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Challenge to Income Tax Enforcement Authority Within Constitutional States of the Union

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Form 05.052, Rev. 8-25-2017

EXHIBIT: ______
Summary of Legal Constraints Upon Income Tax Enforcement

Jurisdiction

1. 4 U.S.C. §72 is positive law that provides the litmus test for the jurisdiction granted to the office of the Secretary of the United States Treasury who is also sometimes referenced as the Secretary and/or his delegates. It decrees (emphasis added) as follows:

“All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.”

2. 4 U.S.C. §72 specifies WHERE the authority for the United States offices can be exercised - not WHAT said offices can do. The breakdown and analysis of this law is as follows:

a. ALL offices attached to the seat of government are covered in this law, including the Secretary, the IRS, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), etc.;

b. All offices are vested by Congress with specific authority to be exercised by officers holding a particular official positions (i.e., the Secretary and his delegates).

c. All offices attached – does not mean physically connected “wall to wall”. It means connected or related to the seat of government by a delegated authority.

d. The provisions of 4 U.S.C. §72 are mandatory by the use of the word “shall”. This is not an “optional” consideration for any United States officer, Court, Agency, etc.;

e. The “exercise” of the functions delegated to ALL government offices is limited to “the District of Columbia” by default as the ONLY place where said jurisdiction is granted by the added enforcer “and not elsewhere”;

f. Any “exception” from the “and not elsewhere” territorial authority of an office of the United States must be “expressly” granted by Congress through “law” before any such office may extend its authority outside “the District of Columbia”;

g. Since only the Legislative Branch (Congress) has the exclusive authority to create law for the United States (District of Columbia) and territories or insular possessions, any “exceptions” to the 4 U.S.C. §72 mandates must be found only in United States “law”, NOT in Codes of Regulations or presidential executive orders (Executive Branch) or in Supreme Court rulings (Judicial Branch).

3. As “exceptions” to the limitations mandated by 4 U.S.C. §72 are to be “expressly” authorized only by Congress in United States “law”, the Courts are not empowered to extend the authority of any office beyond “the District of Columbia” (see case cited in ¶ 26.c herein).

The Supreme Court states:

“Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms and necessary implications of the grant. If broader powers be desirable, they must be conferred by Congress.” Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587 (1931) (Emphasis added)

4. When Congress extends the authority of any office of the United States beyond the mandates for “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere,” Congress “expressly” extends authority for the office of the Secretary by leaving no doubt that said authority has been extended to a particular geographical area outside “the District of Columbia.” The definition of “expressly” from Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. is as follows:

“In an express manner; in direct and unmistakable terms; explicitly; definitely; directly. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S.W.2d. 685, 689. The opposite of impliedly. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381, 396.” (Emphasis added)

[Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.]

5. The following examples of United States laws show that Congress knows very well how to “expressly” extend authority outside of "the District of Columbia" for offices attached to the seat of government, and has properly done so on every necessary occasion:

a. 48 U.S.C. §1612(a) is cited herein as follows:
Jurisdiction. The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have the jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States, including, but not limited to, the diversity jurisdiction provided for in section 1332 of title 28, United States Code, and that of a bankruptcy court of the United States. The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal and civil proceedings in the Virgin Islands with respect to the income tax laws applicable to the Virgin Islands, regardless of the degree of the offense or of the amount involved, except the ancillary laws relating to the income tax enacted by the legislature of the Virgin Islands. Any act or failure to act with respect to the income tax laws applicable to the Virgin Islands which would constitute a criminal offense described in chapter 75 of subtitle F of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 U.S.C. § § 7201 et seq.] shall constitute an offense against the government of the Virgin Islands and may be prosecuted in the name of the government of the Virgin Islands by the appropriate officers thereof in the District Court of the Virgin Islands without the request or consent of the United States attorney for the Virgin Islands, notwithstanding the provisions of section 27 of this Act [48 U.S.C.S. § 1617]. (Emphasis added)

b. 48 U.S.C. §1397. Income tax laws of United States in force; payment of proceeds; levy of surtax on all taxpayers

The income-tax laws in force in the United States of America and those which may hereafter be enacted shall be held to be likewise in force in the Virgin Islands of the United States, except that the proceeds of such taxes shall be paid into the treasuries of said islands: Provided, further, That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Legislature of the Virgin Islands is authorized to levy a surtax on all taxpayers in an amount not to exceed 10 per centum of their annual income tax obligation to the government of the Virgin Islands.

c. 48 U.S.C. §1421i. Income tax

Applicability of Federal laws; separate tax

The income-tax laws in force in the United States of America and those which may hereafter be enacted shall be held to be likewise in force in Guam: Provided, That notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Legislature of Guam may levy a separate tax on all taxpayers in an amount not to exceed 10 per centum of their annual income tax obligation to the Government of Guam.

d. 48 U.S.C. §1801. Approval of Covenant to Establish Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands That the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, the text of which is as follows [note to this section], is hereby approved.

and the Covenant which was approved by Congress states in part:

“Article VI”

“revenue and taxation”

“Section 601. (a) The income tax laws in force in the United States will come into force in the Northern Mariana Islands as a local territorial income tax on the first day of January following the effective date of this Section, in the same manner as those laws are in force in Guam.”

In the NOTES under References in Text it states:

“The income-tax laws in force in the United States of America, referred to in text, are classified to Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.”

6. Likewise, in 55 Stat. 685, the War Department, later renamed to Department Of Defense (“DOD”) was “expressly” authorized by Congress to enter Arlington County, Virginia and occupy an office building on land which had already been designated and approved for the Department of Agriculture. This shows conclusively that even when the federal government has expressly authorized one office of the government to exercise its authority and to function outside the District of Columbia and within one of the several 50 union states (i.e. Virginia) pursuant to 4 U.S.C. §72, another office of the government seeking to exercise its authority in the same area is required to obtain the expressly granted authority from Congress before that specific office may exercise its authority in said same specific geographical area.

7. Unless Congress, through United States law, expressly grants to the Office of the Secretary the authority to Act outside “the District of Columbia”, any non-specific general authority dealing with “WHO” has authority or “WHAT” authority is given to a particular office attached to the seat of government is to be construed as limited to and restricted to ONLY “the District of Columbia, and NOT ELSEWHERE.” pursuant to 4 U.S.C. §72.
8. U.S. attorneys have been unable to find and submit into evidence any such United States law by which Congress expressly extends the authority of the Office of the Secretary to the several states in like manner as Congress has so expressly extended said authority to Virgin Islands, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands - soil over which Congress has “exclusive” legislative jurisdiction.

9. In addition to the mandates of 4 U.S.C. §72, Congress has also enacted United States law that restricts the delegates of the Secretary and the Commissioner from leaving “the District of Columbia” and entering the several states without designated authority from the Secretary and the Commissioner. In 1994, 26 U.S.C. §7803(b)(1) stated in part the following:

“(b) Appointment and supervision

“(1) Designation of Post of Duty

“The Secretary shall determine and designate the posts of duty of all such persons engaged in field work or traveling on official business outside the District of Columbia.” 2 (Emphasis added)

10. The same law is now found in 26 U.S.C. §7804(b)(1) and reads as follows:

“(b) Posts of duty of employees in field service or traveling

“Unless otherwise prescribed by the Secretary

“(1) Designation of post of duty

“The Commissioner shall determine and designate the posts of duty of all such persons engaged in field work or traveling on official business outside the District of Columbia.” 2 (Emphasis added)

11. In order to confirm whether the Secretary, the Commissioner or their delegate IRS Agents have the authority to administer and enforce internal revenue laws within the several states, the government has the burden of proof to produce the delegation of authority from the Secretary to the Commissioner, or from other alleged delegates which “designate” agents or other delegates acting on behalf of the Secretary to a “post of duty” in geographical areas “outside the District of Columbia” and within the several states for the purpose of conducting “official business” pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7803(b)(1) (1994) (re-codified as 26 U.S.C. §7804(b)(1)) and 4 U.S.C. §72?

12. Without evidence of said law or said delegation of authority, it can only be concluded that no such delegation of authority exists in United States law. This may be one reason why no delegation has been published in the Federal Register thereby giving notice to the people in the several states of the purportedly extended powers of the Secretary and his delegates. As no such United States law exists, then not even the Secretary has any authority “expressly” granted by Congress to be exercised within the several states.

13. It should be conclusive that Congress knows how to, and did “expressly” extend the authority of the Secretary to other locations outside “the District of Columbia” in United States law when it intended to do so. In fact, if Congress follows its own mandates of 4 U.S.C. §72 with regard to the Virgin Islands, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands - territories or insular possessions of the United States over which it has exclusive legislative authority - why wouldn’t (or shouldn’t) Congress follow the same mandate with respect to the several states - areas over which it does NOT have exclusive legislative jurisdiction?

14. There is no legal argument or basis in law for the contention that the mandates of 4 U.S.C. §72 should only be followed in regards to territories or insular possessions of the United States over which Congress has “exclusive” legislative authority, but ignored in regards to the several states over which Congress has “limited” legislative or constitutional authority.

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1 In the case of Walden v. U.S., #A-05-CA-444-LY, U.S. District Court, Austin, TX, the Court issued a protective order so the United States attorneys do not have to expose the Material Fact that Congress has not so “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary to the several 50 union states. Declarations by Courts that the IRS or the Secretary can exercise their authority without substantiating said allegation with an “expressly” extended authority granted by Congress in United States law are nothing more than opinions, and bear no evidentiary weight when confronted with United States law 4 U.S.C. §72 to determine if the Secretary has jurisdiction in the several states pursuant thereto.

2 Said field service personnel which have been so designated outside the District of Columbia by the Secretary or the Commissioner can be designated to work inside the District of Columbia and then reassigned, by delegation of authority, to a designated post of duty back outside the District of Columbia after their work is done (See 26 U.S.C. §7803(b)(1) (1994) (re-codified as 26 U.S.C. §7804(b)(1))).
15. It has been long established by the Courts that in personam and subject-matter jurisdiction are paramount to an Agency’s authority to act. The following ruling by the Supreme Court demonstrates that it is not frivolous for one to demand from agents acting on behalf of the Secretary to identify the Act of Congress “expressly” extending the authority of the Secretary outside “the District of Columbia” to the several states pursuant to 4 U.S.C. §72:

“The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the States, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government.”

[Carath v. United States, 152 U.S. 211 (Emphasis added)]

16. The location of “The United States”, as defined by law, further confirms that the authority for the Office of the Secretary is restricted to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere.” The Uniform Commercial Code at § 9-307(h) states:

“(h) The United States is located in the District of Columbia.”

[Uniform Commercial Code at § 9-307(h)]

17. This exact provision is reflected in various state codes, including, but not limited to California and Texas. 3

18. Judges and even government prosecutors are not legislators and may not add to statutory definitions without becoming legislators:

“Exiroprio unius est exclusio alterius. A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Burgin v. Forbes, 293 Ky. 456, 169 S.W.2d. 321, 325; Newblock v. Bowles, 710 Okl. 487, 40 P.2d. 1097, 1100. Mention of one thing implies exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. Under this maxim, if statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded.”


“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484-488 (1987) (“It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term”); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 392-393, n. 10 (“As a rule, a definition which declares what a term "means" . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated”); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 502 (1945); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 294 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1935) (Cardozo, J.); see also 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.07, p. 152, and n. 10 (5th ed. 1992) (collecting cases). That is to say, the statute, read “as a whole,” post at 998 [530 U.S. 943] (THOMAS, J., dissenting), leads the reader to a definition. That definition does not include the Attorney General’s restriction — “the child up to the head.” Its words, “substantial portion,” indicate the contrary.”

[Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)]

19. Judges and prosecutors adding to statutory geographical definitions by presumption without an express statutory authority is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, and a criminal conspiracy against the rights of those who are the victims of all such unsubstantiated presumptions:

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3 See California Commercial Code § 9307(h) and Texas Business & Commerce Code § 9.307(h).
20. Because judges and prosecutors cannot expand statutory definitions, it is pointless and an act of deception and even FRAUD to cite any court case, state or federal, as a conclusive authority for expanding a statutory definition to include things not expressly stated in the statutes themselves.

21. Likewise, the U.S. Congress describes the essence of communism itself as the failure or refusal to recognize or enforce the constitutional or statutory limits upon the authority of those in government, such as judges or prosecutors intent on unconstitutionally expanding statutory definitions. The BEGINNING of that limitation is the definitions found in statutes:

\[\text{TITLE 50 > CHAPTER 23 > SUBCHAPTER IV > Sec. 841.} \]

\[\text{Sec. 841. - Findings and declarations of fact} \]

The Congress finds and declares that the Communist Party of the United States [consisting of the IRS, DOJ, and a corrupted federal judiciary], although purportedly a political party, is in fact an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the [de jure] Government of the United States [and replace it with a de facto government ruled by the judiciary]. It constitutes an authoritarian dictatorship [IRS, DOJ, and corrupted federal judiciary in collusion] within a constitutional republic, demanding for itself the rights and privileges [including immunity from prosecution for their wrongdoing in violation of Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8 of the Constitution] accorded to political parties, but denying to all others the liberties [Bill of Rights] guaranteed by the Constitution [Form #10.002]. Unlike political parties, which evolve their policies and programs through public means, by the reconciliation of a wide variety of individual views, and submit those policies and programs to the electorate at large for approval or disapproval, the policies and programs of the Communist Party are secretly [by corrupt judges and the IRS in complete disregard of, Form #05.014, the tax franchise "codes", Form #05.001] prescribed for it by foreign leaders of the world Communist movement [the IRS and Federal Reserve].

Its members [the Congress, which was terrorized to do IRS bidding by the framing of Congressman Traficant] have no part in determining its goals, and are not permitted to voice dissent to party objectives. Unlike members of political parties, members of the Communist Party are recruited for indoctrination [in the public FOOL system by homosexuals, liberals, and socialists] with respect to its objectives and methods, and are organized, instructed, and disciplined [by the IRS and a corrupted judiciary] to carry into action slavishly the assignments given them by their hierarchical chieftains. Unlike political parties, the Communist Party [thanks to a corrupted federal judiciary] acknowledges no constitutional or statutory limitations upon its conduct or upon that of its members [ANARCHISTS!, Form #08.020]. The Communist Party is relatively small numerically, and gives scant indication of capacity ever to attain its ends by lawful political means. The peril inherent in its operation arises not from its numbers, but from its failure to acknowledge any limitation as to the nature of its activities, and its dedication to the proposition that the present constitutional Government of the United States ultimately must be brought to ruin by any available means, including resort to force and violence [or using income taxes]. Holding that doctrine, its role as the agency of a hostile foreign power [the Federal Reserve and the American Bar Association (ABA)] renders its existence a clear present and continuing danger to the security of the United States. It is the means whereby individuals are seduced [legally KIDNAPPED] via identity theft!, Form #05.046] into the service of the world Communist movement [using FALSE information returns and other PERJURIOUS government forms, Form #04.001], trained to do its bidding [by FALSE government publications and statements that the government is not accountable for the accuracy of, Form #05.007], and directed and controlled [using FRANCHISES illegally enforced upon NONRESIDENTS, Form #05.030] in the conspiratorial performance of their revolutionary services.

Therefore, the Communist Party should be outlawed.

22. Without EXPRESS positive law statutory evidence to the contrary or by a designated post of duty, the Secretary or his delegates lack authority to enter or do any of the following within the several states:

\[\text{a. Investigate;}\]

\[\text{b. Confiscate (seize), lien or levy;}\]

\[\text{c. Make a referral to the Justice Department;}\]

\[\text{d. Ask for Search or Arrest Warrants;}\]

23. All actions of the Secretary and his delegates which are done without the express leave by Congress under the positive laws of the United States are null and void:
24. It is required that proof of jurisdiction appears on the record.

“The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and all
administrative proceedings”
[ Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533.]

25. There is no public or court record whereby the Secretary or his delegates have produced the United States law which grants them leave from “the District of Columbia” and entry in the several states. Such silence of the Secretary and his delegates operates as an estoppel. 4

26. Non-responsive answers to specific inquiries include the following:

a. “Treasury Order 150-10 (See ¶ 31) extends the Secretary’s authority to the Commissioner.”
   i. This Treasury Order does not prove “expressly” delegated authority for Secretary;
   ii. This is a general delegation of authority which merely addresses "WHAT" the Commissioner can do and does not address “WHERE” the Commissioner can exercise the Secretary’s authority pursuant to 4 U.S.C. §72;
   iii. Nothing in TDO 150-10 “expressly” extends the authority of the Commissioner to the several states;
   iv. This Treasury Order has not been published in the Federal Register pursuant to 44 U.S.C. §1505 and 5 U.S.C. §553. By his ruling in 1953,5 the Secretary required all IRS divisions or units to publish in the Federal Register any item of concern to the American public. This was even more clearly stated in 19556 as follows:

   “It shall be the policy to publish for public information all statements of practices and procedure issued primarily for internal use, and, hence, appearing in internal management documents, which affect rights or duties of taxpayers or other members of the public under the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes.”
   (Emphasis added)

   v. Since TDO 150-10 has not been published in the Federal Register, it is not applicable to the people in the several states; and
   vi. Therefore, citing TDO 150-10 is non-responsive to the mandates of 4 U.S.C. §72.

b. U.S. Attorneys have cited Hughes v. U.S., 953 F.2d. 531, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1991) in response to the jurisdictional challenges regarding the Secretary. The Hughes ruling claims that 4 U.S.C. §72 does not foreclose the IRS authority outside the District of Columbia. The only reason given by the Hughes Court is that the President in 26 U.S.C. §7621 is authorized to establish internal revenue districts outside Washington, D.C.7 This argument fails every aspect of the 4 U.S.C. §72 litmus test as follows:
   i. Establishing internal revenue districts outside Washington, D.C. does not have the same effect in law as establishing internal revenue districts within the several states; especially in light of 4 U.S.C. §72. It has already been cited supra that Congress has granted the Secretary leave, to leave Washington, D.C. and

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4 “Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. . . . This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately.” U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d. 297, 299. See also U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d. 1021, 1032; Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932; “Silence is a species of conduct, and constitutes an implied representation of the existence of facts in question. When silence is of such character and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud, it will operate as an Estoppel.” Carmine v. Bowen, 64 U.S. 932; . . . “Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit . . . includes the deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public,. . . and if he deliberately conceals material information from them he is guilty of fraud.” McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350, 371-372, Quoting U.S. v Holzer, 816 F.2d. 304, 307.
5 Revenue Ruling 2 (1953-1 CB 484).
6 Rev Proc. 55-1 (1955-2 CB 897)
7 Congress has “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary to the Virgin Islands with respect to 26 U.S.C. Chapter 75 and this area is obviously outside “the District of Columbia” but not remotely associated with the several states.
enter The Virgin Islands, Guam and the Northern Marianas. The question still remains whether a leave to enter the several states was “expressly” granted by Congress;

ii. 4 U.S.C. §72 mandates that ALL offices associated with the seat of government shall be “expressly” authorized by Congress in United States law in order to have jurisdiction and act within the several states. Authorizing the office of President in 26 U.S.C. §7621 does not “expressly” authorize the office of Secretary when the Secretary is not even mentioned in §7621;

iii. The term ALL OFFICES, whether defined or not, includes all offices associated with the seat of government. If this refers to buildings, then ALL BUILDINGS are to be in “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” unless Congress “expressly” provides otherwise in United States law.

iv. It is unlikely that Congress intended that the term “offices” would refer to buildings since buildings cannot exercise anything. Only people can exercise the authority vested with a particular office and it is the authority of said offices which must be “exercised” only within the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as expressly granted;

v. With few exceptions, it is the Secretary who is authorized by Congress to write all needful rules and regulations for the administration and enforcement of Title 26 (See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7801, 7805). Therefore it is not the office of the President, but the office of the Secretary which must by law be granted “express” leave by Congress to act within the several states.

vi. The Hughes Court implies in error that 26 U.S.C. §7621 is the “expressly” stated grant of leave issued by Congress as required under 4 U.S.C. §72, claiming that the office of the President is somehow the same as the office of the Secretary.

vii. The term “State” as used in 26 U.S.C. §7621 includes “the District of Columbia” (see 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(10))8. How can “State” be construed to include one of the several states when clearly a definition cannot “expressly” extend the office of Secretary to the several states. Furthermore, the several states are not even mentioned in the meaning of “State” as used in §7621 (see § 7701(a)(10)).

viii. Any “definition” or “term” is a limitation upon the term defined and it excludes what is not specifically included (See Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition for “Definition” and “Term”). Without rebuttal to the contrary, Congress has limited the Secretary’s authority to “the District of Columbia,” the Virgin Islands, Guam and the Northern Marianas (see § 5 supra), never having “expressly” granted the Secretary the statutory leave to exercise authority in the several states.

ix. Moreover, there is no evidence in the Hughes case or in any other case to prove that any President has in fact established said internal revenue districts within the several states9. There is evidence that “customs districts” were established - but none that the President established internal revenue districts in the several states.

x. If one argues that the President has authorized the Secretary to create internal revenue districts, then what evidence exists that the Secretary has, by treasury order or regulation, created internal revenue districts within the several states?

xi. If no internal revenue districts have been established in the several states by the President or even by the Secretary, then out of which internal revenue districts does the Secretary administer and enforce internal revenue laws within the several states?

c. Several Court rulings have stated that the IRS can exercise its authority outside the District of Columbia.

i. Every court case cited by any U.S. Attorney is off-point because 4 U.S.C. §72 states that any “expressly” granted exceptions from “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” as mandated, are to be found in the United States written law and NOT in the Courts.

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8 Under this definition, Alaska and Hawaii were removed from applicability upon receiving freely associated compact state status (See P.L. 86-624, §18(j); P.L. 86-70, § 22(a)). The several states are “countries” (See 28 U.S.C. §297(b)).

9 In 1998, via Executive Order (“E.O.”) #10289, as amended, President William J. Clinton authorized the Secretary to establish revenue districts under authority of 26 U.S.C. §7621. Although § 7621 is not listed in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, E.O. #10289 is listed. The implementing regulations for said Executive Order are found in 19 C.F.R. Part 101. Said regulation establishes “customs collection offices” in each of the several states; it does not establish “internal revenue districts”. A note at 26 C.F.R. § 301.7621-1 confirms that E.O. #10289 is the only authority for establishing revenue districts.
“Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms and necessary implications of the grant. If broader powers be desirable, they must be conferred by Congress.”


ii. Generally, the cases cited by U.S. Attorneys have dealt with WHAT the Secretary can do and not WHERE he can do it. 4 U.S.C. §72 establishes the geographical location WHERE the Secretary can exercise authority, and nothing else.

iii. Unless one can present the law which “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary to the several states, said authority may only be exercised within the geographical areas “expressly” authorized by Congress in law (See ¶ 5 supra);

iv. Therefore citing court rulings is an irrelevant and non-responsive argument.

d. Judges have attempted to protect U.S. Attorneys and the government by stating on the record and in court orders that “the defendant is arguing that the Secretary cannot leave the District of Columbia.” Such statement is a misrepresentation of the argument which has always been that the Secretary has not been “expressly” granted leave by Congress through United States law to enter the several states. It has been shown supra that the Secretary was “expressly” granted leave by Congress through United States law to exercise his authority within Virgin Islands, Guam and the Northern Marianas areas which are outside “the District of Columbia”.

27. The Courts, U.S. Attorneys, the Secretary, the Commissioner and the IRS are reasonably expected to address the issue of jurisdiction as cited herein. Neither the Courts nor the Secretary and his delegates can enforce internal revenue laws within the several states without the Secretary having an “expressly” granted authority. To do so would be a denial of the protections guaranteed by United States law - 4 U.S.C. §72 and 26 U.S.C. §7803(b)(1) (1994) (re-codified as 26 U.S.C. §7804(b)(1)) - to not be bothered by the government (See 18 U.S.C. §242) and, if said right is denied or ignored by more than two officers of the United States, such denial constitutes a denial of rights per 18 U.S.C. §241.

28. Moreover, the offices associated with the seat of government are foreign to the several states and this is precisely why the jurisdiction of the United States is restricted to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.”

"The United States Government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state.


29. The United States Supreme Court removes all doubt by stating this fact as follows:

"The laws of Congress...do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government."

[Cuba v. United States, 152 U.S., at 215]

30. It is not unreasonable to demand said “expressly” delegated authority in light of the following Treasury Delegation Orders (TDO) by which the Secretary “expressly” authorized the Commissioner to ACT in certain areas outside “the District of Columbia”:

a. The Commissioner’s authority was published in the Federal Register via Treasury Department Order (TDO) 150-42 dated July 27, 1956, 21 Fed. Reg. 5852. It delegated to the Commissioner the following authority:

"The Commissioner shall, to the extent of authority vested in him, provide for the administration of the United States Internal Revenue laws in the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands." [Emphasis added]


b. TDO 150-105 of January 24, 1985, Designation of Internal Revenue Districts states at paragraph 4, U.S. Territories and insular possessions:

"The Commissioner Internal Revenue Service shall, to the extent of authority otherwise vested in him, provide for the administration of the United States Internal Revenue laws in the U.S. territories and insular possessions and other authorized areas of the world. [areas “expressly” authorized by Congress and by other delegations of authority]." [TDO 150-105]

[Emphasis added]

10 TDO 150-105 of 1/24/85 was superseded by TDO 150-1 2/27/86.
c. TDO 150-104 of January 24, 1985, Designation of Internal Regions and Regional Service Centers, at paragraph 4. U.S. Territories and Insular Possessions:

“The Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service shall, to the extent of authority otherwise vested in him, provide for the administration of the United States Internal Revenue laws in the U.S. Territories and insular possessions and other authorized areas of the world.” (Emphasis added)

[TDO 150-104]

d. Then, in February 27, 1986, the Secretary delegated additional authority to the Commissioner in TDO 150-01 51 Fed. Reg. 9571 on Page 9573, it states:

“...the Commissioner shall, to the extent of authority otherwise vested in him, provide for the administration of the United States Internal Revenue laws in the "U.S. Territories and insular possessions and other authorized areas of the world.” (Emphasis added)

e. TDO 150-01 dated October 27, 1987 at Paragraph 5: U.S. Territories and Insular Possessions” is identical to TDO 150-01 of Feb. 27, 1986.


“The Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall, to the extent of authority vested in the Commissioner, provide for the administration of the United States internal revenue laws in the U.S. territories and insular possessions and other areas of the world [again, areas “expressly” authorized by Congress and by other delegations of authority].” (Emphasis added)

[TDO 150-01]

31. In TDO 150-10 the Secretary delegates his authority to the Commissioner as follows:

“1. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall be responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Internal Revenue laws.”

While the loose and general language in TDO 150-10 may mislead one to think that the Commissioner now has authority to administer and enforce internal revenue law without any geographical limitations, 4 U.S.C. §72, still restricts said authority to those areas “expressly” authorized by Congress in United States law (i.e., The District of Columbia, The Virgin Islands, Guam and the Northern Marianas, etc.).

[TDO 150-10]

32. It must also be noted that the cancellation of TDO 150-01 by TDO 150-02 decommissioned the districts in the several states and located the 13 offices created by TDO 150-02 within the District of Columbia.

33. In short, when districts existed within the several states, the Commissioner was authorized by the Secretary to act only within the District of Columbia and within the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico the Virgin Islands, U.S. territories and insular possessions. When the districts are decommissioned in the several states, the commissioner is given a general authority to act on behalf of the Secretary. By this action, one can only conclude that 4 U.S.C. §72 now becomes the limiting factor since Congress has not “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary to the several states, and the Secretary therefore can only extend his authority granted by Congress to the Commissioner and other delegates in TDO 150-10 to the same geographical areas in which Congress has authorized the Secretary to enter (i.e., the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, Guam and the Northern Marianas pursuant to 4 U.S.C. §72, 48 U.S.C. §§ 1612(a), 1397, 1421i, 1801 (citing Northern Marianas Covenant § 601), respectively).

34. Since the Secretary knows how to, and has on previous occasions “expressly” granted authority to the Commissioner in accordance with the mandates of 4 U.S.C. §72, for specific areas outside “the District of Columbia” — namely “Panama Canal Zone”, “Puerto Rico”, “the Virgin Islands” and “U.S. territories and insular possessions” — it is reasonable to expect the Secretary to follow the same lawful protocol and mandates of 4 U.S.C. §72 and “expressly” grant the Commissioner the authority to administer and enforce internal revenue law outside “the District of Columbia” to geographical areas over which the Secretary was granted express authority, and to further delegate it to the Commissioner and his Delegates

35. In order to properly address this jurisdictional challenge, it is necessary to provide the Act of Congress which “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary to the several states.

36. In light of the above there is no excuse for the Courts and Agencies NOT to presume that the authority of the Secretary, the Commissioner and the IRS is limited and restricted to “the District of Columbia and not elsewhere” when there is
no evidence that Congress has “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary in United States law to the several states.

37. In the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justices John G. Roberts, Jr. and Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr., it was reiterated numerous times that this country operates under the rule of law and that it is the intent of Congress expressed in said law, not the arbitrary decisions of a Court, that must dictate the outcome of cases. Thus the rule of law mandates that pursuant to 4 U.S.C. §72, no office attached to the seat of government can exercise authority outside “the District of Columbia”, unless Congress “expressly” extends said authority as shown in ¶ 5 supra.

38. In footnote 16 of a 1980 case, U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, the court states:

“... We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them.” Id., at 404 (Emphasis added)

39. In the context of this jurisdictional challenge one must consider 4 U.S.C. §73 which states:

“In case of the prevalence of a contagious or epidemic disease at the seat of government, the President may permit and direct the removal of any or all the public offices to such other place or places as he shall deem most safe and convenient for conducting the public business.”

40. Is 4 U.S.C. §73 a Congressional grant of authority to the President to remove any or all public offices to places outside the United States (i.e. other countries)? Or is this a grant to remove offices of the government from “the District of Columbia” and to exercise said offices within the surrounding several states which have not been affected by said epidemic disease?

41. If 4 U.S.C. §72 does not indeed require “expressly” granted authority for offices attached to the seat of government to be exercised within the several states, then why did Congress make such specific grant to the President in 4 U.S.C. §73? Clearly, nobody would argue that the President was authorized to take our government to another country and therefore it had to be “expressly” granted in 4 U.S.C. §73. Such argument would be absurd.

2 Questions Which Will Force the Government to Prove Alleged but not Actual Authority

These questions are provided for readers, Grand Jurors, and Petit Jurors to present to the government or anyone else who would challenge the facts and law appearing in this pamphlet, most of whom work for the government or stand to gain financially from perpetuating the fraud. If you find yourself in receipt of this pamphlet, you are demanded to answer the questions within 10 days. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(6), failure to deny within 10 days constitutes an admission to each question. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6065, all of your answers must be signed under penalty of perjury. We are not interested in agency policy, but only sources of reasonable belief identified in the pamphlet below:

Reasonable Belief About Income Tax Liability, Form #05.007
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

Your answers will become evidence in future litigation, should that be necessary in order to protect the rights of the person against whom you are attempting to unlawfully enforce federal law.

2.1 Instructions to the Recipient

1. For each question, check either the “Admit” or “Deny” blocks.
2. Add additional explanation in the “Clarification” block at the end of the question. You are also encouraged to add additional amplifying exhibits and explanation to your answers, and reference the section number and question number in your answers.
3. Any question left unanswered shall be deemed as “Admit” and constitute a default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(6). To wit:
III. PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS > Rule 8.

Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading

(b) Defenses; Admissions and Denials.

(6) Effect of Failing to Deny.

An allegation — other than one relating to the amount of damages — is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied. If a responsive pleading is not required, an allegation is considered denied or avoided.

4. If the whole questionnaire is left unanswered, then the answer to all questions by the recipient shall be deemed to be “Admit” and constitute a default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(6).

5. Sign and date the end using blue original ink.

6. Photocopy.

7. Retain the copy for yourself and give the original to the requester.

2.2 Interrogatories

Q1. Does 4 U.S.C. §72 restrict the office of the Secretary to “the District of Columbia” if said office is not “expressly” authorized by Congress to act in specific geographical areas outside “the District of Columbia” over which Congress has jurisdiction?

DEFAULT ANSWER: Yes.

Q2. What United States law did Congress enact pursuant to 4 U.S.C. §72 to “expressly” extend the authority for the office of the Secretary to administer and enforce internal revenue laws within the several states?

DEFAULT ANSWER: None.

Q3. Since the definition of “expressly” from Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. is as follows:


[Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.]

Does 26 U.S.C. §7621 qualify as an “expressly” granted authority to the Secretary to act in areas within the several states or does §7621 at best present only an “impliedly” granted authority (“the opposite of expressly”)?

DEFAULT ANSWER: No. It presents no implied authority

Q4. Is IRS enforcement authority limited to enforcing ONLY in Internal Revenue Districts?

26 U.S. Code § 7601 - Canvass of districts for taxable persons and objects

(a)GENERAL RULE

The Secretary shall, to the extent he deems it practicable, cause officers or employees of the Treasury Department to proceed, from time to time, through each internal revenue district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax, and all persons owning or having the care and management of any objects with respect to which any tax is imposed.

(b) PENALTIES

For penalties applicable to forcible obstruction or hindrance of Treasury officers or employees in the performance of their duties, see section 7212.

DEFAULT ANSWER: Yes.

Q5. Do you have any evidence proving that the “States” mentioned within the definition of “internal revenue districts” expressly includes states of the Union or anything other that that appearing in the definition below?
Q6. If you don’t have any evidence expressly identifying “State” as a constitutional state of the Union, then by what constitutional authority can you add to the express definition of “State” above?

**DEFAULT ANSWER:** There is no constitutional authority to add to statutory definitions. All attempts to do so are a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, cause the judge to act as a legislator, and produce the following consequences, according to the man that designed our three system branch of government:

“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.

Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression [sound familiar?].

There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.”

[...]
Q7. Does 26 U.S.C. §7621 satisfy the following litmus tests of 4 U.S.C. §72:

a. “All offices” — the Secretary or just the President?

b. “shall” — is this mandatory?

c. “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” — is this a restriction to the geographical area of the District of Columbia?

d. “expressly” — does an “implied” grant of authority to the President meet the “expressly” criteria of 4 U.S.C. §72?

DEFAULT ANSWER: Yes.

Q8. If one cites Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d. 531, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1991) in response to inquiries regarding the jurisdictional authority of the Secretary in the several states, does the wording of 4 U.S.C. §72 support the conclusion of the Hughes Court which claims that “4 U.S.C. §72 does not foreclose [restrict] the authority of the IRS [Secretary] outside the District of Columbia?”

DEFAULT ANSWER: No.

Q9. Is there anything in the English language that would support the conclusion of the Hughes Court - especially when the IRS operates under the authority granted by Congress to the Secretary?

DEFAULT ANSWER: No.

Q10. The only reason given by the Hughes Court for their rendition of 4 U.S.C. §72 is that the President is authorized to establish internal revenue districts outside Washington, D.C. Do you have a statutory definition of “State” that expressly includes anything OTHER than the District of Columbia, as identified in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(10)?

DEFAULT ANSWER: No.

Q11. Since 4 U.S.C. §72 mandates that ALL offices be “expressly” authorized by law to act outside the District of Columbia, is “expressly” authorizing the office of the President also “expressly” authorizing the office of Secretary when neither Secretary nor the office is even mentioned in 26 U.S.C. §7621?

DEFAULT ANSWER: No.

Q12. Can one rightly infer from the Hughes Court that 26 U.S.C. §7621 “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary to the several states when §7621 does not even mention the several states and the term “State” is defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(10) to EXCLUDE everything but the District of Columbia?

DEFAULT ANSWER: No.

Q13. Is the Hughes Court correct when it implies that 26 U.S.C. §7621 “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary when §7621 only authorizes the office of the President to act, without any mention to the office of the Secretary?

DEFAULT ANSWER: No.

Q14. With few exceptions, it is the office of Secretary which is authorized by Congress to write all needful rules and regulations for the administration and enforcement of internal revenue laws (See 26 U.S.C. §§7801, 7805). Therefore, is it specifically the office of Secretary which must acquire “express” permission from Congress to act within the several states pursuant to 4 U.S.C. §72?

DEFAULT ANSWER: Yes.

Q15. The term “State” as used in 26 U.S.C. §7621 includes ONLY “the District of Columbia” (see 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(10)) (See Footnote 9). Even if “State” could be construed to include the several states by implication only, does this definition “expressly” extend the office of Secretary or does it allegedly extend the office of President?

DEFAULT ANSWER: No. It only extends to office of the President.
Q16. Does §7621 “expressly” extend said enforcement authority to constitutional and not statutory “states’ when the several states are not “expressly” mentioned in the definition of “State” as used in §7621 (see §7701(a)(10))? 
DEFAULT ANSWER: No.

Q17. Has the President in fact established said internal revenue districts in the constitutional rather than statutory states of the Union? If so, please produce evidence of same.
DEFAULT ANSWER: No. We have no evidence.

Q18. Is there any evidence that the President established any other tax collection districts besides “customs districts” within the several states?
DEFAULT ANSWER: No.

Q19. Is there any Presidential Executive Order by which the President has established internal revenue districts within the several states?
DEFAULT ANSWER: No.

Q20. If one argues that the Secretary has been given the authority to create internal revenue districts, is there any evidence on the record to prove that the Secretary has created internal revenue districts within the exclusive jurisdiction of constitutional states of the Union pursuant to 4 U.S.C. §72, 26 U.S.C. §7621, Executive Order #10289 and/or 26 U.S.C. §7803(b)(1) (1994) (re-codified as 26 U.S.C. §7804(b)(1))? 
DEFAULT ANSWER: No.

Q21. If one cannot prove that either the President or the Secretary has established internal revenue districts within the Constitutional and not statutory “States”, out of which non-existent internal revenue districts does the Secretary have the authority to administer and enforce internal revenue laws?
DEFAULT ANSWER: There is no such remaining internal revenue district.

Q22. Explain the Secretary’s authority within the several states in light of 4 U.S.C. §72 and the following:

“It is no longer open to question that the general [federal] government, unlike the states, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275, 38 S.Ct. 529, 3 A.L.R. 649, Ann.Cas.1918E 724, possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of the states; and emphatically not with regard to legislation.”
[Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936)]

“It is well established principle of law that all federal legislation applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless a contrary intent appears [see 4 U.S.C. §72].”
[Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1948)]

“The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the States, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government.”
[Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211 (1894)] (Emphasis added).

“Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms and necessary implications of the grant [by Congress]. If broader powers be desirable, they must be conferred by Congress.”

2.3 Admissions

2.3.1 Taxable “activities” and “taxable income”

For more information about the subjects covered in this section, refer to the pamphlet below:

The “Trade or Business” Scam, Form #05.001
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
1. Admit that the term “trade or business” is defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26).

    26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26)

    "The term 'trade or business' includes the performance of the functions [activities] of a public office."

    YOUR ANSWER: ____Admit ____Deny

    CLARIFICATION:__________________________________________

2. Admit that there are no other definitions or references in I.R.C. Subtitle A relating to a “trade or business” which would change or expand the definition of “trade or business” above to include things other than a “public office”.

    YOUR ANSWER: ____Admit ____Deny

    CLARIFICATION:__________________________________________

3. Admit that a “trade or business” is an “activity”.

    "Trade or Business in the United States

    Generally, you must be engaged in a trade or business during the tax year to be able to treat income received in that year as effectively connected with that trade or business. Whether you are engaged in a trade or business in the United States depends on the nature of your activities. The discussions that follow will help you determine whether you are engaged in a trade or business in the United States."

    [IRS Publication 519 (2000), p. 15, emphasis added]

    YOUR ANSWER: ____Admit ____Deny

    CLARIFICATION:__________________________________________

4. Admit that all excise taxes are taxes on privileged or licensed “activities”.

    "Excise tax. A tax imposed on the performance of an act, the engaging in an occupation, or the enjoyment of a privilege. Rapa v. Haines, Ohio Comm.Pl., 101 N.E.2d, 733, 735. A tax on the manufacture, sale, or use of goods or on the carrying on of an occupation or activity or tax on the transfer of property."


    YOUR ANSWER: ____Admit ____Deny

    CLARIFICATION:__________________________________________

5. Admit that holding “public office” in the United States government is an “activity”.

    YOUR ANSWER: ____Admit ____Deny

    CLARIFICATION:__________________________________________

6. Admit that those holding “public office” are described as “employees” within 26 C.F.R. §31.3401(c)-1.

    26 C.F.R. §31.3401(c)-1 Employee:

    "...the term [employee] includes officers and employees, whether elected or appointed, of the United States, a [federal] State, Territory, Puerto Rico or any political subdivision, thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term 'employee' also includes an officer of a corporation."

    YOUR ANSWER: ____Admit ____Deny

    CLARIFICATION:__________________________________________
7. Admit that one cannot be engaged in a “trade or business” WITHOUT ALSO being an “employee” as defined above.

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:_____________________________________________________________

8. Admit that all revenues collected under the authority of I.R.C. Subtitle A in connection with a “trade or business” are upon the entity engaged in the “activity”, who are identified in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26) as those holding “public office”.

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:_____________________________________________________________

9. Admit that the decision to hold public office is a voluntary personal decision that cannot be coerced.

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:_____________________________________________________________

10. Admit that because holding public office is “voluntary”, then all taxes based upon this activity must also be voluntary and avoidable.

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:_____________________________________________________________

11. Admit that the way to legally avoid taxes based on the activity of holding of a public office is to choose not to involve oneself in the activity.

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:_____________________________________________________________

12. Admit that there are no taxable “activities” mentioned anywhere within Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code except that of a “trade or business” as defined within 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26).

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:_____________________________________________________________

13. Admit that all taxes falling upon “public officers” are upon the office, and not upon the private person performing the functions of the public office during his off-duty time.

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:_____________________________________________________________

14. Admit that a tax upon a “public office” rather than directly upon a natural person is an “indirect” rather than a “direct” tax within the meaning of the Constitution Of the United States.

“Direct taxes bear immediately upon persons, upon the possession and enjoyment of rights; indirect taxes are levied upon the happening of an event as an exchange.”

[Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)]

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny
15. Admit that all earnings originating within the “United States” defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) fall within the classification of a “trade or business” under 26 U.S.C. §864(c)(3).

Title 26 > Subtitle A > Chapter 1 > Subchapter N > Part I > § 864
§864. Definitions and special rules
(c) Effectively connected income, etc.
(3) Other income from sources within United States
All income, gain, or loss from sources within the United States (other than income, gain, or loss to which paragraph (2) applies) shall be treated as effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.

Income Subject to Tax
Income from sources outside the United States that is not effectively connected with a trade or business in the United States is not taxable if you receive it while you are a nonresident alien. The income is not taxable even if you earned it while you were a resident alien or if you became a resident alien or a U.S. citizen after receiving it and before the end of the year.


Your Answer: ___Admit ___Deny

Clarification:

16. Admit that the amount of “taxable income” defined in 26 U.S.C. §863 that a person must include in “gross income” within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §61 is determined by their earnings from a “trade or business” plus any earnings of “nonresident aliens” coming under 26 U.S.C. §871(a).

Title 26 > Subtitle A > Chapter 1 > Subchapter N > Part I > Sec. 863.
Sec. 863. - Special rules for determining source
(a) Allocation under regulations
Items of gross income, expenses, losses, and deductions, other than those specified in sections 861(a) and 862(a), shall be allocated or apportioned to sources within or without the United States, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Where items of gross income are separately allocated to sources within the United States, there shall be deducted (for the purpose of computing the taxable income therefrom) the expenses, losses, and other deductions properly apportioned or allocated thereto and a ratable part of other expenses, losses, or other deductions which cannot definitely be allocated to some item or class of gross income. The remainder, if any, shall be included in full as taxable income from sources within the United States.

Your Answer: ___Admit ___Deny

Clarification:

17. Admit that the phrase “from whatever source derived” found in the Sixteenth Amendment DOES NOT mean any source, but a SPECIFIC taxable activity within the jurisdiction of the United States.


Your Answer: ___Admit ___Deny

Clarification:
18. Admit that only earnings derived from a “trade or business” are includible in “gross income” for the purposes of “self employment”:

\[\text{TITLE 26 } > \text{ Subtitle A } > \text{ CHAPTER 2 } > \text{ §1402} \]
\[\text{§1402: Definitions} \]
\[(a) \text{ Net earnings from self-employment} \]

The term “net earnings from self-employment” means the gross income derived by an individual from any trade or business carried on by such individual, less the deductions allowed by this subtitle which are attributable to such trade or business, plus his distributive share (whether or not distributed) of income or loss described in section 702(a)(8) from any trade or business carried on by a partnership of which he is a member; ....

YOUR ANSWER: _____Admit _____Deny

CLARIFICATION:_________________________________________________

19. Admit that earnings from a “foreign employer” by a “nonresident alien” are not considered to be includible in “trade or business” income and therefore not “gross income”:

\[\text{TITLE 26 } > \text{ Subtitle A } > \text{ CHAPTER 1 } > \text{ Subchapter N } > \text{ PART I } > \text{ §864} \]
\[\text{§864: Definitions and special rules} \]
\[(b) \text{ Trade or business within the United States} \]

For purposes of this part, part II, and chapter 3, the term “trade or business within the United States” includes the performance of personal services within the United States at any time within the taxable year, but does not include—

(1) Performance of personal services for foreign employer

The performance of personal services—

(A) for a nonresident alien individual, foreign partnership, or foreign corporation, not engaged in trade or business within the United States, or

(B) for an office or place of business maintained in a foreign country or in a possession of the United States by an individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States or by a domestic partnership or a domestic corporation,

YOUR ANSWER: _____Admit _____Deny

CLARIFICATION:_________________________________________________

20. Admit that private businesses in states of the Union that do not have Employer Identification Numbers and who do not do voluntary withholding on their workers qualify as “foreign employers” as described above.

\[\text{Internal Revenue Manual (I.R.M.), Section 5.14.10.2 (09-30-2004)} \]
\[\text{Payroll Deduction Agreements} \]

2. Private employers, states, and political subdivisions are not required to enter into payroll deduction agreements. Taxpayers should determine whether their employers will accept and process executed agreements before agreements are submitted for approval or finalized.


YOUR ANSWER: _____Admit _____Deny

CLARIFICATION:_________________________________________________
21. Admit that the term “personal services” is limited exclusively to services performed in connection with a “trade or business”.

26 C.F.R. Sec. 1.469-9 Rules for certain rental real estate activities.

(b)(4) PERSONAL SERVICES. Personal services means any work performed by an individual in connection with a trade or business. However, personal services do not include any work performed by an individual in the individual’s capacity as an investor as described in section 1.469-5T(f)(2)(i).

26 U.S.C. §861 Income from Sources Within the United States

(a)(3) “...Compensation for labor or personal services performed in the United States shall not be deemed to be income from sources within the United States if-

(C) the compensation for labor or services performed as an employee of or under contract with--

(i) a nonresident alien, not engaged in a trade or business in the United States…”

YOUR ANSWER: ___Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION: ___________________________________________________________

22. Admit that there is no definition of “personal services” anywhere in the I.R.C. or the Treasury Regulations that would expand the definition of “personal services” beyond that appearing above.

YOUR ANSWER: ___Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION: ___________________________________________________________

23. Admit that a nonresident alien with no earnings from a “trade or business” earns no “gross income” as defined in 26 U.S.C. §61.

26 C.F.R. §1.872-2 Exclusions from gross income of nonresident alien individuals.

(f) Other exclusions.

Income which is from sources without[outside] the United States [District of Columbia and territories and possessions per 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) and 4 U.S.C. §110(d)], as determined under the provisions of sections 861 through 863, and the regulations thereunder, is not included in the gross income of a nonresident alien individual unless such income is effectively connected for the taxable year with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States by that individual. To determine specific exclusions in the case of other items which are from sources within the United States, see the applicable sections of the Code. For special rules under a tax convention for determining the sources of income and for excluding, from gross income, income from sources without the United States which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States, see the applicable tax convention. For determining which income from sources without the United States is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States, see section 864(c)(4) and §1.864–5.

YOUR ANSWER: ___Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION: ___________________________________________________________

2.3.2 Which “United States”? 

1. Admit that the term “United States” defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) is the geographic region over which Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code is defined to apply.

"The term 'United States' may be used in any one of several senses. [1] It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. [2] It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, [3] or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution.”
The term "United States" defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) is the geographic region over which Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code is defined to apply.

The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.

The term "State" shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title.
YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:____________________________________

3. Admit that the term “United States” defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) is has the same meaning as United States** identified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hooven and Allison v. Evatt above.

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:____________________________________

4. Admit that there is no other definition of “United States” applying to subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code which might modify or enlarge the definition of “United States” found above.

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:____________________________________

5. Admit the term “United States” as defined in the Internal Revenue Code Subtitle A to areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction and excludes areas under exclusive state legislative jurisdiction.

See: http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/UnitedStates.htm

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:____________________________________

6. Admit that the rules of statutory construction state the following:

“Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Burgin v. Forbes, 293 Ky. 456, 169 S.W.2d. 321, 325; Newblock v. Bowles, 170 O.R. 487, 40 P.2d. 1097, 1100. Mention of one thing implies exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. Under this maxim, if statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded.” [Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 581]

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:____________________________________

7. Admit that the rules of statutory construction above apply to the interpretation of all statutes, including the Internal Revenue Code and all 50 titles of the U.S. Code.

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:____________________________________

8. Admit that observing the rules of statutory construction above and the following Supreme Court rulings in the case of the definition of “United States” defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) results in excluding states of the Union from the definition of “United States”.

“It should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or by its legislation suspend the exercise of the police powers of the States, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is clearly manifested.” [Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902)]

______________________________

______________________________
"The principle thus applicable has been frequently stated. It is that the Congress may circumscribe its regulation and occupy a limited field, and that the intention to supersede the exercise by the State of its authority as to matters not covered by the federal legislation is not to be implied unless the Act of Congress fairly interpreted is in conflict with the law of the State. See Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533."


"If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed."

[Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-203 (1952)]

YOUR ANSWER: ______Admit ______Deny

CLARIFICATION:__________________________________________

9. Admit that the term “United States” as used in the Constitution and “United States” and as used in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) refer to two mutually exclusive geographical areas.

"Foreign Laws: ‘The laws of a foreign country or sister state. In conflicts of law, the legal principles of jurisprudence which are part of the law of a sister state or nation. Foreign laws are additions to our own laws, and in that respect are called ‘jus receptum’.”


"Foreign States: ‘Nations outside of the United States…Term may also refer to another state; i.e. a sister state. The term ‘foreign nations’, …should be construed to mean all nations and states other than that in which the action is brought; and hence, one state of the Union is foreign to another, in that sense.’


YOUR ANSWER: ______Admit ______Deny

CLARIFICATION:__________________________________________

10. Admit that all earnings originating within the “United States” defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) fall within the classification of a “trade or business” under 26 U.S.C. §864(c )(3).

TITLE 26 > Subtitle A > CHAPTER 1 > Subchapter N > PART I > § 864

§864. Definitions and special rules

(c) Effectively connected income, etc.

(3) Other income from sources within United States

All income, gain, or loss from sources within the United States (other than income, gain, or loss to which paragraph (2) applies) shall be treated as effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Income Subject to Tax

Income from sources outside the United States that is not effectively connected with a trade or business in the United States is not taxable if you receive it while you are a nonresident alien. The income is not taxable even if you earned it while you were a resident alien or if you became a resident alien or a U.S. citizen after receiving it and before the end of the year.


YOUR ANSWER: ______Admit ______Deny

CLARIFICATION:__________________________________________

11. Admit that the ONLY place where EVERYTHING is connected with a public office/”trade or business” in the U.S. government is the government itself, and hence, the term “United States” as used in the phrase “sources within the
United States” within the I.R.C. Subtitle A can ONLY mean the GOVERNMENT of the United States and NOT any geographic place.

“Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L.Ed. 98, was an action of trespass or, as appears by the original record, replevin, brought in the circuit court for the District of Columbia to try the right of Congress to impose a direct tax for general purposes on that District. 3 Stat. at L. 216, chap. 60. It was insisted that Congress could act in a double capacity: in one as legislating [182 U.S. 244, 260] for the states; in the other as a local legislature for the District of Columbia. In the latter character, it was admitted that the power of levying direct taxes might be exercised, but for District purposes only, as a state legislature might tax for state purposes; but that it could not legislate for the District under art. 1, 8, giving to Congress the power ‘to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises,’ which ‘shall be uniform throughout the United States,’ inasmuch as the District was no part of the United States [described in the Constitution]. It was held that the grant of this power was a general one without limitation as to place, and consequently extended to all places over which the government extends; and that it extended to the District of Columbia as a constituent part of the United States. The fact that art. 1, 2, declares that ‘representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states . . . according to their respective numbers’ furnished a standard by which taxes were apportioned, but not to exempt any part of the country from their operation. The words used do not mean that direct taxes shall be imposed on states only which are represented, or shall be apportioned to representatives; but that direct taxation, in its application to states, shall be apportioned to numbers. That art. 1, 9, 4, declaring that direct taxes shall be laid in proportion to the census, was applicable to the District of Columbia, and will enable Congress to apportion on it its just and equal share of the burden, with the same accuracy as on the respective states. If the tax be laid in this proportion, it is within the very words of the restriction. It is a tax in proportion to the census or enumeration referred to.’ It was further held that the words of the 9th section did not ‘in terms require that the system of direct taxation, when resorted to, shall be extended to the territories, as the words of the 2d section require that it shall be extended to all the states. They therefore may, without violence, be understood to give a rule when the territories shall be taxed, without imposing the necessity of taxing them.’”

[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

YOUR ANSWER: ____Admit ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:

2.3.3 Federal jurisdiction

For additional information on the subjects covered in this section, please refer to:

1. Federal Jurisdiction, Form #05.018
   http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

2. Tax Deposition Questions, Form #03.016
   http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/Forms/Discovery/Deposition/Deposition.htm

1. Admit that the word “Internal” in the phrase “INTERNAL Revenue Service” means internal to the United States federal corporation and not internal to the geographical “United States”.

“Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L.Ed. 98, was an action of trespass or, as appears by the original record, replevin, brought in the circuit court for the District of Columbia to try the right of Congress to impose a direct tax for general purposes on that District. 3 Stat. at L. 216, chap. 60. It was insisted that Congress could act in a double capacity: in one as legislating [182 U.S. 244, 260] for the states; in the other as a local legislature for the District of Columbia. In the latter character, it was admitted that the power of levying direct taxes might be exercised, but for District purposes only, as a state legislature might tax for state purposes; but that it could not legislate for the District under art. 1, 8, giving to Congress the power ‘to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises,’ which ‘shall be uniform throughout the United States,’ inasmuch as the District was no part of the United States [described in the Constitution]. It was held that the grant of this power was a general one without limitation as to place, and consequently extended to all places over which the government extends; and that it extended to the District of Columbia as a constituent part of the United States.”

[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

YOUR ANSWER: ____Admit ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:
2. Admit that the phrase “wherever the government extends” in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) above includes ONLY the offices, chattel, and land owned by the government and excludes absolutely owned PRIVATE property, meaning property whose ownership and control is not shared with any government.

   “Ownership of property is either absolute or qualified. The ownership of property is absolute when a single person has the absolute dominion over it, and may use it or dispose of it according to his pleasure, subject only to general laws. The ownership is qualified when it is shared with one or more persons, when the time of enjoyment is deferred or limited, or when the use is restricted. Calif. Civil Code, §§678-680.


YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:


   TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
   PART VI - PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
   CHAPTER 176 - FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE
   SUBCHAPTER A - DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
   Sec. 3002. Definitions

   (15) “United States” means -
   (A) a Federal corporation;
   (B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or
   (C) an instrumentality of the United States.

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:

4. Admit that those who are public officers of the “United States” federal corporation are unavoidably engaged in a “trade or business” as defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26).

   26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26)

   “The term ‘trade or business’ includes the performance of the functions [activities] of a public office.”

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:

5. Admit that the federal government has no legislative jurisdiction within states of the Union according to the U.S. Supreme Court.

   “It is no longer open to question that the general [federal] government, unlike the states, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275, 38 S.Ct. 529, 3 A.L.R. 649, Ann.Cas.1918E 724, possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of the states; and emphatically not with regard to legislation.”

   [Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936)]

   “But very different considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no power of regulation [or taxation] nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But, it reaches only existing subjects, Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it.”

   [License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall, 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866)]
YOUR ANSWER: ____Admit ____Deny

CLARIFICATION: ________________________________________________________________

6. Admit that Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code qualifies as “legislation” with respect to the above court ruling(s).

YOUR ANSWER: ____Admit ____Deny

CLARIFICATION: ________________________________________________________________

7. Admit that the “trade or business” mentioned in the following is the SAME “trade or business” upon which Internal Revenue Code Subtitle A taxes are imposed:

“Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it.”

[License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866)]

26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26)

“The term ‘trade or business’ includes the performance of the functions [activities] of a public office.”

YOUR ANSWER: ____Admit ____Deny

CLARIFICATION: ________________________________________________________________

8. Admit that because the Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code qualifies as “legislation”, then its jurisdiction does not include areas internal to states of the Union, excepting possibly federal areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States and coming under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution.

YOUR ANSWER: ____Admit ____Deny

CLARIFICATION: ________________________________________________________________

9. Admit that the District of Columbia and the territories and possessions of the United States are outside of areas within the exclusive jurisdiction of states of the Union and outside the “United States” as used in the Constitution.

“As the only judicial power vested in Congress is to create courts whose judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, it necessarily follows that, if Congress authorizes the creation of courts and the appointment of judges for limited time, it must act independently of the Constitution upon territory which is not part of the United States within the meaning of the Constitution.”

[O’Donohue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 53 S.Ct. 740 (1933)]

“The earliest case is that of Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445, 2 L.Ed. 332, in which this court held that, under that clause of the Constitution limiting the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States to controversies between citizens of different states, a citizen of the District of Columbia could not maintain an action in the circuit court of the United States. It was argued that the word ‘state,’ in that connection, was used simply to denote a distinct political society. But, said Chief Justice, as the act of Congress obviously used the word ‘state’ in reference to that term as used in the Constitution, it becomes necessary to inquire whether Columbia is a state in the sense of that instrument. The result of that examination is a conviction that the members of the American confederation only are the states contemplated in the Constitution . . . . and excludes from the term the significations attached to it by writers on the law of nations.” This case was followed in Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280, 18 L.Ed. 825, and quite recently in Hooe v. Janieson, 166 U.S. 395, 41 L.Ed. 1049, 17 Sup.Ct.Rep. 596. The same rule was applied to citizens of territories in New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91, 4 L.Ed. 44, in which an attempt was made to distinguish a territory from the District of Columbia. But it was said that ‘neither of them is a state in the sense in which that term is used in the Constitution.’ In Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343, 12 L.Ed. 181, and in Miners’ Bank v. Iowa ex rel. District Prosecuting Attorney, 12 How. 1, 13 L.Ed. 867, it was held that under the judiciary act, permitting writs of error to the supreme court of a state in cases where the validity of a state statute is drawn in question, an act of a territorial legislature was not within the contemplation of Congress.”

[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), emphasis added]
10. Admit that the District of Columbia and territories and possessions of the United States are subject to the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the federal government under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution.

United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings;--And

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:______________________________

11. Admit that IRS Form 1040 (not 1040NR, but 1040) is intended to be submitted only by those who are “citizens or residents” of the “United States”.

1040A  11327A  Each
U.S. Individual Income Tax Return

Annual income tax return filed by citizens and residents of the United States. There are separate instructions available for this item. The catalog number for the instructions is 12088U.

W:CAR:MP:FP:F:I Tax Form or Instructions
[IRS Published Products Catalog, Document 7130, Year, 2003, p. F-15]

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:______________________________

12. Admit that those who do not maintain a “domicile” within the District of Columbia or the territories or possessions of the United States do not qualify as either “citizens” or “residents” of the “United States” as used above.

domicile, A person’s legal home. That place where a man has his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning. Smith v. Smith, 206 Pa.Super. 310, 213 A.2d. 94. Generally, physical presence within a state and the intention to make it one’s home are the requisites of establishing a “domicile” therein. The permanent residence of a person or the place to which he intends to return even though he may actually reside elsewhere. A person may have more than one residence but only one domicile. The legal domicile of a person is important since it, rather than the actual residence, often controls the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities and determines where a person may exercise the privilege of voting and other legal rights and privileges. The established, fixed, permanent, or ordinary dwellingplace or place of residence of a person, as distinguished form his temporary and transient, though actual, place of residence. It is his legal residence, as distinguished from his temporary place of abode; or his home, as distinguished from a place to which business or pleasure may temporarily call him. See also Abode; Residence.

"Citizenship," "habitancy," and "residence" are severally words which in particular cases may mean precisely the same as "domicile," while in other uses may have different meanings.

"Residence" signifies living in particular locality while "domicile" means living in that locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent home. Schreiner v. Schreiner, Tex.Civ.App., 502 S.W.2d. 840, 843.

For purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction, "citizenship" and "domicile" are synonymous. Hendry v. Masonite Corp., C.A.Miss., 455 F.2d. 955.

YOUR ANSWER:  ____Admit  ____Deny

CLARIFICATION:______________________________
13. Admit that under 4 U.S.C. §72, all those exercising a “public office” within the federal government must do so in the District of Columbia and NOT elsewhere.

14. Admit that there is no provision of law extending “public offices” to any state of the Union as required by the above positive law statute.

15. Admit that 48 U.S.C. §1612(a) extends the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to enforce Title 26, Subchapter F to the Virgin Islands.

16. Admit that Congress has not “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to any one of the several states of the Union.

17. Admit that there is no statutory authority or Treasury Order which would “expressly” extend the authority of the Secretary outside the District of Columbia to the several Union states.

18. Admit that 26 U.S.C. §7621 authorizes the President of the United States to establish internal revenue districts.

For the purpose mentioned in subsection (a), the President may subdivide any State, or the District of Columbia, or may unite into one district two or more States.
19. Admit that the United States Constitution forbids the President of the United States to “join or divide” any state of the Union.

   United States Constitution
   Article 4, Section 3, Clause 1

   New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

   YOUR ANSWER (circle one):  Admit/Deny

   CLARIFICATION:_________________________________________________________________________

20. Admit that 26 U.S.C. §7621 authorizes the President of the United States to join or divide “States”:

   YOUR ANSWER (circle one):  Admit/Deny

   CLARIFICATION:_________________________________________________________________________

21. Admit that pursuant 26 U.S.C. §7621, the President has not authorized any part of any state of the Union to be part of any internal revenue district.

   YOUR ANSWER (circle one):  Admit/Deny

   CLARIFICATION:_________________________________________________________________________

22. Admit that the “State” referred to in 26 U.S.C. §7621 above is a federal “State” defined in 4 U.S.C. §110(d), which is a territory or possession of the United States and includes no part of any state of the Union:

   TITLE 4 > CHAPTER 4 > § 110
   § 110. Same; definitions
   As used in sections 105–109 of this title—
   (d) The term “State” includes any Territory or possession of the United States.

   YOUR ANSWER (circle one):  Admit/Deny

   CLARIFICATION:_________________________________________________________________________

23. Admit that the states of the Union are not “territories” of the United States:

   Corpus Juris Secundum Legal Encyclopedia
   Territories
   §1. Definitions, Nature, and Distinctions

   "The word 'territory,' when used to designate a political organization has a distinctive, fixed, and legal meaning under the political institutions of the United States, and does not necessarily include all the territorial possessions of the United States, but may include only the portions thereof which are organized and exercise governmental functions under act of congress."

   "While the term 'territory' is often loosely used, and has even been construed to include municipal subdivisions of a territory, and 'territories of the' United States is sometimes used to refer to the entire domain over which the United States exercises dominion, the word 'territory,' when used to designate a political organization, has a distinctive, fixed, and legal meaning under the political institutions of the United States, and the term 'territory' or 'territories' does not necessarily include only a portion or the portions thereof which are organized and exercise government functions under acts of congress. The term 'territories' has been defined to be political subdivisions of the outgoing dominion of the United States, and in this sense the term 'territory' is not a description
of a definite area of land but of a political unit governing and being governed as such. The question whether a particular subdivision or entity is a territory is not determined by the particular form of government with which it is, more or less temporarily, invested.

"Territories' or 'territory' as including 'state' or 'states.' While the term 'territories of the United States' may, under certain circumstances, include the states of the Union, as used in the federal Constitution and in ordinary acts of congress "territory" does not include a foreign state.

"As used in this title, the term 'territories' generally refers to the political subdivisions created by congress, and not within the boundaries of any of the several states."

[86 Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), Territories, §1 (2003), Emphasis added]

YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:____________________________________________________

24. Admit that pursuant to Executive Order #10289, the President has delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to establish internal revenue districts.

YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:____________________________________________________

25. Admit that the Secretary of the Treasury has not established internal revenue districts which include any part of any state of the Union that is not federal territory or property.

YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:____________________________________________________

26. Admit that the only existing internal revenue district is the District of Columbia.

YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:____________________________________________________

27. Admit that pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7601, the only place the IRS is authorized to search for taxable persons and property is within internal revenue districts created by the President.

YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:____________________________________________________

28. Admit that the term “State” as used in the Constitution includes states of the Union and excludes territories and possessions of the United States or the “State” mentioned in 4 U.S.C. §110(d).

"The earliest case is that of Hepburn v. Elizy, 2 Cranch, 445, 2 L.Ed. 332, in which this court held that, under that clause of the Constitution limiting the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States to controversies between citizens of different states, a citizen of the District of Columbia could not maintain an action in the circuit court of the United States. It was argued that the word 'state,' in that connection, was used simply to denote a distinct political society. 'But,' said the Chief Justice, 'as the act of Congress obviously used the word 'state' in reference to that term as used in the Constitution, it becomes necessary to inquire whether Columbia is a state in the sense of that instrument. The result of that examination is a conviction that the members of the American confederacy only are the states contemplated in the Constitution . . . and excludes from the term the signification attached to it by writers on the law of nations.' This case was followed in Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280, 18 L.Ed. 825, and quite recently in Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U.S. 395, 41 L.Ed. 1049, 17 Sup.Ct.Rep. 596. The same rule was applied to citizens of territories in New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91, 4 L.Ed. 44, in which an attempt was made to distinguish a territory from the District of Columbia. But it was said that 'neither of them is a state in the sense in which that term is used in the Constitution.' In Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343, 12 L.Ed. 181, and in Miners' Bank v. Iowa ex rel. District Prosecuting Attorney, 12 How. 1, 13 L.Ed. 867, it was held that under
the judiciary act, permitting writs of error to the supreme court of a state in cases where the validity of a state statute is drawn in question, an act of a territorial legislature was not within the contemplation of Congress.”
[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:______________________

29. Admit that the term “State” as defined in 4 U.S.C. §110(d) refers to a territory or possession of the United States pursuant to the Buck Act.

TITLE 4 - FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
CHAPTER 4 - THE STATES

Sec. 110. Same; definitions
(d) The term “State” includes any Territory or possession of the United States.

YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:______________________

30. Admit that the term “State” as used 4 U.S.C. §110(d) is the “State” upon which state income taxes are levied pursuant to the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §§105-113.

YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:______________________

31. Admit that states of the Union are foreign, for the purposes of federal legislative jurisdiction, for most federal subject matters.

Foreign States: “Nations outside of the United States…Term may also refer to another state; i.e. a sister state. The term ‘foreign nations’, ...should be construed to mean all nations and states other than that in which the action is brought; and hence, one state of the Union is foreign to another, in that sense.”

Foreign Laws: “The laws of a foreign country or sister state.”

Dual citizenship. Citizenship in two different countries. Status of citizens of United States who reside within a state; i.e., person who are born or naturalized in the U.S. are citizens of the U.S. and the state wherein they reside.

YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:______________________

32. Admit that following are the only subject matters for which the states of the Union are “domestic” for the purposes of federal legislative jurisdiction, pursuant to the authority of the Constitution of the United States of America.

a. Counterfeiting pursuant to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 5 of the United States Constitution.
b. Postal matters pursuant to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 7 of the United States Constitution.

c. Foreign commerce pursuant to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution.
d. Treason pursuant to Article 4, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.
e. Property, contracts, and franchises of the U.S. Government coming under Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.
f. Jurisdiction over aliens (foreign nationals who are NOT state nationals), which is a foreign relations issue reserved exclusively to the federal and not state government. See Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:_________________________________________

33. Admit that what makes a human being a statutory “U.S. citizen” under 8 U.S.C. §1401 is a legal domicile on federal territory.

“The writers upon the law of nations distinguish between a temporary residence in a foreign country for a special purpose and a residence accompanied with an intention to make it a permanent place of abode. The latter is styled by Vattel [in his book The Law of Nations as] “domicile,” which he defines to be “a habitation fixed in any place, with an intention of always staying there.” Such a person, says this author, becomes a member of the new society at least as a permanent inhabitant, and is a kind of citizen of the inferior order from the native citizens, but is, nevertheless, united and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages. This right of domicile, he continues, is not established unless the person makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration. Vatt. Law Nat, pp. 92, 93. Grotius nowhere uses the word “domicile,” but he also distinguishes between those who stay in a foreign country by the necessity of their affairs, or from any other temporary cause, and those who reside there from a permanent cause. The former he denominates “strangers,” and the latter, “subjects.” The rule is thus laid down by Sir Robert Phillimore:

There is a class of persons which cannot be, strictly speaking, included in either of these denominations of naturalized or native citizens, namely, the class of those who have ceased to reside [maintain a domicile] in their native country, and have taken up a permanent abode in another. These are domiciled inhabitants. They have not put on a new citizenship through some formal mode enjoined by the law or the new country. They are de facto, though not de jure, citizens of the country of their [new chosen] domicile.

[Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)]

YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:_________________________________________

34. Admit that there is no provision of currently enacted law, including “judge-made law” that “expressly extends” beyond the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands: 1. Enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code by the IRS; 2. “Public offices” needed to conduct said enforcement.

YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:_________________________________________

35. Admit that because there is neither legislative authority to enforce the Internal Revenue Code in states of the Union, nor any Treasury order that establishes internal revenue districts within any state of the Union, that the states of the Union are “foreign” with respect to the jurisdiction of Internal Revenue Code, Subtitle A.

YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:_________________________________________

36. Admit that according to the U.S. Supreme Court, the taxing powers of Congress do not extend into any state of the Union.

“It is no longer open to question that the general government, unlike the states, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275, 38 S.Ct. 529, 3 A.L.R. 649, Ann.Cas.1918E 724, possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of the states; and emphatically not with regard to legislation.”

[Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936)]

“The difficulties arising out of our dual form of government and the opportunities for differing opinions concerning the relative rights of state and national governments are many; but for a very long time this court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the taxing power of Congress does not extend to the states or their political subdivisions. The same basic reasoning which leads to that conclusion, we think, requires like limitation upon the power which springs from the bankruptcy clause. United States v. Butler, supra.”

[Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 56 S.Ct. 892 (1936)]
YOUR ANSWER (circle one): Admit/Deny

CLARIFICATION:______________________________________________________________

2.3.4 Authority for establishing “areas” in lieu of statutory “internal revenue districts”

1. Admit that there are NO District Directors within the Internal Revenue Service.

YOUR ANSWER: _____Admit _____Deny

CLARIFICATION:______________________________________________________________

2. Admit that the reason there are no remaining District Directors is because all statutory “internal revenue districts” were abolished as a result of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 112 Stat. 685.

YOUR ANSWER: _____Admit _____Deny

CLARIFICATION:______________________________________________________________

3. Admit that there is NO statutory authority for the Internal Revenue Service to establish “areas” to replace “internal revenue districts”.

YOUR ANSWER: _____Admit _____Deny

CLARIFICATION:______________________________________________________________

4. Admit that there is no statutory authority for creating “areas” within the exclusive jurisdiction of a constitutional state of the Union.

YOUR ANSWER: _____Admit _____Deny

CLARIFICATION:______________________________________________________________

5. Admit that the IRS has no delegated authority to create “areas” by regulation if there is no statutory authority expressly granted by Congress to do so. See U.S. v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351 (1957)

“Finally, the Government points to the fact that the Treasury Regulations relating to the statute purport to include the pick-up man among those subject to the § 3290 tax[15] and argues (a) that this constitutes an administrative interpretation to which we should give weight in construing the statute, particularly because (b) section 3290 was carried over in haec verba into § 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. We find neither argument persuasive. In light of the above discussion, [359*359] we cannot but regard this Treasury Regulation as no more than an attempted addition to the statute of something which is not there. [359*359] As such the regulation can furnish no sustenance to the statute. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441, 446-447;” [U.S. v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351 (1957)]

YOUR ANSWER: _____Admit _____Deny

CLARIFICATION:______________________________________________________________

2.3.5 Civil Status

1. Admit that the ONLY statutory “individual” defined in the I.R.C. is a statutory “alien”:

26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1 Requirement for the deduction and withholding of tax on payments to foreign persons.

(c) Definitions

(3) Individual.
(i) Alien individual.

The term alien individual means an individual who is not a citizen or a national of the United States. See Sec. 1.1-1(c).

YOUR ANSWER: _____Admit _____Deny

CLARIFICATION:

2. Admit that the statutory “qualified individual” who is abroad and in a foreign country is ALSO an alien as defined above in relation to the foreign country they are physically in under 26 U.S.C. §911:

26 U.S. Code § 911 - Citizens or residents of the United States living abroad

(d) DEFINITIONS AND SPECIAL RULES

For purposes of this section—

(1) QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL

The term “qualified individual” means an individual whose tax home is in a foreign country and who is—

(A) a citizen of the United States and establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary that he has been a bona fide resident of a foreign country or countries for an uninterrupted period which includes an entire taxable year, or

(B) a citizen or resident of the United States and who, during any period of 12 consecutive months, is present in a foreign country or countries during at least 330 full days in such period.

YOUR ANSWER: _____Admit _____Deny

CLARIFICATION:

3. Admit that those who are human beings but not statutory “individuals” cannot be “persons” as defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(1):

26 U.S. Code § 7701 - Definitions

(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof—

(1) PERSON

The term “person” shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.

YOUR ANSWER: _____Admit _____Deny

CLARIFICATION:

4. Admit that those who are NOT abroad under 26 U.S.C. §911 are expressly exempted from withholding and reporting and therefore not liable for any income tax pursuant to 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(d)(1).

YOUR ANSWER: _____Admit _____Deny

CLARIFICATION:

5. Admit that the above “individual” is the SAME “individual” mentioned in the upper left corner of the IRS Form 1040 as “U.S. Individual”.

YOUR ANSWER: _____Admit _____Deny
6. Admit that human beings born within and domiciled within the exclusive jurisdiction of a state of the Union are legislatively “foreign” but not statutory “aliens” in relation to federal territory and the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress.

“Constitutionally, only those born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens. Const.Amdt. XIV. The power to fix and determine the rules of naturalization is vested in the Congress. Const.Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 4. Since all persons born outside of the [CONSTITUTIONAL] United States, are “foreigners,”[1] and not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, the statutes, such as § 1993 and 8 U.S.C.A. §601 [currently 8 U.S.C. §1401], derive their validity from the naturalization power of the Congress. Elk v. Wilkins, 1884, 112 U.S. 94, 101, 5 S.Ct. 41, 28 L.Ed. 643; Wong Kim Ark v. U. S., 1898, 169 U.S. 649, 702, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890. Persons in whom citizenship is vested by such statutes are naturalized citizens and not native-born citizens, Zimmer v. Acheson, 10 Cir. 1951, 191 F.2d. 209, 211; Wong Kim Ark v. U. S., supra.”

[Ly Shew v. Acheson, 110 F.Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal., 1953)]

FOOTNOTES:

YOUR ANSWER: ___Admit ___Deny

CLARIFICATION:___________________________

7. Admit that no one can force you to become a “resident” against your will without violating the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude.

“That it does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, is too clear for argument. Slavery implies involuntary servitude—a state of bondage; the ownership of mankind as a chattel, or at least the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property, and services [in their entirety]. This amendment was said in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall, 36, to have been intended primarily to abolish slavery, as it had been previously known in this country, and that it equally forbade Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie trade, when they amounted to slavery or involuntary servitude and that the use of the word ‘servitude’ was intended to prohibit the use of all forms of involuntary slavery, of whatever class or name.”

[Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896)]

YOUR ANSWER: ___Admit ___Deny

CLARIFICATION:___________________________

8. Admit that you cannot be a “resident” of a place you have never been to and that it is FRAUD to declare oneself a “resident” of the “United States” if one has never physically lived there.

YOUR ANSWER: ___Admit ___Deny

CLARIFICATION:___________________________

2.4 Affirmation

I declare under penalty of perjury as required under 26 U.S.C. §6065 that the answers provided by me to the foregoing questions are true, correct, and complete to the best of my knowledge and ability, so help me God. I also declare that these answers are completely consistent with each other and with my understanding of both the Constitution of the United States,
Internal Revenue Code, Treasury Regulations, the Internal Revenue Manual, and the rulings of the Supreme Court but not necessarily lower federal courts.

Name (print):____________________________________________________

Signature:______________________________________________________

Date:______________________________

Witness name (print):_______________________________________________

Witness Signature:__________________________________________________

Witness Date:________________________

3 **Criminal consequences suffered by all judges and public officers who REFUSE to address the issues in this document**

Any and all public servants who omit, avoid, or fail to answer or deal with the jurisdictional issues raised in this document are highly susceptible to DEFINITE, SEVERE criminal consequences. Those consequences and the CRIMINAL DURESS they institute against the submitter of this document are described in the following document incorporated herein by reference:

**Affidavit of Duress: Illegal Tax Enforcement by De Facto Officers.** Form #02.005
[https://sedm.org/Forms/02-Affidavits/AffOfDuress-Tax.pdf](https://sedm.org/Forms/02-Affidavits/AffOfDuress-Tax.pdf)

4 **Admissibility of this document into evidence in any and all litigation relating to the submitter**

Because this document establishes the FACT that the submitter is illegally being compelled to assume the duties and obligations of a public office that he or she does not consent to fill and cannot fill, then:

1. Under the Public Records Exception of the Hearsay Rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), this document is admissible.

2. Any attempt to interfere with the admission of this evidence into the proceeding or to deprive the jury of access to it by the judge shall constitute the following CRIMES
   2.1. Obstruction of justice.

The court WILL NOT be allowed to impute a DE FACTO office to the Submitter and at the same time INTERFERE with exercising ALL the “benefits” of said office at least long enough to prove that it is NOT lawfully exercised. A public office that is not lawfully exercised is called a de facto office and the person filling it is a de facto officer under the De Facto Officer Doctrine. The illegal and unconstitutional CREATION or perpetuation of said office is exhaustively described in the following documents incorporated herein by reference:

1. **Proof That There is a “Straw Man”.** Form #05.042
[https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/StrawMan.pdf](https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/StrawMan.pdf)

2. **Why Your Government is Either a Thief or You are a “Public Officer” for Income Tax Purposes.** Form #05.008
[https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhyThiefOrPubOfficer.pdf](https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhyThiefOrPubOfficer.pdf)

5 **What this document is NOT**
This document is NOT a request for legal advice of any kind. It merely demands that you obey the law. You can’t OBEY that law without READING and interpreting it. You can’t do your job and stay within the limits of your statutory authority WITHOUT reading and interpreting it. This is an unavoidable consequence of the fact that we are a “society of laws and NOT men”. That means you SHOULD NOT be asking another employee or ANY man about what you should do or even CAN do in this circumstance. The ONLY basis for reasonable belief about what the law requires in this case is YOUR OWN reading of the law.

“No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.” 106 U.S., at 220. “Shall it be said... that the courts cannot give remedy when the Citizen has been deprived of his property by force, his estate seized and converted to the use of the government without any lawful authority, without any process of law, and without any compensation, because the president has ordered it and his officers are in possession? If such be the law of this country, it sanctions a tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which has a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal rights,” 106 U.S., at 221.

Rather, this document:

1. Acknowledges that YOU, the Recipient are the moving party in this enforcement action or solicitation.
2. DEMANDS that you satisfy your burden of proof with court admissible evidence or to discontinue permanently our interactions.
3. Acknowledges that it is NOT my responsibility to respond to a mere BELIEF on your part, whether that BELIEF derives from untrustworthy government publications or another equally untrustworthy man. The courts have repeatedly held that all government publications, all statements by government actors are UNTRUSTWORTHY and therefore devolve to a mere “belief” akin to a religion. See:

Reasonable Belief About Income Tax Liability, Form #05.007
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/ReasonableBelief.pdf

Since the government cannot use such “beliefs” to create a religion without violating the First Amendment, then it can’t in effect FORCE me to obey whatever that belief is. If I can’t force the GOVERNMENT to act on MY religious belief, then THEY can’t establish or especially ENFORCE their own flavor of religion with THEIR beliefs or presumptions against me EITHER.¹¹

Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family. The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Just as the Government may not insist that appellees engage in [476 U.S. 693, 700] any set form of religious observance, so appellees may not demand that the Government join in their chosen religious practices by refraining from using a number to identify their daughter. “[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can extract from the government.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).

As a result, Roy may no more prevail on his religious objection to the Government’s use of a Social Security number for his daughter than he could on a sincere religious objection to the size or color of the Government’s filing cabinets. The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government’s internal procedures.” [Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)].

This document therefore establishes that attempts to ENFORCE your belief without supporting evidence provided directly to me and signed under penalty of perjury with the real legal name of a government witness is nothing more than a violation of the above and hence, a PRIVATE commercial transaction that I am billing you for. Anything NOT so signed under penalty of perjury will be treated as a NON-RESPONSE and a mere “belief” rather than a court admissible FACT that is actionable to me. Every time I want you to do something, I have to sign under penalty of


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Form 05.052, Rev. 1-17-2019
EXHIBIT:________
perjury. I expect the same measure of accountability from you as you impose on me. If you refuse that accountability, you are a hypocrite, and elitist, and an economic terrorist in violation of Constitution Article 4, Section 4.

4. Provides overwhelming evidence which destroys your ability to meet your burden of proof that you have lawful enforcement authority against me, the Submitter, absent my demonstrated express consent.

5. Acknowledges that if you continue to proceed WITHOUT evidence signed under penalty of perjury or based on a BELIEF rather than facts, that you are soliciting to receive my property in the form of my services and time to respond in educating you about the fact that you are NOT proceeding lawfully. By making such a commercial solicitation extraterritorially and outside your legislative jurisdiction, you are:

5.1. Making yourself subject to the Uniform Commercial Code.

5.2. Approaching me as a Buyer (U.C.C. §2-103(1)(a)) of my absolutely owned private property.

5.3. The party to an acceptance of my terms as the Merchant (U.C.C. §2-104(1)) offering use or control but not ownership of my absolutely owned private property. Those terms are documented in:

Injury Defense Franchise and Agreement, Form #06.027
https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/InjuryDefenseFranchise.pdf

5.4. A THIEF of my time and services beyond this point if you are NOT treated as a consenting Buyer under the above implied agreement.

5.5. Waiving official, judicial, and sovereign immunity and coming down to the level of any ordinary business and private status under:


5.5.2. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. Chapter 97.


6. Destroys any possibility of creating or enforcing IMPLIED CONSENT to anything you are offering in the context of our interactions. Since all JUST authority of government derives from the CONSENT of those “governed” according to the Declaration of Independence, then that makes this interaction UNJUST and tort.

7. Identifies your enforcement presentment or correspondence as:

7.1. Based upon inadmissible presumption and belief rather than facts. Federal Rule of Evidence 610 and/or

7.2. Without evidentiary foundation and/or . . .

7.3. Based on knowingly false information that you already agree is false or inapplicable by your failure to deny, in satisfaction of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(6) . . . and/or

7.4. Malicious, because you have been presented with legally admissible evidence that your actions are illegal or unconstitutional and yet continue to tortiously proceed anyway.

8. Creates an equitable estoppel against further administrative or judicial enforcement action.

9. Destroys any possibility of “mens rea” on me, the Submitter, should criminal proceedings be undertaken related to our future interactions.

This document also does NOT advocate any of the following flawed arguments, so don’t proceed further with these false arguments to answer or presume issues that are NOT advocated or presented herein as a red herring:

1. That anyone other than statutory “withholding agents” are liable for I.R.C. Subtitles A and C income taxes. In fact, the only parties EXPRESSLY made liable for income tax are withholding agents under 26 U.S.C. §1461. Everyone ELSE is, by implication, a volunteer and not a taxpayer. They can only be made liable AFTER they voluntarily consent to assume the duties of a withholding agent, just as any indirect excise requires, and to consent to do so in a physical place where they are legally allowed to alienate otherwise inalienable rights, such as abroad or on federal territory but not in a constitutional state:

26 U.S. Code § 1461 - Liability for withheld tax

Every person required to deduct and withhold any tax under this chapter is hereby made liable for such tax and is hereby indemnified against the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any payments made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

"Tax' is legal imposition, exclusively of statutory origin, and liability to taxation must be read in statute, or it does not exist.”

[Bente v. Bugbee, 137 A. 552; 103 N.J. Law. 608 (1927)]

"The taxpayer must be liable for the tax. Tax liability is a condition precedent to the demand. Merely demanding payment, even repeatedly, does not cause liability.”
2. That the United States government has no legislative jurisdiction outside of federal territory or outside the District of Columbia. Instead:

2.1. The government has legislative jurisdiction over its own property WHEREVER it is found under Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution.

"The Constitution permits Congress to dispose of and to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States. This power applies as well to territory belonging to the United States within the States, as beyond them. It comprehends all the public domain, wherever it may be. The argument is, that the power to make 'all needful rules and regulations,' is a power of legislation, 'a full legislative power;' 'that it includes all subjects of legislation in the territory,' and is without any limitations, except the positive prohibitions which affect all the powers of Congress. Congress may then regulate or prohibit slavery upon the public domain within the new States, and such a prohibition would permanently affect the capacity of a slave, whose master might carry him to it. And why not? Because no power has been conferred on Congress. This is a conclusion universally admitted. But the power to 'make rules and regulations respecting the territory' is not restrained by State lines, nor are there any constitutional prohibitions upon its exercise in the domain of the United States within the States; and whatever rules and regulations respecting territory Congress may constitutionally make are supreme, and are not dependent on the situs of 'the territory.'"

[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 509-510 (1856)]

2.2. The government has jurisdiction over its own OFFICERS wherever they are found, PROVIDED that such jurisdiction is EXPRESSLY authorized as required by 4 U.S.C. §72.

"It is true, that the person who accepts an office may be supposed to enter into a compact to be answerable to the government, which he serves, for any violation of his duty; and, having taken the oath of office, he would unquestionably be liable, in such case, to a prosecution for perjury in the Federal Courts. But because one man, by his own act [CONSENT], renders himself amenable to a particular jurisdiction, shall another man, who has not incurred a similar obligation, be implicated? If, in other words, it is sufficient to vest a jurisdiction in this court, that a Federal Officer is concerned; if it is a sufficient proof of a case arising under a law of the United States to affect other persons, that such officer is bound, by law, to discharge his duty with fidelity; a source of jurisdiction is opened, which must inevitably overflow and destroy all the barriers between the judicial authorities of the State and the general government. Anything which can prevent a Federal Officer from the punctual, as well as from an impartial, performance of his duty; an assault and battery; or the recovery of a debt, as well as the offer of a bribe, may be made a foundation of the jurisdiction of this court; and, considering the constant disposition of power to extend the sphere of its influence, fictions will be resorted to, when real cases cease to occur. A mere fiction, that the defendant is in the custody of the marshall, has rendered the jurisdiction of the King's Bench universal in all personal actions."

[United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. 384 (1798)]

SOURCE: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3339893669697439168

2.3. The government has jurisdiction over all of the powers expressly granted to it under Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.

2.4. The Sixteenth Amendment created NO new powers of taxation within states of the union and therefore did not add to the powers expressly listed in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.

"The contention is that as the tax here imposed is not on the net product but in a sense somewhat equivalent to a tax on the gross product of the working of the mine by the corporation, therefore the tax is not within the purview of the Sixteenth Amendment and consequently it must be treated as a direct tax on property because of its ownership and as such void for want of apportionment. But aside from the obvious error of the proposition intrinsically considered, it manifestly disregards the fact that by the previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged"

[Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916)]

A franchise tax upon public offices is the only type of tax that can or does satisfy the reason the amendment was passed. A tax that only applies to those exercising the public office franchise, defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26) as "the functions of a public office" is in fact an indirect excise tax and a franchise tax limited to those in government. Those serving in said offices are not tied to a specific geographical place, as the U.S. Supreme Court said that it MUST limit itself to in the following. Note the language "wherever the GOVERNMENT extends", not wherever the GEOGRAPHY extends". The only way the tax could be "without limitation as to place" is to place the tax on an activity and to regard "United States" as a corporation as the LEGAL and not PHYSICAL place within which the activity is conducted.
“Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L.Ed. 98, was an action of trespass or, as appears by the original record, replevin, brought in the circuit court for the District of Columbia to try the right of Congress to impose a direct tax for general purposes on that District. 3 Stat. at L. 216, chap. 60. It was insisted that Congress could act in a double capacity: in one as legislating [182 U.S. 244, 260] for the states; in the other as a local legislature for the District of Columbia. In the latter character, it was admitted that the power of levying direct taxes might be exercised, but for District purposes only, as a state legislature might tax for state purposes; but that it could not legislate for the District under art. 1, 8, giving to Congress the power ‘to lay and collect taxes, impost[s], and excises,’ which ‘shall be uniform throughout the United States,’ inasmuch as the District was no part of the United States [described in the Constitution]. It was held that the grant of this power was a general one without limitation as to place, and consequently extended to all places over which the government extends; and that it extended to the District of Columbia as a constituent part of the United States. The fact that art. 1, 2, declares that ‘representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states . . . according to their respective numbers’ furnished a standard by which taxes were apportioned, but not to exempt any part of the country from their operation. The words used do not mean that direct taxes shall be imposed on states only which are represented, or shall be apportioned to representatives; but that direct taxation, in its application to states, shall be apportioned to numbers;’ That art. 1, 9, 4, declaring that direct taxes shall be laid in proportion to the census, was applicable to the District of Columbia, and will enable Congress to apportion on it its just and equal share of the burden, with the same accuracy as on the respective states. If the tax be laid in this proportion, it is within the very words of the restriction. It is a tax in proportion to the census referred to.’ It was further held that the words of the 9th section did not ‘in terms require that the system of direct taxation, when resorted to, shall be extended to the territories, as the words of the 2d section require that it shall be extended to all the states. They therefore may, without violence, be understood to give a rule when the territories shall be taxed, without imposing the necessity of taxing them.’”

[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

2.5. Whatever legislative jurisdiction it wishes to exercise beyond the above MUST be demonstrated with evidence BEFORE enforcement is attempted and if it isn’t it becomes a constitutional TORT.

“Every State or nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within her own territory, and her laws affect and bind all property and persons residing within it. It may regulate the manner and circumstances under which property is held, and the condition, capacity, and state of all persons therein, and also the remedy and modes of administering justice. And it is equally true that no State or nation can affect or bind property out of its territory, or persons not residing domiciled within it. No State therefore can enact laws to operate beyond its own dominions, and if it attempts to do so, it may be lawfully refused obedience. Such laws can have no inherent authority extraterritorially. This is the necessary result of the independence of distinct and separate sovereignties.

“Now it follows from these principles that whatever force or effect the laws of one State or nation may have in the territories of another must depend solely upon the laws and municipal regulations of the latter, upon its own jurisprudence and polity, and upon its own express or tacit consent.”

[Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)]

3. That the ability to enforce the I.R.C. Subtitles A and C is limited to the District of Columbia in the case of human beings. Instead, it is limited to aliens (born in a foreign country OTHER than a constitutional state of the Union) at home and STATUTORY citizens/residents abroad, meaning:

3.1. Those domiciled on federal territory and born or naturalized there and temporarily abroad under 26 U.S.C. §911. The “citizens” or “residents” under the Internal Revenue Code are in fact domiciled on federal territory and described in 8 U.S.C. §1401, 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(c), and 26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1)(A). 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(d)(1) even expressly exempts these parties from withholding and reporting when they are not abroad in a foreign country. Such parties are referred to as statutory “U.S. persons” in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(30).


Those domiciled in states of the Union and born there are non-residents and non-persons and would fall in NEITHER of the above statuses. They are also NOT statutory “U.S. persons” under 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(30) unless they are acting as officers of the national government on official business representing the MAIN “U.S. citizen”, which is “U.S. Inc”.

Non-Resident Non-Person Position, Form #05 020

Instead, this document insists that the moving party, which is the government in this case, has the burden or PROVING jurisdiction on the record with court admissible evidence signed under penalty of perjury using the real legal birthname of the respondent. The burden of proof must disprove the evidence herein in its entirety by answering the questions indicated in the previous section. In the absence of satisfying the moving party’s burden of proof, your enforcement and/or collection
activities are proven with evidence to be illegal, injurious, tortious, and unconstitutional not in ALL cases, but in this specific case.

For a complete treatment of all the flawed arguments that both the government and this document DO NOT advocate, see and rebut the following:

1. **Flawed Tax Arguments to Avoid**, Form #08.004  
   [https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/FlawedArgsToAvoid.pdf](https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/FlawedArgsToAvoid.pdf)

2. **Rebutted Version of the IRS “The Truth About Frivolous Tax Arguments”**, Form #08.005  
   [https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/friv_tax_rebuts.pdf](https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/friv_tax_rebuts.pdf)


4. **Rebutted Version of “Tax Resister Frequently Asked Questions”**, Form #08.007  
   [http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/FalseRhetoric/TRFAQ/TRFAQ.htm](http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/FalseRhetoric/TRFAQ/TRFAQ.htm)

A failure by the recipient to rebut the above constitutes an admission of the truthfulness of all of the above documents, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(6).

In the event that the responding party fails to disprove the facts stated in this document, the government is in error and is illegally procuring and demanding property it is not entitled to. The terms of the loan of my services and time in educating them about the limits upon their constitutional and statutory authority is found in the following binding agreement which they consent to by failing to prove that they are lawfully enforcing:

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**Injury Defense Franchise and Agreement**, Form #06.027  
[https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/InjuryDefenseFranchise.pdf](https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/InjuryDefenseFranchise.pdf)

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### 6 Definitions of key terms in this document

This section defines key terms used throughout this document, in court pleadings, and in all interactions between the recipient, the submitter, and the employer of the recipient.

Form number references appearing in this document derive from the following internet link:

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[Forms and Publications Page](https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm)

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The word "private" when it appears in front of other entity names such as "person", "individual", "business", "employee", "employer", etc. shall imply that the entity is:

1. In possession of absolute, exclusive ownership and control over their own labor, body, and all their property. In Roman Law this was called "dominium".

2. On an EQUAL rather than inferior relationship to government in court. This means that they have no obligations to any government OTHER than possibly the duty to serve on jury and vote upon voluntary acceptance of the obligations of the civil status of “citizen” (and the DOMICILE that creates it). Otherwise, they are entirely free and unregulated unless and until they INJURE the equal rights of another under the common law.

3. A "nonresident" in relation to the state and federal government.

4. Not a PUBLIC entity defined within any state or federal statutory law. This includes but is not limited to statutory "person", "individual", "taxpayer", "driver", "spouse" under any under any civil statute or franchise.

5. Not engaged in a public office or "trade or business" (per 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26)). Such offices include but are not limited to statutory "person", "individual", "taxpayer", "driver", "spouse" under any civil statute or franchise.
6. **Not consenting** to contract with or acquire any public status, public privilege, or public right under any state or federal franchise. For instance, the phrase "private employee" means a common law worker that is NOT the statutory "employee" defined within 26 U.S.C. §3401(c) or 26 C.F.R. §301.3401(c)-1 or any other federal or state law or statute.

7. Not sharing ownership or control of their body or property with anyone, and especially a government. In other words:
   7.1 Ownership is not "qualified" but "absolute".
   7.2 There are no moities between them and the government.
   7.3 The government has no usufructs over any of their property.

8. Not subject to civil enforcement or regulation of any kind, except AFTER an injury to the equal rights of others has occurred. Preventive rather than corrective regulation is an unlawful taking of property according to the Fifth Amendment takings clause.

Every attempt by anyone in government to alienate rights that the Declaration of Independence says are UNALIENABLE shall also be treated as "PRIVATE BUSINESS ACTIVITY" that cannot be protected by sovereign, official, or judicial immunity. So called "government" cannot make a profitable business or franchise out of alienating inalienable rights without ceasing to be a classical/de jure government and instead becoming in effect an economic terrorist and de facto government in violation of Article 4, Section 4.

"No servant [or government or biological person] can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will be loyal to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon [government]."

[Luke 16:13, Bible, NKJV]

The term "tax" includes any method to collect revenues to support ONLY the operation of the government. It does NOT include the abuse of taxing power to transfer wealth between ordinary citizens or residents and when it is used for this purpose it is THEFT, not "taxation".

"The power to tax is, therefore, the strongest, the most pervading of all powers of government, reaching directly or indirectly to all classes of the people. It was said by Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of McCulloch v. Md., 4 Wheat. 431, that the power to tax is the power to destroy. A striking instance of the truth of the proposition is seen in the fact that the existing tax of ten per cent, imposed by the United States on the circulation of all other banks than the National Banks, drove out of existence every state bank of circulation within a year or two after its passage. This power can be readily employed against one class of individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other, if there is no implied limitation of the uses for which the power may be exercised.

To lay, with one hand, the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative forms.

Nor is it taxation. 'A tax,' says Webster’s Dictionary, ‘is a rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of a citizen by government for the use of the nation or State.’ 'Taxes are burdens or charges imposed by the Legislature upon persons or property to raise money for public purposes.' Cooley, Const. Lim., 479.

Coulter, J., in Northern Liberties v. St. John’s Church, 13 Pa.St. 104 says, very forcibly, ‘I think the common mind has everywhere taken in the understanding that taxes are a public imposition, levied by authority of the government for the purposes of carrying on the government in all its machinery and operations—that they are imposed for a public purpose.’ See, also Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 Pa.St. 69; Matter of Mayor of N.Y., 11 Johns., 77; Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutch., 398; Sharpless v. Mayor, supra; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Ia., 47; Whiting v. Fond du Lac, supra.

[Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1874)]

"A tax, in the general understanding of the term and as used in the constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the government. The word has never thought to connote the expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of another."

Challenge to Income Tax Enforcement Authority Within Constitutional States of the Union 52 of 81
"Tax" includes ONLY impositions upon PUBLIC property or franchises (Form #05.030) and not upon absolutely owned PRIVATE property.

1. PRIVATE property must be consensually converted to PUBLIC property before it can be taxed, and the burden of proof rests on the government to prove that it was lawfully converted before it can be subject to tax. See: Separation Between Public and Private Course, Form 12.025

2. The "persons" spoken above are civil statutory PUBLIC "persons" and not PRIVATE humans. See: Why All Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037

The term “statutory” when used as a prefix to any other term, means that the term it precedes pertains only to federal territory, property, PUBLIC rights, or privileges under the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government. Includes NO private property or people.

The term “constitutional” when used as a prefix to any other term, means that the term it precedes pertains only to land, property, rights, or privileges under the exclusive jurisdiction of a state of the Union and not within the civil or criminal jurisdiction of the national government.

The word "frivolous" as used by the government or on other websites in referring to this website shall mean "correct" and "truthful". Any attempts to call anything on this website incorrect or untruthful must be accompanied by authoritative, court-admissible evidence to support such a conclusion or shall be presumed by the reader to be untrustworthy and untruthful. All such evidence MUST derive EXCLUSIVELY from the consensual civil domicile of the defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b). Parties subject to this agreement stipulate that any violation of this rule is a malicious prosecution and obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1589(a)(3). See the following link for details on domicile:

Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent, Form #05.002
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Domicile.pdf

The term "federal income tax", in the context of this website, means the revenue scheme described in Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code as applied specifically and only to human beings who are not statutory "persons" or "individuals" under federal law and shall NOT refer to businesses or artificial entities. This website does NOT concern itself with businesses or corporations or artificial entities of any description.

The word "protection" includes only CRIMINAL, constitutional, and common law protection. It excludes every type of government activity, franchise, or program that requires a predicate civil status (Form #13.008) to enforce, such as "citizen", "resident", "taxpayer", "spouse", Social Security beneficiary, etc. Every attempt to impose, acquire, or enforce a civil status or to enforce duties upon a civil status NOT related to voting or jury service constitutes the following:

1. An INJURY and an INJUSTICE (Form #05.050).
2. Identity Theft (Form #05.046).

7 Legal limitations upon the creation, exercise, and termination of public offices

Adapted from: Path to Freedom, Form #09.015, Section 4.1; SOURCE: https://sedm.org/Forms/09-Procs/PathToFreedom.pdf.
7.1 General constraints

1. The only group of people the government can write CIVIL statutory codes or franchises for are its own agents, officers, and employees for the most part and NOT private people. The designer of our three branch system of government, Charles de Montesquieu, calls this “political law” in his famous work *The Spirit of Laws*. The courts call the audience for these statutes “state actors”.

“A private person cannot make constitutions or laws, nor can he with authority construe them, nor can he administer or execute them.”

[United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 1 S.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290 (1883)]

“All the powers of the government [including ALL of its civil enforcement powers against the public] must be carried into operation by individual agency, either through the medium of public officers, or contracts made with [private] individuals.”


“The power to "legislate generally upon" life, liberty, and property, as opposed to the "power to provide modes of redress" against offensive state action, was "repugnant" to the Constitution. Id., at 15. See also United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1876); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903). Although the specific holdings of these early cases might have been superseded or modified, see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 274 (1966), their treatment of Congress’ §5 power as corrective or preventive, not definitional, has not been questioned.”

[City of Boerne v. Flores, Archbishop of San Antonio, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)]

1.1. President Obama admitted in his Farewell Address that a “citizen” is a public office!

President Obama Admits in His Farewell Address that “citizen” is a public office. Exhibit #01.018
https://youtu.be/XjVyEZU0mlc

1.2. The U.S. Supreme Court even identified a statutory “citizen” as an AGENT of government! If you don’t want to be an agent of government and therefore an agent of what the Bible calls “The Beast” in Revelation 19:19, you can’t have a domicile within the civil statutory jurisdiction of the government. By the way, if the government has any more power than a single human being, it has supernatural or superior powers and is like a God, in which case you as a statutory “citizen” become an idolater who is violating the First Commandment not to serve other Gods.

"Under our own systems of polity, the term 'citizen', implying the same or similar relations to the government and to society which appertain to the term, 'subject' in England, is familiar to all. Under either system, the term used is designed to apply to man in his individual character and to his natural capacities -- to a being or agent of government, also called a PUBLIC OFFICER! possessing social and political rights and sustaining social, political, and moral obligations. It is in this acceptance only, therefore, that the term 'citizen', in the article of the Constitution, can be received and understood. When distributing the judicial power, that article extends it to controversies between 'citizens' of different states. This must mean the natural physical beings composing those separate communities, and can by no violence of interpretation be made to signify artificial, incorporeal, theoretical, and invisible creations. A corporation, therefore, being not a natural person, but a mere creature of the mind, invisible and intangible, cannot be a citizen of a state, or of the United States, and cannot fall within the terms or the power of the above mentioned article, and can therefore neither plead nor be impleaded in the courts of the United States.”

[Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Company, 55 U.S. 80, 99 (1852) from dissenting opinion by Justice Daniel]

1.3. The reason why governments cannot regulate or tax PRIVATE rights or anyone other than their own PUBLIC officers or agents is that they are equal to everyone else. If you can’t regulate your neighbor without his or her consent, then they can’t regulate you without YOUR express consent. Therefore you are legislatively foreign and a nonresident to the government public office and civil statutory law franchise unless and until you EXPRESSLY consent to it. Without such consent, the Declaration of Independence says any attempt to enforce civil laws against non-consenting parties is UNJUST. That consent must at least come by selecting a domicile within that government AND accepting the OFFICE implemented within the civil statute called “person”.

1.4. Charles de Montesquieu, the designer of our three branch system of government stated that the POLITICAL law should not EVER be mingled with the CIVIL law or else tyranny will result. By “civil law” the only thing he can mean is what we call today the “common law”. We have violated that requirement and corrupted our three branch system of government by turning the CIVIL law into the POLITICAL law and using it to regulate EVERY aspect of our behavior unjustly and in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Spirit of Laws, Book XXVI, Section 15

15. That we should not regulate by the Principles of political law those Things which depend on the Principles of civil Law.

As men have given up their natural independence to live under political laws, they have given up the natural community of goods to live under civil laws.

By the first, they acquired [PUBLIC] liberty; by the second, [PRIVATE] property. We should not decide by the laws of [PUBLIC] liberty, which, as we have already said, is only the government of the community, what ought to be decided by the laws concerning [PRIVATE] property. It is a paralogism to say that the good of the individual should give way to that of the public; this can never take place, except when the government of the community, or, in other words, the liberty of the subject is concerned; this does not affect such cases as relate to private property, because the public good consists in every one’s having his property, which was given him by the civil laws, invariably preserved.

Cicero maintains that the Agrarian laws were unjust; because the community was established with no other view than that every one might be able to preserve his property.

Let us, therefore, lay down a certain maxim, that whenever the public good happens to be the matter in question, it is not for the advantage of the public to deprive an individual of his property, or even to retrench the least part of it by a law, or a political regulation. In this case we should follow the rigour of the civil law, which is the Palladium of [PRIVATE] property.

Thus when the public has occasion for the estate of an individual, it ought never to act by the rigour of political law; it is here that the civil law ought to triumph, which, with the eyes of a mother, regards every individual as the whole community.

If the political magistrate would erect a public edifice, or make a new road, he must indemnify those who are injured by it; the public is in this respect like an individual who treats with an individual. It is fully enough that it can oblige a citizen to sell his inheritance, and that it can strip him of this great privilege which he holds from the civil law, the not being forced to alienate his possessions.

After the nations which subverted the Roman empire had abused their very conquests, the spirit of liberty called them back to that of equity. They exercised the most barbarous laws with moderation: and if any one should doubt the truth of this, he need only read Beaumanoir’s admirable work on jurisprudence, written in the twelfth century.

They mended the highways in his time as we do at present. He says, that when a highway could not be repaired, they made a new one as near the old as possible; but indemnified the proprietors at the expense of those who reaped any advantage from the road.62 They determined at that time by the civil law; in our days, we determine by the law of politics.


1.5. As long as you are acting under the authority or compulsion of any civil statute, you are regarded as a “state actor” and officer of the government under the State Action Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court. Therefore EVERYONE who either claims the “benefit” of a CIVIL statute or acts under the alleged authority of any civil statute is a “state actor” and therefore “state officer”, even if they have no legitimate authority to do so. The courts would say they are acting “under the color of law” and therefore are a “state actor”. The “private person” mentioned below who is under state compulsion of a statute in fact is NOT a “private person” and is therefore a public officer EXACTLY because of the legal compulsion they speak of.

For petitioner to recover under the substantive count of her complaint, she must show a deprivation of a right guaranteed to her by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the ‘action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States,’ Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 842, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948), we must decide, for purposes of this case, the following ‘state action’ issue: Is there sufficient state action to prove a violation of petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights if she shows that Kress refused her service because of a state-enforced custom compelling segregation of the races in Hattiesburg restaurants?

In analyzing this problem, it is useful to state two polar propositions, each of which is easily identified and resolved. On the one hand, the Fourteenth Amendment plainly prohibits a State itself from discriminating because of race. On the other hand, § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid a private party, not acting against a backdrop of state compulsion or involvement, to discriminate on the basis of race in his personal affairs as an expression of his own personal predilections. As was said in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra,
§ 1 of (t)hat Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.
334 U.S., at 13, 68 S.Ct., at 842.

At what point between these two extremes a State’s involvement in the refusal becomes sufficient to make the private refusal to serve a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is far from clear under our case law. If a State had a law requiring a private person to refuse service because of race, it is clear beyond dispute that the law would violate the Fourteenth Amendment and could be declared invalid and enjoined from enforcement. Nor can a State enforce such a law requiring discrimination through either convictions of proprietors who refuse to discriminate, or trespass prosecutions of patrons who, after being denied service pursuant to such a law, refuse to honor a request to leave the premises.

The question most relevant for this case, however, is a slightly different one. It is whether the decision of an owner of a restaurant to discriminate on the basis of race under the compulsion of state law offends the Fourteenth Amendment. Although this Court has not explicitly decided the Fourteenth Amendment state action issue implicit in this question, underlying the Court’s decisions in the sit-in cases is the notion that a State is responsible for the discriminatory act of a private party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act. As the Court said in Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248, 83 S.Ct. 1119, 1121 (1963): ‘When the State has commanded a particular result, it has saved to itself the power to determine that result and thereby ‘to a significant extent’ has ‘become involved’ in it.’ Moreover, there is much support in lower court opinions for the conclusion that discriminatory acts by private parties done under the compulsion of state law offend the Fourteenth Amendment. In Baldwin v. Morgan, supra, the Fifth Circuit held that (the very act of posting and maintaining separate (waiting room) facilities when done by the (railroad) Terminal as commanded by these state orders is action by the State.’ The Court then went on to say: ‘As we have pointed out above the State may not use race or color as the basis for distinction. It may not do so by direct action or through the medium of others who are under State compulsion to do so.’ Id., 287 F.2d at 755—756. (emphasis added). We think the same principle governs here.

For state action purposes it makes no difference of course whether the racially discriminatory act by the private party is compelled by a statutory provision or by a custom having the force of law—in either case it is the State that has commanded the result by its law. Without deciding whether less substantial involvement of a State might satisfy the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, we conclude that petitioner would show an abridgement of her equal protection right, if she proves that Kress refused her service because of a state-enforced custom of segregating the races in public restaurants. [Adickes v. Kress Company, 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d. 142 (1970)]

1.6. You can be an “agent” of the government through contract, but that doesn’t automatically MAKE you a “public officer”. Public officers cannot be supervised but agents can. The definition of “employee” found in 5 U.S.C. §2105(a) confirms that all STATUTORY “employees” are both “individuals” AND “officers” and therefore “public officers”. Those who are NOT “officers” cannot be statutory “employees” or even STATUTORY “individuals”.

1.7. Without public office LAWFULLY and CONSENSUALLY filled and exercised ONLY where expressly authorized by 4 U.S.C. §72, the federal civil statutes cannot lawfully reach you because of the separation of powers doctrine. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) requires that the legal “person” against whom civil enforcement can lawfully be instituted MUST have a domicile on federal territory. Therefore one of the following two conditions must exist before the federal civil law can lawfully reach YOU as a human being:

1.7.1. YOU have a physical domicile on federal territory OR
1.7.2. You represent a public office that is domiciled on federal territory.

1.8. Writing or enforcing the civil statutory codes against any other non-consenting party violates government’s fiduciary duty to protect PRIVATE rights and constitutes unconstitutional eminent domain without compensation. See: Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

2. The Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery EVERYWHERE, including on federal territory. Therefore slavery is a crime both in states of the Union and on federal territory.

"...the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases 12 provides authoritative guidance on the territorial scope of the term "the United States" in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Insular Cases were a series of Supreme Court decisions that addressed challenges to duties on goods transported from Puerto Rico to the continental United States. Puerto Rico, like the Philippines, had been recently ceded to the United States. The Court considered the territorial scope of the term "the United States" in the Constitution and held that this term as used in the uniformity clause of the Constitution was territorially limited to the states of the Union. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 ("[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." (emphasis added)); see

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251, 21 S.Ct. 770, 773, 45 L.Ed. 1088 (1901) ("[I]t can nowhere be inferred that the territories were considered a part of the United States. The Constitution was created by the people of the United States, as a union of States, to be governed solely by representatives of the States; ... In short, the Constitution deals with States, their people, and their representatives."); Rabang, 35 F.3d at 1452. Puerto Rico was merely a territory "appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution." Downes, 182 U.S. at 287, 21 S.Ct. at 787.

The Court's conclusion in Downes was derived in part by analyzing the territorial scope of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude "within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added). The Fourteenth Amendment states that persons "born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). The disjunctive "or" in the Thirteenth Amendment demonstrates that "there may be places within the jurisdiction of the United States that are not part of the Union" to which the Thirteenth Amendment would apply. Downes, 182 U.S. at 251, 21 S.Ct. at 773. Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, however, is "not extended to persons born in any place 'subject to the United States' jurisdiction," but is limited to persons born or naturalized in the states of the Union. Downes, 182 U.S. at 251, 21 S.Ct. at 773 (emphasis added); see also id. at 263, 21 S.Ct. at 777 ("[In dealing with foreign sovereignties, the term 'United States' has a broader meaning than when used in the Constitution, and includes all territories subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal government, wherever located."). 14

[Valmonte v. I.N.S., 136 F.3d. 914 (C.A. 2, 1998)]

"That it does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, is too clear for argument. Slavery implies involuntary servitude—a state of bondage; the ownership of mankind as a chattel, or at least the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property, and services in their entirety. This amendment was said in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, to have been intended primarily to abolish slavery, as it had been previously known in this country, and that it equally forbade Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie trade, when they amounted to slavery or involuntary servitude and that the use of the word 'servitude' was intended to prohibit the use of all forms of involuntary slavery, of whatever class or name."

[Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896)]

"Other authorities to the same effect might be cited. It is not open to doubt that Congress may enforce the Thirteenth Amendment by direct legislation, punishing the holding of a person in slavery or in involuntary servitude except as a punishment for a crime. In the exercise of that power Congress has enacted these sections denouncing peonage, and punishing one who holds another in that condition of involuntary servitude. This legislation is not limited to the territories or other parts of the strictly national domain, but is operative in the states and wherever the sovereignty of the United States extends. We entertain no doubt of the validity of this legislation, or of its applicability to the case of any person holding another in a state of peonage, and this whether there be municipal ordinance or state law sanctioning such holding. It operates directly on every citizen of the Republic, wherever his residence may be."

[Chyatt v. U.S., 197 U.S. 207 (1905)]

2.1. Consequently, the government is without authority to write any civil statute that imposes ANY kind of duty or obligation against you other than simply to provide remedy AFTER injuring the equal rights of others. That would be a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude.

"The doctrine that each one must so use his own as not to injure his neighbor — sic utere tuo ut alienum non lupas — is the rule by which every member of society must possess and enjoy his property, and all legislation essential to secure this common and equal enjoyment is a legitimate exercise of State authority. Except in cases where property may be destroyed to arrest a conflagration or the ravages of pestilence, or be taken under the pressure of an immediate and overwhelming necessity to prevent a public calamity, the power of the State over the property of the citizen does not extend beyond such limits."

[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) ]

14 Congress, under the Act of February 21, 1871, ch. 62, § 34, 16 Stat. 419, 426, expressly extended the Constitution and federal laws to the District of Columbia. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 261, 21 S.Ct. at 777 (stating that the "mere cession of the District of Columbia" from portions of Virginia and Maryland did not "take [the District of Columbia] out of the United States or from under the aegis of the Constitution.").

"Love does no harm to a neighbor; therefore love is the fulfillment of the ONLY requirement off the law [which is to avoid hurting your neighbor and thereby love him]."

[Romans 13:9-10, Bible, NKJV]
“Do not strive with a man without cause, if he has done you no harm.”
[Prov. 3:30, Bible, NKJV]

“With all [our] blessings, what more is necessary to make us a happy and a prosperous people? Still one thing more, fellow citizens—a wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government, and this is necessary to close the circle of our felicities.”
[Thomas Jefferson: 1st Inaugural, 1801. ME 3:320]

2.2. If someone is trying to abuse the authority of civil statutes to impose a mandatory duty upon you, then the only kind of law they can be enforcing is private or contract law to which you had to expressly consent at some point. The consent you had to give was your permission to assume the duties of a public office, because everyone who exercises the authority of the civil law is regarded as a “state actor” under the State Action Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court. Your reaction should always be to insist that they produce evidence of your consent in writing and prove that you were physically in a place outside of constitutional states where you could lawfully alienate an otherwise INALIENABLE right. This is similar to what the courts do in the case of the government, where they can’t be sued or compelled to do anything without you producing an express waiver of sovereign immunity by THEM. They got that authority and that sovereignty from you(!), because it was delegated to them by We The People, so you must ALSO have sovereign immunity. Your job as a vigilant American who cares about his freedom and rights is then to discover by what lawful mechanism you waived that sovereign immunity and the following document is very helpful in determining that mechanism:

Requirement for Consent, Form #05.003
http://sedm.org_Forms/FormIndex.htm

3. A slave is someone who satisfies any one or more of the following:
3.1. With NO PRIVATE rights or PRIVATE property.
3.2. Who cannot exercise the most basic element of their ownership of their property, which is the right to EXCLUDE anyone and everyone, including the GOVERNMENT, from using or benefitting from the use of their PRIVATE property.
3.3. Who cannot ABSOLUTELY own PRIVATE PROPERTY. Instead, ownership is:
3.3.1. Held exclusively by the government or
3.3.2. Is QUALIFIED ownership in which the REAL owner is the government and the party holding title has merely equitable interest in the fruits.
3.4. Who is compelled to satisfy the obligations of a public office against his/her will. Such offices include the following statutory civil statuses and others:
3.4.1. “citizen” (under civil statutory law).
3.4.2. “resident” (under the domicile civil protection franchise).
3.4.3. “taxpayer” (under the income tax franchise).
3.4.4. “driver” (under the vehicle code franchise).
3.4.5. “spouse” (under the family code franchise), etc.
3.5. Who is compelled to obey the civil statutory laws without evidence on the record that they EXPRESSLY consented to:
3.5.1. A civil domicile within the EXCLUSIVE jurisdiction of said government.
3.5.2. The office of “citizen” and were lawfully elected or appointed to that office with the proper oath.
3.6. Who can be unilaterally “elected” into public office as a PRIVATE human through a false third party information return, such as IRS Forms W-2, 1042-S, or 1099.
3.7. Who is not allowed to challenge third party information returns that elect them into the “public office” called “taxpayer”.
3.8. Who can be connected with any statutory status in civil franchises or civil law to which public rights attach without their EXPRESS WRITTEN consent. This is a Fifth Amendment taking without compensation, a violation of the right to contract and associate, and a conversion of PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property.
3.9. Who is SOMEONE ELSE’S PROPERTY. That property is called a “person”, “taxpayer” (under the tax code), “driver”, “spouse” (under the family code). You volunteered to become someone else’s property by invoking these statuses, which are government property.
3.10. Who is compelled to economic or contractual servitude to anyone else, including a government. All franchises are contracts. Therefore, compelled participation is compelled contracting.
3.11. Whose ownership of property was converted from ABSOLUTE to QUALIFIED without their EXPRESS written and informed consent.

3.12. Who is not allowed to EXCLUDE government from benefitting from or taxing property held as ABSOLUTE title.

7.2 Limitations upon the CREATION of public offices

1. The creation of public offices is described in 5 U.S.C. §2105.

2. 5 U.S.C. §2105 indicates that the WAY one becomes a statutory “individual” is by exercising a public office.

5 U.S. Code § 2105.Employee

(a) For the purpose of this title, “employee”, except as otherwise provided by this section or when specifically modified, means an officer and an individual who is—

(I) appointed in the civil service by one of the following acting in an official capacity—

(A) the President;

(B) a Member or Members of Congress, or the Congress;

(C) a member of a uniformed service;

(D) an individual who is an employee under this section;

(E) the head of a Government controlled corporation; or

(F) an adjutant general designated by the Secretary concerned under section 709(c) of title 32;

(2) engaged in the performance of a Federal function under authority of law or an Executive act; and

(3) subject to the supervision of an individual named by paragraph (1) of this subsection while engaged in the performance of the duties of his position.

WITHOUT being an officer of the government, one cannot BE a statutory “individual”, because the ability to control or regulate exclusively private conduct is repugnant to the constitution, as held earlier.

3. It is a violation of due process of law to PRESUME that statutory “individuals” include ALL private humans, because:

3.1. All presumptions are a violation of due process of law for those protected by the constitution.

3.2. Doing so would outlaw private property and private rights and subject them to government control and/or shared ownership.

3.3. Doing so removes the protections of the common law:

“The words “privileges” and “immunities,” like the greater part of the legal phraseology of this country, have been carried over from the law of Great Britain, and recur constantly either as such or in equivalent expressions from the time of Magna Charta. For all practical purposes they are synonymous in meaning, and originally signified a peculiar right or private law conceded to particular persons or places whereby a certain individual or class of individuals was exempted from the rigor of the common law. Privilege or immunity is conferred upon any person when he is invested with a legal claim to the exercise of special or peculiar rights, authorizing him to enjoy some particular advantage or exemption.”

[The Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship, Roger Howell, PhD, 1918, pp. 9-10; SOURCE: http://famguardian.org/Publications/ThePrivAndImmOfStateCit/The_privileges_and_immunities_of_state_c.pdf]

3.4. Doing so would remove the protections of the constitution.

The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:

[...]


[Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936)]

The restrictions that the Constitution places upon the government in its capacity as lawmaker, i.e., as the regulator of private conduct, are not the same as the restrictions that it places upon the government in its capacity as employer. We have recognized this in many contexts, with respect to many different constitutional guarantees. Private citizens perhaps cannot be prevented from wearing long hair, but policemen can. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976). Private citizens cannot have their property searched without probable cause, but in many circumstances government employees can. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (plurality opinion); id., at 732 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Private citizens cannot be punished for refusing to provide the government information that may incriminate them, but government employees can be dismissed when the incriminating information that they refuse to provide relates to the performance of their job. Gardner v. Broderick, 497 U.S. 62, 95. 392 U.S. 273, 277-278 (1968). With regard to freedom of speech in particular: Private citizens cannot be punished for speech of merely private concern, but government employees can be fired for that reason. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). Private citizens cannot be punished for partisan political activity, but federal and state employees can be dismissed and otherwise punished for that reason. Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947); Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616-617 (1973)."


4. You are not a public officer if you were not lawfully “elected or appointed”. 5 U.S.C. §2105 says so.
5. You cannot unilaterally “elect” yourself into public office.
   5.1. The state must ALSO give EXPRESS evidence of its consent to accept you as said public officer.
5.2. You cannot “elect” yourself into office by filling out any government form or tax form, for instance.
7. You are not a public officer if you never took an oath. 5 U.S.C. §3331.
8. You are not a public officer if you gave your consent to become one but the government didn’t administer an oath and issue you an appointment document. See 5 U.S.C. §3331.
9. Government CANNOT use government-issued ID such as driver licenses or passports as a method to:
   9.1. CREATE any new public offices. . .OR
   9.2. Destroy private rights.

Either one of the above outcomes violates the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court. See: Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030, Section 28.2

https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

7.3 Limitations upon the EXERCISE of public offices

1. All public offices MUST be exercised ONLY where Congress EXPRESSLY authorizes, per 4 U.S.C. §72. If they did not EXPRESSLY authorize the exercise of the office outside of the District of Columbia by statute, then the office is a de facto office that is UNLAWFULLY exercised.
2. The ONLY sufficient legal evidence of the existence of a public office is an Oath AND an Appointment document. Without such legal proof, the actor is presumed to be EXCLUSIVELY private. See 5 U.S.C. Subchapter 1 and 5 U.S.C. §3331.
3. You can be a contractor or agent of the government WITHOUT being a public officer. The only duties that may be enforced against you in that condition are those EXPRESSLY identified in the contract itself. Any attempt to ADD to
those duties using franchise marks: such as Social Security Numbers or Taxpayer Identification Numbers within a Constitutional state of the Union or outside of federal territory is a usurpation that unlawfully creates or enforces a NEW public office or at least the DUTIES of such office. It is criminal identity theft as documented in: Government Identity Theft, Form #05.046 https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

4. You cannot serve in a public office WITHOUT knowing you are doing so. Any attempt to enforce the duties of a public office against someone who was never properly notified of the lawful creation of the office is FRAUD.

5. Those exercising public offices:

1. Are removed from the protections of the common law:

“...The words “privileges” and “immunities,” like the greater part of the legal phraseology of this country, have been carried over from the law of Great Britain, and recur constantly either as such or in equivalent expressions from the time of Magna Charta. For all practical purposes they are synonymous in meaning, and originally signified a peculiar right or private law conceded to particular persons or places whereby a certain individual or class of individuals was exempted from the rigor of the common law. Privilege or immunity is conferred upon any person when he is invested with a legal claim to the exercise of special or peculiar rights, authorizing him to enjoy some particular advantage or exemption.” [The Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship, Roger Howell, PhD, 1918, pp. 9-10; SOURCE: http://famguardian.org/Publications/ThePrivAndImmOfStateCit/The_privileges_and_immunities_of_state_c.pdf]

5.2. Are removed from the protections of the constitution.

The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:

[...]


[Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 646 (1936)]

The restrictions that the Constitution places upon the government in its capacity as lawmaker, i.e., as the regulator of private conduct, are not the same as the restrictions that it places upon the government in its capacity as employer. We have recognized this in many contexts, with respect to many different constitutional guarantees. Private citizens perhaps cannot be prevented from wearing long hair, but policemen can. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976). Private citizens cannot have their property searched without probable cause, but in many circumstances government employees can. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (plurality opinion); id., at 732 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Private citizens cannot be punished for refusing to provide the government information that may incriminate them, but government employees can be dismissed when the incriminating information that they refuse to provide relates to the performance of their job. Gardner v. Broderick, [497 U.S. 62, 95] 392 U.S. 273, 277-278 (1968). With regard to freedom of speech in particular: Private citizens cannot be punished for speech of merely private concern, but government employees can be fired for that reason. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). Private citizens cannot be punished for partisan political activity, but federal and state employees can be dismissed and otherwise punished for that reason. Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947); Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616 -617 (1973).” [Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990)]

15 See the following for details on “franchise marks”: About SSNs and TINs on Government Forms and Correspondence, Form #05.012, Section 2; https://sedm.org/Forms/05_MemFml.pdf/AboutSSNsAndTINS.pdf;
6. Parties indicated as occupying a public office include jurors.

7. If you serve in a public office without satisfying the requirements of the previous section then:

7.1. You become a de facto officer under the De Facto Officer Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court. See:

7.2. You are committing the crime of impersonating a public office. 18 U.S.C. §912.

8. If you were the target of duress in occupying or accepting the public office, then the party instituting the duress is engaging in human trafficking so long as they continue to enforce the duties of the office upon you without your consent. 18 U.S.C. Chapter 77. Such duress includes but is not limited to financial or commercial incentives or enticements of any kind.

9. You must be INFORMED of your working hours as a public officer:

9.1. You cannot be a public officer 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

9.2. When you are NOT officially on duty, the duties of the office cannot be enforced.

9.3. If you must represent a public office 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and the government REFUSES to recognize your right to be either off duty or to act in an EXCLUSIVELY private capacity, then you are a SLAVE and chattel of the national government.

7.4 Limitations upon the TERMINATION of public offices

1. You must be able to resign from the office for it to be lawful.

2. A human being who CANNOT resign is a SLAVE in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.

3. A human being who is NEVER treated as OFF DUTY, and therefore EXCLUSIVELY private is a SLAVE in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.

7.5 “Trade or business” and Public office within the Internal Revenue Code

The subject of exactly what constitutes a “public office” within the meaning described in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26) is not defined in any IRS publication we could find. The reason is quite clear: the “trade or business” scam is the Achilles heel of the IRS fraud and both the IRS and the Courts are loath to even talk about it because there is nothing they can defend themselves with other than unsubstantiated presumption created by the abuse of the word “includes” and certain key “words of art”. In the face of such overwhelming evidence of their own illegal and criminal mis-enforcement of the tax codes, silence or omission in either admitting it or prosecuting it can only be characterized as FRAUD on a massive scale, in fact:

"Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading."

[U.S. v. Pruuden, 424 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1970)]

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"Silence can be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. . . We cannot condone this shocking behavior by the IRS. Our revenue system is based on the good faith of the taxpayer and the taxpayers should be able to expect the same from the government in its enforcement and collection activities."

[U.S. v. Tweel, 530 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977)]

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"Silence is a species of conduct, and constitutes an implied representation of the existence of the state of facts in question, and the estoppel is accordingly a species of estoppel by misrepresentation. When silence is of such a character and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud upon the other party to permit the party

16 Source: Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030, Section 23.4.3; https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Franchises.pdf. 

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who has kept silent to deny what his silence has induced the other to believe and act upon, it will operate as an estoppel.”

[Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932 (1906)]

The “duty” the courts are talking about above is the fiduciary duty of all those serving in public offices in the government, and that fiduciary duty was created by the oath of office they took before they entered the office. Therefore, those who want to know how they could lawfully be classified as a “public officer” will have to answer that question completely on their own, which is what we will attempt to do in this section.

We begin our search with a definition of “public office” from Black’s Dictionary:

"Public office. The right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government for the benefit of the public. Walker v. Rich, 79 Cal.App. 139, 249 P. 56, 58. An agency for the state, the duties of which involve in their performance the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power, either great or small. Yaselli v. Goff, C.C.A., 12 F.2d. 396, 403, 56 A.L.R. 1239; Lacey v. State, 13 Ala.App. 212, 68 So. 706, 710; Curtin v. State, 61 Cal.App. 377, 214 P. 1030, 1035; Shelmadine v. City of Elkhart, 75 Ind.App. 493, 129 N.E. 878. State ex rel. Colorado River Commission v. Frohmiller, 46 Ariz. 413, 52 P.2d. 483, 486. Where, by virtue of law, a person is clothed, not as an incidental or transient authority, but for such time as de- notes duration and continuance, with Independent power to control the property of the public, or with public functions exercised in the supposed interest of the people, the service to be compensated by a stated yearly salary, and the occupant having a designation or title, the position so created is a public office. State v. Brennan, 49 Ohio.St. 33, 29 N.E. 593."


Black’s Law Dictionary Sixth Edition further clarifies the meaning of a “public office” below:

"Essential characteristics of a 'public office' are:
(1) Authority conferred by law,
(2) Fixed tenure of office, and
(3) Power to exercise some of the sovereign functions of government.

Key element of such test is that "officer is carrying out a sovereign function. Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d. 871, 875. Essential elements to establish public position as 'public office' are:
- Position must be created by Constitution, legislature, or through authority conferred by legislature.
- Portion of sovereign power of government must be delegated to position,
- Duties and powers must be defined, directly or implied, by legislature or through legislative authority.
- Duties must be performed independently without control of superior power other than law, and
- Position must have some permanency." [Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1230]

American Jurisprudence Legal Encyclopedia further clarifies what a “public office” is as follows:

"As expressed otherwise, the powers delegated to a public officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officer. Furthermore, the view has been expressed that all public officers, within whatever branch and whatever level of government, and whatever be their private vocations, are trustees of the people, and accordingly labor under every disability and prohibition imposed by law upon trustees relative to the making of personal financial gain from a discharge of their trusts. That is, a public officer occupies a fiduciary relationship to the political entity on whose behalf he or she serves, and owes a fiduciary duty to the public. It has been said that the fiduciary responsibilities of a public officer cannot be less than those of a private individual.

[20] United States v. Holzer (CA7 Ill) 816 F.2d. 304 and vacated, remanded on other grounds 484 U.S. 807, 98 L.Ed.2d. 18, 108 S.Ct. 53, on remand (CA7 Ill) 840 F.2d. 1343, cert den 486 U.S. 1035, 100 L.Ed.2d. 608, 108 S.Ct. 2022 and (criticized on other grounds by United States v. Osser (CA3 Pa) 864 F.2d. 1056) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Little (CA3 Miss) 889 F.2d. 1367) and (among conflicting authorities on other grounds noted in United States v. Boylan (CA1 Mass), 898 F.2d. 230, 29 Fed.Rules.Evid.Serv. 1223).

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Based on the foregoing, one cannot be a “public officer” if:

1. There is not a statute or constitutional authority that specifically creates the office. All “public offices” can only be created through legislative authority.
2. Their duties are not specifically and exactly enumerated in some Act of Congress.
3. They have a boss or immediate supervisor. All duties must be performed INDEPENDENTLY.
4. They have anyone but the law and the courts to immediately supervise their activities.
5. They are serving as a “public officer” in a location NOT specifically authorized by the law. The law must create the office and specify exactly where it is to be exercised. 4 U.S.C. §72 says ALL public offices of the federal and national government MUST be exercised ONLY in the District of Columbia and not elsewhere, except as expressly provided by law.
6. Their position does not carry with it some kind of fiduciary duty to the “public” which in turn is documented in and enforced by enacted law itself.
7. The beneficiary of their fiduciary duty is other than the “public”. Public service is a public trust, and the beneficiary of the trust is the public at large and not any one specific individual or group of individuals. See 5 C.F.R. §2635.101(b) and Executive Order 12731.

All public officers must take an oath. The oath, in fact, is what creates the fiduciary duty that attaches to the office. This is confirmed by the definition of “public official” in Black’s Law Dictionary:

A person who, upon being issued a commission, taking required oath, enters upon, for a fixed tenure, a position called an office where he or she exercises in his or her own right some of the attributes of sovereign he or she serves for benefit of public. Macy v. Heverin, 44 Md.App. 358, 408 A.2d. 1067, 1069. The holder of a public office though not all persons in public employment are public officials, because public official’s position requires the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power, whether great or small. Town of Arlington v. Bd. of Conciliation and Arbitration, Mass., 352 N.E.2d. 914.


The oath for United States federal and state officials was prescribed in the very first enactment of Congress on March 4, 1789 as follows:

Statutes At Large, March 4, 1789
1 Stat. 23-24

SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and [Home of] Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the oath or affirmation required by the sixth article of the Constitution of the United States, shall be administered in the form following, to wit: “I, A. B. do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States.” The said oath or affirmation shall be administered within three days after the passing of this act, by any one member of the Senate, to the President of the Senate, and by him to all the members and to the secretary; and by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to all the members who have not taken a similar oath, by virtue of a particular resolution of the said House, and to the clerk; and in case of the absence of any member from the service of either House, at the time prescribed for taking the said oath or affirmation, the same shall be administered to such member, when he shall appear to take his seat.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That at the first session of Congress after every general election of Representatives, the oath or affirmation aforesaid, shall be administered by any one member of the House of Representatives to the Speaker; and by him to all the members present, and to the clerk, previous to entering on any other business; and to the members who shall afterwards appear, previous to taking their seats. The President of the Senate for the time being, shall also administer the said oath or affirmation to each Senator who shall hereafter be elected, previous to his taking his seat: and in any future case of a President of the Senate, who shall not have taken the said oath or affirmation, the same shall be administered to him by any one of the members of the Senate.

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the members of the several State legislatures, at the next sessions of the said legislatures, respectively, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States, who have been heretofore chosen or appointed, or who shall be chosen or appointed before the first day of August next, and who shall then be in office, shall, within one month thereafter, take the same oath or affirmation, except where they shall have taken it before; which may be administered by any person authorized by the law of the State, in which such office shall be held, to administer oaths. And

the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States, who shall be chosen or appointed after the said first day of August, shall, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, take the foregoing oath or affirmation, which shall be administered by the person or persons, who by the law of the State shall be authorized to administer the oath of office; and the person or persons so administering the oath hereby required to be taken, shall cause a re- cord or certificate thereof to be made, in the same manner, as, by the law of the State, he or they shall be directed to record or certify the oath of office.

SEC. 4. And he it further enacted, That all officers appointed, or hereafter to be appointed under the authority of the United States, shall, before they act in their respective offices, take the same oath or affirmation, which shall be administered by the person or persons who shall be authorized by law to administer to such officers their respective oaths of office; and such officers shall incur the same penalties in case of failure, as shall be imposed by law in case of failure in taking their respective oaths of office.

SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That the secretary of the Senate, and the clerk of the House of Representatives, for the time being, shall, at the time of taking the oath or affirmation aforesaid, each take an oath or affirmation in the words following, to wit: “I, A. B. secretary of the Senate, or clerk of the House of Representatives (as the case may be) of the United States of America, do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will truly and faithfully discharge the duties of my said office, to the best of my knowledge and abilities.”

Based on the above, the following persons within the government are “public officers”:

1. Federal Officers:
   1.1. The President of the United States.
   1.2. Members of the House of Representatives.
   1.3. Members of the Senate.
   1.4. All appointed by the President of the United States.
   1.5. The secretary of the Senate.
   1.6. The clerk of the House of Representatives.
   1.7. All district, circuit, and supreme court justices.

2. State Officers:
   2.1. The governor of the state.
   2.2. Members of the House of Representatives.
   2.3. Members of the Senate.
   2.4. All district, circuit, and supreme court justices of the state.

At the federal level, all those engaged in the above “public offices” are statutorily identified in 26 U.S.C. §2105. Consistent with this section, what most people would regard as ordinary common law employees are not included in the definition. Note the phrase “an officer AND an individual”:

(TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart A > CHAPTER 21 > §2105) Employee

(a) For the purpose of this title, “employee”, except as otherwise provided by this section or when specifically modified, means an officer and an individual who is—

(1) appointed in the civil service by one of the following acting in an official capacity—

(A) the President;
(B) a Member or Members of Congress, or the Congress;
(C) a member of a uniformed service;
(D) an individual who is an employee under this section;
(E) the head of a Government controlled corporation; or
(F) an adjutant general designated by the Secretary concerned under section 709 (c) of title 32;

(2) engaged in the performance of a Federal function under authority of law or an Executive act; and
(3) subject to the supervision of an individual named by paragraph (1) of this subsection while engaged in the performance of the duties of his position.

Within the military, only commissioned officers are “public officers”. Enlisted or NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers) are not.

Those holding Federal or State public office, county or municipal office, under the Legislative, Executive or Judicial branch, including Court Officials, Judges, Prosecutors, Law Enforcement Department employees, Officers of the Court, and etc.,
before entering into these public offices, are required by the U.S. Constitution and statutory law to comply with 5 U.S.C. §3331, “Oath of office.” State Officials are also required to meet this same obligation, according to State Constitutions and State statutory law.


Under Title 22 U.S.C., Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Section §611, a Public Official is considered a foreign agent. In order to hold public office, the candidate must file a true and complete registration statement with the State Attorney General as a foreign principle.

The Oath of Office requires the public officials in his/her foreign state capacity to uphold the constitutional form of government or face consequences, according to 10 U.S.C. §333, “Interference with State and Federal law”

The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it—

(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or

(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.

In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.

Willful refusal action while serving in official capacity violates 18 U.S.C. §1918, “Disloyalty and asserting the right to strike against the Government”

Whoever violates the provision of 7311 of title 5 that an individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia if he—

(1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

(2) is a member of an organization that he knows advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year and a day, or both.

AND violates 18 U.S.C. §1346:

"For the purposes of this chapter, the term "scheme or artifice to defraud" includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.

The “public offices” described in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26) within the definition of “trade or business” are ONLY public offices located in the District of Columbia and not elsewhere. To wit:

§72. Public offices; at seat of Government

All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.

[SOURCE: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/4/72]
The only provision of any act of Congress that we have been able to find which authorizes "public offices" outside the District of Columbia as expressly required by law above, is 48 U.S.C. §1612, which authorizes enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code within the U.S. Virgin Islands. To wit:

TITLE 48 > CHAPTER 12 > SUBCHAPTER V > § 1612
§ 1612. Jurisdiction of District Court

(a) Jurisdiction

The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have the jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States, including, but not limited to, the diversity jurisdiction provided for in section 1332 of title 28 and that of a bankruptcy court of the United States. The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal and civil proceedings in the Virgin Islands with respect to the income tax laws applicable to the Virgin Islands, regardless of the degree of the offense or of the amount involved, except the ancillary laws relating to the income tax enacted by the legislature of the Virgin Islands. Any act or failure to act with respect to the income tax laws applicable to the Virgin Islands which would constitute a criminal offense described in chapter 73 of subtitle F of title 26 shall constitute an offense against the government of the Virgin Islands and may be prosecuted in the name of the government of the Virgin Islands by the appropriate officers thereof in the District Court of the Virgin Islands without the request or the consent of the United States attorney for the Virgin Islands, notwithstanding the provisions of section 1617 of this title.

There is NO PROVISION OF LAW which would similarly extend public offices or jurisdiction to enforce any provision of the Internal Revenue Code to any place within the exclusive jurisdiction of any state of the Union, because Congress enjoys NO LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION THERE.

"It is no longer open to question that the general government, unlike the states, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275, 38 S.Ct. 529, 3 A.L.R. 649, Ann.Cas.1918E 724, possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of the states; and emphatically not with regard to legislation."
[Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936)]

"The difficulties arising out of our dual form of government and the opportunities for differing opinions concerning the relative rights of state and national governments are many, but for a very long time this court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the taxing power of Congress does not extend to the states or their political subdivisions. The same basic reasoning which leads to that conclusion, we think, requires like limitation upon the power which springs from the bankruptcy clause. United States v. Butler, supra."
[Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 56 S.Ct. 892 (1936)]

By law then, no “public office” may therefore be exercised OUTSIDE the District of Columbia except as “expressly provided by law”, including privileged or licensed activities such as a “trade or business”. This was also confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the License Tax Cases, when they said:

"Thus, Congress having power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt, provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to pilots, licenses to trade with the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper for the exercise of that great and extensive power; and the same observation is applicable to every other power of Congress, to the exercise of which the granting of licenses may be incident. All such licenses confer authority, and give rights to the licensee.

But very different considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But, it reaches only existing subjects.

Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it."
[License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866)]

Since Internal Revenue Code, Subtitle A is a tax on “public offices”, which is called a “trade or business”, then the tax can only apply to those domiciled within the statutory but not constitutional “United States**” (federal territory), wherever they are physically located to include states of the Union, but only if they are serving under oath in their official capacity as “public officers”.
“Thus, the Court has frequently held that domicile or residence, more substantial than mere presence in transit or sojourn, is an adequate basis for taxation, including income, property, and death taxes. Since the Fourteenth Amendment makes one a citizen of the state wherein he resides, the fact of residence creates universally reciprocal duties of protection by the state and of allegiance and support by the citizen. The latter obviously includes a duty to pay taxes, and their nature and measure is largely a political matter. Of course, the situs of property may tax it regardless of the citizenship, domicile, or residence of the owner, the most obvious illustration being a tax on realty laid by the state in which the realty is located.”

[Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 540 (1954)]

Another important point needs to be emphasized, which is that those working for the federal government, while on official duty, are representing a federal corporation called the “United States”, which is domiciled in the District of Columbia.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) says that the capacity to sue and be sued civilly is based on one’s domicile:

IV. PARTIES > Rule 17.

Rule 17. Parties Plaintiff and Defendant: Capacity

(b) Capacity to Sue or be Sued.

Capacity to sue or be sued is determined as follows:

(1) for an individual who is not acting in a representative capacity, by the law of the individual’s domicile;

(2) for a corporation [the “United States”, in this case, or its officers on official duty representing the corporation], by the law under which it was organized [laws of the District of Columbia]; and

(3) for all other parties, by the law of the state where the court is located, except that:

(A) a partnership or other unincorporated association with no such capacity under that state’s law may sue or be sued in its common name to enforce a substantive right existing under the United States Constitution or laws; and

(B) 28 U.S.C. §§754 and 959(a) govern the capacity of a receiver appointed by a United States court to sue or be sued in a United States court.


Government employees, including “public officers”, while on official duty representing the federal corporation called the “United States”, maintain the character of the entity they represent and therefore have a legal domicile in the statutory but not constitutional “United States***” (federal territory) within the context of their official duties. The Internal Revenue Code also reflects this fact in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(39) and 26 U.S.C. §7408(d):

(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof—

(39) Persons residing outside United States

If any citizen or resident of the United States does not reside in (and is not found in) any United States judicial district, such citizen or resident shall be treated as residing in the District of Columbia for purposes of any provision of this title relating to—

(A) jurisdiction of courts, or

(B) enforcement of summons
Kidnapping and transporting the legal identity of a person domiciled outside the District of Columbia in a foreign state, which includes states of the Union, is illegal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1201. Therefore, the only people who can be legally and involuntarily “kidnapped” by the courts based on the above two provisions of statutory law are those who individually consent through private contract to act as “public officials” in the execution of their official duties. The fiduciary duty of these “public officials” is further defined in the I.R.C. as follows, and it is only by an oath of “public office” that this fiduciary duty can lawfully be created:

The existence of fiduciary duty of “public officers” is therefore the ONLY lawful method by which anyone can be prosecuted involuntarily “kidnapped” by the courts based on the above two provisions of statutory law are those who individually consent through private contract to act as “public officials” in the execution of their official duties. The fiduciary duty of these “public officials” is further defined in the I.R.C. as follows, and it is only by an oath of “public office” that this fiduciary duty can lawfully be created:

We remind our readers that there is no liability statute within Subtitle A of the I.R.C. that would create the duty documented above, and therefore the ONLY way it can be created is by the oath of office of the “public officers” who are the subject of the tax in question. This was thoroughly described in the following article:


The existence of fiduciary duty of “public officers” is therefore the ONLY lawful method by which anyone can be prosecuted for an “omission”, which is a thing they didn’t do that the law required them to do. It is otherwise illegal and unlawful to prosecute anyone under either common law or statutory law for a FAILURE to do something, such as a FAILURE TO FILE a tax return pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7203. Below is an example of where the government gets its authority to prosecute “taxpayers” for failure to file a tax return, in fact:

“I: DUTY TO ACCOUNT FOR PUBLIC FUNDS
§ 909. In general.—

It is the duty of the public officer, like any other agent or trustee, although not declared by express statute, to faithfully account for and pay over to the proper authorities all moneys which may come into his hands upon the public account, and the performance of this duty may be enforced by proper actions against the officer himself, or against those who have become sureties for the faithful discharge of his duties.”


In addition to the above, every attorney admitted to practice law in any state or federal court is described as an “officer of the court”, and therefore ALSO is a “public officer”:

In English law, a public officer belonging to the superior courts of common law at Westminster, who conducted legal proceedings on behalf of others, called his clients, by whom he was retained; he answered to the solicitor in the courts of chancery, and the proctor of the admiralty, ecclesiastical, probate, and divorce courts. An attorney was almost invariably also a solicitor. It is now provided by the judicature act. 1873, 8 87. that solicitors. Attorneys, or proctors of, or by law empowered to practice in, any court the jurisdiction of which is by that act transferred to the high court of justice or the court of appeal, shall be called “solicitors of the supreme court.” Wharton.


ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, Corpus Juris Secundum Legal Encyclopedia Volume 7, Section 4

His [the attorney’s] first duty is to the courts and the public, not to the client, and wherever the duties to his client conflict with those he owes as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the former must yield to the latter.

[7 Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), Attorney and Client, §4 (2003)]

Executive Order 12731 and 5 C.F.R. §2635.101(a) furthermore both indicate that “public service is a public trust”:

Executive Order 12731

“Part 1 -- PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT

“Section 101. Principles of Ethical Conduct. To ensure that every citizen can have complete confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, each Federal employee shall respect and adhere to the fundamental principles of ethical service as implemented in regulations promulgated under sections 201 and 301 of this order:

“(a) Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place loyalty to the Constitution, the laws, and ethical principles above private gain.

TITLE 5-ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL
CHAPTER XVI--OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS
PART 2635--STANDARDS OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH--Table of Contents
Subpart A--General Provisions
Sec. 2635.101 Basic obligation of public service.

(a) Public service is a public trust. Each employee has a responsibility to the United States Government and its citizens to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws and ethical principles above private gain. To ensure that every citizen can have complete confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, each employee shall respect and adhere to the principles of ethical conduct set forth in this section, as well as the implementing standards contained in this part and in supplemental agency regulations.

The above provisions of law imply that everyone who works for the government is a “trustee” of “We the People”, who are the sovereigns they serve in the public. In law, EVERY “trustee” is a “fiduciary” of the Beneficiary of the trust within which he serves:

‘TRUSTEE. The person appointed, or required by law, to execute a trust; one in whom an estate, interest, or power is vested, under an express or implied agreement [e.g. PRIVATE LAW or CONTRACT] to administer or exercise it for the benefit or to the use of another called the cestui que trust. Pioneer Mining Co. v. Tyberg, C.C.A.Alaska, 215 F. 501, 506, L.R.A.1915B, 442; Kaelin v. St. Paul Co-op. Ass’n, 156 Minn. 113, 194 N.W. 112; Catlett v. Hawthorne, 157 Va. 372, 161 S.E. 47. 48. Person who holds title to res and administers it for others’ benefit. Reinecke v. Smith, Ill., 53 S.Ct. 570, 289 U.S. 172, 77 L.Ed. 1109. In a strict sense, a “trustee” is one who holds the legal title to property for the benefit of another. While, in a broad sense, the term is sometimes applied to anyone standing in a fiduciary or confidential relation to another, such as agent, attorney, bailee, etc. State ex rel. Lee v. Sartorius, 344 Mo. 912, 130 S.W.2d. 547, 549, 550. “Trustee” is also used in a wide and perhaps inaccurate sense, to denote that a person has the duty of carrying out a transaction, in which he and another person are interested, in such manner as will be most for the benefit of the latter, and not in such a way that he himself might be tempted, for the sake of his personal advantage, to neglect the interests of the other. In this sense, directors of companies are said to be “trustees for the shareholders.” Sweet.


An example of someone who is NOT a “public officer” is a federal worker on duty and who is not required to take an oath. These people may think of themselves as employees in an ordinary and not statutory sense and even be called employees by their supervisor or employer, but in fact NOT be the statutory “employee” defined in 5 U.S.C. §2105(a). Remember that 5 U.S.C. §2105(a) defines a STATUTORY “employee” as “an officer and an individual” and you don’t become an “officer” in a statutory sense unless and until you take a Constitutional oath. Almost invariably, such workers also have some kind of
immediate supervisor who manages and oversees and evaluates his activities pursuant to the position description drafted for the position he fills. He may be a “trustee” and he may have a “fiduciary duty” to the public as a “public servant”, but he isn’t an “officer” or “public officer” unless and until he takes an oath of office prescribed by law. A federal worker, however, can become a “public office” by virtue of any one or more of the following purposes that we are aware of so far:

1. Being elected to political office.
2. Being appointed to political office by the President or the governor of a state of the Union.

A “public office” is not limited to a human being. It can also extend to an entire entity such as a corporation. An example of an entity that is a “public office” in its entirety is a federally chartered bank, such as the original Bank of the United States described in Osborn v. United States, in which the U.S. Supreme Court identified the original and first Bank of the United States, a federally chartered bank corporation created by Congress, as a “public office”:

**All the powers of the government must be carried into operation by individual agency, either through the medium of public officers, or contracts made with individuals.** Can any public office be created, or does one exist, the performance of which may, with propriety, be assigned to this association [or trust], when incorporated? If such office exist, or can be created, then the company may be incorporated, that they may be appointed to execute such office. Is there any portion of the public business performed by individuals upon contracts, that this association could be employed to perform, with greater advantage and more safety to the public, than an individual contractor? If there be an employment of this nature, then may this company be incorporated to undertake it.

**There is an employment of this nature.** Nothing can be more essential to the fiscal concerns of the nation, than an agent of undoubted integrity and established credit, with whom the public moneys can, at all times, be safely deposited. Nothing can be of more importance to a government, than that there should be some capitalist in the country, who possesses the means of making advances of money to the government upon any exigency, and who is under a legal obligation to make such advances. For these purposes the association would be an agent peculiarly suitable and appropriate. [. . .]

The mere creation of a corporation, does not confer political power or political character. So this Court decided in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, already referred to. If I may be allowed to paraphrase the language of the Chief Justice, a corporation, in its nature, is no more a State instrument, than a natural person performing the same business would be. If, then, a natural person, engaged in the trade of banking, should contract with the government to receive the public money upon deposit, to transmit it from place to place, without charging for commission or difference of exchange, and to perform, when called upon, the duties of commissioner of loans, would not thereby become a public officer, how is it that this artificial being, created by law for the purpose of being employed by the government for the same purposes, should become a part of the civil government of the country? Is it because its existence, its capacities, its powers, are given by law? because the government has given it power to take and hold property in a particular form, and to employ that property for particular purposes, and in the disposition of it to use a particular name? because the government has sold it a privilege [22 U.S. 738, 774] for a large sum of money, and has bargained with it to do certain things; is it, therefore, a part of the very government with which the contract is made?

**If the Bank be constituted a public office, by the connexion between it and the government, it cannot be the mere legal franchise in which the office is vested; the individual stockholders must be the officers.** Their character is not merged in the charter. This is the strong point of the Mayor and Commonalty v. Wood, upon which this Court ground their decision in the Bank v. Deveaux, and from which they say, that cause could not be distinguished. Thus, aliens may become public officers, and public duties are confided to those who owe no allegiance to the government, and who are even beyond its territorial limits.

**With the privileges and perquisites of office, all individuals holding offices, ought to be subject to the disabilities of office.** But if the Bank be a public office, and the individual stockholders public officers, this principle does not have a fair and just operation. The disabilities of office do not attach to the stockholders; for we find them every where holding public offices, even in the national Legislature, from which, if they be public officers, they are excluded by the constitution in express terms.

**If the Bank be a public institution of such character as to be justly assimilated to the mint and the post office, then its charter may be amended, altered, or even abolished, at the discretion of the National Legislature. All public offices are created [22 U.S. 738, 775] purely for public purposes, and may, at any time, be modified in such manner as the public interest may require. Public corporations partake of the same character.** So it is distinctly adjudged in Dartmouth College v. Woodward. In this point, each Judge who delivered an opinion concurred. By one of the Judges it is said, that ‘public corporations are generally esteemed such as exist for public political purposes only, such as towns, cities, parishes and counties; and in many respects they are so, although they involve some private interests; but, strictly speaking, public corporations are such only as are founded by the government for public purposes, where the whole interest belongs also to the government. If, therefore, the foundation be private, though under the charter of the government, the corporation is private, however extensive the uses may be to which it is devoted, either by the bounty of the founder, or the nature and
objects of the institution. For instance, a bank, created by the government for its own uses, whose stock is
exclusively owned by the government, is, in the strictest sense, a public corporation. So, a hospital created and
endowed by the government for general charity. But a bank, whose stock is owned by private persons, is a
private corporation, although it is erected by the government, and its objects and operations partake of a public
nature. The same doctrine may be affirmed of insurance, canal, bridge, and turnpike companies. In all these
cases, the uses may, in a certain sense, be called public, but the corporations are private; as much [22 U.S. 738,
776] so, indeed, as if the franchises were vested in a single person. [. . .]

In what sense is it an instrument of the government? and in what character is it employed as such? Do the
government employ the faculty, the legal franchise, or do they employ the individuals upon whom it is conferred?
and what is the nature of that employment? does it resemble the post office, or the mint, or the custom house, or
the process of the federal Courts?

The post office is established by the general government. It is a public institution. The persons who perform its
duties are public officers. No individual has, or can acquire, any property in it. For all the services performed, a
compensation is paid out of the national treasury; and all the money received upon account of its operations, is
public property. Surely there is no similitude between this institution, and an association who trade upon their
own capital, for their own profit, and who have paid the government a million and a half of dollars for a legal
character and name, in which to conduct their trade.

Again: the business conducted through the agency of the post office, is not in its nature a private business. It is
of a public character, and the [22 U.S. 738, 786] charge of it is expressly conferred upon Congress by the
constitution. The business is created by law, and is annihilated when the law is repealed. But the trade of banking
is strictly a private concern. It exists and can be carried on without the aid of the national Legislature. Nay, it is
only under very special circumstances, that the national Legislature can so far interfere with it, as to facilitate its
operations.

The post office executes the various duties assigned to it, by means of subordinate agents. The mails are opened
and closed by persons invested with the character of public officers. But they are transported by individuals
employed for that purpose, in their individual character, which employment is created by and founded in contract.
To such contractors no official character is attached. These contractors supply horses, carriages, and whatever
else is necessary for the transportation of the mails, upon their own account. The whole is engaged in the public
service. The contractor, his horses, his carriage, his driver, are all in public employ. But this does not change
their character. All that was private property before the contract was made, and before they were engaged in
public employ, remain private property still. The horses and the carriages are liable to be taxed as other property,
for every purpose for which property of the same character is taxed in the place where they are employed. The
reason is plain: the contractor is employing his own means to promote his own private profit, and the tax collected
is from the individual, though assessed upon the [22 U.S. 738, 787] means he uses to perform the public service.
To tax the transportation of the mails, as such, would be taxing the operations of the government, which could
not be allowed. But to tax the means by which this transportation is effected, so far as those means are private
property, is allowable; because it abstracts nothing from the government; and because, the fact that an individual
employs his private means in the service of the government, attaches to them no immunity whatever."

The record of the House of Representatives after the enactment of the first income tax during the Civil War in 1862, confirmed
that the income tax was upon a “public office” and that even IRS agents, who are not “public officers” and who are not
required to take an oath, are therefore exempt from the requirements of the revenue acts in place at the time. Read the amazing
truth for yourself:

House of Representatives, Ex. Doc. 99, 1867

Below is an excerpt from that report proving our point. The Secretary of the Treasury at the time is comparing the federal
tax liabilities of postal clerks to those of internal revenue clerks. At that time, the IRS was called the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (B.I.R.). The office of Commissioner of Internal Revenue was established in 1862 as an emergency measure to
fund the Civil War, which ended shortly thereafter, but the illegal enforcement of the revenue laws continued and expanded
into the states over succeeding years:

House of Representatives, Ex. Doc. 99, 1867, pp. 1-2
39th Congress, 2d Session

Salary Tax Upon Clerks to Postmasters

Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury in answer to A resolution of the House of the 12th of February,
relative to salary tax upon clerks to postmasters, with the regulations of the department
Postmasters’ clerks are appointed by postmasters, and take the oaths of office prescribed in the 2d section of the act of July 2, 1862, and in the 2d section of the act of March 3, 1863.

Their salaries are not fixed in amount by law, but from time to time the Post master General fixes the amount, allotted to each postmaster for clerk hire, under the authority conferred upon him by title ninth section of the act of June 5, 1836, and then the postmaster, as an agent for and on behalf of the United States, determines the salary to be paid to each of his clerks. These salaries are paid by the postmasters, acting as disbursing agents, from United States moneys advanced to them for this purpose, either directly from the Post Office Department in pursuance of appropriations made by law, or from the accruing revenues of their offices, under the instructions of the Postmaster General. The receipt of such clerks constitute vouchers in the accounts of the postmasters acting as disbursing agents in the settlements made with them by the Sixth Auditor. In the foregoing transactions the postmaster acts not as a principal, but as an agent of the United States, and the clerks are not in his private employment, but in the public employment of the United States. Such being the facts, these clerks are subjected to and required to account for and pay the salary tax, imposed by the one hundred and twenty-third section of the internal revenue act of June 30, 1864, as amended by the ninth section of the internal revenue act of July 13, 1866, upon payments for services to persons in the civil employment or service of the United States.

Copies of the regulations under which such salary taxes are withheld and paid into the treasury to the credit of internal revenue collection account are herewith transmitted, marked A, b, and C. Clerks to assessors of internal revenue [IRS agents] are appointed by the assessors. Neither law nor regulations require them to take an oath of office, because, as the law at present stands, they are not in the public service of the United States, through the agency of the assessor, but are in the private service of the assessor, as a principal, who employs them.

The salaries of such clerks are neither fixed in amount by law, nor are they regulated by any officer of the Treasury Department over the clerk hire of assessors to is to prescribe a necessary and reasonable amount which shall not be exceeded in reimbursing the assessors for this item of their expenses.

No money is advanced by the United States for the payment of such salaries, nor do the assessors perform the duties of disbursing agents of the United States in paying their clerks. The entire amount allowed is paid directly to the assessor, and he is not accountable to the United States for its payment to his clerks, for the reason that he has paid them in advance, out of his own funds, and this is a reimbursement to him of such amount as the department decides to be reasonable. No salary tax is therefore collected, or required by the Treasury Department to be accounted for, or paid, on account of payments to the assessors’ clerks, as the United States pays no such clerks nor has them in its employ or service, and they do not come within the provisions of existing laws imposing such a tax.

Perhaps no better illustration of the difference between the status of postmasters’ clerks and that of assessors’ clerks can be given than the following: A postmaster became a defaulter, without paying his clerks; his successor received from the Postmaster General a new remittance for paying them; and if at any time, the clerks in a post office do not receive their salaries, by reason of the death, resignation or removal of a postmaster, the new appointee is authorized by the regulations of the Post Office Department to pay them out of the proceeds of the office; and should there be no funds in his hands belonging to the department, a draft is issued to place money in his hands for that purpose.

If an assessor had not paid his clerks, they would have no legal claim upon the treasury for their salaries. A discrimination is made between postmasters’ clerks and assessor’s clerks to the extent and for the reasons hereinbefore set forth.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

H. McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury
[House of Representatives, Ex. Doc. 99, 1867, pp. 1-2]

Notice based on the above that revenue officers don’t take an oath, so they don’t have to pay the tax, while postal clerks take an oath, so they do. Therefore, the oath that creates the “public office” is the method by which the government manufactures “public officers”, “taxpayers”, and “sponsors” for its wasteful use or abuse of public monies. If you would like a whole BOOK full of reasons why the only “taxpayers” under the Internal Revenue Code, Subtitle A are “public offices”, please see the following exhaustive analysis:

Why Your Government is Either a Thief or You are a “Public Officer” for Income Tax Purposes, Form #05.008 http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
7.6 De Facto Public Officers

Based on the previous sections, we are now thoroughly familiar with all the legal requirements for:

1. How public offices are lawfully created.
2. The only places where they can lawfully be exercised.
3. The duties that attach to the public office.
4. The type of agency exercised by the public officer.
5. The relationship between the public office and the public officer.

What we didn’t cover in the previous section is what are all the legal consequences when someone performs the duties of a public office without satisfying all the legal requirements for lawfully occupying the office? In law, such a person is called a “de facto officer” and books have been written about the subject of the “de facto officer doctrine”. Below is what the U.S. Supreme Court held on the subject of “de facto officers”:

None of the cases cited militates against the doctrine that, for the existence of a de facto officer, there must be an office de jure, although there may be loose expressions in some of the opinions, not called for by the facts, seemingly against this view. Where no office legally exists, the pretended officer is merely a usurper, to whose acts no validity can be attached, and such, in our judgment, was the position of the commissioners of Shelby county, who undertook to act as the county court, which could be constitutionally held only by justices of the peace. Their right to discharge the duties of justices of the peace was never recognized by the justices, but from the outset was resisted by legal proceedings, which terminated in an adjudication that they were usurpers, clothed with no authority or official function.


As we have already established, all statutory “taxpayers” are public offices in the U.S. and not state government. This is exhaustively proven with evidence in:

Why Your Government is Either a Thief or You are a “Public Officer” for Income Tax Purposes, Form #05.008
http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

A person who fulfills the DUTIES of a statutory “taxpayer” under 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(14) without lawfully occupying a public office in the U.S. government BEFORE becoming surety for the “taxpayer” public office would be a good example of a de facto public officer. Those who exercise the duties of a public officer without meeting all the requirements, from a legal perspective, are in fact committing the crime of impersonating a public officer.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 43 > § 912
§ 912. Officer or employee of the United States

Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

What are some examples where a person would be impersonating a public officer unlawfully? Here are a few:

1. You elect or appoint yourself into public office by filling out a tax form without being occupying said office BEFORE becoming surety for the statutory “taxpayer” office.
2. You serve in the office in a geographic place NOT expressly authorized by law. For instance, 4 U.S.C. §72 requires that ALL federal public offices MUST be exercised ONLY in the District of Columbia and NOT ELSEWHERE, unless expressly authorized by law.
3. A third party unilaterally ELECTS you into a public office by submitting an information return linking you to such a BOGUS office under the alleged but not actual authority of 26 U.S.C. §6041(a).
4. You occupy the public office without either expressly consenting to it IN WRITING or without even knowing you occupy such an office.

Source: Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030, Section 23.4.4; https://sedm.org/Forms/05-Mem1.law/Franchises.pdf

Challenge to Income Tax Enforcement Authority Within Constitutional States of the Union
If a so-called “GOVERNMENT” is established in which:

1. The only kind of “citizens” or “residents” allowed are STATUTORY citizens and residents. CONSTITUTIONAL citizens are residents are either not recognized or allowed. . . OR
2. All “citizens” and “residents” are compelled under duress to accept the duties of a public office or ANY kind of duties imposed by the government upon them. Remember, the Thirteenth Amendment forbids “involuntary servitude”, so if the government imposes any kind of duty or requires you to surrender private property of any kind by law, then they can only do so through the medium of a public office. . . OR
3. Everyone is compelled to obey government statutory law. Remember, nearly all laws passed by government can and do regulate ONLY the government and not private people. See:

\[
\text{Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037} \\
\text{http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm}
\]

. . . then you end up not only with a LOT of public officers, but a de facto GOVERNMENT as well. That government is thoroughly described in:

\[
\text{De Facto Government Scam, Form #05.043} \\
\text{http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm}
\]

Even at the state level, it is a crime in every state of the Union to pretend to be a public officer of the state government who does not satisfy ALL of the legal requirements for occupying the public office. Below is an itemized list by jurisdiction of constitutional and statutory requirements that are violated by those who either impersonate a state public officer OR who serve simultaneously serve in BOTH a FEDERAL public office and a STATE public office AT THE SAME TIME. That’s right: When you either impersonate a state public officer OR serve in BOTH a FEDERAL public office and STATE public office AT THE SAME TIME, then you are committing a crime and have a financial conflict of interest and conflict of allegiance that can and should disqualify you from exercising or accepting the duties of the office:
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<td>Statute</td>
<td>Crime: Impersonating Public Officer</td>
<td>W.V.C. §61-5-27a(e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>Dual Office Prohibition</td>
<td>Const. Article IV, Section 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>Crime: Identity Theft</td>
<td>W.S. §943.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>Dual Office Prohibition</td>
<td>Const. Section 97-3-008 (legislature);Const. Section 97-5-027 (judges)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Challenge to Income Tax Enforcement Authority Within Constitutional States of the Union**

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Form 05.052, Rev. 1-17-2019

EXHIBIT: ________
### Jurisdiction | Legal Cite Type | Title | Legal Cite
--- | --- | --- | ---
Wyoming | Statute | Crime: Identity Theft | W.S. §6-3-901
Wyoming | Statute | Crime: Impersonating Public Officer | W.S. §6-5-307

If you would like to research further the laws and remedies available in the specific jurisdiction you are in, we highly recommend the following free tools on our website:

1. **SEDM Jurisdictions Database**, Litigation Tool #09.003
   
   [http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm](http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm)
2. **SEDM Jurisdictions Database Online**, Litigation Tool #09.004
   
   [http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm](http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm)

The above tool is also available at the top row under the menu on our Litigation Tools Page at the link below:

[http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm](http://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm)

### 8 Warning to Litigants About Not Abandoning the Approach in this Document

The corrupt de facto government knows the approach in this document is literally the heart of their fraud. They will make and have made every possible attempt to steer litigation off the key issues in this document. Early pioneers of this approach, such as for instance Joseph Saladino of the now defunct Freedom and Privacy Committee (FPC) developed much of the information in this document with our help and participation and basing their research on the *Great IRS Hoax*, Form #11.302 and our *Test for Federal Tax Professionals*, Form #03.009. See, for instance:

**Secretary's Authority in the Several States Pursuant to 4 U.S.C. 72**, Joe Saladino

[https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/ChallJurisdiction/BriefRegardingSecretary-4usc72.pdf](https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/ChallJurisdiction/BriefRegardingSecretary-4usc72.pdf)

When the government tried to prosecute Joseph Saladino criminally for offenses completely unrelated to this approach, they made him agree as a precondition to accepting a free public pretender (public defender) that he would not take any aspect of the approach in this document during litigation. You can read about this dastardly conspiracy against his constitutional rights by the judge in the following document:

**Policy Document: Who's Who in the Freedom Community**, Form #08.009, Section 3.42

[https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm](https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm)

We therefore STRONGLY recommend that you NOT deviate from or especially ABANDON any part of the arguments in this document during litigation against the government to stop illegal income tax enforcement. Stick to your guns!

### 9 Resources for further study and rebuttal

If you would like to further investigate the matters discussed in this pamphlet beyond what appears here, we refer you to the following FREE resources elsewhere on the Internet:

1. **Test for Federal Tax Professionals**, Form #03.009
   
   [https://sedm.org/Forms/03-Discovery/TestForFedTaxProfessionals.pdf](https://sedm.org/Forms/03-Discovery/TestForFedTaxProfessionals.pdf)
2. **Federal Enforcement Authority Within States of the Union**, Form #05.032
   
   [https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm](https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm)
3. **Statutory Interpretation-Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner**. This excellent video summarizes and explains some of the more popular canons of statutory interpretation and how they are abused to allow judges to
unconstitutionally “make law”. The speakers are U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia (now deceased) and Bryan Garner, who is the author of Black’s Law Dictionary.

https://sedm.org/statutory-interpretation-justice-scalia/

4. How Judges Unconstitutionally “Make Law”, Litigation Tool #01.009-This form documents common tactics by which judges unconstitutionally, injuriously, and even criminally “make law”. It is useful as a preemptive tool to prevent judicial abuse and also as a way to prosecute and punish it.

https://sedm.org/Litigation/LitIndex.htm


7. Presumption: Chief Weapon for Unlawfully Enlarging Federal Jurisdiction, Form #05.017

http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

8. Sovereignty Forms and Instructions Online, Form #10.004, Cites by Topic: “includes”

http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/includes.htm

9. Family Guardian Forum 6.5: Word Games that STEAL from and Deceive People


10. Lost Horizons Website: “includes”, Pete Hendrickson


11. Truth in Taxation Hearing, Section 9, Ambiguity of Law, Family Guardian Fellowship

http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/Forms/Discovery/Deposition/Section%2009.htm

12. Words and Phrases: “includes”

http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/Include-WP.pdf

13. Great IRS Hoax, Form #11.302, Section 2.8.2: Presumption

http://famguardian.org/Publications/GreatIRSHoax/GreatIRSHoax.htm


http://famguardian.org/PublishedAuthors/Govt/CRS/Statutory%20Interpretation-General%20Principles.MARCH%2030.2006.CRS97-589.pdf