to the principal, because the national government has made NO INVESTMENT
20 and paid NO expense necessary to make the services even possible.

21 By changing the choice of law from CONSTITUTIONAL to STATUTORY in this case and thereby compelling the Petitioner
22 to represent the CIVIL “taxpayer” and “person” res against his consent, this Court or the Plaintiff are engaging in human
23 trafficking of the Petitioner. The memorandum below PROVES the existence of this PUBLIC res as part of “publici juris”:

Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/StatLawGovt.pdf>

24 HOWEVER, in this case, Petitioner has already stated under penalty of perjury that:

- 25 1. This action is NOT an “in rem” action against a the statutory “taxpayer” res defined at 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(14), but
26 rather an IN PERSONAM action against a PRIVATE CONSTITUTIONALLY protected “person”.
- 27 2. He did not file the tax refund claim as an entity or agent of anyone other than God and acting in a private,
28 constitutionally protected capacity.
- 29 3. He never consented to act as an agent of the national government as principal such as a 5 U.S.C. §2105 civil statutory
30 “employee” in the context of this proceeding.
- 31 4. It would be a CRIME for him to PRETEND to be an agent or officer of the national government in this case pursuant
32 to 18 U.S.C. §912 and in violation of 4 U.S.C. §72.
- 33 5. Any evidence contradicting these statements was submitted under duress by either threatening to not hire him or fire
34 him for failure to submit withholding paperwork that he always has known would be FALSE in his own case.
- 35 6. His full-time biblical delegation of authority order, the Bible, FORBIDS him from consenting to act as an agent or
36 representative of any government in the context of his labor. See:

Delegation of Authority Order from God to Christians, Form #13.007
<https://sedm.org/Forms/13-SelfFamilyChurchGovnce/DelOfAuthority.pdf>

The burden of proof rests upon the Respondent to DISPROVE the above. That will be difficult, because the attorneys representing the Respondent cannot act as fact witnesses in this case and because the courts have repeatedly affirmed that you cannot trust ANYTHING that ANYONE in government says, writes, publishes on their website, or prints, as documented in:

Legal Deception, Propaganda, and Fraud, Form #05.014
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/LegalDecPropFraud.pdf>

It is certainly NOT unreasonable to request and require that this court enforce the ONLY “benefit” of the entire national constitution, which is “private property”. That right includes the ability to deny the government the use or “benefit” of the property and to CONTROL its uses while in the temporary possession, stewardship, or benefit of the Plaintiff under the terms of the grant described herein. Any attempt to INTERFERE with the delivery of that “benefit” constitutes TREASON and a violation of the oaths of this Court and the Respondent:

“As expressed otherwise, the powers delegated to a public officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officer.”³² Furthermore, the view has been expressed that all public officers, within whatever branch and whatever level of government, and whatever be their private vocations, are trustees of the people, and accordingly labor under every disability and prohibition imposed by law upon trustees relative to the making of personal financial gain from a discharge of their trusts.³³ That is, a public officer occupies a fiduciary relationship to the political entity on whose behalf he or she serves.³⁴ and owes a fiduciary duty to the public.³⁵ It has been said that the fiduciary responsibilities of a public officer cannot be less than those of a private individual.³⁶ Furthermore, it has been stated that any enterprise undertaken by the public official which tends to weaken public confidence and undermine the sense of security for individual rights is against public policy.³⁷”
[63C American Jurisprudence 2d, Public Officers and Employees, §247 (1999)]

13 Rebutted False Arguments

The following subsections rebut common false arguments about the content of this memorandum. You are welcome to reuse these in court.

13.1 Income Taxation is not slavery

FALSE STATEMENT:

Income taxation is not slavery. See below:

A. J. Porth, herein referred to as taxpayer, instituted this action against the Collector of Internal Revenue for the State of Kansas to recover the sum of \$135 which he alleged was erroneously and illegally paid on his declaration of estimated income tax for the year 1951. The trial court dismissed the petition upon the Collector's motion on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The taxpayer appealed.

The taxpayer filed his declaration of estimated income tax for 1951 and at the same time paid \$135. On the same day he filed a claim for a refund of \$135 with the Internal Revenue Service in Wichita, Kansas. The claim was

³² State ex rel. Nagle v. Sullivan, 98 Mont. 425, 40 P.2d. 995, 99 A.L.R. 321; Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 115 A.2d. 8.

³³ Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, 249 Ga. 543, 291 S.E.2d. 524. A public official is held in public trust. Madlener v. Finley (1st Dist), 161 Ill.App.3d. 796, 113 Ill.Dec. 712, 515 N.E.2d. 697, app gr 117 Ill.Dec. 226, 520 N.E.2d. 387 and revd on other grounds 128 Ill.2d. 147, 131 Ill.Dec. 145, 538 N.E.2d. 520.

³⁴ Chicago Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill.2d. 555, 37 Ill.Dec. 291, 402 N.E.2d. 181, appeal after remand (1st Dist) 107 Ill.App.3d. 222, 63 Ill.Dec. 134, 437 N.E.2d. 783.

³⁵ United States v. Holzer (CA7 Ill), 816 F.2d. 304 and vacated, remanded on other grounds 484 U.S. 807, 98 L.Ed. 2d 18, 108 S.Ct. 53, on remand (CA7 Ill) 840 F.2d. 1343, cert den 486 U.S. 1035, 100 L.Ed. 2d 608, 108 S.Ct. 2022 and (criticized on other grounds by United States v. Osser (CA3 Pa) 864 F.2d. 1056) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Little (CA5 Miss), 889 F.2d. 1367) and (among conflicting authorities on other grounds noted in United States v. Boylan (CA1 Mass), 898 F.2d. 230, 29 Fed.Rules.Evid.Serv. 1223).

³⁶ Chicago ex rel. Cohen v. Keane, 64 Ill.2d. 559, 2 Ill.Dec. 285, 357 N.E.2d. 452, later proceeding (1st Dist) 105 Ill.App.3d. 298, 61 Ill.Dec. 172, 434 N.E.2d. 325.

³⁷ Indiana State Ethics Comm'n v. Nelson (Ind App), 656 N.E.2d. 1172, reh gr (Ind App) 659 N.E.2d. 260, reh den (Jan 24, 1996) and transfer den (May 28, 1996).

not acted upon within six months and the taxpayer brought this action to recover the \$135. The petition alleged that the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution which gives Congress the power "to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration" was illegal and unconstitutional because the taxpayer was placed in a position of involuntary servitude contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment [926*926](#) to the United States Constitution.^[1] The petition further alleged that the clear intent of Congress in adopting the Sixteenth Amendment was to provide for a fair, just and reasonable source of revenue to the United States Government through a simple and direct levy or tax upon the income of the people, but that Federal tax legislation enacted after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment has given rise to such a mass of ambiguous, contradictory, inequitable and unjust rules, regulations and methods of procedure, that the taxpayer's rights as a citizen of the United States have been placed in jeopardy because the present and existing tax laws, rules, regulations and methods of procedure have compelled him to assume unreasonable duties, obligations and burdens in order to make a just accounting of his income and pay the tax thereon. If the requirements of the tax laws were to be classed as servitude, they would not be the kind of involuntary servitude referred to in the Thirteenth Amendment.^[2] [Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman](#), 256 U.S. 170, 199, 41 S.Ct. 465, 65 L.Ed. 877; [In re Slaughter-House Cases](#), 16 Wall. 36, 69, 21 L.Ed. 394; [Butler v. Perry](#), 240 U.S. 328, 333, 36 S.Ct. 258, 60 L.Ed. 672; [Hodges v. United States](#), 203 U.S. 1, 16, 27 S.Ct. 6, 51 L.Ed. 65; [United States v. Harris](#), 106 U.S. 629, 640, 1 S.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290.

The allegations of the petition are very broad and it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine therefrom just what the complaint is except that there exists a strong dislike for the taxing procedure. Apparently the taxpayer, while recognizing the taxing power of the United States, attacks both the legality of the Sixteenth Amendment and the constitutionality of the Federal tax laws, rules and regulations enacted pursuant thereto. It is admitted that a federal income tax may be levied under the Sixteenth Amendment and no law, rule, or regulation is referred to which impinges upon or destroys any right guaranteed the taxpayer by the Constitution. The claim is clearly unsubstantial and without merit. [Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin](#), 289 U.S. 103, 53 S.Ct. 549, 77 L.Ed. 1062. In [Abney v. Campbell](#), 5 Cir., 206 F.2d. 836, certiorari denied [346 U.S. 924](#), 74 S.Ct. 311, similar allegations were said to be far-fetched and frivolous. We think the description applies to the allegations in this case.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES:

^[1] In his brief the taxpayer states that, "The gist of the complaint in this action is that appellant is placed in a position of involuntary servitude by operation of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution."

^[2] The first section of the Thirteenth Amendment reads:

"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
[\[Porth v. Brodrick, 214 F.2d. 925 \(Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit 1954\)\]](#)

REBUTTAL:

The above ruling ignores how the obligation to pay taxes was acquired. The obligation attaches to the civil status of the party "made liable". In the case of income tax, the parties made "liable TO" rather than "liable FOR" the income tax are found at 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1. They are STATUTORY and not CONSTITUTIONAL "citizens and residents of the United States".

[26 C.F.R. §1.1-1 - Income tax on individuals](#)

(b) Citizens or residents of the United States liable to tax.

In general, all citizens of the United States, wherever resident, and all resident alien individuals are liable to the income taxes imposed by the Code whether the income is received from sources within or without the United States. Pursuant to section 876, a nonresident alien individual who is a bona fide resident of a section 931 possession (as defined in §1.931-1(c)(1) of this chapter) or Puerto Rico during the entire taxable year is, except as provided in section 931 or 933 with respect to income from sources within such possessions, subject to taxation in the same manner as a resident alien individual. As to tax on nonresident alien individuals, see sections 871 and 877.

(c) Who is a citizen.

Every person born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction is a citizen. For other rules governing the acquisition of citizenship, see chapters 1 and 2 of title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1401-1459). For rules governing loss of citizenship, see sections 349 to 357, inclusive, of such Act (8

U.S.C. 1481–1489), *Schneider v. Rusk*, (1964) 377 U.S. 163, and Rev. Rul. 70–506, C.B. 1970–2, 1. For rules pertaining to *persons* who are nationals but not citizens at birth, e.g., a *person* born in American Samoa, see section 308 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1408). For special rules applicable to certain expatriates who have lost citizenship with a *principal purpose* of avoiding certain *taxes*, see section 877. A foreigner who has filed his declaration of intention of becoming a citizen but who has not yet been admitted to citizenship by a final order of a naturalization court is an alien.

The phrase “liable TO” does NOT mean “liable FOR”. Further, there is NO provision of statutory law that expressly creates the liability. Therefore, there is no liability:

‘Tax’ is legal imposition, exclusively of statutory origin, and liability to taxation must be read in statute, or it does not exist.”
[*Bente v. Bugbee*, 137 A. 552, 103 N.J. Law. 608 (1927)]

“The taxpayer must be liable for the tax. Tax liability is a condition precedent to the demand. Merely demanding payment, even repeatedly, does not cause liability.”
[*Bothke v. Terry*, 713 F.2d. 1405, at 1414 (1983)]

“Liability for taxation must clearly appear from statute imposing tax.”
[*Higley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, 69 F.2d. 160 (1934)]

A statute making someone “liable FOR” the tax is necessary. Using the word “liable TO” does not create a liability. Even if the courts WANT to treat the phrase “liable TO” as creating a liability in the regulation, the fact that the same phraseology does not appear in the statute the above regulation implements means that the regulation unconstitutionally exceeds the scope of the statute it implements. This was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court:

*Finally, the Government points to the fact that the Treasury Regulations relating to the statute purport to include the pick-up man among those subject to the § 3290 tax,^[11] and argues (a) that this constitutes an administrative interpretation to which we should give weight in construing the statute, particularly because (b) section 3290 was carried over in haec verba into § 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. We find neither argument persuasive. **In light of the above discussion, 359*359 we cannot but regard this Treasury Regulation as no more than an attempted addition to the statute of something which is not there.^[12] As such the regulation can furnish no sustenance to the statute. *Koshland v. Helvering*, 298 U.S. 441, 446-447. Nor is the Government helped by its argument as to the 1954 Code. The regulation had been in effect for only three years,^[13] and there is nothing to indicate that it was ever called to the attention of Congress. The re-enactment of § 3290 in the 1954 Code was not accompanied by any congressional discussion which throws light on its intended scope. In such circumstances we consider the 1954 re-enactment to be without significance. *Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.*, 348 U.S. 426,431.***
[*United States v. Calamaro*, 354 U.S. 351 (1957);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2040626426665191763]

If the statute in [26 U.S.C. §1](#) contains no EXPRESS [liability](#), then the implementing regulations in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1 may not either. If the regulation DOES impose an express liability that the statute DOES NOT, then the only people the liability can refer to are people within the Treasury Department in the case of regulations written by the Secretary of the Treasury per [5 U.S.C. §301](#). Do you work for the Treasury Department or the Secretary of the Treasury or are you handling Treasury property? NO? Then why did you consent to be treated AS IF you are a Treasury officer called a “citizen”, “resident”, or “nonresident alien” engaged in the “trade or business” excise taxable/public office franchise?

So it’s inevitable to conclude anything other than that if you claim the status of STATUTORY “citizen” and “resident” who are “liable TO” the tax on a tax form, then you are a VOLUNTEER who agreed to a job (an office called “citizen” or “resident”) in the Department of Treasury working for the Secretary of the Treasury without compensation. That cannot be called slavery at all. We prove this in:

| |
|---|
| <p><i>How State Nationals Volunteer to Pay Income Tax</i>, Form #08.024 https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/HowYouVolForIncomeTax.pdf</p> |
|---|

The court ruling above didn’t explain these critical facts because they are Third Rail Issues that threaten their power and revenue. Do you think they are going to EVER explain how to UNVOLUNTEER? You have to read between the lines and figure this out for yourself. Porth in the above case didn’t do his due diligence or properly assert or describe his legal status. That is why he lost.

On the OTHER hand, if Porth above instead had claimed under penalty of perjury that he was a “nonresident alien” with no U.S. source income by providing the following form then he might have had a chance to win his case:

W-8SUB, Form #04.231

<https://sedm.org/Forms/04-Tax/2-Withholding/W-8SUB.pdf>

If they didn’t respect his lawful status as a nontaxpayer documented above, he could then have filed a criminal complaint of identity theft and slavery, such as the following:

Identity Theft Affidavit, Form #14.020

https://sedm.org/Forms/14-PropProtection/Identity_Theft_Affidavit-f14039.pdf

Filing the above form is MANDATORY for all members, in fact.

It’s also ambiguous at best whether “citizen” in “citizen of the United States” refers to any and all “citizens of the United States” (the federal term for “American Citizens”). Treasury Regulations make it clear at 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(b) that not all citizens of the United States are liable for tax on their worldwide income. But they fail to explain what exceptions there are, or why or how there can be any exceptions.

The obvious conclusion is that it is a voluntary choice for each American Citizen whether to file as a “citizen” or to file as a “nonresident alien”. To assert there is no choice would be to unreasonably construe the income tax law as imposing slavery on all American Citizens. The rules of construction favor a construction that keeps a statute in harmony with all other law, including organic law. So it is preposterous to construe income tax as imposing slavery or involuntary servitude. In fact, other people have asserted that very thing in court and this argument has been rejected.

"Defendants' fourth argument that paying income tax is a violation of the prohibition against involuntary servitude is also without merit. Again, due to a lack of state case law, we turn to federal law for guidance. In Porth v. Brodrick, 214 F.2d. 925 (10th Cir. 1954), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the taxpayer's suit. The taxpayer argued that Congress' power to collect income taxes violated the prohibition against involuntary servitude. The court responded by stating, "[i]f the requirements of the tax laws were to be classed as servitude, they would not be the kind of involuntary servitude referred to in the Thirteenth Amendment." Porth, 214 F.2d. at 926. Multiple other cases have come to this same conclusion and summarily dismissed this argument. See Ginter v. Southern, 611 F.2d. 1226, 1229 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967, 64 L.Ed.2d 827 (1980); Kasey v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d. 369, 370 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869, 34 L.Ed.2d 120 (1972); Abney v. Campbell, 206 F.2d. 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924, 98 L.Ed. 417 (1954). We agree with the reasoning of these cases and find defendants' argument to be without merit."
[State v. Simmott, 163 N.C. App. 268, 273 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)]

13.2 The “taxpayer”, “citizen”, and “resident” are all fictions and they can tax earnings of their creations, even from labor

STATEMENT: Parties responsible for income tax are all fictional creations of Congress and offices rather than human beings. They can have earnings of their own derived from voluntary work of the OFFICER representing the fiction, whether labor or not.

REBUTTAL: Substance matters, not form. Government doesn’t allow you to create a structure for the sole purpose of avoiding tax! See Knetsch v. U.S., 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (William Brennan): A transaction was a sham when it did not appreciably affect the taxpayer's beneficial interest except to reduce their tax. In other words, there was nothing of substance to be realized by the taxpayer from the transaction beyond a tax deduction. See also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935):

"In these circumstances, the facts speak for themselves and are susceptible of but one interpretation. The whole undertaking, though conducted according to the terms of subdivision (B), was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else. The rule which excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, because the transaction upon its face lies outside the plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose."
[Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)]

So, government can't use a structure to make income of something that's not income for the sole purpose of taxing it. There is no substantive difference between the "individual" and the human who did the work.

13.3 It's Contradictory to Pretend that "You Own Yourself" While Also Saying God Owns Everything

STATEMENT: It's contradictory and hypocritical to say on the one hand that "you own yourself" while also saying that God owns everything. I want to own myself. Is that even possible consistent with God's law?

REBUTTAL: Now you are going down the sophist road, which is always fashioned to evade responsibility and advantage oneself. His holy word and law says He is "the author and finisher of our faith" (Heb. 12:2), meaning He is the only one who can define ANYTHING that can be "owned". Your interpretation, however self-serving and myopic, bestows legislative powers upon you instead of our ONLY Lawgiver (James 4:12, Isaiah 33:22).

An Introduction to Sophistry Course, Form #12.042
<https://sedm.org/an-introduction-to-sophistry/>

THEIR STATEMENT: Legislative powers like defining your own terms to exclude everything the government includes in theirs?

OUR REBUTTAL: The power to define originates in OWNERSHIP. You own yourself. Any definition that interferes with that ownership only controls those who SHARE that ownership through stupidity or idolatry.

Ownership as the Origin of the Right to Define, SEDM
<https://sedm.org/ownership-as-the-origin-of-the-right-to-define/>

The only reason you can contract with others is because you own the property that is the subject of the contract. Does Caesar own you, or do you? All that statutory civil offices do is dilute your self ownership. "Taxpayer" is an example. See:

1. *Who Are "Taxpayers" and Who Needs a "Taxpayer Identification Number"?*, Form #05.013
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhoAreTaxpayers.pdf>
2. *Your Rights as a "Nontaxpayer"*, Form #08.008
<https://sedm.org/LibertyU/NontaxpayerBOR.pdf>

THEIR STATEMENT: The Creator owns unless He releases such ownership. Free will does not necessarily mean that God has released ownership of any of us. The Creator also owns everything else...He has granted us dominion (not ownership) in Genesis. So to even claim we own ourselves seems contradictory.

OUR REBUTTAL: By "own yourself", I mean control the office God legislatively granted called "Christian", as trustee over his property. God didn't delegate us authority to impair our trustee position.

THEIR STATEMENT: If we are His, then we are not ours. Now you are going down the path of sophistry.

OUR REBUTTAL: The entire premise of our site is that we are only sovereign when we are representing Him under our Biblical Delegation of Authority order. See:

Delegation of Authority Order from God to Christians, Form #13.007
<https://sedm.org/Forms/13-SelfFamilyChurchGovnce/DelOfAuthority.pdf>

"Own yourself" =lawfully and faithfully represent God under His delegation order. Not sophistry because that position is not self serving or irresponsible. As you suggested, it's all God's, so "yourself" is His property and synonymous with Him, and not me as a free agent.

Ownership=responsibility, and the person you are responsible to is the ultimate owner, which is God. Any action that God's law does not forbid or command, it is in that context we belong to ourself. We are, at that point, off duty as His trustee.

1 It's just like saying, when you are not DRIVING, you're not a "driver" under the vehicle code, even if you consented and
2 ASKED to be a "driver". Whenever you are "handling" or "using" government property in a REGULATED fashion such as
3 using the roadways for hire to transport passengers or cargo, you are under their supervision and acting as their agent. If you
4 refuse to accept the legal duties of that agency (called "rules" for using government property), you are stealing an aspect of
5 control over the property you are using or benefitted from. Control=ownership. Partial control=partial ownership. The
6 regulated property in the case of civil statutory "drivers" is the public roadways.

7 Nice try, sophist.

8 **THEIR STATEMENT:** Looking at the definition you gave of "own yourself" - that seems to be a term of equivocation
9 now. There is no true "absolute ownership" that I can nail down. We are merely "granted" (revocable at the whim and will
10 of the Creator, be it God or Gov) dominion over the earth...to use and enjoy....spoil, whatever. We are deluded into thinking
11 we actually OWN anything because of the programming of society, so we make claims against things and call them our
12 own...including ourselves. We belong to Gepetto (the puppeteer in the story of Pinocchio) as far as I can tell.

13 **OUR REBUTTAL:** "You own yourself" comes from the secular Thirteenth Amendment. If involuntary servitude is
14 outlawed in the entire COUNTRY, then anything anyone wants you to do you have to consent to. So from a secular
15 perspective, you own yourself. Looking at it theologically, God's law limits what you can consent to, so in that respect you
16 don't ENTIRELY own yourself. But those subjects that God's law doesn't forbid or command, only there do you truly "own"
17 yourself without supervision or accountability. The bible is your delegation of authority order. What it doesn't speak about
18 is outside that delegation order and therefore "PRIVATE property" not owned or controlled by God.

19 As far as revocability, God's written law is unchanging, so technically His will doesn't change so we aren't subject to His
20 "whims". Our understanding of His laws, illuminated by the Holy Spirit, is the only thing that really changes over time.

21 **THEIR STATEMENT:** Are we not subject to Gods whim as to when we are revoked from this realm? Or is that all pre-
22 destined/pre-contracted prior to our eventual arrival here on Earth?

23 As for his will being written and unchanging...THAT may be true, but the evolution of language, and the thousands of
24 translations of said written will has certainly caused confusion.

25 **OUR REBUTTAL:** His will is preordained from the foundation of the world. It must be so because He is unchanging and
26 eternal in His moral character. That is the thesis of the following sermon, in fact:

Twin Truths: God's Sovereignty and Man's Responsibility (John 3:11-21), SEDM
<https://sedm.org/twin-truths-gods-sovereignty-and-mans-responsibility-john-311-21-john-macarthur/>

27 God is the ONLY Sovereign, and we are in fact His puppets, EVEN when we are doing EVIL and violating His wishes to
28 ultimately produce good and glorify Him ANYWAY, in spite of our own intentions. Romans 8:28. Bow down to Gepetto.
29 And if we don't because of our own pride and narcissism (like Satan), here is the fate promised to all atheists or anarchists
30 under His divine law:

The Unlimited Liability Universe, Family Guardian Fellowship
<https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Spirituality/Articles/UnlimitedLiabilityUniverse.htm>

31 His spirit and Law can only work when our flesh is invisible. Why do you keep trying to introduce the flesh to detract from
32 His glory and sovereignty? When we truly reflect His character in everything we do as His agent and representative while
33 visiting earth as sojourners and "nonresidents", we become immortal, because HE is immortal. And the essence of what He
34 is "law", not a physical thing. See John 1:1. This is what the scripture means when it says in Romans 12:5 that "we are
35 ONE".

36 This really is the ONLY way we know of to rationally view our mission on earth that is entirely coherent with the way things
37 actually work, with scripture, and with life experience. If you have a more coherent and useful view consistent with these
38 principles, we are all ears.

1 **THEIR STATEMENT:** I agree we are ONE. That's why I have such a hard time with all the division. If everyone comes
2 from ONE source, then we are fighting a losing battle. Sounds like a mental hospital. Multiple split personalities. If we are
3 all one then Satan is also part of all of us, AND part of God.

4 **OUR REBUTTAL:** Having the SAME law means having the SAME God. Satan wants to be his own source of law and
5 replace God's law, so he couldn't be one with God. Anarchy and law don't go together:

6 *"And now you know what is restraining, that he may be revealed in his own time. 7 For the [d]mystery of*
7 *lawlessness is already at work; only [e]He who now restrains will do so until He is taken out of the way. 8 And*
8 *then the lawless one will be revealed, whom the Lord will consume with the breath of His mouth and destroy with*
9 *the brightness of His coming. 9 The coming of the lawless one is according to the working of Satan, with all*
10 *power, signs, and lying wonders, 10 and with all unrighteous deception among those who perish, because they*
11 *did not receive the love of the truth, that they might be saved. 11 And for this reason God will send them strong*
12 *delusion, that they should believe the lie, 12 that they all may be condemned who did not believe the truth but had*
13 *pleasure in."*
14 *[2 Thess. 2, Bible, NKJV]*

15 Yes, there are many split personalities, but these all originate in privileges and franchises that, like Satan, seek to nominate a
16 man or group of men to godhood as a lawgiver. This results in ANARCHY against God's law and God as the only legitimate
17 source of law.

18 These "personalities" you speak of are, in fact, civil statuses that we must volunteer for. CIVIL statutory "persons",
19 "taxpayers", "citizens", "residents", etc. God says we can't volunteer. And thus, all the anarchy and split personalities
20 disappear.

21 **THEIR STATEMENT:** But if ALL derives from ONE source, then anarchy and law derive from that same source. they
22 are the polar opposites on the same spectrum. Satan is part of God and God part of Satan, just as you and I also derive from
23 God all things being equal.

24 So, its all mental constructs then?

25 Once Alice wakes up from Wonderland, then all is well? Once Dorothy leaves Oz (it was in her mind) then?

26 **OUR REBUTTAL:** Law and Choice derive from one source: God. Satan and evil result from the abuse of choice. That
27 abuse happens when we don't obey God's laws.

28 So no, evil does not originate from God. Abuse of free choice does. Yes, he gave us free choice, but every improper exercise
29 of our free will takes us OUTSIDE of His divine protection and allows Satan and anarchy to reign.

30 **THEIR STATEMENT:** Ok. That makes more sense...obedience and abuse: those are the polar ends of a spectrum then it
31 seems.

32 That is so conflicting to me. if EVERYTHING originates from God...if He is the source of ALL, then how can you argue
33 that evil does not derive from God?

34 **OUR REBUTTAL:** Sin in Spanish is "without". When we operate WITHOUT the authority of God or inconsistent with
35 His biblical delegation order, we operate without God.

36 **THEIR STATEMENT:** Abuse had to originate from God also IF he is the creator of all.

37 **OUR REBUTTAL:** In a legal sense, the responsible or liable party is always the person who commands, commits, or at least
38 authorizes the offending or injurious act. If God never commands evil and expressly forbids it, He can never be the
39 responsible or liable party when anyone other than Him institutes it.

40 That is why our Member Agreement, Form #01.001 specifically says that illegal or injurious acts are not "intended,
41 recommended, or authorized" in connection with the use or abuse of our services or materials. Crimes cannot happen unless
42 people MALICIOUSLY INTEND to make them happen. That malicious intent is called "mens rea".

1 **THEIR STATEMENT:** Legal sense or not, if there is but one source of everything, then nothing can exist without that
2 source. Good, evil, happy, sad. It all comes from this one source.

3 Just because I never command my child to be evil and I forbid it, if one of them goes and damages property, who is ultimately
4 held liable? Sure, after age of majority, its different to an extent, but ultimately my child "derives" in part from me, so even
5 if i do not condone an act, the child is still an extension of me and vicarious liability on some level still exists, even if i am
6 not held financially liable or otherwise.

7 Ownership = liability. So if God owns us all as creator, He is liable, although to whom? If He is the ONLY sovereign, there
8 is no accountability so I guess you are right on that.

9 **OUR REBUTTAL:** Christians are called "children of God" in the Bible. The domicile of a child follows that of his Father
10 until he reaches the age of majority. God is domiciled in Heaven, which also is our "domicile of origin", so we are domiciled
11 there and not in any man-made locality or government.

12 Ownership=responsibility. However, God cannot be held responsible for MISUSES or UNAUTHORIZED uses of His
13 property. When you crash someone else's car you borrowed or kill someone with it while drunk driving, who is responsible
14 for the murder: You or the car owner?

15 I think this is more sophistry, because you are just trying to find a way to blame God for all the evil in the world, so you don't
16 have to be responsible for ANYTHING. This pastor does a good job explaining that tendency on Satan's part:

| |
|--|
| <p><i>Satanic Exposition</i>, Tim Keller https://sedm.org/satanic-exposition/</p> |
|--|

17 When are you going to grow up and start taking full responsibility for yourself and not blame God?

18 **THEIR STATEMENT:** Valid points. I would say it depends on the car scenario. God KNOWS all of his children inside
19 and out I've been told my whole life. If he does, then he has foresight into the abuse and disobedience that will occur by each
20 of us.

21 In the car scenario, if I lend my car to someone who I even have a suspicion of being inebriated then I would hold vicarious
22 liability if said borrower caused damage.

23 I'm not trying to blame God for anything. ...I am simply stating that IF everything originates from ONE sovereign source,
24 that also has to include all the ugly.

25 You can't just say God is the only sovereign and He created EVERYTHING and ALL that is, will be or ever was, and then
26 somehow carve out an exception....

27 That is sophistry.

28 **OUR REBUTTAL:** The experience of the ugly is what draws us to God and teaches us who He is. It is the main thing that
29 does this for fools. Wise men learn from other people's mistakes. Fools can't even learn from their own mistakes or will only
30 learn by being beaten over the head with the consequences of their own anarchistic choices.

31 The problem with vicarious liability is that it depends on your state of mind and INTENT. You as God's creation are not in
32 a position to deposition God, the Creator, and He isn't authorized and can't be required to answer you in a Court of Law. As
33 a matter of fact, He runs the ONLY real "court". So, you will never be able to prove vicarious liability in His case. Thus,
34 you have no "standing" to sue Him and he has "sovereign immunity". As a matter of fact, He is the ONLY one who actually
35 DOES have it. No earthy government does. By His design, vicarious liability on His part is a legal impossibility, my friend.
36 That's why He is the ONLY Sovereign and He wouldn't be sovereign unless He designed it that way.

37 **THEIR STATEMENT:** Perhaps i am a lost cause.

38 **OUR REBUTTAL:**

1 *"Surely you have things turned around!*
2 *Shall the potter be esteemed as the clay;*
3 *For shall the thing made say of him who made it,*
4 *"He did not make me"?*
5 *Or shall the thing formed say of him who formed it,*
6 *"He has no understanding"?"*
7 *[Isaiah 29:16, Bible, NKJV]*

8 **THEIR STATEMENT:** I am in no position to challenge you on any of this. My learning is low and my life experience as
9 well. All I have at this point is whatever logic I can muster up. I do recognize the need to think more right brained, which is
10 why I have reignited my passion for drawing and music (piano)...but as someone who has been susceptible to depression and
11 anxiety most of my life, I am rolling through a pretty deep low point where I don't know what is what. So thank you for the
12 contrast...but you are probably just wasting your time/energy on me. I'm sure I will break out of this "funk" at some point,
13 but I can't say when.

14 **OUR RESPONSE:** Good luck in your growth and spiritual progress. As someone with years of spiritual training in a semi-
15 Christian scenario, you are WAY ahead of most people, and especially as America grows more secular and less spiritual. We
16 encourage you to use those advantages to grow in a healthier direction. It would probably help eliminate your depression.

17 By no means is this a waste of time, because there are a lot of secular atheistic youth out there who are grappling with these
18 issues in the midst of a spiritual famine. This discussion will nourish them and inspire them, hopefully.

19 Thanks for your help improving our offerings, whether you realized it at the time or not, you did. If you see a contradiction
20 as the alert and thoughtful person that you are, then certainly there will be many others who do also. It's important to remove
21 all contradictions within our materials, because "the law of non-contradiction" is a main tool that people use to gauge the
22 credibility of our information.

23 Even as someone with an "anti-Christ" position, you still add great value to our materials mainly through locating
24 contradictions so they can be eliminated to restore "cohesion" to the truths found on our site.

25 **13.4 STATUTORY "Wages" are CONSTITUTIONAL "income"**

26 *"Romero's proclaimed belief that he was not a "person" and that the wages he earned as a carpenter were not*
27 *"income" is fatuous as well as obviously incorrect. See [Lucas v. Earl](#), 281 U.S. 111, 114-15, 50 S.Ct. 241, 74*
28 *L.Ed. 731 (1930); [Roberts v. Commissioner](#), 176 F.2d. 221, 225 (9th Cir. 1949); 26 U.S.C. §61 (1976). The trial*
29 *judge acted properly with respect to his comments and instructions regarding this matter of law. See [United States](#)*
30 *v. [Miller](#), 634 F.2d. 1134 (8th Cir. 1980).*

31 *Romero received a fair trial. He based his defense on his proclaimed belief that the wages he earned were not*
32 *taxable income and that he was not a person within the meaning of the income tax laws. At trial the judge properly*
33 *instructed the jury on these matters of law. [HN8](#) The jury's function is to determine matters of fact. [HN9](#)*
34 *Compensation for labor or services, paid in the form of wages or salary, has been universally, held by the courts*
35 *of this republic to be income, subject to the income tax laws [\[**8\]](#) currently applicable. We recognize that the*
36 *tax laws bear heavily on all persons engaged in gainful activity, and recognize the right of a taxpayer to minimize*
37 *his taxes by all lawful means. But Romero here is not attempting to minimize his taxes; instead he is attempting*
38 *willfully and intentionally to shift his burden to his fellow workers by the use of semantics. He seems to have been*
39 *inspired by various tax protesting groups across the land who postulate weird and illogical theories of tax*
40 *avoidance, all to the detriment of the common weal and of themselves."*
41 *[United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d. 1014 (1981)]*

42 The above case is often quoted obiter dicta, and it is 100% bullshit. This court does not cite even ONE court case that held
43 that "compensation for services, paid in the form of wages or salary" is income TO THE HUMAN BEING who performed
44 the labor.

45 **13.5 Slavery or Involuntary Servitude or Human Trafficking Mean PHYSICAL constraint**

46 **STATEMENT:**

47 Slavery and involuntary servitude involve physical restraint, chains, whips, and a beating. You aren't subjected to that by
48 the taxation of your labor without your consent.

REBUTTAL:

As we learned from the definitions in section 5 earlier, slavery is the ownership of human beings as property instead of them owning themselves. It is always done with the sanction and blessing of an entire society. There is little practical difference between making a human into property and legislatively creating a civil “taxpayer” or “person” office that is property of the national government and forcing a specific human being to become surety for it.

*“**surety.** One who at the request of another, and for the purpose of securing to him a benefit, becomes responsible for the performance by the latter of some act in favor of a third person, or hypothecates property as security therefore. One who undertakes to pay money or to do any other act in event that his principal fails therein. A person who is primarily liable for payment of debt or performance of obligation of another.”*
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1441]

Below is some biblical wisdom about surety:

“A man devoid of understanding shakes hands in a pledge, and becomes surety for his friend.”
[Proverbs 17:18, Bible, NKJV]

“He who is surety for a stranger will suffer, but one who hates being surety is secure.”
[Prov. 11:15, NKJV]

When we have committed the sin and the mistake of becoming surety for anyone or a straw man public office called “taxpayer”, the Bible emphatically tells us what we must do in no uncertain terms:

“My son, if you become surety for your friend, if you have shaken hands in pledge for a stranger, you are snared by the words of your mouth; you are taken by the words of your mouth. So do this, my son, and deliver yourself; for you have come into the hand of your friend [slavery!]: Go and humble yourself; plead with your friend. Give no sleep to your eyes, nor slumber to your eyelids. Deliver yourself like a gazelle from the hand of the hunter; and like a bird from the hand of the fowler.”
[Prov. 6:1-5, Bible, NKJV]

Involuntary servitude is defined much more broadly to include all forms of coercion and intimidation to force you to do something you don’t want to do.

Those who do not consent to and refuse to pay taxes on their labor often have their mobility and liberty constrained by any one or more of the following means:

1. They can have their driver license revoked, which has the effect of not allowing them to travel on airlines, which require ID. See, for instance, California Revenue and Taxation Code §19195 and California Business and Professions Code §494.5.
2. They can have their passport denied or revoked, so that they will be unable to leave the slave plantation, I mean COUNTRY. See Public Law 114-94, Section 32101 and 22 U.S.C. §2714a(e) (1)(A).
3. Without ID, banks won’t let them open or access their bank account or deposit or withdraw funds. They are commercially LOCKED out of society as if they were selectively targeted for “economic sanctions” not unlike those used against rogue states to interfere with their ability to function.
4. They are often denied a job because of a credit report destroyed by an administrative tax lien or because they don’t have government ID linking them to a statutory “citizen”, “resident”, or domiciliary legal status they don’t want. States refuse to issue NON-RESIDENT ID.
5. They will be unable to enter a federal and/or state courthouse, because they must have either a passport or RealID to do so, and both of these can be revoked for failure to pay income tax. Thus, they can’t even litigate to restore their rights beyond that point. See, for instance, the Real ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005).
6. They cannot even get a driver’s license if they don’t provide an SSN they aren’t eligible for that is then used to file FALSE information return reports connecting them to a public office in the national government. See:
 - 6.1. *About SSNs and TINs on Government Forms and Correspondence*, Form #05.012
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/AboutSSNsAndTINs.pdf>
 - 6.2. *Why It is Illegal for Me to Request or Use a Taxpayer Identification Number*, Form #04.205
<https://sedm.org/Forms/04-Tax/2-Withholding/WhyTINIllegal.pdf>
 - 6.3. *Why You Aren’t Eligible for Social Security*, Form #06.001
<https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/SSNotEligible.pdf>

These are hardly trivial punishments for people who refuse to consent to be a statutory “taxpayer” or pay income tax on earnings from labor that are NOT “profit” and therefore not taxable. They also represent a supreme interference with the physical mobility and autonomy that are mandatory in today’s society, not unlike the chains and gallows of old. Such restraints can also be life threatening to those who are targeted by them. The inability to conduct commerce for lack of suitable identification could interfere with getting a job or paying your bills. The result is GENOCIDE in many cases. Many people have committed suicide over such interference with their autonomy.

13.6 Domicile can be COMPELLED by UNILATERALLY Interpreting your ACTIONS as Consent

13.6.1 Introduction

For this analysis, we will examine false arguments made by the Iowa Supreme court in *Barhydt v. Cross*, 156 Iowa 271 (1912), in which a litigant before the court was compelled to assume a specific domicile against his will, resulting in an income tax liability and civil protection that he did not want and quite frankly did not need.

The most amazing admission in the above case is the following:

*“Cases of abandonment of residence, as applied to homesteads, or as to residence, where it is not essential that [**278] one have a homestead at all, or a definite residence, for the purposes of the case, are not applicable to such controversies as this, where a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere. Courts endeavor to construe revenue laws so that each one will share his just burden of taxation; and he should pay his taxes somewhere. Hence it is the universal rule, in construing revenue statutes, that, as a man must have a domicile or taxing residence somewhere, his old residence will be deemed his present one until a new one is acquired. If this were not the rule, a man might escape taxation altogether.* Assuming, for the purposes of argument, as we must, that the laws of California are the same as our own, Barhydt would escape all taxation for the year 1910, were he successful in this appeal; for he could not, under the record, be taxed in California. Our own cases, with possibly one exception, sustain this view, and, as we shall see, this is the holding elsewhere. Of our own cases supporting the conclusion [***11] here reached, see *Tuttle v. Wood*, 115 Iowa 507 at 509, 88 N.W. 1056; *Glottelty v. Brown*, 148 Iowa 124, 126 N.W. 797; *In re Titterington*, 130 Iowa 356 at 358, 106 N.W. 761; *Nugent v. Bates*, 51 Iowa 77 at 79, 50 N.W. 76; *Cover v. Hatten*, 136 Iowa 63 at 65, 113 N.W. 470.
[*Barhydt v. Cross*, 156 Iowa 271, 277-278 (1912)]

The other noteworthy holdings in this case are that for the purposes of income taxation:

1. Domicile and “residence” are synonymous.

“We used the words ‘residence’ and ‘domicile’ interchangeably as synonymous terms under our statute. Hall v. Hall, 25 Wis. 600.”
[*Barhydt v. Cross*, 156 Iowa 271, 281 (1912)]

2. The word “inhabitant” means “one domiciled”:

“Upon the whole, therefore, we can have no doubt that the word ‘inhabitant,’ as used in our statutes when referring to liability to taxation, by an overwhelming preponderance of authority, means ‘one domiciled.’”
[*Barhydt v. Cross*, 156 Iowa 271, 279 (1912)]

This is a very important subject to rebut and debate, because if these communist arguments are allowed to stand, the literal result is:

1. The elimination of the foundation of our system of government per the Declaration of Independence: consent of the governed.
2. A repeal of the Bill of Rights insofar as private property is concerned.
3. A repeal of the entire common law for all practical purposes, at least in the context of taxation.
4. The elimination of any burden of proof on the part of every government to prove that what they offer is a “benefit” not as THEY define it, but as YOU, the ONLY “customer” of their legitimate services, define it. The customer is always supposed to be right in a commercial setting.
5. Involuntary servitude satisfying the obligations associated with the civil statutory law in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.

- 1 6. Treating humans like government cattle on a farm whose boundaries are the borders of the country.
- 2 7. Perpetual peonage to pay off endless public debt from unconstitutional money printing, in violation of the Thirteenth
- 3 Amendment.
- 4 8. The foreclosure of all common law remedies in favor of civil statutory privileges.
- 5 9. The elevation of government to god-like status in violation of the First Amendment.

6 Every attempt to compel domicile described herein hinges on:

- 7 1. IMPLIED rather than EXPRESS consent, in which ACTIONS alone are the trigger to CONSTRUE a specific act of
- 8 consent.
- 9 2. Replacing the word “consent” with “intention”. Can we permit courts to speculate or infer what is on people mind
- 10 regardless of their ACTION?

11 The U.S. government, on the other hand, has OUTLAWED all such manifestations of IMPLIED consent and REQUIRED

12 all consent to be in writing, either by contract or by legislation:

13 *The facility with which the government may be pillaged by the presentment of claims of the most extraordinary*

14 *character, [95 U.S. 542] if allowed to be sustained by parol evidence, which can always be produced to any*

15 *required extent, renders it highly desirable that all contracts which are made the basis of demands against the*

16 *government should be in writing. Perhaps the primary object of the statute was to impose a restraint upon the*

17 *officers themselves, and prevent them from making reckless engagements for the government; but the*

18 *considerations referred to make it manifest that there is no class of cases in which a statute for preventing*

19 *frauds and perjuries is more needed than in this. And we think that the statute in question was intended to*

20 *operate as such. It makes it unlawful for contracting officers to make contracts in any other way than by*

21 *writing signed by the parties. This is equivalent to prohibiting any other mode of making contracts. Every man*

22 *is supposed to know the law. A party who makes a contract with an officer without having it reduced to writing*

23 *is knowingly accessory to a violation of duty on his part. Such a party aids in the violation of the law. We are*

24 *of opinion, therefore, that the contract itself is affected, and must conform to the requirements of the statute until*

25 *it passes from the observation and control of the party who enters into it. After that, if the officer fails to follow*

26 *the further directions of the act with regard to affixing his affidavit and returning a copy of the contract to the*

27 *proper office, the party is not responsible for this neglect.*

28 *We do not mean to say that where a parol contract has been wholly or partially executed and performed on one*

29 *side, the party performing will not be entitled to recover the fair value of his property or services. On the contrary,*

30 *we think that he will be entitled to recover such value as upon an implied contract for a quantum meruit. In the*

31 *present case, the implied contract is such as arises upon a simple bailment for hire, and the obligations of the*

32 *parties are those which are incidental to such a bailment. The special contract being void, the claimant is thrown*

33 *back upon the rights which result from the implied contract. This will cast the loss of the vessel upon him. A bailee*

34 *for hire is only responsible for ordinary diligence and liable for ordinary negligence in the care of the property*

35 *bailed. This is not only the common law but the [95 U.S. 543] general law on the subject. See Jones, Bailm., p.*

36 *88; Story, Bailm., secs. 398, 399; Domat, Lois Civiles, lib. 1, tit. 4, sec. 3, pars. 3, 4; 1 Bell, Com., pp. 481, 483,*

37 *7th ed.*

38 *[Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539 (1877)]*

39 Why then can everyone NOT be permitted to insist that all acts of consent must be in writing rather than implied by action

40 just as the U.S. government has? All we get are crickets on that question. All real law requires equality of TREATMENT.

41 If the feds can do this, everyone should be able to do this, and if not, ultimately it creates chaos and insecurity of private

42 property and makes it susceptible of takings in violation of the Fifth Amendment without the EXPRESS consent of the owner.

43 If in fact ALL are treated equally under REAL law, all that Barhydt should have had to do was notice the governments

44 involved in every interaction that all acts of consent MUST be in a writing signed by both parties. Then the Supreme Court

45 of Iowa would have NOTHING to say about what his domicile was or whether he even HAD to have one.

46 **13.6.2 FALSE STATEMENT: You’re NOT ALLOWED to know what the rules are for determining whether you**

47 **are a customer of our protection racket or whose customer you are. Only the government can decide that**

48 **because only we are smart enough to figure it out**

49 *“Residence and domicile have no uniform meaning in law; and when it becomes necessary to interpret them*

50 *much depends upon the nature of the action.”*

51 *[Barhydt v. Cross, 156 Iowa 271, 277 (1912)]*

52

The difficulty, if not impossibility, of arriving at an entirely satisfactory definition of domicile has been frequently commented upon. Lord Alvanley, in *Somerville v. Somerville*, praised the wisdom of Bynkershoek in not hazarding a definition; and Dr. Lushington, in *Maltass v. Maltass*, speaking of the various attempts of jurists in this direction, considered himself justified in the remarkable language of Hertius: "Verum in iis definiendis mirum est quam sudant doctores." Lord Chelmsford, speaking, as late as 1863, in the case of *Moorhouse v. Lord*, says: "The difficulty of getting a satisfactory definition of domicil, which will meet every case, has often been admitted, and every attempt to frame one has hitherto failed."

[Treatise on the Law of Domicil, M.W. Jacobs, 1887; Little Brown and Company, §57, pp. 93-98

SOURCE: <http://books.google.com/books?id=MFQvAAAAIAAJ&printsec=titlepage/>

REBUTTAL: The foundation of due process is reasonable and unambiguous notice of all the specific rules by which one who is a member of the social compact must govern their affairs. The rules must be well-defined, fixed, clear, knowable to the common man, and unchanging, or else the result is constant fear and uncertainty for CONSENTING members of the social compact. The constitutional requirement for "reasonable notice" and "due process" are further defined in:

1. Requirement for Reasonable Notice, Form #05.022
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/ReasonableNotice.pdf>
2. Requirement for Due Process, Form #05.045
<https://sedm.org/product/requirement-for-due-process-of-law-form-05-045/>

To suggest that only an elite priesthood of judges and licensed attorneys can define or determine what the words "domicile" and "residence" mean makes a mockery of the judicial branch, of freedom, and of self-government generally. So-called "laws" that fail to give reasonable notice or to define terms so as to limit jurisdiction also make a mockery of the idea of limited government generally.

"When we consider the nature and theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power."
[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

Limited government is impossible without clear definitions that are limiting and never subjective. In this case, we have no binding definition and therefore, the government is no longer limited but UNLIMITED as James Madison, the author of the Bill of Rights from whose notes the Constitution was written, warned:

"With respect to the words general welfare, I have always regarded them as qualified by the detail of powers connected with them. To take them in a literal and unlimited sense would be a metamorphosis of the Constitution into a character which there is a host of proofs was not contemplated by its creator."

"If Congress can employ money indefinitely to the general welfare, and are the sole and supreme judges of the general welfare, they may take the care of religion into their own hands; they may appoint teachers in every State, county and parish and pay them out of their public treasury; they may take into their own hands the education of children, establishing in like manner schools throughout the Union; they may assume the provision of the poor; they may undertake the regulation of all roads other than post-roads; in short, every thing, from the highest object of state legislation down to the most minute object of police, would be thrown under the power of Congress.... Were the power of Congress to be established in the latitude contended for, it would subvert the very foundations, and transmute the very nature of the limited Government established by the people of America."

"If Congress can do whatever in their discretion can be done by money, and will promote the general welfare, the government is no longer a limited one possessing enumerated powers, but an indefinite one subject to particular exceptions."
[James Madison. House of Representatives, February 7, 1792, On the Cod Fishery Bill, granting Bounties]

To allow the whim of judges to subjectively determine their own definition of the words domicile and residence or even to allow them to make domicile and residence mandatory, even if the civil code DOES NOT for anyone OTHER than aliens, is to make them literally into legislators in violation of the separation of powers, and introduces a financial conflict of interest into every judgment relating to domicile, because domicile is the entire basis of income taxation itself. Here is what the author of our three-branch system of separation of powers said on this subject just before the Declaration of Independence was written:

"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner."

Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression [sound familiar?].

There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals."

[. . .]

In what a situation must the poor subject be in those republics! The same body of magistrates are possessed, as executors of the laws, of the whole power they have given themselves in quality of legislators. They may plunder the state by their general determinations; and as they have likewise the judiciary power in their hands, every private citizen may be ruined by their particular decisions."

[The Spirit of Laws, Charles de Montesquieu, Book XI, Section 6, 1758;

SOURCE: http://famguardian.org/Publications/SpiritOfLaws/sol_11.htm]

13.6.3 FALSE STATEMENT: It's up to the government to decide your "intention" and affix obligations to it without your consent, not you

"As Barhydt must have had a residence and domicile somewhere, it is for the courts to decide where that was, under the record now presented. Residence and domicile have no uniform [**528] meaning in law; and when it becomes necessary [***10] to interpret them much depends upon the nature of the action."
[Barhydt v. Cross, 156 Iowa 271, 277 (1912)]

TRANSLATION: Since EVERYONE must be a "customer" of a government monopoly on the optional civil statutory protection franchise, it is up to the court to decide WHICH mafia he/she is a customer of. Everyone is our whore, and we get to decide who to pimp them out to. We don't need their permission to do so.

REBUTTAL: Government is a business. It only delivers two types of products: CIVIL statutory protection and CRIMINAL protection. CIVIL protection is optional and consensual, CRIMINAL protection is mandatory. What business is allowed to FORCE you to buy their product? What business can set up a store, lock the doors after you walk in, and make you buy EVERYTHING in the store for the PRIVILEGE of leaving? That's what domicile does: It bundles all the civil services offered by any government together and forces you to buy THEM ALL. If a private store tried to do that, they would be prosecuted for kidnapping and hostage taking. We call this kind of bundling "weaponization of government" in our Disclaimer, Section 4.30. It's an unconscionable adhesion contract that is a product of a corporate monopoly.

We define what "civil services" in our Disclaimer as follows:

4.6 Civil Service

The term "civil service" or "civil service fee" relates to any and all activities of "government" OTHER than:

1. Police.
2. Military.
3. Jails.
4. Criminal court.
5. Common law court.

"civil service" and "civil service fee" includes any attempt or act to:

1. Establish or enforce a [domicile \(Form #05.002\)](#)
2. Procure [consent \(Form #05.003\)](#) of any kind to alienate rights that are supposed to be INALIENABLE per the Declaration of Independence.
3. PRESUME [consent \(Form #05.003\)](#) to surrender INALIENABLE PRIVATE RIGHTS by virtue of submitting, accepting, or receiving any application for a government benefit, license, or franchise. See [Form #12.023](#).
4. Convert PRIVATE property or PRIVATE rights to PUBLIC property, PUBLIC offices, or excise taxable franchises. See [Form #12.025](#). Government's FIRST and most important duty is to at all times maintain TOTAL separation between PRIVATE and PUBLIC and NEVER to allow them to convert one to another. Every attempt

to convert one to the other represents a criminal financial conflict of interest that turns the PUBLIC trust into a SHAM trust.

5. Offer or enforce the civil statutory code.

6. Offer or enforce civil franchises (see Form #05.030),
[SEDM Disclaimer, Section 4.6; <https://sedm.org/disclaimer.htm#4.6>. Civil Service]

All the civil services that a government offers should be listed separately as optional and voluntary on the tax return, and those who WANT those services should fill out a schedule to select the services they want and pay the bill every year. If they don't want the services, they shouldn't have to pay the bill. The only services that should be mandatory are police, the courts, and the jails. Everything else should be optional on the tax return. This is a fulfillment of the common law concept that you have an absolute RIGHT to refuse to receive or pay for "benefits". Below is what the ChatGPT-4 AI Chatbot says on this subject:

QUESTION: Is there such a thing as a right to NOT receive or pay for a "benefit" you don't want, and if so can you provide legal authorities proving this?

ANSWER: Yes, there is a legal principle that individuals have the right to refuse benefits that they do not want or that would burden them. This principle is grounded in the constitutional right to liberty and property, and has been recognized by courts in various contexts.

For example, in the case of *Rust v. Sullivan*, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Supreme Court held that the government could impose restrictions on the use of federal funds by family planning clinics, including prohibiting the use of such funds for abortion services, without violating the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the restrictions did not impose an undue burden on the clinics' freedom of speech, because the clinics were free to decline the government funding if they disagreed with the restrictions.

Similarly, in the case of *Sherbert v. Verner*, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the government could not deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who refused to work on Saturdays, the Sabbath day of her faith, because doing so would burden her free exercise of religion. The Court held that the burden on the government to accommodate the plaintiff's religious beliefs was not undue, and that the government could not deny benefits to individuals based on their religious beliefs.

In general, the principle that individuals have the right to refuse unwanted benefits is rooted in the idea of personal autonomy and freedom of choice, which are fundamental principles of the American legal system. While there may be limitations on this right in certain circumstances, such as when the refusal of a benefit would harm others or violate important public policies, the principle is generally recognized as an important protection for individual liberty and property rights.
[ChatGPT-4 AI Chatbot; <http://chat.openai.com>]

It is an AFFRONT to my autonomy, dignity, equality, choice, and freedom to bundle ANYTHING and EVERYTHING that government offers CIVILLY together into one choice or act of consent, and destroy my life or make it extremely unpleasant if I don't give my consent. Such a scenario would be an extortion and a punishment for exercising self-governance and protecting my constitutional rights by limiting their loss.

Further, equality of treatment is the foundation of all freedom.

"No duty rests more imperatively upon the courts than the enforcement of those constitutional provisions intended to secure that equality of rights which is the foundation of free government."
[Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897)]

If the government can just ASSUME I consent to become THEIR customer/whore called a "citizen" or "resident", then we by implication are able to do the same thing to THEM. That is how they in fact consent to OUR Member Agreement: We define all the behavior that demonstrate consent in the introduction of the Member Agreement, Form #01.001, and interpret all such behaviors as an act of unconditional and perpetual consent to the member agreement. That worked wonders when they went after us and tried to enjoin us in 2005. When they manifested consent to the member agreement by using copyrighted and licensed intellectual property from our site in litigation against us, they consented to the member agreement and became the substitute defendant. What is good for the goose is good for the gander. Haven't heard from them in decades since, because it worked so well.

If the government can PRESUME consent based on specific voluntary acts, Barnhydt must be able to also under the requirement for equal protection and equal treatment that are the foundation of the Constitution. All that Barnhydt should have had to so was notice the government when he moved into the state that he surrendered the protections of the statutory

civil law and the obligation to pay for it in satisfaction of his right to reject and pay for any and all “benefits”, and that the specific acts listed in SEDM Disclaimer, Section 4.6 would constitute and implied consent to his protection franchise:

1. Establish or enforce a [domicile \(Form #05.002\)](#).
2. Procure [consent \(Form #05.003\)](#) of any kind to alienate rights that are supposed to be INALIENABLE per the Declaration of Independence.
3. PRESUME [consent \(Form #05.003\)](#) to surrender INALIENABLE PRIVATE RIGHTS by virtue of submitting, accepting, or receiving any application for a government benefit, license, or franchise. See [Form #12.023](#).
4. Convert PRIVATE property or PRIVATE rights to PUBLIC property, PUBLIC offices, or excise taxable franchises. See [Form #12.025](#). Government's FIRST and most important duty is to at all times maintain TOTAL separation between PRIVATE and PUBLIC and NEVER to allow them to convert one to another. Every attempt to convert one to the other represents a criminal financial conflict of interest that turns the PUBLIC trust into a SHAM trust.
5. Offer or enforce the civil statutory code.
6. Offer or enforce [civil franchises \(see Form #05.030\)](#).

By the government committing the above acts of implied consent, they would then agree to the following anti-franchise franchise:

Injury Defense Franchise and Agreement, Form #06.027
<https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/InjuryDefenseFranchise.pdf>

13.6.4 FALSE STATEMENT: All men and women MUST have a SECULAR domicile within the civil statutory jurisdiction of a specific earthly government

*“As **Barhydt must have had a residence and domicile somewhere**, it is for the courts to decide where that was*

[. . .]

Hence it is the universal rule, in construing revenue statutes, that, as a man must have a domicile or taxing residence somewhere”
[Barhydt v. Cross, 156 Iowa 271, 277 (1912)]

TRANSLATION: No one is entitled to leave the federal plantation and cease to be cattle on the government tax farm. Everyone must come in annually to the milking stall to be literally “milked” of all their wealth and dignity and autonomy. If they don’t, they will literally starve to death because we will steal all their feed. See:

How to Leave the Government Farm, Form #12.020
<http://youtu.be/Mp1gJ3iF2Ik>

REBUTTAL: It is NOT a “universal rule” for EVERYONE, because WE don’t agree that everyone must have a domicile. Only among covetous and unaccountable judges who want to expand their civil statutory protection racket is it “universal”, and the fact that it is universal among them is problematic at best for the reasons stated by Thomas Jefferson:

*“Contrary to all correct example, [the Federal judiciary] are in the habit of going out of the question before them, to throw an anchor ahead and grapple further hold for future advances of power. **They are then in fact the corps of sappers and miners, steadily working to undermine the independent rights of the States and to consolidate all power in the hands of that government in which they have so important a freehold estate.**”*
[Thomas Jefferson: Autobiography, 1821. ME 1:121]

*“We all know that permanent judges acquire an esprit de corps; that, being known, **they are liable to be tempted by bribery; that they are misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party, by a devotion to the executive or legislative;** that it is better to leave a cause to the decision of cross and pile than to that of a judge biased to one side; and that the opinion of twelve honest jurymen gives still a better hope of right than cross and pile does.”*
[Thomas Jefferson to Abbe Arnoux, 1789. ME 7:423, Papers 15:283]

“It is not enough that honest men are appointed judges. All know the influence of interest on the mind of man, and how unconsciously his judgment is warped by that influence. To this bias add that of the esprit de corps, of their peculiar maxim and creed that ‘it is the office of a good judge to enlarge his jurisdiction,’ and the absence of responsibility, and how can we expect impartial decision between the General government, of which they are themselves so eminent a part, and an individual state from which they have nothing to hope or fear?”
[Thomas Jefferson: Autobiography, 1821. ME 1:121]

"At the establishment of our Constitutions, the judiciary bodies were supposed to be the most helpless and harmless members of the government. Experience, however, soon showed in what way they were to become the most dangerous; that the insufficiency of the means provided for their removal gave them a freehold and irresponsibility in office; that their decisions, seeming to concern individual suitors only, pass silent and unheeded by the public at large; that these decisions nevertheless become law by precedent, sapping by little and little the foundations of the Constitution and working its change by construction before any one has perceived that that invisible and helpless worm has been busily employed in consuming its substance. In truth, man is not made to be trusted for life if secured against all liability to account."

[Thomas Jefferson to A. Coray, 1823. ME 15:486]

"I do not charge the judges with willful and ill-intentioned error; but honest error must be arrested where its toleration leads to public ruin. As for the safety of society, we commit honest maniacs to Bedlam; so judges should be withdrawn from their bench whose erroneous biases are leading us to dissolution. It may, indeed, injure them in fame or in fortune; but it saves the republic, which is the first and supreme law."

[Thomas Jefferson: Autobiography, 1821. ME 1:122]

"The original error [was in] establishing a judiciary independent of the nation, and which, from the citadel of the law, can turn its guns on those they were meant to defend, and control and fashion their proceedings to its own will."

[Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles Eppes, 1807. FE 9:68]

"It is a misnomer to call a government republican in which a branch of the supreme power [the Federal Judiciary] is independent of the nation."

[Thomas Jefferson to James Pleasants, 1821. FE 10:198]

"It is left... to the juries, if they think the permanent judges are under any bias whatever in any cause, to take on themselves to judge the law as well as the fact. They never exercise this power but when they suspect partiality in the judges; and by the exercise of this power they have been the firmest bulwarks of English liberty."

[Thomas Jefferson to Abbe Arnoux, 1789. ME 7:423, Papers 15:283]

The fact that something is "universal" among covetous judges with a financial conflict of interest also makes it neither just nor lawful. GREED and covetousness for other people's property are universal. Sin is universal, according to the Bible. Greed and covetousness are universal.

"[. . .] for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, [. . .]"

[Romans 3:23, Bible, NKJV]

If these degenerate human traits were not universal, we wouldn't need the Ten Commandments or law at all.

As Thomas Jefferson pointed out in reference to the judiciary, ACCOUNTABILITY to the written law and the constitution are the only real check on judicial tyranny. You can always expect that judges will want to expand their power, and thus to seek to expand the audience of people under their CIVIL STATUTORY mafia protection by forcing a domicile onto people who don't want one and who instead would prefer the common law as documented below:

Rebutted False Arguments About the Common Law, Form #08.025
<https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/RebuttedFalseArgumentsAboutCommonLaw.pdf>

13.6.5 FALSE STATEMENT: SECULAR domicile and residence are presumed to continue until one acquires another

"Where one acquires a residence, that residence is presumed to continue until he acquires another; and the burden is upon him to show a change and the acquisition of a new residence. This change, for the purpose of taxation, must be something more than a mere intent. It involves a change of place as well. In other words, the mere intent of the plaintiff, no matter how expressed, will not constitute a change, unless there be a change in abode as well."

[Barhydt v. Cross, 156 Iowa 271, 278 (1912)]

TRANSLATION: No one escapes the government plantation alive. Slaves will be WHIPPED like Barhydt was! If you travel to a different plantation, you better contact the rancher and sign up to rent a STALL so you can be milked regularly, whether you want one or not. And yes, it is a plantation. Each "state" is just a single ranch. The counties are "sub-ranches". No "free range" farming here! The ranchers are the state legislators who think they own and control everything and everyone needs THEIR legislative permission to do anything and everything, whether it be a license, permission to travel outside the country, a government ID, or a bank account you cannot get without a government ID.

REBUTTAL: To the extend that we are compelled to FIRE God as our CIVIL lawgiver and replace Him with a secular king literally makes government into a pagan deity in violation of the First Amendment and the Ten Commandments.. The Bible says God owns the Heavens and the Earth and as the REAL “landlord” or rancher, He is the only one truly qualified to make rules to regulate His absolutely owned property:

The heavens are Yours, the earth also is Yours; The world and all its fullness, You have founded them.”
[Psalm 89:11, Bible, NKJV]

*By the word of the LORD the heavens were made,
And all the host of them by the breath of His mouth.
He gathers the waters of the sea together as a heap;[a]
He lays up the deep in storehouses.
Let all the earth fear the LORD;
Let all the inhabitants of the world stand in awe of Him.
For He spoke, and it was done;
He commanded, and it stood fast.
[Psalm 33:6-9, Bible, NKJV]*

*Thus says God the LORD,
Who created the heavens and stretched them out,
Who spread forth the earth and that which comes from it,
Who gives breath to the people on it,
[Isaiah 42:5, Bible, NKJV]*

“Everyone who is called by My name, Whom I have created for My glory; I have formed him, yes, I have made him.”
[Isaiah 43:7, Bible, NKJV]

“For thus says the LORD, Who created the heavens, Who is God, Who formed the earth and made it, Who has established it, Who did not create it in vain, Who formed it to be inhabited: “ I am the LORD, and there is no other.”
[Isaiah 45:18, Bible, NKJV]

To REMOVE your private property from the protections of the Bill of Rights and the Common Law, and to substitute the whims of a secular legislature (what the Bible calls a “king”) in its place using the civil statutory law fires God as the CIVIL protector and replaces Him with a covetous King in violation of God’s laws:

“Then all the elders of Israel gathered together and came to Samuel at Ramah, and said to him, ‘Look, you are old, and your sons do not walk in your ways. Now make us a king to judge us like all the nations [and be OVER them]’.

“But the thing displeased Samuel when they said, ‘Give us a king to judge us.’ So Samuel prayed to the Lord. And the Lord said to Samuel, ‘Heed the voice of the people in all that they say to you; for they have rejected Me, that I should not reign over them. According to all the works which they have done since the day that I brought them up out of Egypt, even to this day—with which they have forsaken Me and served other gods—so they are doing to you also [government becoming idolatry].”
[1 Sam. 8:4-8, Bible, NKJV]

“And when you saw that Nahash king of the Ammonites came against you, you said to me, ‘No, but a king shall reign over us,’ when the Lord your God was your king.

.....

And all the people said to Samuel, “Pray for your servants to the Lord your God, that we may not die; for we have added to all our sins the evil of asking a king for ourselves.”
[1 Sam. 12:12, 19, Bible, NKJV]

DOMICILE is WORST than black slavery, because EVERYONE is subject to it, and not just blacks, and the entire STATE or COUNTRY is a slave plantation. Universal slavery. The slave contract is the civil code, because a domicile is the method of imposing the involuntary civil obligations and you have no choice to NOT HAVE a civil secular domicile according to this corrupt court. The obligations attached to the civil statutory status of “citizen”, “resident”, and “person” represent

property STOLEN from you. The fact that there are civil statutory PRIVILEGES available to REWARD you for GIVING up such rights is the justification they use to defend their THEFT of your constitutional and natural rights akin to a “tacit procuration”. But who is the real “customer” here? They are the only ones who can determine the amount of “benefit”, meaning “privileges” that you get in exchange for accepting the obligations. What if you don’t want to accept their offer? They send you to the gulag and political prison called jail as a literal political prisoner! Hardly a bargain.

Is it POSSIBLE EVEN AS A CONSENTING MEMBER of the social compact to EVER be “off duty” and to abandon the protections or benefits of the civil statutory protection franchise for a specific circumstance or locality? The common law says yes, but covetous courts and judges like this one don’t EVER want to let you out of your “franchise cage”, even though you receive no quantifiable consideration that they ever have any burden of proof whatsoever to demonstrate to defend their mafia tactics. The legal leash you are on is the civil status they created as their property that they loan to you with legal conditions attached. Welcome to Amerika and The Matrix, COMRADE!

13.6.6 FALSE STATEMENT: If we didn’t compel secular domicile SOMEWHERE, a man might escape income taxation altogether!

*“Cases of abandonment of residence, as applied to homesteads, or as to residence, where it is not essential that [*278] one have a homestead at all, or a definite residence, for the purposes of the case, are not applicable to such controversies as this, where a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere. Courts endeavor to construe revenue laws so that each one will share his just burden of taxation; and he should pay his taxes somewhere. Hence it is the universal rule, in construing revenue statutes, that, as a man must have a domicile or taxing residence somewhere, his old residence will be deemed his present one until a new one is acquired. If this were not the rule, a man might escape taxation altogether. Assuming, for the purposes of argument, as we must, that the laws of California are the same as our own, Barhydt would escape all taxation for the year 1910, were he successful in this appeal; for he could not, under the record, be taxed in California. Our own cases, with possibly one exception, sustain this view, and, as we shall see, this is the holding elsewhere. Of our own cases supporting the conclusion [***11] here reached, see Tuttle v. Wood, 115 Iowa 507 at 509, 88 N.W. 1056; Glotfelty v. Brown, 148 Iowa 124, 126 N.W. 797; In re Titterington, 130 Iowa 356 at 358, 106 N.W. 761; Nugent v. Bates, 51 Iowa 77 at 79, 50 N.W. 76; Cover v. Hatten, 136 Iowa 63 at 65, 113 N.W. 470. [Barhydt v. Cross, 156 Iowa 271, 277-278 (1912)]*

TRANSLATION: EVERYONE is a tax slave on the government plantation, whether they want to be or not. Never mind that the ability to make civil rules for property requires ownership, whether qualified or absolute, and that the civil government can’t own people nor do they own the land protected by the civil statutory law. All we need are the guns and the jails and we can take whatever we want and PRETEND like we own EVERYTHING!

REBUTTAL: This is an obvious over-exaggeration and dramatization by the court. The subject of this case was income tax ALONE, but there are LOTS of taxes that people pay that aren’t income tax:

1. Sales tax.
 2. Gas tax.
 3. Property tax.
 4. Car registration.
 5. Licenseing fees.
- Etc.

It’s clearly NOT the end of the world to deprive the state of fees to pay for services that you do not want, do not use, and in many cases regard as immoral and harmful and destructive of your property rights, autonomy, and control. Obviously, the court was in marketing mode in this case to expand their “mafia civil protection racket” through fear and intimidation. Many states, in fact, do not even have an income tax and don’t need it to cover their expenses!

“A constitutional right against unjust taxation is given for the protection of private property, but it may be waived by those affected who consent to such action to their property as would otherwise be invalid.” [Wight v. Davidson, 181 U.S. 371 (1901)]

Further, income taxation amounts essentially to club membership dues. The CLUB is called the “social compact”. The rules are the civil statutes, which are based on the consent of VOLUNTARY members. Those who have consented to join any club should certainly pay their way. However, no one should be compelled to join the club for the simple reason that the

1 foundation of the social compact is consent of the governed. The First Amendment prohibits all such forms of “compelled
2 association”. There can be no consent where there is no choice, which implies that every choice implies the right to NOT
3 consent. In the case of the civil statutory law, saying NO to the club means to be subject to the common law INSTEAD of
4 the civil statutory law, whether or not you consent. The common law is the DEFAULT law system for those who don’t join
5 the club. The purpose of the common law (of England) we inherited from our predecessor is personal responsibility and
6 providing remedy for injuries after they occur, whether you consent to the remedy or not. Under the common law, where
7 there is no proven injury, there is no “standing” to sue and you must be left alone as a matter of justice itself.

8 *"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They*
9 *recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a*
10 *part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect*
11 *Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. **They conferred, as against the***
12 ***Government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized***
13 ***men.**"*

14 *[Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) see also Washington v. Harper,*
15 *494 U.S. 210 (1990)]*

16 Is there ANY aspect of your private life that the government can’t tax, regulate, or humiliate you with once you become a
17 member of THEIR club? NONE!

18 *"To be [CIVILLY] governed is to be watched over, inspected, spied on, directed, legislated, regimented, closed*
19 *in, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, assessed, evaluated, censored, commanded; all by creatures that have*
20 *neither the right, nor wisdom, nor virtue . . .*

21 *To be governed means that at every move, operation, or transaction one is noted, registered, entered in a census,*
22 *taxed, stamped, priced, assessed, patented, licensed, authorized, recommended, admonished, prevented,*
23 *reformed, set right, corrected. Government means to be subjected to tribute, trained, ransomed, exploited,*
24 *monopolized, extorted, pressured, mystified, robbed; all in the name of public utility and the general good.*

25 *Then, at the first sign of resistance or word of complaint, one is repressed, fined, despised, vexed, pursued,*
26 *hustled, beaten up, garroted, imprisoned, shot, machine-gunned, judged, sentenced, deported, sacrificed, sold,*
27 *betrayed, and to cap it all, ridiculed, mocked, outraged, and dishonored. That is government, that is its justice*
28 *and its morality! . . . O human personality! How can it be that you have cowered in such subjection for sixty*
29 *centuries?"*

30 *[Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (born A. D. 1809 – died A. D. 1865)]*

31 **13.6.7 FALSE STATEMENT: Courts must endeavor to construe revenue laws so that each one will share his** 32 **burden of taxation**

33 *"Courts endeavor to construe revenue laws so that each one will share his just burden of taxation; and he*
34 ***should pay his taxes somewhere.** Hence it is the universal rule, in construing revenue statutes, that, as a man*
35 *must have a domicile or taxing residence somewhere, his old residence will be deemed his present one until a*
36 *new one is acquired."*

37 *[Barhydt v. Cross, 156 Iowa 271, 278 (1912)]*

38 **TRANSLATION:** “Every one” is the customer of our civil statutory protection franchise MONOPOLY. We will provide
39 NO support NO escape hatch to UNCONSENT to be a “customer” called a civil statutory “citizen”, “resident” or “person”,
40 such as the common law instead of civil statutory law. We don’t care that supporting the common law of England is in the
41 constitution. Common law be damned because people should NEVER have a choice of the law system that protects them or
42 their property. Even though involuntary servitude is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment, a little slavery to a corporate
43 monopoly to pay off my judicial retirement check and the public debt never hurt ANYONE, even though it is a crime for a
44 judge to preside over matters he/she has a financial conflict of interest in. 28 U.S.C. §§144, 455, and 18 U.S.C. §208.

45 **REBUTTAL:** The term “each one” cannot possibly mean EVERY MAN OR WOMAN. It can only mean every man or
46 woman WHO VOLUNTEERS TO BE PARTY TO THE CIVIL SOCIAL COMPACT, which is OPTIONAL for those who
47 wish to retain full self-ownership and pursue only the protections of the common law and equality in relation to the
48 government in court. If joining weren’t optional, why THE HELL would we even need a constitution? The Bill of Rights
49 protects private property, but statutory privileges DESTROY private rights and private property and replace them with
50 privileges.

51 The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that it is VOLUNTARY “MEMBERSHIP” that is the cause for loss of most rights:

When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain. "A body politic," as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, "is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good." This does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights which are purely and exclusively private, Thorpe v. R. & B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 143; but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government, and 125*125 has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. From this source come the police powers, which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 583, "are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, . . . that is to say, . . . the power to govern men and things." Under these powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good. In their exercise it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold. To this day, statutes are to be found in many of the States upon some or all these subjects; and we think it has never yet been successfully contended that such legislation came within any of the constitutional prohibitions against interference with private property. With the Fifth Amendment in force, Congress, in 1820, conferred power upon the city of Washington "to regulate . . . the rates of wharfage at private wharves, . . . the sweeping of chimneys, and to fix the rates of fees therefor, . . . and the weight and quality of bread," 3 Stat. 587, sect. 7; and, in 1848, "to make all necessary regulations respecting hackney carriages and the rates of fare of the same, and the rates of hauling by cartmen, wagoners, carmen, and draymen, and the rates of commission of auctioneers," 9 id. 224, sect. 2. [Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), SOURCE: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6419197193322400931]

The "whole people" mentioned above is the ENTIRE "body politic" of consenting members to the social compact called STATUTORY "citizens" and "residents", and not those born or naturalized in the country.

"The term [STATUTORY] 'citizen,' as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term subject in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people — and he who before was a 'subject of the king' is now 'a citizen of the State [the COLLECTIVE corporation]." State v. Manuel, 1838, 20 N.C. 144, 4 Dev. & B. 20, 24-26, cited with approval in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, at page 668, 18 S.Ct. 456, at page 464, 42 L.Ed. 890, where the court said: "Nor can it be doubted that it is the inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship." [Medvedieff v. Citizens Service Oil Co, 35 F.Supp. 999 (1940)]

"It will be sufficient to observe briefly, that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in England, exist on feudal principles. That system considers the Prince as the sovereign, and the people as his subjects; it regards his person as the object of allegiance, and excludes the idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject, either in a Court of Justice or elsewhere. That system contemplates him as being the fountain of honor and authority; and from his grace and grant derives all franchises, immunities and privileges..." at 471.

"From the differences existing between feudal sovereignties and Government founded on compacts, it necessarily follows that their respective prerogatives must differ. Sovereignty is the right to govern; a nation or State-sovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides. In Europe the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the Prince; here it rests with the people; there, the sovereign actually administers the Government; here, never in a single instance; our Governors are the agents of the people, and at most stand in the same relation to their sovereign, in which regents in Europe stand to their sovereigns. Their Princes have personal powers, dignities, and pre-eminences, our rulers have none but official; nor do they partake in the sovereignty otherwise, or in any other capacity, than as private citizens." at 472. [Justice Wilson] [Chisholm, Ex'r. v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (U.S.) 419, 1 L.Ed. 454, 457, 471, 472) (1794)]

The "State" in the above is a corporation. Those who are STATUTORY "citizens" are officers of that corporation. President Obama even said so in his Farewell Address! See for yourself:

President Obama Admits in His Farewell Address that "citizen" is a public office, SEDM Exhibit #01.018
<https://sedm.org/Exhibits/EX01.018-39-45-20170110-Obama%20Farewell%20Speech.mp4>

You have a choice about whether you want to serve as officers or public officers of that corporation, and if you don't, YOU ARE A SLAVE people! The way you volunteer is to choose a CIVIL domicile. The way to unvolunteer is to be a transient foreigner domiciled in the kingdom of Heaven on the absolutely owned territory of your only King and civil lawgiver, which

is God. Below are the “preferred pronouns” used to refer to those who DO NOT consent and have lawfully REMOVED consent to a SECULAR civil domicile and replaced it with a domicile in the Kingdom of Heaven in full satisfaction of the Biblical delegation of authority order:

My Preferred Pronouns, SEDM
<https://sedm.org/my-preferred-pronouns/>

Notice the phrase above in Chisholm “partake of the sovereignty otherwise, or in any capacity, than as private citizens”. Not “private PEOPLE”, but “private [STATUTORY/domiciled] citizens”. If you go to your local registrar of voters, they will tell you that you will NOT be permitted to register to vote unless you have a civil domicile in the country REGARDLESS of your nationality or your place of birth. If you don’t have a domicile, even though you have American NATIONALITY, or you don’t WANT a domicile, then you, like us, will be treated as a NON-MEMBER. If you choose to be a member, you by implication SURRENDER some of the protections of the constitution as intimated above in the Munn case:

“Under basic rules of construction, statutory laws enacted by legislative bodies [by writing CIVIL STATUTES] cannot impair rights given under a constitution. 194 B.R. at 925. ”
[In re Young, 235 B.R. 666 (Bankr.M.D.Fla., 1999)]

One can have nationality and therefore be a CONSTITUTIONAL “citizen of the United States” under the Fourteenth Amendment WITHOUT being a member of the “body politic” as a STATUTORY “citizen” or “resident” with a domicile within the forum. We are, in fact! The Bible says we HAVE to do this:

“Above all, you must live as citizens of heaven [INSTEAD of citizens of earth. [You can only be a citizen of ONE place at a time because you can only have a domicile in one place at a time](#)], conducting yourselves in a manner worthy of the Good News about Christ. Then, whether I come and see you again or only hear about you, I will know that you are standing together with one spirit and one purpose, fighting together for the faith, which is the Good News.”
[Philippians 1:27, Bible, NLT]

Notice that in Munn the covenant is with “EVERY CITIZEN” and not “EVERY ONE”. You must join voluntarily to be party to such a covenant or else the First Amendment right of freedom from compelled association is violated. The Bill of Rights, of which the First Amendment is a part, protects CONSTITUTIONAL persons, which are all HUMAN BEINGS and not fictions called CITIZENS and RESIDENTS. The fact that this even has to be explained to the Iowa Supreme Court makes a travesty of justice.

An act of BIRTH, on the other hand, is not a voluntary choice of membership that could give rise to a LOSS of natural or constitutional rights of human beings within the Bill of Rights, although it is the origin of the concept of allegiance and nationality:

In Udney v. Udney (1869), L.R., 1 H. L. Sc. 441, the point decided was one of inheritance, depending upon the question whether the domicile of the father was in England or in Scotland, he being in either alternative a British subject. Lord Chancellor Hatherley said: ‘The question of naturalization and of allegiance is distinct from that of domicile.’ Page 452. Lord Westbury, in the passage relied on by the counsel for the United States, began by saying: ‘The law of England, and of almost all civilized countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or conditions,—one by virtue of which he becomes the subject [NATIONAL] of some particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance, and which may be called his political status; another by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political status.’ And then, while maintaining that the civil status is universally governed by the single principle of domicile (domicilium), the criterion established by international law for the purpose of determining civil status, and the basis on which ‘the personal rights of the party—that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy, or intestacy— must depend,’ he yet distinctly recognized that a man’s political status, his country (patria), and his ‘nationality,—that is, natural allegiance,—‘may depend on different laws in different countries.’ Pages 457, 460. He evidently used the word ‘citizen,’ not as equivalent to ‘subject,’ but rather to ‘inhabitant’; and had no thought of impeaching the established rule that all persons born under British dominion are natural-born subjects.
[United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898) ;
SOURCE: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3381955771263111765]

The VOLUNTARY “membership” that the U.S. Supreme Court refers to in the case of Munn above which is the origin of a LOSS of constitutional or natural rights is therefore CLEARLY domicile, and not NATIONALITY, allegiance, or even naturalization. Domicile is voluntary. NATIONALITY upon birth is NOT voluntary and therefore cannot be the origin of

1 how one CONSENTS to become subject to the civil statutory law as a CONSENTING MEMBER of the social compact.
2 Corrupt courts and judges often try to confuse CONSTITUTIONAL citizenship (nationality and allegiance) with CIVIL
3 STATUTORY citizenship (domicile) so they can make you believe that both of them are the same, because they want more
4 cows to milk on the government plantation. This is called EQUIVOCATION, which is exhaustively explored in:

Legal Deception, Propaganda, and Fraud, Form #05.014
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/LegalDecPropFraud.pdf>

13.7 Contention: Wages, tips, and other compensation received for personal services are not income³⁸

7 This argument asserts that wages, tips, and other compensation received for personal services are not income, because there
8 is allegedly no taxable gain when a person “exchanges” labor for money. Under this theory, wages are not taxable income
9 because people have basis in their labor equal to the fair market value of the wages they receive; thus, there is no gain to be
10 taxed.

There is no question that “wages”, as legally defined in [26 U.S.C. §3401\(a\)](#), are taxable and are “income”. We agree with the IRS that anyone who uses this argument is wrong and deserves all the persecution they will inevitably get if they try to litigate this in a federal court. The regulations, in fact, say that a person who fills out a W-4 has signed a contract which requires him to include the earnings associated with the I.R.S. Form W-4 as “gross income” on a tax return. Therefore, all “wages” subject to this private contract become taxable by private agreement, even where there is not territorial jurisdiction:

[26 C.F.R. §31.3402\(p\)-1 Voluntary withholding agreements.](#)

(a) In general.

An employee and his employer may enter into an agreement under section 3402(b) to provide for the withholding of income tax upon payments of amounts described in paragraph (b)(1) of §31.3401(a)–3, made after December 31, 1970.

An agreement may be entered into under this section only with respect to amounts which are includible in the gross income of the employee under section 61, and must be applicable to all such amounts paid by the employer to the employee. The amount to be withheld pursuant to an agreement under section 3402(p) shall be determined under the rules contained in section 3402 and the regulations thereunder. See §31.3405(c)–1, Q&A–3 concerning agreements to have more than 20-percent Federal income tax withheld from eligible rollover distributions within the meaning of section 402.

It is therefore pointless to argue that “wages” are not taxable, because they are, but only to those who are either engaged in a “trade or business” or who have elected to be treated as though they are by voluntarily signing an IRS Form W-4.

Now let’s look at WHERE they can lawfully tax “wages”. I.R.C. Subtitle A describes an indirect excise tax upon a “trade or business”, which is defined in [26 U.S.C. §7701\(a\)\(26\)](#) as “the functions of a public office”. [4 U.S.C. §72](#) mandates that all “public offices” must exist only in the District of Columbia and no place else except as expressly authorized by law.

[TITLE 4 > CHAPTER 3 > § 72](#)

[§ 72. Public offices: at seat of Government](#)

All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.

If you search the entire Internal Revenue Code electronically as we have for an enactment of Congress that “expressly extends” the enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code to any place other than the District of Columbia, the only reference you will find is in [48 U.S.C. §1612](#). That section of code “expressly extends” the enforcement of the I.R.C. to the Virgin Islands. There is no provision of the I.R.C. or any other Title of the U.S. Code which extends the enforcement of the I.R.C. to any state of the Union.

It gets worse, folks. [26 U.S.C. §7601](#) only authorizes the I.R.S. to enforce within Internal Revenue Districts. [26 U.S.C. §7621](#) authorizes the President to determine Internal Revenue Districts, and he delegated that authority to the Secretary of the Treasury in [Executive Order 10289](#) in 1952. The Secretary of the Treasury, in turn, only has one standing Treasury Order, [Treasury Order 150-02](#), and it only authorizes internal revenue districts within the District of Columbia. The previous Treasury Order 150-01, established internal revenue districts that included states of the Union, but it was repealed by [Treasury Order 150-02](#) as a result of the [IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998](#). The result

³⁸ SOURCE: *Rebutted Version of the IRS Publication: “The Truth About Frivolous Tax Arguments”*, Form #08.005; https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/friv_tax_rebuts.pdf.

is that the only internal revenue district left in which the IRS can enforce is the District of Columbia. Do you live in the District of Columbia?

The Law: For federal income tax purposes, “gross income” means all income from whatever source derived and includes compensation for services. I.R.C. §61. Any income, from whatever source, is presumed to be income under section 61, unless the taxpayer can establish that it is specifically exempted or excluded. In *Reese v. United States*, 24 F.3d. 228, 231 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the court stated, “an abiding principle of federal tax law is that, absent an enumerated exception, gross income means all income from whatever source derived.”

All compensation for personal services, no matter what the form of payment, must be included in gross income. This includes salary or wages paid in cash, as well as the value of property and other economic benefits received because of services performed, or to be performed in the future. Furthermore, criminal and civil penalties have been imposed against individuals relying upon this frivolous argument.

Relevant Case Law:

Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1955) – referring to the statute’s words “income derived from any source whatever,” the Supreme Court stated, “this language was used by Congress to exert in this field ‘the full measure of its taxing power.’ ... And the Court has given a liberal construction to this broad phraseology in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically exempted.”

Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977) – the Supreme Court found that payments are considered income where the payments are undeniably accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which a taxpayer has complete dominion.

United States v. Connor, 898 F.2d. 942, 943-44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029 (1990) – the court stated that “[e]very court which has ever considered the issue has unequivocally rejected the argument that wages are not income.”

Lonsdale v. Commissioner, 661 F.2d. 71, 72 (5th Cir. 1981) – the court rejected as “meritless” the taxpayer’s contention that the “exchange of services for money is a zero-sum transaction ...”

Reading v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 730 (1978), aff’d, 614 F.2d. 159 (8th Cir. 1980) – the court said the entire amount received from the sale of one’s services constitutes income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.

United States v. Richards, 723 F.2d. 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1983) – the court upheld conviction and fines imposed for willfully failing to file tax returns, stating that the taxpayer’s contention that wages and salaries are not income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment is “totally lacking in merit.”

United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d. 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1981) – the court affirmed Romero’s conviction for willfully failing to file tax returns, finding, in part, that “[t]he trial judge properly instructed the jury on the meaning of [‘income’ and ‘person’]. Romero’s proclaimed belief that he was not a ‘person’ and that the wages he earned as a carpenter were not ‘income’ is fatuous as well as obviously incorrect.”

Abrams v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 403, 413 (1984) – the court rejected the argument that wages are not income, sustained the failure to file penalty, and awarded damages of \$5,000 for pursuing a position that was “frivolous and groundless ... and maintained primarily for delay.”

Cullinane v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-2, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1192, 1193 (1999) – noting that “[c]ourts have consistently held that compensation for services rendered constitutes taxable income and that taxpayers have no tax basis in their labor,” the court found Cullinane liable for the failure to file penalty, stating that “[his] argument that he is not required to pay tax on compensation for services does not constitute reasonable cause.”

14 IRS: Ignorance Related Slavery (IRS)

We are not against the government. Government has always been a necessary evil to deal with the natural human tendency to sin in a way that injures others.

1 We are not against all law nor are we anarchists either. But civil statutes, however, are not law if they come with unavoidable
2 obligations not directly related to remedies for an injury that occurred AFTER it has occurred. We prove this in:

What is "Law"?2, Form #05.048
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhatIsLaw.pdf>

3 Our main enemy is LEGAL ignorance that permits evil to flourish in the public square and thereby to undermine the authority
4 of God and His Holy Laws over society. To the extent that you, our reader, are or continue to remain legally ignorant is the
5 extent to which you become an instrument of sin and evil and a threat to yourself and the rest of us:

6 *"...it is not good for a soul to be without [LEGAL] knowledge,"*
7 *[Prov. 19:2, Bible, NKJV]*

8 *"My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge."*
9 *[Hosea 4:6, Bible, NKJV]*

10 *"But this crowd that does not know [and quote and follow and use] the law is accursed."*
11 *[John 7:49, Bible, NKJV]*

12 *"Salvation is far from the wicked, For they do not seek Your [God's] statutes."*
13 *[Psalm 119:155, Bible, NKJV]*

14 Only by learning the law, starting with God's law, can you ever hope to be truly free:

15 *"Only the educated are free. "*
16 *[Epictetus, Discourses]*

17 *"Most assuredly, I say to you, whoever commits sin is a slave of sin."*
18 *[John 8:34, Bible, NKJV]*

19 *"One who turns his ear from hearing the law [God's law or man's law], even his prayer is an abomination. "*
20 *[Prov. 28:9, Bible, NKJV]*

21 *"If a nation expects to be ignorant and free... it expects what never was and never will be. "*
22 *[Thomas Jefferson]*

23 *"And thou shalt teach them ordinances and laws [of both God and man], and shalt shew them the way wherein*
24 *they must walk, and the work [of obedience to God] that they must do. "*
25 *[Exodus 18:20, Bible, NKJV]*

26 *"This Book of the Law [God's Law] shall not depart from your mouth, but you shall meditate in it day and night,*
27 *that you may observe to do according to all that is written in it. For then you will make your way prosperous, and*
28 *then you will have good success. Have I not commanded you? Be strong and of good courage; do not be afraid,*
29 *nor be dismayed, for the LORD your God is with you wherever you go. "*
30 *[Joshua 1:8-9, Bible, NKJV]*

31 *"Ye shall know the Truth and the Truth shall make you free"*
32 *[Jesus in John 8:32, Bible, NKJV]*

33 *"Humble yourselves in the sight of the Lord, and He will lift you up [above your government]."*
34 *[James 4:10, Bible, NKJV]*

35 What you probably believed about income tax for most of your life is simply that: nothing but a belief completely detached
36 from what the law actually and expressly says on the subject. That belief is a product mainly of deceptive legal profession
37 and government propaganda and sophistry which is emphatically untrustworthy, self-serving, and which omits the most
38 important truths about who it applies to. That deception is thoroughly documented in:

Legal Deception, Propaganda, and Fraud, Form #05.014
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/LegalDecPropFraud.pdf>

39 The purpose of that malicious government and legal profession deception is to literally implement communism. Communism
40 is based on two main techniques:

1. Government deception through control of the press, which in this case limits itself to the LEGAL press.
2. Government ownership or control over all otherwise private property.

The above techniques are not possible without a legally uniformed, naïve, and passive populace that does not question or challenge authority. If you make yourselves sheep, the government wolves will DEFINITELY eat you.

What you have witnessed in this document is a mere taste of a much larger picture. You have chosen and taken the figurative Red Pill in the movie *The Matrix*. That choice is described below:

Why You Are Here, SEDM
<http://famguardian.org/Media/Choices.mp3>

The choice you have just made was hidden from you by government deception. Equivocation was abused to hide that choice. Equivocation with such terms as “United States”, “employee”, “trade or business”, “person”, “citizen”, “resident”, etc. The result of hiding that choice is that your consent or acquiescence was procured without your knowledge. We call that tactic “invisible consent”:

*Hot Issues: Invisible Consent**, SEDM
<https://sedm.org/invisible-consent/>

The result of such invisible consent tactics is criminal identity theft in which your legal identity was unknowingly transported to a legislatively foreign jurisdiction, you were put into a franchise legal cage, and made a state whore and a human sacrifice to a pagan secular religion as described in:

1. *How Scoundrels Corrupted Our Republican Form of Government*, Family Guardian Fellowship
<https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Evidence/HowScCorruptOurRepubGovt.htm>

Curses of Disobedience [to God’s Laws]

“The alien [Washington, D.C. is legislatively “alien” in relation to states of the Union] who is among you shall rise higher and higher above you, and you shall come down lower and lower [malicious destruction of EQUAL PROTECTION and EQUAL TREATMENT by abusing FRANCHISES]. He shall lend to you [Federal Reserve counterfeiting franchise], but you shall not lend to him; he shall be the head, and you shall be the tail.

“Moreover all these curses shall come upon you and pursue and overtake you, until you are destroyed, because you did not obey the voice of the Lord your God, to keep His commandments and His statutes which He commanded you. And they shall be upon you for a sign and a wonder, and on your descendants forever.

“Because you did not serve [ONLY] the Lord your God with joy and gladness of heart, for the abundance of everything, therefore you shall serve your [covetous thieving lawyer] enemies, whom the Lord will send against you, in hunger, in thirst, in nakedness, and in need of everything; and He will put a yoke of iron [franchise codes] on your neck until He has destroyed you. The Lord will bring a nation against you from afar [the District of CRIMINALS], from the end of the earth, as swift as the eagle flies [the American Eagle], a nation whose language [LEGALESE] you will not understand, a nation of fierce [coercive and fascist] countenance, which does not respect the elderly [assassinates them by denying them healthcare through bureaucratic delays on an Obamacare waiting list] nor show favor to the young [destroying their ability to learn in the public FOOL system]. And they shall eat the increase of your livestock and the produce of your land [with “trade or business” franchise taxes], until you [and all your property] are destroyed [or STOLEN/CONFISCATED]; they shall not leave you grain or new wine or oil, or the increase of your cattle or the offspring of your flocks, until they have destroyed you. [Deut. 28:43-51, Bible, NKJV]

2. *Government Identity Theft*, Form #05.046
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/GovernmentIdentityTheft.pdf>
3. *Socialism: The New American Civil Religion*, Form #05.016
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/SocialismCivilReligion.pdf>

If you would like to see how deep the rabbit hole REALLY goes without the Third Rail filter advanced by a covetous and corrupt legal profession and government, we welcome you to visit our website at:

<http://sedm.org>

15 Conclusions

We will now concisely summarize the findings of this document:

1. All just powers derive from the CONSENT of the governed, as the Declaration of Independence indicates.
2. Real “law” DOES NOT require your consent in some form, whether EXPRESS or IMPLIED. It operates INDEPENDENT of your consent. Thus, the only real “law” is the common law and the criminal law. Everything else requires consent or agreement or acquiescence in some form.
3. You absolutely own yourself. That concept is the BEGINNING of the notion of freedom and liberty, in fact.
4. As the absolute owner of yourself, YOU get to choose what system of law you want to use to protect that absolute and PRIVATE ownership.
5. There are TWO choices of law when it comes to protecting your private property:
 - 5.1. The CIVIL statutory law, which attaches to you through your voluntary choice of civil domicile.
 - 5.2. The common law, which attaches to you by default if you choose not to have a civil domicile.
6. You don’t need a civil domicile to receive protection of your absolutely owned PRIVATE property from the state. The constitution and the common law ALONE are sufficient. The civil statutory law is optional.
7. Your labor is your PRIVATE, absolutely owned property.
8. NO ONE can tax your labor without your consent in some form.
9. As the owner of yourself, YOU and ONLY YOU get to define BY WHAT METHOD you give your consent.
10. The method of choice to make your labor taxable is to make your consent IMPLIED rather than EXPRESS.
11. Domicile is the basis for income taxation and for enforcing the civil statutory law.
12. Domicile requires your consent.
13. When domicile is compelled, it becomes a vehicle to introduce slavery into society.
14. The method of choice for corrupt and covetous courts is to make your labor taxable is to make your consent IMPLIED rather than EXPRESS.
15. The method of obfuscating these critical facts is the equivocate NATIONALITY and DOMICILE so as to make you falsely believe that they are always synonymous. This has the effect of:
 - 15.1. Falsely making the civil statutory law appear MANDATORY.
 - 15.2. Repealing or rendering ineffectual the common law as a remedy for self protection.
 - 15.3. Making everyone into “harlots” fornicating with Caesar.

16 Resources for Further Study and Rebuttal

If you would like to study the subjects covered in this short memorandum in further detail, may we recommend the following authoritative sources, and also welcome you to rebut any part of this pamphlet after you have read it and studied the subject carefully yourself just as we have:

1. *U.S. Supreme Court Petition-My Labor Not Taxable*, Litigation Tool #07.008- use as a template to litigate this issue if someone won’t allow you to exclude your personal labor from a tax return
<https://sedm.org/Litigation/07-Appeals/SCPetition-LaborNotTaxable.docx>
2. Definition of Slavery and Human Trafficking
 - 2.1. Wikipedia: Slavery
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery>
 - 2.2. Wikipedia: Involuntary Servitude
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Involuntary_servitude
 - 2.3. Wikipedia: Human Trafficking
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_trafficking
3. Laws
 - 3.1. 18 U.S. Code Chapter 77: Peonage, Slavery, and Trafficking in Persons
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/part-I/chapter-77>
 - 3.2. 18 U.S.C. §1583: Enticement into slavery
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1583>
 - 3.3. 18 U.S.C. §1584: Sale into Involuntary Servitude
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1584>
 - 3.4. 18 U.S.C. §1589: Forced labor
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1589>

- 3.5. 18 U.S.C. §1590: Trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1590>
- 3.6. 22 U.S.C. §7102(8): Involuntary Servitude
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/7102>
- 3.7. *Annotated Thirteenth Amendment*, Justia
<https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-13/>
4. Government Enforcement
 - 4.1. *Human Trafficking*, U.S. Department of State
<https://www.state.gov/policy-issues/human-trafficking/>
 - 4.2. *Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons*, U.S. Department of State
<https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-civilian-security-democracy-and-human-rights/office-to-monitor-and-combat-trafficking-in-persons/>
 - 4.3. *Involuntary Servitude, Forced Labor, and Sex Trafficking Statutes Enforces*, U.S. Department of Justice
<https://www.justice.gov/crt/involuntary-servitude-forced-labor-and-sex-trafficking-statutes-enforced>
 - 4.4. *Human Trafficking*, Federal Bureau of Investigation
<https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/violent-crime/human-trafficking>
5. Discovery
 - 5.1. *Tax Deposition Questions*, Form #03.016, Section 2: Right to Labor
<https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/Forms/Discovery/Deposition/Section%2002.htm>
 - 5.2. *Tax Deposition Questions*, Form #03.016, Section 6: Sixteenth Amendment
<https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/Forms/Discovery/Deposition/Section%2006.htm>
 - 5.3. *Tax Deposition CD*, Form #11.301 -CD version of the above
6. How You Consent or Volunteer
 - 6.1. *Hot Issues: Invisible Consent**-SEDM
<https://sedm.org/invisible-consent/>
 - 6.2. *Sovereignty Forms and Instructions Online*, Form #10.004, Cites by Topic: “comity”-how extraterritorial jurisdiction is obtained
<https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/comity.htm>
 - 6.3. *Requirement For Consent*, Form #05.002
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Domicile.pdf>
 - 6.4. *How You Lose Constitutional or Natural Rights*, Form #10.015
<https://sedm.org/Forms/10-Emancipation/HowLoseConstOrNatRights.pdf>
 - 6.5. *How State Nationals Volunteer to Pay Income Tax*, Form #08.024
<https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/HowYouVolForIncomeTax.pdf>
 - 6.6. *Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises*, Form #05.030
<http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Franchises.pdf>
 - 6.7. *Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent*, Form #05.002
<https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Domicile.pdf>
7. My Preferred Pronouns, SEDM-how to describe oneself for those who want to be completely free, and protected only by the Constitution and the common law, but never the civil statutory law:
<https://sedm.org/my-preferred-pronouns/>
8. Authorities on Key “Words of Art”
 - 8.1. *Sovereignty Forms and Instructions Online*, Form #10.004, Cites by Topic: “slavery”
<https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/slavery.htm>
 - 8.2. *Sovereignty Forms and Instructions Online*, Form #10.004, Cites by Topic: “income”
<https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/income.htm>
 - 8.3. *Sovereignty Forms and Instructions Online*, Form #10.004, Cites by Topic: “wages”
<https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/wages.htm>
 - 8.4. *ChatGPT Questions About the Legal Definition of “income”*, SEDM
<https://sedm.org/chatgpt-questions-about-the-legal-definition-of-income/>
9. Pivotal Court Cases relating to slavery:
 - 9.1. *Bailey v. Pointexter's Ex'r*, 55 Va. 132 (1858)-The most complete and accurate description we have found of the consequences of being a slave are, from a civil status perspective. Quite diabolical. Virginia Supreme Court just before the Civil War fought over slavery began.
https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/CivilStatus-Bailey%20v.%20Poindexter_s%20Ex_r_%2055%20Va.%20132-Slave%20civil%20status.pdf

- 1 9.2. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)-U.S. Supreme Court case on slavery. Notice that the entire focus of
2 the case is on the treatment of PROPERTY, and how slaves are literally PROPERTY, just like the fictional civil
3 statutory “straw man”.
4 https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3231372247892780026
5 9.3. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1906) -U.S. Supreme Court case on peonage
6 https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18047423494759334829
7 9.4. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)-U.S. Supreme Court case on slavery
8 https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16038751515555215717
9 10. Income Tax As Slavery
10 10.1. Is the Income Tax a Form of Slavery?, Steven Yates and Ray Bornert III
11 <https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Freedom/Articles/IncomeTaxSlavery.htm>
12 10.2. Income Tax Reality Check: Income Tax is SLAVERY, Family Guardian Fellowship-absolutely excellent video!
13 <https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Evidence/IncomeTaxRealityCheck.mp4>