Proof of Facts: Proof that PUBLIC property and “Benefits” are the REAL problem
The following authorities establish that asking for and actually receiving government/public property or “benefits” are how you essentially ASSENT to the obligations associated with the status that is eligible for the property.
The KEY to understanding the SCAM of “benefits” and public property is:
- WHO defines whether it is a “benefit” or NOT: YOU or the government?
- Do you have a PRIVATE right to NOT receive the benefit WITHOUT having to accept a public civil status to exercise that right?
- Does the government offer you a way, including the appropriate forms and procedures to withdraw consent to RECEIVE the benefit?
- Is it REALLY a “benefit” if you never receive REAL consideration as a PRIVATE right. Privileges do NOT convey an unalienable private right to ANYTHING? Their “benefits” can be unilaterally withdrawn without your consent. Thus, they do not satisfy the contractual requirement of mutual obligation and mutual consideration.
- Does it violate the oath of public officers to protect private property to in effect create a profitable BUSINESS called a “franchise” out of ALIENATING rights that the Declaration of Independence says are UNALIENABLE? YES!
Government is supposed to be the servant and YOU are their only customer. You as the absolute owner of yourself are the ONLY one who therefore can define whether what they offer is a “benefit”. If they define it for you in a way that impairs your PRIVATE property ownership or exercises control over your private property, they are STEALING. James Madison, the person from who’s notes the Constitution was written, had the following to say about allowing governments to offer “benefits” to special classes of consenting parties:
“With respect to the words general welfare, I have always regarded them as qualified by the detail of powers connected with them. To take them in a literal and unlimited sense would be a metamorphosis of the Constitution into a character which there is a host of proofs was not contemplated by its creator.”
“If Congress can employ money indefinitely to the general welfare, and are the sole and supreme judges of the general welfare, they may take the care of religion into their own hands; they may appoint teachers in every State, county and parish and pay them out of their public treasury; they may take into their own hands the education of children, establishing in like manner schools throughout the Union; they may assume the provision of the poor; they may undertake the regulation of all roads other than post-roads; in short, every thing, from the highest object of state legislation down to the most minute object of police, would be thrown under the power of Congress…. Were the power of Congress to be established in the latitude contended for, it would subvert the very foundations, and transmute the very nature of the limited Government established by the people of America.”
“If Congress can do whatever in their discretion can be done by money, and will promote the general welfare, the government is no longer a limited one possessing enumerated powers, but an indefinite one subject to particular exceptions.”
[James Madison. House of Representatives, February 7, 1792, On the Cod Fishery Bill, granting Bounties]
Thomas Jefferson said exactly the same thing:
Congress has not unlimited powers to provide for the general welfare, but only those specifically enumerated.
They are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose. To consider the latter phrase not as describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent power to do any act they please which may be good for the Union, would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power completely useless. It would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States; and as they would be the sole judges of the good or evil, it would be also a power to do whatever evil they please…. Certainly no such universal power was meant to be given them. It was intended to lace them up straightly within the enumerated powers and those without which, as means, these powers could not be carried into effect.
That of instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States; and, as they would be the sole judges of the good or evil, it would be also a power to do whatever evil they please.
[Thomas Jefferson: Opinion on National Bank, 1791. ME 3:148; SOURCE: http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Politics/ThomasJefferson/jeff1020.htm and
http://thefederalistpapers.org/founders/jefferson/thomas-jefferson-opinion-on-national-bank-1791]
For more on this subject, see:
- The Government “Benefits” Scam, Form #05.040** (Member Subscriptions)
https://sedm.org/product/the-government-benefits-scam-form-05-040/ - Sovereignty Forms and Instructions Online, Form #10.004, Cites by Topic: “Benefit”
https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/Benefit.htm - Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Franchises.pdf - Why the Government is the Only Real Beneficiary of All Government Franchises, Form #05.051** (Member Subscriptions)
https://sedm.org/product/why-the-government-is-the-only-real-beneficiary-of-all-government-franchises-form-05-051/ - Property View of Income Taxation, Form #12.046-income taxes are “RENT” on public/government property
https://sedm.org/LibertyU/PropertyViewOfIncomeTax.pdf
“The power of taxation, indispensable to the existence of every civilized government, is exercised upon the assumption of an equivalent rendered to the taxpayer in the protection of his person and property, in adding to the value of such property, or in the creation and maintenance of public conveniences in which he shares — such, for instance, as roads, bridges, sidewalks, pavements, and schools for the education of his children. If the taxing power be in no position to render these services, or otherwise to benefit the person or property taxed, and such property be wholly within the taxing power of another state, to which it may be said to owe an allegiance, and to which it looks for protection, the taxation of such property within the domicil of the owner partakes rather of the nature of an extortion than a tax and has been repeatedly held by this Court to be beyond the power of the legislature, and a taking of property without due process of law. Railroad Company v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262 ; State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Tappan v. Merchants’ National Bank, 19 Wall. 490, 499 ; Delaware &c. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341, 358 . In Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, it was held, after full consideration, that the taking of private property [199 U.S. 203] without compensation was a denial of due process within the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102; Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417; Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 519.”
[Union Refrigerator Transit Company v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905)]
[EDITORIAL: Receipt or eligibility for a “benefit” creates the statutory “person” who is the object of taxation. To rebut the liability, rebut the eligibility for the benefit so you can claim that its extortion. For an example how to do that in the case of Social Security, see:
Why You Aren’t Eligible for Social Security, Form #06.001
https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/SSNotEligible.pdf]
We think that the selection of such income for taxation at rates and with deductions not shown to be unrelated to an equitable distribution of the tax burden is not a denial of the equal protection commanded by the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. It cannot be doubted that the receipt of dividends from a corporation is an event which may constitutionally be taxed either with or without deductions, Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 , 38 S.Ct. 543; see Helvering v. Inde- [305 U.S. 134, 144] pendent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 , 54 S.Ct. 758, 760, even though the corporate income which is their source has also been taxed. See Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 129, 136 , 6 S.Ct. 645, 647; Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 23 , 51 S.Ct. 15, 73 A.L.R. 679; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 420 , 56 S.Ct. 252, 254, 102 A.L.R. 54. The fact that the dividends of corporations which have to some extent borne the burden of state taxation constitute a distinct class for purposes of tax exemption, Colgate v. Harvey, supra; compare Travelers’ Insurance Company v. Connecticut, 185 U.S. 364, 367 , 22 S.Ct. 673, 674; Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U.S. 730 , 23 S.Ct. 401; Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U.S. 390, 398 , 33 S.Ct. 120, and that in consequence such dividends have borne no tax burden, is equally a basis for their selection for taxation. Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U.S. 122, 124 , 125 S., 41 S.Ct. 43, 44; Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, supra. Any classification of taxation is permissible which has reasonable relation to a legitimate end of governmental action. Taxation is but the means by which government distributes the burdens of its cost among those who enjoy its benefits. And the distribution of a tax burden by placing it in part on a special class which by reason of the taxing policy of the State has escaped all tax during the taxable period is not a denial of equal protection. See Watson v. Comptroller, supra, page 125, 41 S.Ct. page 44. Nor is the tax any more a denial of equal protection because retroactive. If the 1933 dividends differed sufficiently from other classes of income to admit of the taxation, in that year, of one without the other, lapse of time did not remove that difference so as to compel equality of treatment when the income was taxed at a later date. Selection then of the dividends for the new taxation can hardly be thought to be hostile or invidious when the basis of selection is the fact that the taxed income is of the class which has borne no tax burden. The equal protection clause does not preclude the legislature from changing its mind in making an otherwise permissible choice of subjects of taxation. The very fact that [305 U.S. 134, 145] the dividends were relieved of tax, when the need for revenue was less, is basis for the legislative judgment that they should bear some of the added burden when the need is greater.
Numerous retroactive revisions of the federal and Wisconsin revenue laws, presently to be discussed, have imposed taxes on subjects previously untaxed and shifted the burden of old taxes by changes in rates, exemptions and deductions. It has never been thought that such changes involve a denial of equal protection if the new taxes could have been included in the earlier act when adopted. If some retroactive alteration in the scheme of a tax act is permissible, as is conceded, it seems plain that validity, so far as equal protection is concerned must be determined, as in the case of any other tax, by ascertaining whether the thing taxed falls within a distinct class which may rationally be treated differently from other classes. If such changes are forbidden in the name of equal protection, legislatures in laying new taxes would be left powerless to rectify to any extent a previous distribution of tax burdens which experience had shown to be inequitable, even though constitutional.
The bare fact that the present tax is imposed at different rates and with different deductions from those applied to other types of income does not establish unconstitutionality. It is a commonplace that the equal protection clause does not require a state to maintain rigid rules of equal taxation, to resort to close distinctions, or to maintain a precise scientific uniformity. Possible differences in tax burdens, not shown to be substantial, or which are based on discrimination not shown to be arbitrary or capricious, do not fall within the constitutional prohibition. Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 284 , 285 S., 52 S.Ct. 556, 558, 559, 87 A.L.R. 374, and cases cited.
Just what the differences are in the tax burdens cast upon the two types of income by the divergence in rates [305 U.S. 134, 146] and deductions applied to them does not appear. The burden placed on dividends by the taxing act might have been greater if they had been included in gross income and taxed on the same basis as other income since, in that case, the resulting increase in net income would be taxed at the rates applicable to the higher brackets. When the challenged statute was enacted there were available to the legislature the returns for the taxable year showing the different classes of income, the application to them of the existing law, and the effect of existing rates and deductions. There were also data to be derived from the corporation tax returns showing what part of the exempted dividends had their source in corporate income which had been taxed to the corporation and what part was attributable to corporate income not similarly taxed. The legislature was free to take into account all these factors in prescribing rates and deductions to be applied to the newly taxed dividends so as to arrive at an equitable distribution of the added tax burden. In the absence of any facts tending to show that the taxing act, in its purpose or effect, is a hostile or oppressive discrimination against the recipients of dividends who have been hitherto fortunate enough to escape all taxation we cannot say the taxing statute denies equal protection.
Second. The objection chiefly urged to the taxing statute is that it is a denial of due process of law because in 1935 it imposed a tax on income received in 1933. But a tax is not necessarily unconstitutional because retroactive. Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 21 , 51 S.Ct. 324, 326, and cases cited. Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. [305 U.S. 134, 147] Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive imposition does not necessarily infringe due process, and to challenge the present tax it is not enough to point out that the taxable event, the receipt of income, antedated the statute.
In the cases in which this Court has held invalid the taxation of gifts made and completely vested before the enactment of the taxing statute, decision was rested on the ground that the nature or amount of the tax could not reasonably have been anticipated by the taxpayer at the time of the particular voluntary act which the statute later made the taxable event. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542 , 47 S.Ct. 710, 713, 52 A.L.R. 1081; Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445 , 48 S.Ct. 353, 354 (citing Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147 , 48 S.Ct. 105, 106); Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 , 51 S.Ct. 306. Since, in each of these cases, the donor might freely have chosen to give or not to give, the taxation, after the choice was made, of a gift which he might well have refrained from making had he anticipated the tax, was thought to be so arbitrary and oppressive as to be a denial of due process. But there are other forms of taxation whose retroactive imposition cannot be said to be similarly offensive, because their incidence is not on the voluntary act of the taxpayer. And even a retroactive gift tax has been held valid where the donor was forewarned by the statute books of the possibility of such a levy, Milliken v. United States, supra. In each case it is necessary to consider the nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid before it can be said that its retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation.
“The contention was rejected that a citizen’s property without the limits of the United States derives no benefit from the United States. The contention, it was said, came from the confusion of thought in “mistaking the scope and extent of the sovereign power of the United States as a nation and its relations to its citizens and their relations to it.” And that power in its scope and extent, it was decided, is based on the presumption that government by its very nature benefits the citizen and his property wherever found, and that opposition to it holds on to citizenship while it “belittles and destroys its advantages and blessings by denying the possession by government of an essential power required to make citizenship completely beneficial.” In other words, the principle was declared that the government, by its very nature, benefits the citizen and his property wherever found and, therefore, has the power to make the benefit complete. Or to express it another way, the basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or out of the United States, and was not and cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen, that being in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation of the latter to him as citizen. The consequence of the relations is that the native citizen who is taxed may have domicile, and the property from which his income is derived may have situs, in a foreign country and the tax be legal — the government having power to impose the tax.”
“The compensation which the owners of property, not having any special rights or privileges from the government in connection with it, may demand for its use, or for their own services in union with it, forms no element of consideration [BENEFIT] in prescribing regulations for that purpose.
[. . .]
“It is only where some right or privilege [which are GOVERNMENT/PUBLIC PROPERTY] is conferred by the government or municipality upon the owner, which he can use in connection with his property, or by means of which the use of his property is rendered more valuable to him, or he thereby enjoys an advantage over others, that the compensation to be received by him becomes a legitimate matter of regulation. Submission to the regulation of compensation in such cases is an implied condition of the grant, and the State, in exercising its power of prescribing the compensation, only determines the conditions upon which its concession shall be enjoyed. When the privilege ends, the power of regulation [and taxation] ceases.”
[. . .]
The State in such cases exercises no greater right than an individual may exercise over the use of his own property when leased or loaned to others. The conditions upon which the privilege shall be enjoyed being stated or implied in the legislation authorizing its grant, no right is, of course, impaired by their enforcement. The recipient of the privilege, in effect, stipulates to comply with the conditions. It matters not how limited the privilege conferred, its acceptance implies an assent [IMPLIED CONSENT] to the regulation of its use and the compensation for it.
[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6419197193322400931]
IMPORTANT NOTES ON THE MUNN CASE ABOVE:
1.The use of the word “CONCESSION” above implies that they are SELLING you something as a MERCHANT under U.C.C. § 2-104(1). That makes you a BUYER under U.C.C. §2-103(1)(a). What they are SELLING is CIVIL STATUTORY “protection”, which is in effect a Private Member Association (PMA). You have to JOIN the government to receive this protection. See Form #05.037.
2.What they are selling are PUBLIC PROPERTY consisting of services, benefits, and payments. If you accept these things, they come bundled with the power to regulate and tax. That regulation is an implementation of Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 power to make rules over government property. WATCH OUT!
3.Note the phrase “It matters not how limited the privilege conferred, its acceptance implies an assent to the regulation of its use and the compensation for it.”.
3.1. This is an admission they can charge or tax ANY AMOUNT or impose ANY obligation upon you that they want in connection with the privilege. Thus, it becomes a “WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION” for ALL of your private rights and complete anarchy in the process.
3.2 NO OTHER business has the ability to do this: WRITE their own check and charge whatever they want for their services. This is CLEARLY an ADHESION contract.
4.Notice also the use of the word “assent”. In this case, they are describing an act of IMPLIED consent, which is CONSENT through ACTION rather than in WRITING. I you and only you don’t have the ability to define exactly when and how you consent, then YOU ARE LITERALLY A SLAVE beyond that point. They can claim ANY arbitrary act constitutes consent to ANYTHING they want, even without your knowledge!
5.This adhesion contract works BOTH ways. If you pay them more than you owe or they receive your property by mistake, YOU can regulate or tax or control THEM so long as they have the constitutionally required “reasonable notice” (Form #05.022) of the connected obligation! See the following for how to do this:
Injury Defense Franchise and Agreement, Form #06.027
https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/InjuryDefenseFranchise.pdf
For the proper way to approach the government’s OFFER as a Merchant, see:
Path to Freedom, Form #09.015, Sections 5.5-5.7
https://sedm.org/download-ministry-resource/?wdt_column_filter%5B0%5D=203
“We have repeatedly held that the Federal Government may impose appropriate conditions on the use of federal property or privileges and may require that state instrumentalities comply with conditions that are reasonably related to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs. See, e. g., Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294 -296 (1958); Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 142 -144 (1947); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940); cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). A requirement that States, like all other users, pay a portion of the costs of the benefits they enjoy from federal programs is surely permissible since it is closely related to the [435 U.S. 444, 462] federal interest in recovering costs from those who benefit and since it effects no greater interference with state sovereignty than do the restrictions which this Court has approved.”
[Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16842193024599209893]