Contents

4. AVOIDING GOVERNMENT FRANCHISES, LICENSES, AND IDENTITY THEFT

This section deals with how to lawfully avoid government "franchises". A "franchise" is an arrangement usually between you and the government, the voluntary acceptance of which puts you into a "privileged" state and causes a surrender of rights of one kind or another. The courts call "franchises" by various pseudonames to disguise the nature of the inferior relation to the government of "franchisees", such as "public right" or "privilege". Franchises include but are not limited to:

A public office:
“Is it a franchise? A franchise is said to be a right reserved to the people by the constitution, as the elective franchise. Again, it is said to be a privilege conferred by grant from government, and vested in one or more individuals, as a public office. Corporations, or bodies politic are the most usual franchises known to our laws."
[People v. Ridgley, 21 Ill. 65, 1859 WL 6687, 11 Peck 65 (Ill., 1859)]
All federal and state income taxes. Click here for details.
Domicile in the forum state, which causes one to end up being one of the following:

3.1 Statutory "U.S. citizen" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1401 if a domestic national.

3.2 Statutory "Permanent resident" pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1)(A) if a foreign national.
Becoming a notary public. This makes the applicant into a "public official" commissioned by the state government.

Chapter 1

Introduction

§1.1 Generally

A notary public (sometimes called a notary) is a public official appointed under authority of law with power, among other things, to administer oaths, certify affidavits, take acknowledgments, take depositions, perpetuate testimony, and protect negotiable instruments. Notaries are not appointed under federal law; they are appointed under the authority of the various states, districts, territories, as in the case of the Virgin Islands, and the commonwealth, in the case of Puerto Rico. The statutes, which define the powers and duties of a notary public, frequently grant the notary the authority to do all acts justified by commercial usage and the "law merchant".

[Anderson's Manual for Notaries Public, Ninth Edition, 2001, ISBN 1-58360-357-3]
Becoming a registered "voter" rather than an "elector".
Serving as a jurist. 18 U.S.C. §201(a)(1) says that all persons serving as federal jurists are "public officials".
I.R.C. 501(c )(3) status for churches. Churches that register under this program become government "trustees" and "public officials" that are part of the government. Is THIS what you call "separation of church and state"? Click here (OFFSITE LINK) for details.
Most but not all licensed activities, such as:
8.1 Attorney licenses. All attorneys are "officers of the court" and the courts in turn are part of the government. Click here for details.
8.2 Marriage licenses. Click here for details.
8.3 Driver's licenses. Click here for details.
8.4 Professional licenses.
8.5 Fishing licenses.
All government "benefits", including, but not limited to:
9.1 Social Security benefits. Click here for details.
9.1 Medicare.
9.2 Medicaid.
FDIC insurance of banks. 31 C.F.R. §202.2 says all FDIC insured banks are "agents" of the federal government and therefore "public officers".
Participation of banks in the federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. §90 makes all "national banks" that are part of the Federal Reserve System into "agents of the government".
Patents.
Copyrights.

The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that private conduct is beyond the reach of the government and that certain harmful, and therefore regulated activities may cause the actors to become “public officers” when it held the following.

“One great object of the Constitution is to permit citizens to structure their private relations as they choose subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional law. [500 U.S. 614, 620]

To implement these principles, courts must consider from time to time where the governmental sphere [e.g. “public purpose” and “public office”] ends and the private sphere begins. Although the conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in most instances, governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional constraints. This is the jurisprudence of state action, which explores the "essential dichotomy" between the private sphere and the public sphere, with all its attendant constitutional obligations. Moose Lodge, supra, at 172.“

[. . .]

Given that the statutory authorization for the challenges exercised in this case is clear, the remainder of our state action analysis centers around the second part of the Lugar test, whether a private litigant, in all fairness, must be deemed a government actor in the use of peremptory challenges. Although we have recognized that this aspect of the analysis is often a fact-bound inquiry, see Lugar, supra, 457 U.S. at 939, our cases disclose certain principles of general application. Our precedents establish that, in determining whether a particular action or course of conduct is governmental in character, it is relevant to examine the following:

[1] the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, see Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);

[2] whether the the actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic [500 U.S. 614, 622] Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 544 -545 (1987);

[3] and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority, see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

Based on our application of these three principles to the circumstances here, we hold that the exercise of peremptory challenges by the defendant in the District Court was pursuant to a course of state action.
[Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614 (1991)]

Note that the "statutory or decisional law" they are referring to above are ONLY.

Criminal law.
Civil franchises that you consensually engage in using your right to contract.
The common law. This protects exclusively private rights beyond the control of government.

For an explanation of why this is, see: Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037.

Nearly every type of government-issued benefit, license, or "privilege" you could possibly procure requires the participant to be a "public officer", "public official", "fiduciary", "alien", "resident", 'transferee", or "trustee" of the government of one kind or another with a "residence" on federal territory.

“All the powers of the government [ including ALL of its civil enforcement powers (FORM #05.032) against the public] must be carried into operation by individual agency, either through the medium of public officers, or contracts made with [private] individuals.”
[Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824)]

The application or license to procure the " benefits" (FORM #05.040) of the franchise constitutes the contract mentioned above that creates the "RES" which is "IDENT-ified" within the government's legislative jurisdiction on federal territory. Hence "RES-IDENT"/"resident".

"Res. Lat. The subject matter of a trust [the Social Security Trust or the "public trust"/"public office", in most cases] or will [or legislation]. In the civil law, a thing; an object. As a term of the law, this word has a very wide and extensive signification, including not only things which are objects of property, but also such as are not capable of individual ownership. And in old English law it is said to have a general import, comprehending both corporeal and incorporeal things of whatever kind, nature, or species. By "res," according to the modern civilians, is meant everything that may form an object of rights, in opposition to "persona," which is regarded as a subject of rights. "Res," therefore, in its general meaning, comprises actions [or CONSEQUENCES of choices and CONTRACTS/AGREEMENTS you make by procuring BENEFITS] of all kinds; while in its restricted sense it comprehends every object of right, except actions. This has reference to the fundamental division of the Institutes that all law relates either to persons, to things, or to actions.

Res is everything that may form an object of rights and includes an object, subject-matter or status. In re Riggle's Will, 11 A.D.2d 51 205 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21, 22. The term is particularly applied to an object, subject-matter, or status, considered as the defendant [hence, the ALL CAPS NAME] in an action, or as an object against which, directly, proceedings are taken. Thus, in a prize case, the captured vessel is "the res"; and proceedings of this character are said to be in rem. (See In personam; In Rem.) "Res" may also denote the action or proceeding, as when a cause, which is not between adversary parties, is entitled "In re ______".
[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, pp. 1304-1306]

The "subject matter or status" they are talking about includes all privileged statuses such as "taxpayer", "benefit recipient", or statutory "U.S. citizen" (8 U.S.C. §1401), or statutory "U.S. resident (alien)" (26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1)(A)). Even domicile is a type of franchise--a "protection franchise", to be precise. This "res-ident" is what most people in the freedom community would refer to as your "straw man". If a state-issued license or benefit is at issue, the territory that the privilege or franchise attaches to is federal territory that is usually in a federal area within the exterior limits of the state. The reason all licenses must presume domicile of the "person" on federal territory is that they are implemented using civil law and they regulate the exercise of rights protected by the Constitution, which in turn is a violation of rights. The Constitution and the Bill of Rights portion of the Constitution does not apply on federal territory, and therefore there is no conflict with the Constitution in regulating the exercise of rights there.

“Indeed, the practical interpretation put by Congress upon the Constitution has been long continued and uniform to the effect [182 U.S. 244, 279] that the Constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase or conquest, only when and so far as Congress shall so direct. Notwithstanding its duty to 'guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government' (art. 4, 4), by which we understand, according to the definition of Webster, 'a government in which the supreme power resides in the whole body of the people, and is exercised by representatives elected by them,' Congress did not hesitate, in the original organization of the territories of Louisiana, Florida, the Northwest Territory, and its subdivisions of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin and still more recently in the case of Alaska, to establish a form of government bearing a much greater analogy to a British Crown colony than a republican state of America, and to vest the legislative power either in a governor and council, or a governor and judges, to be appointed by the President. It was not until they had attained a certain population that power was given them to organize a legislature by vote of the people. In all these cases, as well as in territories subsequently organized west of the Mississippi, Congress thought it necessary either to extend to Constitution and laws of the United States over them, or to declare that the inhabitants should be entitled to enjoy the right of trial by jury, of bail, and of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as other privileges of the bill of rights.”
[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

Consent to the franchise contract or agreement is therefore what creates the statutory “person” and “individual”, or “res-ident” who is the only proper subject of the franchise in the otherwise foreign jurisdiction. That is why the definition of “foreign” and “domestic” in the Internal Revenue Code hinges on whether the “person” is in fact a corporation:

26 U.S. Code § 7701 – Definitions

(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof—

(4) Domestic
The term “domestic” when applied to a corporation or partnership means created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or of any State unless, in the case of a partnership, the Secretary provides otherwise by regulations.

(5) Foreign
The term “foreign” when applied to a corporation or partnership means a corporation or partnership which is not domestic.
[26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(4)-(5)]

Note that based on the above definitions, those who are NOT corporate statutory “persons” would be “foreign” rather than “domestic”, and a STATUTORY “non-resident non-person”. This STATUTORY “non-resident non-person” is described in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(31) as not engaged in a public office and whose property is a “foreign estate”. The “partnership” they are talking about in the above definition is the same partnership invoked in the definition of “person” at 26 U.S.C. §§6671(b) and 7343, which is a partnership between the United States Federal Corporation and an otherwise PRIVATE human or entity. That partnership gives rise to agency on behalf of said corporation, and the agency itself is the only proper subject of tax. Remember: Contracts create agency:

“All the powers of the government [including ALL of its civil enforcement powers against the public] must be carried into operation by individual agency, either through the medium of public officers, or contracts made with [private] individuals.”
[Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824)]

Notice that the tax extends wherever the GOVERNMENT extends, meaning the PUBLIC OFFICES of the government, because Congress can only tax what it creates, and it didn’t create HUMANS. The only thing it can create are bogus franchise offices and fool legally ignorant humans into volunteering for them using deceptive government forms which are deliberately not trustworthy and contain LIES:

“Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L.Ed. 98, was an action of trespass or, as appears by the original record, replevin, brought in the circuit court for the District of Columbia to try the right of Congress to impose a direct tax for general purposes on that District. 3 Stat. at L. 216, chap. 60. It was insisted that Congress could act in a double capacity: in one as legislating [182 U.S. 244, 260] for the states; in the other as a local legislature for the District of Columbia. In the latter character, it was admitted that the power of levying direct taxes might be exercised, but for District purposes only, as a state legislature might tax for state purposes; but that it could not legislate for the District under art. 1, 8, giving to Congress the power 'to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises,' which 'shall be uniform throughout the United States,' inasmuch as the District was no part of the United States [described in the Constitution]. It was held that the grant of this power was a general one without limitation as to place, and consequently extended to all places over which the government extends; and that it extended to the District of Columbia as a constituent part of the United States. The fact that art. 1 , 2, declares that 'representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states . . . according to their respective numbers' furnished a standard by which taxes were apportioned, but not to exempt any part of the country from their operation. 'The words used do not mean that direct taxes shall be imposed on states only which are represented, or shall be apportioned to representatives; but that direct taxation, in its application to states, shall be apportioned to numbers.' That art. 1, 9, 4, declaring that direct taxes shall be laid in proportion to the census, was applicable to the District of Columbia, 'and will enable Congress to apportion on it its just and equal share of the burden, with the same accuracy as on the respective states. If the tax be laid in this proportion, it is within the very words of the restriction. It is a tax in proportion to the census or enumeration referred to.' It was further held that the words of the 9th section did not 'in terms require that the system of direct taxation, when resorted to, shall be extended to the territories, as the words of the 2d section require that it shall be extended to all the states. They therefore may, without violence, be understood to give a rule when the territories shall be taxed, without imposing the necessity of taxing them.'”
[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

In fact, we refer to all statutory “residents” simply as “government contractors”. Below is an example of how this identity theft and kidnapping occurs in fraudulently creating this “res-ident”. The word of art “trade or business” is defined as “the functions of a public office” in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26). When one indicates that they are engaged in the privileged “trade or business”/public office activity, they at that point are treated as and are presumed to be “resident aliens” within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code:

26 C.F.R. §301.7701-5 Domestic, foreign, resident, and nonresident persons.(4-1-04)

A domestic corporation is one organized or created in the United States, including only the States (and during the periods when not States, the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii), and the District of Columbia, or under the law of the United States or of any State or Territory. A foreign corporation is one which is not domestic. A domestic corporation is a resident corporation even though it does no business and owns no property in the United States. A foreign corporation engaged in trade or business within the United States is referred to in the regulations in this chapter as a resident foreign corporation, and a foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business within the United States, as a nonresident foreign corporation. A partnership engaged in trade or business within the United States is referred to in the regulations in this chapter as a resident partnership, and a partnership not engaged in trade or business within the United States, as a nonresident partnership. Whether a partnership is to be regarded as resident or nonresident is not determined by the nationality or residence of its members or by the place in which it was created or organized.
[Amended by T.D. 8813, Federal Register: February 2, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 21), Page 4967-4975]

_________________________________________________________________________________________

Consensus facit legem.
Consent makes the law. A contract is a law between the parties, which can acquire force only by consent.
[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856;
SOURCE: http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

Applying for any kind of "privilege" or franchise from the government or engaging in the activity that constitutes the privilege amounts to your constructive consent to be treated as a "resident alien" who is domiciled on federal territory and who has no constitutional rights. The following articles and forms describe this straw man and provide tools to notify the government that you have disconnected yourself from this "straw man" who is the "public officer" that is the only proper or lawful subject of most federal legislation:

Participating in federal franchises has the following effects upon the legal status of various types of "persons" listed below. The right column describes the status of the "public officer" you represent while you are acting in that capacity. The right column is a judicial creation not found directly in the statutes and which results from the application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §1605. It does not describe your own private status. This "public officer" in the right column is the "straw man" that is the subject of nearly all federal legislation that could or does regulate your conduct. Without the existence of the straw man, the Thirteenth Amendment would make it illegal to enforce federal civil law against human beings because of the prohibition against involuntary servitude. For details on how the change in "choice of law" is effected by you voluntarily consenting to assume the duties of the "public officer" straw man, read sections 13 through 13.6 of our pamphlet below:

Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030.

Entity type	Sovereign status within federal civil statutory law WITHOUT franchises	Status in federal law AFTER accepting franchise
Human being born within and domiciled within a state of the Union	Non-resident non-person (Form #05.020)	"Resident alien" (26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1)(A)) "Alien individual" (26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1(c)(3)) "Alien" (See Form #10.011, Section 12.1)
	Private man or woman	"Public officer" Trustee of the "public trust"
	Constitutional but not statutory "citizen" (See Why You Are a "national", "state national", and Constitutional but not Statutory Citizen)	Statutory "U.S. citizen" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1401 or 8 U.S.C. &1101(a)(22)(A) because representing a federal corporation under 28 U.S.C. §3002(15)(A) which is a "citizen" pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) NOT a constitutional "citizen of the United States" pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment
	"Stateless person" "Transient foreigner"	Inhabitant
	Foreigner	Domestic person "U.S. person" (26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(30)) Domiciliary
State of the Union	"state" "foreign state"	Statutory "State" as defined in 4 U.S.C. §110(d) (see Federal Trade Zone Act, 1934, 19 U.S.C. 81a-81u)
Trust	Foreigner Foreign estate (26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(31)) Nonstatutory trust	Domestic person "U.S. person" (26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(30)) Statutory trust
State corporation	Foreigner Foreign estate (26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(31))	Domestic person "U.S. person" (26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(30))
Federal corporation	Domestic person "U.S. person" "Person" (already privileged)	Domestic person "U.S. person" (26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(30)) "Person" (already privileged)

WARNING: Participating in ANY government franchise can leave you entirely without standing or remedy in any federal court! Essentially, by eating out of the government's hand, you are SCREWED, BLACK AND BLUED, and TATTOOED! The language below comes from the Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine (Litigation Tool #10.020) of the U.S. Supreme Court:

"These general rules are well settled:

(1) That the United States, when it creates rights in individuals against itself [a "public right", which is a euphemism for a "franchise" to help the court disguise the nature of the transaction], is under no obligation to provide a remedy through the courts. United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 9 Sup. Ct. 12, 32 L. Ed. 354; Ex parte Atocha, 17 Wall. 439, 21 L. Ed. 696; Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall. 188, 195, 19 L. Ed. 35; De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 431, 433, 18 L. Ed. 700; Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, 212, 7 L. Ed. 108.

(2) That where a statute creates a right and provides a special remedy, that remedy is exclusive. Wilder Manufacturing Co. v. Corn Products Co., 236 U. S. 165, 174, 175, 35 Sup. Ct. 398, 59 L. Ed. 520, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 118; Arnson v. Murphy, 109 U. S. 238, 3 Sup. Ct. 184, 27 L. Ed. 920; Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U. S. 555, 558, 25 L. Ed. 212; Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 35, 23 L. Ed. 196. Still the fact that the right and the remedy are thus intertwined might not, if the provision stood alone, require us to hold that the remedy expressly given excludes a right of review by the Court of Claims, where the decision of the special tribunal involved no disputed question of fact and the denial of compensation was rested wholly upon the construction of the act. See Medbury v. United States, 173 U. S. 492, 198, 19 Sup. Ct. 503, 43 L. Ed. 779; Parish v. MacVeagh, 214 U. S. 124, 29 Sup. Ct. 556, 53 L. Ed. 936; McLean v. United States, 226 U. S. 374, 33 Sup. Ct. 122, 57 L. Ed. 260; United States v. Laughlin (No. 200), 249 U. S. 440, 39 Sup. Ct. 340, 63 L. Ed. 696, decided April 14, 1919."
[U.S. v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 39 S.Ct. 464 (1919)]

For a detailed exposition of why the above is true, see also Allen v. Graham, 8 Ariz.App. 336, 446 P.2d 240 (Ariz.App. 1968). Signing up for government entitlements hands them essentially a blank check, because they, and not you, determine the cost for the service and how much you will pay for it beyond that point. This makes the public servant into your Master and beyond that point, you must lick the hands that feed you. Watch Out! NEVER, EVER take a hand-out from the government of ANY kind, or you'll end up being their CHEAP WHORE. The Bible calls this WHORE "Babylon the Great Harlot". Remember: Black's Law Dictionary defines "commerce", e.g. commerce with the GOVERNMENT, as "intercourse". Bend over!

Commerce. …Intercourse by way of trade and traffic between different peoples or states and the citizens or inhabitants thereof, including not only the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities, but also the instrumentalities [governments] and agencies by which it is promoted and the means and appliances by which it is carried on…”
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 269]

Government franchises and licenses are the main method for destroying the sovereignty of the people pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1603(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2). They are also the MAIN method that our public servants abuse to escape the straight jacket chains of the constitution. Below is an admission by the U.S. Supreme Court of this fact in relation to Social Security:

“We must conclude that a person covered by the Act has not such a right in benefit payments… This is not to say, however, that Congress may exercise its power to modify the statutory scheme free of all constitutional restraint.”
[Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960)]

For further details on how franchises destroy rights and undermine the constitutional requirement for equal protection, read the Sovereignty Forms and Instructions Manual, Form #10.005, Sections 1.4 though 1.11.