GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITIONS AND CONVENTIONS
FORM #11.215
A very frequent point of confusion and misunderstanding even within the legal profession is the definition of geographical terms in the various contexts in which they are used. The table below is provided to clear up this confusion in order that people do not misinterpret geographical terms by applying them outside their intended context. Using this page is VERY important for those who will be reading and researching state and federal law. The differences in meaning within the various contexts are primarily a consequence of the Separation of Powers Doctrine.
Law | Federal constitution | Federal statutes | Federal regulations | State constitutions | State statutes | State regulations |
Author |
Union States/ ”We The People” |
Federal Government | “We The People” |
State Government |
||
“state” | Foreign country | Union state or foreign country | Union state or foreign country | Other Union state or federal government | Other Union state or federal government | Other Union state or federal government |
“State” | Union state | Federal state | Federal state | Union state | Union state | Union state |
“in this State” or “in the State”[1] | NA | NA | NA | NA | Federal enclave within state | Federal enclave within state |
“State”[2](State Revenue and taxation code only) | NA | NA | NA | NA | Federal enclave within state | Federal enclave within state |
“several States” | Union states collectively[3] | Federal “States” collectively | Federal “States” collectively | Federal “States” collectively | Federal “States” collectively | Federal “States” collectively |
“United States” | states of the Union collectively | Federal United States** | Federal United States** | United States* the country | Federal United States** | Federal United States** |
What the above table clearly shows is that the word “State” in the GENERAL context of MOST federal statutes and regulations means (not includes!) federal States only under Title 48 of the U.S. Code[4], and these areas do not include any of the 50 Union States. This is true in most cases and especially in the Internal Revenue Code. There are four exceptions to this rule that we are aware of, and these subject matters include (are limited to):
SOURCES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
The above four items collectively are referred to as "extraterritorial jurisdiction". Extraterritorial jurisdiction is defined as SUBJECT MATTER jurisdiction over PUBLIC property (Form #12.025) physically situated OUTSIDE of the EXCLUSIVE jurisdiction of the national government under Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution. Congress has jurisdiction over its property and the offices it creates no matter WHERE they physically reside or are lawfully exercised, INCLUDING within the exclusive jurisdiction of a constitutional state as confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), which ironically was about SLAVES. Those who CONSENT to be statutory "taxpayers" would fall in this same category of "slave" and are treated literally as CHATTEL of the national government. HOWEVER, the Constitution confers NO EXPRESS authorization for Congress to use TACIT and PERSONAL BRIBES or GRANTS of its physical or chattel PUBLIC property or "benefits" to CREATE NEW public offices or appoint new officers to de facto offices that are NOT created by an EXPRESS lawful oath or appointment. Any attempts to do so are CRIMINAL OFFENSES under 18 U.S.C. §§201, 210, 211. More about public offices and officers in:
For the purposes of this discussion, Sovereign States of the Union are NOT "territory" of the national government. Also, the Sixteenth Amendment did NOT confer EXTRATERRITORIAL jurisdiction to levy an UNAPPORTIONED direct tax upon labor as property within the exclusive jurisdiction of a constitutional state of the Union either. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that it "conferred NO NEW power of taxation" in Stanton v. Baltic Mining, 240 U.S. 103 (1916). Thus, the income tax HAS ALWAYS been a tax upon officers of the national government called statutory "taxpayer", "citizens", and "persons" This is ENTIRELY consistent with the legislative intent of the proposed sixteenth amendment proposed to Congress by President Taft himself:
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE - JUNE 16, 1909
[From Pages 3344 – 3345]The Secretary read as follows:
To the Senate and House of Representatives:
It is the constitutional duty of the President from time to time to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures, as he shall judge necessary and expedient. In my inaugural address, immediately preceding this present extraordinary session of Congress, I invited attention to the necessity for a revision of the tariff at this session, and stated the principles upon which I thought the revision should be affected. I referred to the then rapidly increasing deficit and pointed out the obligation on the part of the framers of the tariff bill to arrange the duty so as to secure an adequate income, and suggested that if it was not possible to do so by import duties, new kinds of taxation must be adopted, and among them I recommended a graduated inheritance tax as correct in principle and as certain and easy of collection.
The House of Representatives has adopted the suggestion, and has provided in the bill it passed for the collection of such a tax. In the Senate the action of its Finance Committee and the course of the debate indicate that it may not agree to this provision, and it is now proposed to make up the deficit by the imposition of a general income tax, in form and substance of almost exactly the same character as, that which in the case of Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan and Trust Company (157 U.S., 429) was held by the Supreme Court to be a direct tax, and therefore not within the power of the Federal Government to Impose unless apportioned among the several States according to population. [Emphasis added] This new proposal, which I did not discuss in my inaugural address or in my message at the opening of the present session, makes it appropriate for me to submit to the Congress certain additional recommendations.
Again, it is clear that by the enactment of the proposed law the Congress will not be bringing money into the Treasury to meet the present deficiency. The decision of the Supreme Court in the income-tax cases deprived the National Government of a power which, by reason of previous decisions of the court, it was generally supposed that government had. It is undoubtedly a power the National Government ought to have. It might be indispensable to the Nation’s life in great crises. Although I have not considered a constitutional amendment as necessary to the exercise of certain phases of this power, a mature consideration has satisfied me that an amendment is the only proper course for its establishment to its full extent.
I therefore recommend to the Congress that both Houses, by a two-thirds vote, shall propose an amendment to the Constitution conferring the power to levy an income tax upon the National Government without apportionment among the States in proportion to population.
This course is much to be preferred to the one proposed of reenacting a law once judicially declared to be unconstitutional. For the Congress to assume that the court will reverse itself, and to enact legislation on such an assumption, will not strengthen popular confidence in the stability of judicial construction of the Constitution. It is much wiser policy to accept the decision and remedy the defect by amendment in due and regular course.
Again, it is clear that by the enactment of the proposed law the Congress will not be bringing money into the Treasury to meet the present deficiency, but by putting on the statute book a law already there and never repealed will simply be suggesting to the executive officers of the Government their possible duty to invoke litigation.
If the court should maintain its former view, no tax would be collected at all. If it should ultimately reverse itself, still no taxes would have been collected until after protracted delay.
It is said the difficulty and delay in securing the approval of three-fourths of the States will destroy all chance of adopting the amendment. Of course, no one can speak with certainty upon this point, but I have become convinced that a great majority of the people of this country are in favor of investing the National Government with power to levy an income tax, and that they will secure the adoption of the amendment in the States, if proposed to them.
Second, the decision in the Pollock case left power in the National Government to levy an excise tax, which accomplishes the same purpose as a corporation income tax and is free from certain objections urged to the proposed income tax measure.
I therefore recommend an amendment to the tariff bill Imposing upon all corporations and joint stock companies for profit, except national banks (otherwise taxed), savings banks, and building and loan associations, an excise tax measured by 2 per cent on the net income of such corporations. This is an excise tax upon the privilege of doing business as an artificial entity and of freedom from a general partnership liability enjoyed by those who own the stock. [Emphasis added] I am informed that a 2 per cent tax of this character would bring into the Treasury of the United States not less than $25,000,000.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Spreckels Sugar Refining Company against McClain (192 U.S., 397), seems clearly to establish the principle that such a tax as this is an excise tax upon privilege and not a direct tax on property, and is within the federal power without apportionment according to population. The tax on net income is preferable to one proportionate to a percentage of the gross receipts, because it is a tax upon success and not failure. It imposes a burden at the source of the income at a time when the corporation is well able to pay and when collection is easy.
Another merit of this tax is the federal supervision, which must be exercised in order to make the law effective over the annual accounts and business transactions of all corporations. While the faculty of assuming a corporate form has been of the utmost utility in the business world, it is also true that substantially all of the abuses and all of the evils which have aroused the public to the necessity of reform were made possible by the use of this very faculty. If now, by a perfectly legitimate and effective system of taxation, we are incidentally able to possess the Government and the stockholders and the public of the knowledge of the real business transactions and the gains and profits of every corporation in the country, we have made a long step toward that supervisory control of corporations which may prevent a further abuse of power.
I recommend, then, first, the adoption of a joint resolution by two-thirds of both Houses, proposing to the States an amendment to the Constitution granting to the Federal Government the right to levy and collect an income tax without apportionment among the several States according to population; and, second, the enactment, as part of the pending revenue measure, either as a substitute for, or in addition to, the inheritance tax, of an excise tax upon all corporations, measured by 2 percent of their net income.
Wm. H. Taft
Some people have asserted that it is deceptive to claim that the phrase above "shall propose an amendment to the Constitution conferring the power to levy an income tax upon the National Government" implies it is a tax upon the government. In retort, the following proves we are not only correct, but that the only real DECEPTIVE one was Taft Himself:
"Income" has been taken to mean the same thing as used in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, in the Sixteenth Amendment, and in the various revenue acts subsequently passed. Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335; Merchants' L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 219. After full consideration, this Court declared that income may be defined as gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital. Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415; Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207. And that definition has been adhered to and applied repeatedly. See, e.g., Merchants' L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, supra; 518; Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U.S. 527, 535; United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 169; Miles v. Safe Deposit Co., 259 U.S. 247, 252-253; United States v. Supplee-Biddle Co., 265 U.S. 189, 194; Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 167; Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S. 628, 633. In determining what constitutes income, substance rather than form is to be given controlling weight. Eisner v. Macomber, supra, 206. [271 U.S. 175]"
[Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174, (1926)]
"Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. 317, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L.Ed. 98, was an action of trespass (or, as appears by the original record, replevin) brought in the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia to try the right of Congress to impose a direct tax for general purposes on that District. 3 Stat. 216, c. 60, Fed. 17, 1815. It was insisted that Congress could act in a double capacity: in [****32] one as legislating [*260] for the States; in the other as a local legislature for the District of Columbia. In the latter character, it was admitted that the power of levying direct taxes might be exercised, but for District purposes only, as a state legislature might tax for state purposes; but that it could not legislate for the District under Art. I, sec. 8, giving to Congress the power "to lay and collect taxes, imposts and excises," which "shall be uniform throughout the United States," inasmuch as the District was no part of the United States. It was held that the grant of this power was a general one without limitation as to place, and consequently extended to all places over which the government extends; and that it extended to the District of Columbia as a constituent part of the United States. The fact that Art. I, sec. 20 , declares that "representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective numbers," furnished a standard by which taxes were apportioned; but not to exempt any part of the country from their operation. "The words used do not mean, that direct taxes shall be imposed on States only which are [****33] represented, or shall be apportioned to representatives; but that direct taxation, in its application to States, shall be apportioned to numbers." That Art. I, sec. 9, P4, declaring that direct taxes shall be laid in proportion to the census, was applicable to the District of Columbia, "and will enable Congress to apportion on it its just and equal share of the burden, with the same accuracy as on the respective States. If the tax be laid in this proportion, it is within the very words of the restriction. It is a tax in proportion to the census or enumeration referred to." It was further held that the words of the ninth section did not "in terms require that the system of direct taxation, when resorted to, shall be extended to the territories, as the words of the second section require that it shall be extended to all the [**777] States. They therefore may, without violence, be understood to give a rule when the territories shall be taxed without imposing the necessity of taxing them."
[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]
"The contention was rejected that a citizen's property without the limits of the United States derives no benefit from the United States. The contention, it was said, came from the confusion of thought in "mistaking the scope and extent of the sovereign power of the United States as a nation and its relations to its citizens and their relations to it." And that power in its scope and extent, it was decided, is based on the presumption that government by its very nature benefits the citizen and his property wherever found, and that opposition to it holds on to citizenship while it "belittles and destroys its advantages and blessings by denying the possession by government of an essential power required to make citizenship completely beneficial." In other words, the principle was declared that the government, by its very nature, benefits the citizen and his property wherever found and, therefore, has the power to make the benefit complete. Or to express it another way, the basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or out of the United States, and was not and cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen, that being in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation of the latter to him as citizen. The consequence of the relations is that the native citizen who is taxed may have domicile, and the property from which his income is derived may have situs, in a foreign country and the tax be legal — the government having power to impose the tax."
TITLE 26 > Subtitle F>CHAPTER 68>Subchapter B>PART I>Sec. 6671
Sec. 6671. - Rules for application of assessable penalties
(b)Person defined
The term “person”, as used in this subchapter, includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.
TITLE 26>Subtitle F>CHAPTER 75>Subchapter D> Sec. 7343.
Sec. 7343. - Definition of term ''person''
The term ''person'' as used in this chapter [Chapter 75] includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs
Why Your Government is Either a Thief or You are a "Public Officer" for Income Tax Purposes, Form #05.008 https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhyThiefOrPubOfficer.pdf |
The "Trade or Business" Scam, Form #05.001 https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/TradeOrBusScam.pdf |
You can find more on the above in:
Challenge to Income Tax Enforcement Authority Within Constitutional States of the Union, Form #05.052 https://sedm.org/Forms/05-Memlaw/ChallengeToIRSEnforcementAuth.pdf |
Hierarchy of Sovereignty: The Power to Create is the Power to Tax, Family Guardian Fellowship https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Remedies/PowerToCreate.htm |
Separation Between Public and Private Course, Form #12.025 https://sedm.org/LibertyU/SeparatingPublicPrivate.pdf |
So what the President proposed was an excise tax on the government itself, and nothing more. This is important. More on the history of the Sixteenth Amendment at:
EVEN in the case of item 2 of the extraterritorial jurisdiction list entitled "A matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" above, legislative control over property is limited to public offices, and NOT to private state nationals. A "public officer", after all, is legally defined in Black's Law Dictionary as someone in charge of the PROPERTY of the public. We have never seen any case hold that merely possessing physical property of the national government while physically present within a constitutional state confers DIRECT, PERSONAL legislative jurisdiction over the person whose hands that property is physically in.
The above exceptions are discussed in:
The lower case word “state” in the context of federal statutes and regulations means one of the 50 union states, which are “foreign states”, and “foreign countries” with respect to the federal government as clearly explained in section 5.2.11 of the Great IRS Hoax, Form #11.302(OFFSITE LINK) book. In the context of the above, a “Union State” means one of the 50 Union states of the United States* (the country, not the federal United States**) mentioned in the Constitution for the United States of America.
If you would like to know all the implications of the separation of powers reflected in the above table, as well as a history of unconstitutional efforts to destroy this separation, see the following references:
FOOTNOTES:
[1] See California Revenue and Taxation Code, section 6017
[2] See California Revenue and Taxation Code, section 17018
[3] See, for instance, U.S. Constitution Article IV, Section 2.
[4] See https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/48
Whenever you are reading a particular law, including the U.S. Constitution, or a statute, the Sovereign referenced in that law, who is usually the author of the law, is referenced in the law with the first letter of its name capitalized. For instance, in the U.S. Constitution the phrase “We the People”, “State”, and “Citizen” are all capitalized, because these were the sovereign entities who were writing the document residing in the States. This document formed the federal government and gave it its authority. Subsequently, the federal government wrote statutes to implement the intent of the Constitution, and it became the Sovereign, but only in the context of those territories and lands ceded to it by the union states. When that federal government then refers in statutes to federal “States”, for instance in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(10) or 4 U.S.C. §110(d), then these federal “States” are Sovereigns because they are part of the territory controlled by the Sovereign who wrote the statute, so they are capitalized. Foreign states referenced in the federal statutes then must be in lower case. The sovereign 50 union states, for example, must be in lower case in federal statutes because of this convention because they are foreign states. Capitalization is therefore always relative to who is writing the document, which is usually the Sovereign and is therefore capitalized. The exact same convention is used in the Bible, where all appellations of God are capitalized because they are sovereigns: “Jesus" ”, “God”, “Him”, “His”, “Father”. These words aren’t capitalized because they are proper names, but because the entity described is a sovereign or an agent or part of the sovereign. The only exception to this capitalization rule is in state revenue laws, where the state legislators use the same capitalization as the Internal Revenue Code for “State” in referring to federal enclaves within their territory because they want to scam money out of you. In state revenue laws, for instance in the California Revenue and Taxation Code (R&TC) sections 17018 and 6017, “State” means a federal State within the boundaries of California and described as part of the Buck Act of 1940 found in 4 U.S.C. §§105-113.
SOURCE: State Income Taxes, Form #05.031, Section 5
Wikipedia: Federal Enclave https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_enclave |
State Income Taxes, Form #05.031, Section 10.6 https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/StateIncomeTax.pdf |
The "Trade or Business" Scam, Form #05.001 https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/TradeOrBusScam.pdf |
Catalog of U.S. Supreme Court Doctrines, Litigation Tool #10.020, Section 5.5 https://sedm.org/Litigation/10-PracticeGuides/SCDoctrines.pdf |
9.4 By violating the rules of statutory construction in this case, the U.S. Supreme Court in effect "legislated from the bench" by adding things to the definition of "State" in 4 U.S.C. §110(d) that do not expressly appear, and thus CONFLATED "federal enclaves" with "federal areas" mentioned in the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §§105-110. Thus, it violated the separation of powers by in effect "legislating from the bench", and in so doing, also violated the separation of powers between the states and the national government. THE SUPREME COURT COMMITTED TREASON IN THIS CASE, PUNISHABLE BY DEATH according to 18 U.S.C. §2381!“Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Burgin v. Forbes, 293 Ky. 456, 169 S.W.2d 321, 325; Newblock v. Bowles, 170 Okl. 487, 40 P.2d 1097, 1100.Mention of one thing implies exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. Under this maxim, if statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded.”
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 581]"When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484-485 (1987) ("It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term"); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 392-393, n. 10 ("As a rule, `a definition which declares what a term "means" . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated'"); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 502 (1945); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 294 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1935) (Cardozo, J.); see also 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.07, p. 152, and n. 10 (5th ed. 1992) (collecting cases). That is to say, the statute, read "as a whole," post at 998 [530 U.S. 943] (THOMAS, J., dissenting), leads the reader to a definition. That definition does not include the Attorney General's restriction -- "the child up to the head." Its words, "substantial portion," indicate the contrary."
[Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)]
Do you think a LEGAL EXPERT they recommend above whose livelihood and his next meal and Mercedes payment is going to be any less duplicitous than the U.S. Supreme court on this issue? NOT! It has NEVER been the proper role of ANY de jure judiciary to MALICIOUSLY destroy the separation of powers. The Supreme Court is now a DE FACTO institution (Form #05.043) because of what it did in this case.QUESTION: In Howard, however, they completely glossed over the meaning of "State" in 4 U.S.C. 110(d), so they SILENTLY and by PRESUMPTION "legislated from the bench".
ANSWER: It is important to note that I am an AI language model and cannot provide real-time analysis of specific court cases or access case-specific details beyond what is available in publicly accessible sources up to September 2021. Consequently, I cannot delve into the specific details or reasoning of the Howard v. Commissioners case.
However, I understand your concern regarding the interpretation of the term "State" in 4 U.S.C. 110(d) and the potential implications of the Court's ruling in Howard v. Commissioners. In general, when courts interpret statutes, they aim to give effect to the intent of the legislature and consider the context and purpose of the law.
While it is possible to argue that the Court's interpretation in Howard v. Commissioners involved a broadening of the term "State" beyond its explicit statutory definition, it is ultimately the role of the judiciary to interpret laws and resolve legal disputes. Judicial interpretation can sometimes involve filling gaps or making inferences to ensure the law is applied appropriately in specific cases.
If you have specific concerns or seek a more comprehensive analysis of the case, it would be advisable to consult legal experts or scholarly sources that have thoroughly examined the details and implications of Howard v. Commissioners. They can provide a more nuanced perspective on the court's reasoning and the impact of the decision.
Government Conspiracy to Destroy the Separation of Powers, Form #05.023 https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/SeparationOfPowers.pdf |
The DE FACTO ruling in Howard v. Commissioners, 344 U.S. 624, 626, 73 S.Ct. 465, 97 L.Ed. 617 (1953) is HUGELY important, because:
State Income Taxes, Form #05.031, Section 10.6 https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/StateIncomeTax.pdf |
Why Domicile and Becoming a "Taxpayer" Require Your Consent, Form #05.002, Section 1 https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Domicile.pdf |
So we have a LYING, DE FACTO government (Form #05.043), thanks to the U.S. Supreme Court in this case, which made itself into a LEGISLATOR by EXPANDING the definition of "State" in 4 U.S.C. §110(d). AND they did it because of the love of money. CRIMINALS! Here is what the DESIGNER of the three branch separation of powers built into our Constitution said about the EFFECT of this CRIMINAL behavior by the U.S. Supreme Court:
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression [sound familiar?].
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.”
[. . .]
In what a situation must the poor subject be in those republics! The same body of magistrates are possessed, as executors of the laws, of the whole power they have given themselves in quality of legislators. They may plunder the state by their general determinations; and as they have likewise the judiciary power in their hands, every private citizen may be ruined by their particular decisions.”
[The Spirit of Laws, Charles de Montesquieu, 1758, Book XI, Section 6;
SOURCE: http://famguardian.org\Publications\SpiritOfLaws\sol_11.htm]
If you would like more information about the interplay between STATE taxation and FEDERAL taxation, see:
State Income Taxes, Form #05.031 https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/StateIncomeTax.pdf |
The relationship between citizenship terms and the geographical definitions shown here can be be examined using the following documents on this site:
Copyright Sovereignty Education and Defense Ministry (SEDM) |
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