For the purposes of this website and ministry, the above condition whereby “natural law” prevails is synonymous with:

1. ALL property is absolutely owned.
2. The protection of private property is not regarded by anyone in government as “making law” (Litigation Tool #01.009), but rather a fulfillment of the main purpose of establishing government and the oath that all public officers take when accepting office. The CIVIL statutes DO NOT protect PRIVATE property, but PUBLIC property that became public by donating PRIVATE property to a public use, a public purpose, and/or a public office. In that sense, the current civil government ONLY PROTECTS ITSELF and its own PUBLIC property, and NEVER YOU or ANY HUMAN BEING at least from a CIVIL perspective! See: Why The Government is the Only Real Beneficiary of All Government Franchises, Form #05.051**.
3. Civil statutes (Form #05.037) are not called “law”, but civil service franchise contracts.
4. Only voting and jury service are privileges that can be CIVILLY regulated by default. Any other thing that is a voluntary privilege must be expressly signed up for and PAID for in writing on the annual tax return filed at the beginning of each year and only lasts for one year.
5. Government ID’s are NOT used to change your civil status to a “resident” or “domiciliary”. You remain PRIVATE when using government ID. Click here for information on government ID*.
6. No other franchise or privilege (Form #05.030) is or can be bundled with voting or jury service, such as civil DOMICILE (Form #05.002). This would constitute what we call “weaponization of government” (Disclaimer, Sction 4.30).
7. All government “civil services” must be requested IN WRITING at the beginning of each year and you only pay for what you ask for. The purpose of filing tax returns is to CONSENT to specific civil services you want and to pay for them in advance. Those who didn’t pay for them may not receive them. See SEDM Disclaimer, Section 4.6 for a definition of “civil service”.
8. Everyone is subject to the criminal and common law, whether they consent or not.
9. Civil courts may not enforce civil statutory law upon any party UNLESS they expressly consented IN WRITING to receive its benefits as public property. If they didn’t, only the common law and criminal law applies. That consent shall appear on the tax return filed annually.
10. Administrative tax enforcement is NOT permitted and not necessary, since all civil services consumed are prepaid annually in advance. If you don’t prepay, you don’t get the service.
11. Every government agent is personally accountable for the accuracy and truthfulness of EVERYTHING he or she communicates to the public that might have an adverse affect on PRIVATE property or PRIVATE rights. Thus, they are PRESUMED to be communicating under penalty of perjury at all times. If they lie, they are civilly penalized. ANONYMOUS communication or collection letters are FORBIDDEN. All must be signed by a human being.
12. All government “benefits” are regarded as “civil services” that must be 100% paid annually for by those who consume them AS THEY ARE USED. Use of public funds for charity is FORBIDDEN.
13. The filing of information returns (Form #04.001) such as the W-2 and 1099 are forbidden and a criminal offense of impersonating a public office. They are unnecessary if civil services are consented to and paid for annually and you don’t need to BE a public officer to consume civil services. Being a sponsor is sufficient to consume said services.
14. Consent must always be OVERT and in writing, and NEVER COVERT or implied through actions of any kind. See Hot Topics: Invisible Consent*.

For a system of government that implements the above and builds upon existing organic and statutory law, and which requires the least possible changes to the current system to implement, see:

Self Government Federation: Articles of Confederation, Form #13.002

The above definition of “natural law” also appears in the SEDM Disclaimer, Section 4.31.

1. Introduction

This article derives from:

1. Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent, Form #05.002, Section 11.17-SEDM
2. Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent, Section 11.17-Family Guardian Fellowship

Civil Status, sometimes also called Legal Status, is how you become a “person” under civil statutory law. It is what the courts call a “res” which gives them civil control over you under one of three different systems of civil law. Civil status is VERY important because it is the source of civil statutory jurisdiction of courts over you and their right to “personal jurisdiction” over you. It also describes how your actions affect “choice of law” and your “status” in any court cases you bring. This article summarizes the major aspects of this important subject.

It is the paramount duty of all REAL “governments” to protect people within their territory from involuntary changes to their civil status.  In other words, they must protect people from acquiring legal obligations (Form #12.040) that they did not EXPRESSLY consent to IN WRITING.  Otherwise, they are not really a “government”, but a “de facto government” (Form #05.043).

“In all domestic concerns each state of the Union is to be deemed an independent sovereignty. As such, it is its province and its duty to forbid interference by another state as well as by any foreign power with the status of its own citizens. Unless at least one of the spouses is a resident thereof in good faith, the courts of such sister state or of such foreign power cannot acquire jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of those who have an established domicile in the state which resents such interference with matters which disturb its social serenity or affect the morals of its inhabitants.”
[Roberts v. Roberts, 81 Cal.App.2d. 871, 879 (1947);
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13809397457737233441]

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”But it was also contended in that court, and is insisted upon here, that the judgment in the State court against the plaintiff was void for want of personal service of process on him, or of his appearance in the action in which it was rendered, and that the premises in controversy could not be subjected to the payment of the demand 722*722 of a resident creditor except by a proceeding in rem; that is, by a direct proceeding against the property for that purpose. If these positions are sound, the ruling of the Circuit Court as to the invalidity of that judgment must be sustained, notwithstanding our dissent from the reasons upon which it was made. And that they are sound would seem to follow from two well-established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent State over persons and property. The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is, that

[1] every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may contract, the forms and solemnities with which their contracts shall be executed, the rights and obligations arising from them, and the mode in which their validity shall be determined and their obligations enforced; and also to regulate the manner and conditions upon which property situated within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and transferred.

[2] The other principle of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.”
[Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878);
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13333263776496540273]

You cannot have a “civil status” under the laws of a specific place WITHOUT satisfying one or more of the following criteria:

1. A physical presence in that place. The status would be under the COMMON law.   Common law is based on physical location of people on land rather than their civil statutory status.
2. CONSENSUALLY doing business in that place. The status would be under the common law.  See the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. Chapter 97 and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. A CONSENSUAL domicile in that place. This would be a status under the civil statutes of that place.  See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a).  See also Form #05.002.
4. CONSENSUALLY representing an artificial entity (a legal fiction) that has a domicile in that place. This would be a status under the civil statutes of that place.  See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b).
5. Consenting to a civil status under the laws of that place. Anything done consensually cannot form the basis for an injury in a court of law.  Such consent is usually manifested by filling out a government form identifying yourself with a specific statutory status, such as a W-4, 1040, driver’s license application, etc.  This is covered in:
   

   Avoiding Traps in Government Forms Course, Form #12.023 https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

If any of the above rules are violated, you are a victim of criminal identity theft:

Human beings who are “sovereign” in fact:

1. Have no “civil status” under statutory law.
2. Only have a “civil status” under the constitution and the common law.
3. Are not party to the “social compact”, but “foreigners” among citizens.  The Law of Nations, Book 1, Section 213 calls them “inhabitants”.
4. Are not privileged “aliens”.
5. Participate in NO government franchises or privileges, but instead reserve all their PRIVATE, UNALIENABLE rights (Form #12.038) and thereby remain exclusively private.  See Form #05.030.
6. Were described as “idiots” under early Greek law.  Click here for details.
7. Understand the distinctions between PUBLIC and PRIVATE and maintain absolute separation between the two in all their interactions with any so-called “government”. They ensure that all of their property remains absolutely owned and exclusively private.  Thus, they can control and dictate all uses and everyone who wants to take or control it.  See Form #12.025.
8. Civilly govern themselves without external interference, except possibly of common law and criminal courts.
9. Replace the civil statutory protection franchise with private contracts and franchises of their own for everyone they do business with, thus rendering “civil services” on the part of organized governments irrelevant and unnecessary.  For a definition of “civil services”, see the definition in our Disclaimer, Section 4.  In that sense, they have FIRED the government from a civil perspective and retain all of their God-given inalienable rights.   All rights reserved, UCC 1-308.
10. Are civilly governed mainly by the “civil laws” found in the Holy Bible if they are Christians, or by the laws of their faith if they have another faith. This is a protected First Amendment right to practice their religion.
    Laws of the Bible, Litigation Tool #09.001

The ONLY thing Casear can civilly own, civilly control, or civilly tax is that which he CREATES, and he didn’t create YOU or the right of private property.  God did.  In that sense, his sovereigny is limited by God.  See:

Hierarchy of Sovereignty:  The Power to Create is the Power to Tax, Family Guardian Fellowship

Any deviation from the above hierarchy of sovereignty results in:

1. Theological idolatry.  Click here.
2. The establishment of a state sponsored “church”, where political rulers are the superior being that is “worshipped”, civil statutes become the “bible” being obeyed, and “presumption” (Form #05.017) of superior authority becomes a substitute for religious “faith”.  Form #05.038.
3. Statism, which is the worship of the state as a deity.  See:  Communism, Socialism, and Collectivism, Section 4.
4. Collectivism and humanism, which is the elevation of the collective above the individual in a legal sense.  See Communism, Socialism, and Collectivism, Section 3 and Form #12.024
5. Socialism.  Form #05.016.
6. Imputing “supernatural” or “superior” powers to civil rulers or government
7. A destruction of equality of treatment and protection.  Form #05.033.
8. Establishing an unconstitutional “Title of Nobility”.  That title is “U.S. Inc.”.  Form #05.024.
9. A destruction of ALL of your freedom, because equality between you and the government in court and under REAL law is the foundation of ALL of your freedom.  See Form #12.021, Video 1 for proof.

For a graphical depiction and explanation of how the above corruption happens, see:

How Scoundrels Corrupted our Republican Form of Government, Family Guardian Fellowship

“civil status” is further discussed in:

1. Civil Status (important!)-Article under “Litigation->Civil Status (important!) on the SEDM menus
2. Your Exclusive Right to Declare or Establish Your Civil Status, Form #13.008
3. Proof that There is a “Straw Man”, Form #05.042-SEDM
4. Legal Fictions, Form #09.071-SEDM

2. Basis for your EXCLUSIVE right to declare and establish your civil status

The right to declare and establish your civil and statutory status is tied to the legal definition of “property” itself.  “Property” as legally defined is that which you EXCLUSIVELY own and control, and can deprive all others of using or benefitting from:

Property. That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government. Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 65 Misc.Rep. 263, 121 N.Y.S. 536. The term is said to extend to every species of valuable right and interest. More specifically, ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing. The highest right a man can have to anything; being used to refer to that right which one has to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no way depends on another man’s courtesy.

The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal, everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and interest, and includes real and personal property, easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments, and includes every invasion of one’s property rights by actionable wrong. Labberton v. General Cas. Co. of America, 53 Wash.2d. 180, 332 P.2d. 250, 252, 254.

Property embraces everything which is or may be the subject of ownership, whether a legal ownership. or whether beneficial, or a private ownership. Davis v. Davis. TexCiv-App., 495 S.W.2d. 607. 611. Term includes not only ownership and possession but also the right of use and enjoyment for lawful purposes. Hoffmann v. Kinealy, Mo., 389 S.W.2d. 745, 752.

Property, within constitutional protection, denotes group of rights inhering in citizen’s relation to physical thing, as right to possess, use and dispose of it. Cereghino v. State By and Through State Highway Commission, 230 Or. 439, 370 P.2d. 694, 697.

Goodwill is property, Howell v. Bowden, TexCiv. App., 368 S.W.2d. 842, &18; as is an insurance policy and rights incident thereto, including a right to the proceeds, Harris v. Harris, 83 N.M. 441,493 P.2d. 407, 408.

Criminal code. “Property” means anything of value. including real estate, tangible and intangible personal property, contract rights, choses-in-action and other interests in or claims to wealth, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food and drink, electric or other power. Model Penal Code. Q 223.0. See also Property of another, infra. Dusts. Under definition in Restatement, Second, Trusts, Q 2(c), it denotes interest in things and not the things themselves.
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 1095]

Note that YOUR BODY, your labor, and all that you own at least STARTS OUT as exclusively your property, and by EXCLUSIVELY we mean that it is PRIVATE property beyond the civil control or regulation of any government.  Only by donating it or some portion of it to a “public use”, “public purpose”, or “public office” can its use be civilly regulated by any government.

“Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, is generally admitted; and no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his will…”
[The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 10 Wheat 66, 6 L.Ed. 268 (1825)]
__________________________________________________________
“We have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, “the right to exclude [others is] `one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’ ” Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982), quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). “
[Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)]
__________________________________________________________
“In this case, we hold that the “right to exclude,” so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.”
[Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)]

The only time a government can take away your property without compensation in return and without your consent is when you have hurt someone with it, and that deprivation can only occur AFTER the injury, not BEFORE.  Any deprivation BEFORE the injury must involve your express consent to donate the property or some interest in the property to a “public use”, “public purpose”, and/or “public office”.  These rules were identified by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows:

“Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable  rights,- ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;’ and to ‘secure,’ not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property [or income] which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor’s injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor’s benefit [e.g. SOCIAL SECURITY, Medicare, and every other public “benefit”]; second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.”
[Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892)]

The only way one can rationally disagree with the conclusions of this section is to advocate one of the following positions, all of which corrupt and destroy the notion of private property that is behind any and every great republic:

1. That there is no PRIVATE property and that EVERYTHING is PUBLIC property owned by the government.
2. That the government is the LEGAL owner of EVERYTHING and that they only LOAN it to you.
3. That “taxes” are the “rent” you pay to use GOVERNMENT property.  If you don’t pay the taxes, they can take it away from you and thereby EXCLUDE you from using or benefitting from it.

All the above premises are the foundation of socialism, in which the government either completely owns or at least CONTROLS ALL property.

“socialism n (1839) 1: any of various economic and political theories advocating collective or governmental ownership and administration of the means of production and distribution of goods 2 a: a system of society or group living in which there is no private property b: a system or condition of society in which the means of production are owned and controlled by the state 3: a stage of society in Marxist theory transitional between capitalism and communism and distinguished by unequal distribution of goods and pay according to work done.”
[Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1983, ISBN 0-87779-510-X, p. 1118]

Lastly, we emphasize that the purpose for which ALL governments are established, is to protect PRIVATE rights and PRIVATE property, according to our Declaration of Independence.  Anyone who argues with this section indirectly is advocating that we DO NOT have a “government” as defined by our founding documents:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.–That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, –That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”
[Declaration of Independence]

Furthermore, anyone who takes the position that there is no PRIVATE property and that the GOVERNMENT owns EVERYTHING, indirectly must advocate atheism and is a THIEF, because the Bible itself says that GOD owns THE WHOLE EARTH AND THE HEAVENS.  Caesar cannot own or even control that which does not belong to him:

“Behold, the heaven and the heaven of heavens is the LORD’s thy God, the earth also, with all that therein is.”
[Deuteronomy 10:12-14, Bible, NKJV]

“The heavens are Yours, the earth also is Yours; The world and all its fullness, You have founded them.”
[Psalm 89:11, Bible, NKJV]

3 What do we mean by “civil status”? [1]

A civil status is a term defined or described in either the constitution or statutes or the common law to which either obligations or rights attach.  Example “civil statuses” would be “person” (under a civil statute), “taxpayer” (under the tax code), “driver” (under the vehicle code), “individual”, etc.  Every obligation gives rise to a corresponding right on the part of the entity or person to whom the obligation is owed.  An obligation, in turn, could include the requirement to perform a specific service, or it could include some measure of control over property in your custody or control.  Obligations are always enforceable through some type of legal penalty or administrative or judicial enforcement for non-performance.

California Civil Code – CIV
DIVISION 3. OBLIGATIONS [1427 – 3272.9]
( Heading of Division 3 amended by Stats.   1988, Ch. 160, Sec. 14. )
PART 1. OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL [1427 – 1543] ( Part 1 enacted 1872. )
TITLE 1. DEFINITION OF OBLIGATIONS [1427 – [1428.]] ( Title 1 enacted 1872.)

1427. An obligation is a legal duty, by which a person is bound to do or not to do a certain thing.

(Enacted 1872.)

The ONLY method for lawfully creating obligations is either through your consent in the form of a contract or “operation of law”.  “Operation of law” involves a case where your actions or inactions have injured the equal rights of someone else.  That injury violates the concept of “justice” itself, which is the “right to be let alone”.[2]

California Civil Code – CIV
DIVISION 3. OBLIGATIONS [1427 – 3272.9]
( Heading of Division 3 amended by Stats. 1988, Ch. 160, Sec. 14. )
PART 1. OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL [1427 – 1543]  ( Part 1 enacted 1872. )
TITLE 1. DEFINITION OF OBLIGATIONS [1427 – [1428.]] (Title 1 enacted 1872.)

[1428.] Section Fourteen Hundred and Twenty-eight. An obligation arises either from:

One — The contract of the parties; or,

Two — The operation of law. An obligation arising from operation of law may be enforced in the manner provided by law, or by civil action or proceeding.

(Amended by Code Amendments 1873-74, Ch. 612.)

A violation of the above rules for creating obligations constitutes one of the following:

1. Unconstitutional taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment or equivalent state constitution.
2. Involuntary servitude, in the case of the Thirteenth Amendment, if the thing compelled is some kind of service or physical performance.

For a detailed study of obligations owed to governments or citizens protected by government statutes generally, see:

1. Lawfully Avoiding Government Obligations, Form #12.040
   https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
2. Proof of Claim: Your Main Defense Against Government Greed and Corruption, Form #09.073
   https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

The use of the term “status” in this memorandum:

1. Is associated with the domicile of the party in question.  Before one may have any kind of civil status, one must:
   1. CONSENSUALLY have a domicile or residence within the forum or jurisdiction in question.
   2. Have legal evidence of said domicile admissible in court to prove the domicile they claim.
   3. Acquire statutory “citizen” or “resident” status under the civil laws of the place by virtue of choosing a domicile within that place.
2. Relates exclusively to the civil status of a party under the CIVIL STATUTORY laws of a specific jurisdiction.
   1. Civil statutory laws only pertain to those consensually domiciled within the forum or jurisdiction.
   2. They may not be enforced against non-residents or those not domiciled within the forum or jurisdiction unless the non-resident satisfies the “Minimum Contacts Doctrine” spoken of by the U.S. Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. Does NOT relate to the CRIMINAL laws.  Criminal laws do not attach to the status of the parties or to their consent in any way.  Instead, they attach at the point when a harmful act is committed against a specific party on the territory to which said law attaches.

A well-known book on domicile explains the origin of “civil status” as follows:

§ 29. Status. [3]  It may be laid down that the status-or, as it is sometimes called, civil status, in contradistinction to political status – of a person depends largely, although not universally, upon domicil. The older jurists, whose opinions are fully collected by Story [4] and Burge [5] maintained, with few exceptions, the principle of the ubiquity of status, conferred by the lex domicilii with little qualification. Lord Westbury, in Udny v. Udny [6] thus states the doctrine broadly: “The civil status is governed by one single principle, namely, that of domicil, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining civil status. For it is on this basis. that the personal rights of the party – that is to say, the law which determines his majority and minority, his marriage, succession, testacy, or intestacy-must depend.” Gray, C. J., in the late Massachusetts case of Ross v. Ross [7] speaking with special reference to capacity to inherit, says: “It is a general principle that the status or condition of a person, the relation in which he stands to another person, and by which he is qualified or made capable to take” certain rights in that other’s property, is fixed by the law of the domicil; and that this status and capacity are to be recognized and upheld in every other State, so far as they are not inconsistent with its own laws and policy.”

But great difficulty in the discussion of this subject has arisen by reason of the loose and varying use of the term status and the want of any clear definition of what is meant by it. Savigny [8] understood it to mean ” capacity to have [PUBLIC] rights [meaning PRIVILEGES, not PRIVATE or constitutional or natural rights] and to act;” and this undoubtedly was the sense in which it was understood by the older jurists. In Niboyet v. Niboyet, [9] Brett, L. J., gives this definition: “The status of an individual, used as a legal term, means the legal position of the individual in or with regard to the rest of a community.” But whatever may be the definition of the term, or whatever rules applicable to status in general may be looked upon as having received general acceptance, there are certain prominent states or conditions of persons, which have been treated of by writers and considered by the courts, and these it will be well to examine separately, with a view to ascertain how far they are affected by domicil.
[Treatise on the Law of Domicil, M.W. Jacobs, 1887; Little Brown and Company, §29, pp. 38-39]

In typical deceitful lawyer fashion, the above quote EQUIVOCATES PUBLIC rights and PRIVATE rights, as if to suggest they are the same and that they all originate from DOMICILE. We amplified the quote with brackets to show what they are REALLY saying. PUBLIC rights originate from VOLUNTARY civil domicile and are LEGISLATIVELY CREATED and therefore OWNED by their creator, the “State”. Those exercising them are officers and agents of the state USING PUBLIC property with permission of the state. PUBLIC rights are GRANTED by the “social Compact” and are implemented ONLY with civil statutory law. As such, the civil statutory law acts as a Private Membership Association (PMA).

PRIVATE rights, on the other hand, originate from standing on LAND protected by the Constitution rather than DOMICILE and are SUPERIOR to PUBLIC rights. They are the DEFAULT rights you are BORN with and must SURRENDER by your consent to lose. You cannot exercise PUBLIC rights and PRIVATE rights at the SAME time in the same situation. Either you are acting as a AGENT of the state called a civil statutory “person” or you are acting as a PRIVATE man or woman. You can’t do both at the same time. Pursuing a civil statutory privilege is how you SURRENDER PRIVATE rights and exchange them for PUBLIC rights and privileges.   The PRIVILEGES legislatively granted by the civil statutory law therefore constitute in effect a BRIBE to entice you to sell your birthright like Esau in the Bible for a bowl of pottage in Gen. 25.  Don’t do it!  That birthright is your PRIVATE, constitutional, and natural rights.

Below is an example of the above, from the U.S. Supreme Court.  The “status” spoken in this case of is that of being “married” under the laws of a specific state:

“To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this opinion, it is proper to observe that we do not mean to assert, by any thing we have said, that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, which would be binding within the State, though made without service of process or personal notice to the non-resident. The jurisdiction which every State possesses to determine the civil status and capacities of all its inhabitants involves authority to prescribe the conditions on which proceedings affecting them may be commenced and carried on within its territory. The State, for example, has absolute 735*735 right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved. One of the parties guilty of acts for which, by the law of the State, a dissolution may be granted, may have removed to a State where no dissolution is permitted. The complaining party would, therefore, fail if a divorce were sought in the State of the defendant; and if application could not be made to the tribunals of the complainant’s domicile in such case, and proceedings be there instituted without personal service of process or personal notice to the offending party, the injured citizen would be without redress. Bish. Marr. and Div., sect. 156.”
[Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)]

“Domicile” and “Nationality” are distinguished in the following U.S. Supreme Court case:

In Udny v. Udny (1869) L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 441, the point decided was one of inheritance, depending upon the question whether the domicile of the father was in England or in Scotland, he being in either alternative a British subject. Lord Chancellor Hatherley said: ‘The question of naturalization and of allegiance is distinct from that of domicile.‘ Page 452. Lord Westbury, in the passage relied on by the counsel for the United States, began by saying: ‘The law of England, and of almost all civilized countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or conditions,—one by virtue of which he becomes the subject [NATIONAL] of some particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance, and which may be called his political status; another by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political status.‘ And then, while maintaining that the civil status is universally governed by the single principle of domicile (domicilium), the criterion established by international law for the purpose of determining civil status, and the basis on which ‘the personal rights of the party—that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy, or intestacy— must depend,’ he yet distinctly recognized that a man’s political status, his country (patria), and his ‘nationality,—that is, natural allegiance,’—’may depend on different laws in different countries.’ Pages 457, 460. He evidently used the word ‘citizen,’ not as equivalent to ‘subject,’ but rather to ‘inhabitant’; and had no thought of impeaching the established rule that all persons born under British dominion are natural-born subjects.
[United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898) ;
SOURCE: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3381955771263111765]

In law, all rights are property.  Hence, “civil rights” attach to the CIVIL STATUTORY STATUS of a “person”:

Property. That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government. Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 65 Misc.Rep. 263, 121 N.Y.S. 536. The term is said to extend to every species of valuable right and interest. More specifically, ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing. The highest right a man can have to anything; being used to refer to that right which one has to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no way depends on another man’s courtesy.

The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal, everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and interest, and includes real and personal property, easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments, and includes every invasion of one’s property rights by actionable wrong. Labberton v. General Cas. Co. of America, 53 Wash.2d. 180, 332 P.2d. 250, 252, 254.

Property embraces everything which is or may be the subject of ownership, whether a legal ownership. or whether beneficial, or a private ownership. Davis v. Davis. TexCiv-App., 495 S.W.2d. 607. 611. Term includes not only ownership and possession but also the right of use and enjoyment for lawful purposes. Hoffmann v. Kinealy, Mo., 389 S.W.2d. 745, 752.

Property, within constitutional protection, denotes group of rights inhering in citizen’s relation to physical thing, as right to possess, use and dispose of it. Cereghino v. State By and Through State Highway Commission, 230 Or. 439, 370 P.2d. 694, 697.

Goodwill is property, Howell v. Bowden, TexCiv. App., 368 S.W.2d. 842, &18; as is an insurance policy and rights incident thereto, including a right to the proceeds, Harris v. Harris, 83 N.M. 441,493 P.2d. 407, 408.

Criminal code. “Property” means anything of value. including real estate, tangible and intangible personal property, contract rights, choses-in-action and other interests in or claims to wealth, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food and drink, electric or other power. Model Penal Code. Q 223.0. See also Property of another, infra. Dusts. Under definition in Restatement, Second, Trusts, Q 2(c), it denotes interest in things and not the things themselves.
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 1095]

Those who do not have a domicile in a specific municipal jurisdiction are regarded as “non-residents”, and hence, they have no “civil status” or “status” under the “civil laws” of the jurisdiction they are non-resident in relation to.  An example of this phenomenon is found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), in which jurisdiction is described as follows:

IV. PARTIES > Rule 17.
Rule 17. Parties Plaintiff and Defendant; Capacity

(b) Capacity to Sue or be Sued.

Capacity to sue or be sued is determined as follows:

(1) for an individual who is not acting in a representative capacity, by the law of the individual’s domicile;

(2) for a corporation[the “United States”, in this case, or its officers on official duty representing the corporation], by the law under which it was organized [laws of the District of Columbia]; and

(3) for all other parties, by the law of the state where the court is located, except that:
(A) a partnership or other unincorporated association with no such capacity under that state’s law may sue or be sued in its common name to enforce a substantive right existing under the United States Constitution or laws; and

(B) 28 U.S.C. §§754 and 959(a) govern the capacity of a receiver appointed by a United States court to sue or be sued in a United States court.
[SOURCE:  https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_17]

A human being with no domicile within federal territory, based on the above:

1. Has no capacity to sue or be sued in federal court under the CIVIL statutes of the national government.
2. Has no “status” or “civil status” under any federal civil statute, including:
   1. “person”.
   2. “individual”.
3. Is not a statutory “citizen” under federal law such as 26 U.S.C. §3121(e) and 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(c), but rather a statutory “non-resident non-person”.  If they are ALSO a public officer in the national government, they are also a statutory “individual” and “nonresident alien” (26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1)(B)) in relation to the national government.
4. May STILL sue under the constitution and the common law because both of these sources of law attach to the TERRITORY rather than the “civil status” of the physical people ON that physical territory. This is, in part, because the CONSTITUTION is “self-executing” and needs no statutes to enforce:[12]:

“It is locality that is determinative of the application of the Constitution, in such matters as judicial procedure, and not the status of the people who live in it.”

[Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8956361016270671048]

We must emphasize at this point that the ABSENCE of a STATUTORY “civil status” is ALSO a “civil status”, but under a DIFFERENT system of law, which is that of the ORGANIC law rather than the STATUTORY law.  As an extension of your right to associate/disassociate and contract/not contract under the First Amendment, you can choose to be a CONSTITUTIONAL “PERSON” WITHOUT being a STATUTORY “PERSON”.  The state in such a case STILL has a duty to protect THAT LACK OF STATUS under the CIVIL STATUTORY LAW and to protect the right to ONLY have a “civil status” under the CONSTITUTION or the COMMON LAW:

“In all domestic concerns each state of the Union is to be deemed an independent sovereignty. As such, it is its province and its duty to forbid interference by another state as well as by any foreign power with the status of its own citizens. Unless at least one of the spouses is a resident thereof in good faith, the courts of such sister state or of such foreign power cannot acquire jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of those who have an established domicile in the state which resents such interference with matters which disturb its social serenity or affect the morals of its inhabitants.”

[Roberts v. Roberts, 81 Cal.App.2d. 871, 879 (1947);
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13809397457737233441]

If, in fact, “consent makes the law” per the maxims of the common law, then “consent” of the PARTY claiming OR NOT CLAIMING the “civil status” makes the CIVIL STATUTORY “PERSON” as well:

Consensus facit legem. Consent makes the law. A contract is a law between the parties, which can acquire force only by consent.
[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856; https://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

An example of a “status” that one not domiciled on federal territory cannot lawfully have is that of statutory “taxpayer” as defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(14) .  All tax liability is a CIVIL liability which attaches to a CIVIL statutory status:

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 79 > § 7701
§ 7701. Definitions

(a)When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof—

(14) Taxpayer

The term “taxpayer” means any person subject to any internal revenue tax.

In a sense then, all civil statutory law acts as the equivalent of a “protection franchise” that you have to consent to before you become party to.  “Privileges” under the protection franchise attach to the status of “citizen”.  Those who are non-residents are not parties to the franchise contract and are not bound by the franchise contract:

There is but one law which, from its nature, needs unanimous consent. This is the social compact; for civil association is the most voluntary of all acts. Every man being born free and his own master, no one, under any pretext whatsoever, can make any man subject without his consent. To decide that the son of a slave is born a slave is to decide that he is not born a man.

If then there are opponents when the social compact is made, their opposition does not invalidate the contract, but merely prevents them from being included in it. They are foreigners among citizens. When the State is instituted, residence constitutes consent; to dwell within its territory is to submit to the Sovereign.[10]

Apart from this primitive contract, the vote of the majority always binds all the rest. This follows from the contract itself. But it is asked how a man can be both free and forced to conform to wills that are not his own. How are the opponents at once free and subject to laws they have not agreed to?

I retort that the question is wrongly put. The citizen gives his consent to all the laws, including those which are passed in spite of his opposition, and even those which punish him when he dares to break any of them. The constant will of all the members of the State is the general will; by virtue of it they are citizens and free[11] . When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, what the people is asked is not exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general will, which is their will. Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that point; and the general will is found by counting votes. When therefore the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails, this proves neither more nor less than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will was not so. If my particular opinion had carried the day I should have achieved the opposite of what was my will; and it is in that case that I should not have been free.

This presupposes, indeed, that all the qualities of the general will still reside in the majority: when they cease to do so, whatever side a man may take, liberty is no longer possible.

In my earlier demonstration of how particular wills are substituted for the general will in public deliberation, I have adequately pointed out the practicable methods of avoiding this abuse; and I shall have more to say of them later on. I have also given the principles for determining the proportional number of votes for declaring that will. A difference of one vote destroys equality; a single opponent destroys unanimity; but between equality and unanimity, there are several grades of unequal division, at each of which this proportion may be fixed in accordance with the condition and the needs of the body politic.

There are two general rules that may serve to regulate this relation. First, the more grave and important the questions discussed, the nearer should the opinion that is to prevail approach unanimity. Secondly, the more the matter in hand calls for speed, the smaller the prescribed difference in the numbers of votes may be allowed to become: where an instant decision has to be reached, a majority of one vote should be enough. The first of these two rules seems more in harmony with the laws, and the second with practical affairs. In any case, it is the combination of them that gives the best proportions for determining the majority necessary.
[The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, Jean Jacques Rousseau, 1762, Book IV, Chapter 2]

There is one last very important point we wish to make.  That point is that the civil statutory laws and the domicile they attach to are not the ONLY method of civilly protecting one’s rights.  Some types of civil protection do not require consent of party.  For instance, the U.S. Constitution is an example of a limitation upon government that does NOT require the express consent of those who are protected by it.

1. The USA Constitution is a “compact” or contract.
2. It establishes a public trust, which is an artificial “person” in which:
   1. The corpus of the trust is all public rights and public property.
   2. The trustees of the trust are people working in the government.
   3. All constitutional but not statutory citizens are the “beneficiaries”.
3. The parties who established this public trust are the States of the Union and the government they created.  Individual human beings are NOT party to it or trustees under it:
4. The Bill of Rights portion of the constitution attaches to LAND protected by the constitution, and NOT the civil status of people ON the land:
   

   “It is locality that is determinative of the application of the Constitution, in such matters as judicial procedure, and not the status of the people who live in it.”
   [Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)]

5. The Bill of Rights is a “self-executing” restraint upon all government officers and agents upon all those physically present but not necessarily domiciled on the land it attaches to.  Because the rights it covers are “self-executing”, no statutory civil law is needed to give them “the force of law” against any officer of the government in relation to a person physically present upon land protected by the constitution.
   

   The design of the Fourteenth Amendment has proved significant also in maintaining the traditional separation of powers 524*524 between Congress and the Judiciary. The first eight Amendments to the Constitution set forth self-executing prohibitions on governmental action, and this Court has had primary authority to interpret those prohibitions. The Bingham draft, some thought, departed from that tradition by vesting in Congress primary power to interpret and elaborate on the meaning of the new Amendment through legislation. Under it, “Congress, and not the courts, was to judge whether or not any of the privileges or immunities were not secured to citizens in the several States.” Flack, supra, at 64. While this separation-of-powers aspect did not occasion the widespread resistance which was caused by the proposal’s threat to the federal balance, it nonetheless attracted the attention of various Members. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1064 (statement of Rep. Hale) (noting that Bill of Rights, unlike the Bingham proposal, “provide[s] safeguards to be enforced by the courts, and not to be exercised by the Legislature”); id., at App. 133 (statement of Rep. Rogers) (prior to Bingham proposal it “was left entirely for the courts . . . to enforce the privileges and immunities of the citizens”). As enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights against the States which, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-executing. Cf. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 325 (discussing Fifteenth Amendment). The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.
   [City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)]

Those injured by the actions of the government, whether civilly domiciled there and therefore a “citizen” there OR NOT, are protected by the Bill of Rights and have standing to sue in ANY state or federal court for a violation of that right.

In confirmation of this section, examine the content of 1 U.S.C. §8:

1 U.S. Code § 8 – “Person”, “human being”, “child”, and “individual” as including born-alive infant

(a) In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the words “person”, “human being”, “child”, and “individual”, shall include every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development.

(b) As used in this section, the term “born alive”, with respect to a member of the species homo sapiens, means the complete expulsion or extraction from his or her mother of that member, at any stage of development, who after such expulsion or extraction breathes or has a beating heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles, regardless of whether the umbilical cord has been cut, and regardless of whether the expulsion or extraction occurs as a result of natural or induced labor, cesarean section, or induced abortion.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affirm, deny, expand, or contract any legal status or legal right applicable to any member of the species homo sapiens at any point prior to being “born alive” as defined in this section.
[1 U.S.C. §8, Downloaded 9/13/2014]

_______________________

FOOTNOTES:

[1]. Source:  Your Exclusive Right to Declare or Establish Your Civil Status, Form #13.008, Section 2; https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm.

[2]. See:  What is “Justice”?, Form #05.050 for an exhaustive definition of “justice”; SOURCE: https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm.
[3]. See, e. g., United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 206 Ct.Cl. 649, 669-670, 513 F.2d. 1383, 1394 (1975); United States v. Lutz,295 F.2d. 736, 740 (CA5 1961). As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, “[a]n essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.” International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (dissenting opinion).
[4]. Source:  Your Exclusive Right to Declare or Establish Your Civil Status, Form #13.008, Section 3; https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm.
[5]. On this general subject, see Story, Confl. of L. ch. 4; Burge, For. & Col. L. vol. i ch. 3 et. seq.; Phillimore, Int. L. vol. iv. ch. 17; Westlake, Priv. Int. L. 1st ed. ch. 13; id. 2d ed. ch. 2, 3; Foote, Priv. Int. L. ch. 8; Wharton, Conf. of L. ch. 3; Dicey, Dom. pt. 3, ch. 2; Piggott, For. Judgments, ch. 10; Savigny, System, etc. vol. viii. §§ 362-365 (Guthrie’s trans. p. 148 et. seq.); Bar, Int. Priv. und Strafrecht, §§ 42-46 (Gillespie’s trans. p. 160 et. seq.); and see particularly the learned and elaborate opinion of Gray, C. J., in Rosa v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243 (given infra, §32, note 2). In these places the reader will find collected almost all of the important authorities upon the subject of status.
[6]. Ubi supra.
[7]. Ubi supra.
[8]. L.R. 1 Sch. App. 441, 457.
[9]. 129 Mass. 243, 246.
[10]. System, etc. §361 (Guthrie’s Trans, p. 139). Bar understands status in the same sense, §44 (Gillespie’s trans. p.172). Gray, C. J., in the case above cited, thus distinguishes the two phases of capacity which go to make up status: “The capacity or qualification to inherit or succeed to property, which is an incident of the status or condition, requiring no action to give it effect, is to be distinguished from the capacity or competency to enter into contracts that confer rights upon others. A capacity to take and have differs from a capacity to do and contract; in short, a capacity of holding from a capacity to act.”  Ross v. Ross, ubi supra.
[11]. L. B. 4 P. D. 1, 11.
[12] On the subject of the “self-executing” nature of the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has held:

The design of the Fourteenth Amendment has proved significant also in maintaining the traditional separation of powers 524*524 between Congress and the Judiciary. The first eight Amendments to the Constitution set forth self-executing prohibitions on governmental action, and this Court has had primary authority to interpret those prohibitions. The Bingham draft, some thought, departed from that tradition by vesting in Congress primary power to interpret and elaborate on the meaning of the new Amendment through legislation. Under it, “Congress, and not the courts, was to judge whether or not any of the privileges or immunities were not secured to citizens in the several States.” Flack, supra, at 64. While this separation-of-powers aspect did not occasion the widespread resistance which was caused by the proposal’s threat to the federal balance, it nonetheless attracted the attention of various Members. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1064 (statement of Rep. Hale) (noting that Bill of Rights, unlike the Bingham proposal, “provide[s] safeguards to be enforced by the courts, and not to be exercised by the Legislature”); id., at App. 133 (statement of Rep. Rogers) (prior to Bingham proposal it “was left entirely for the courts . . . to enforce the privileges and immunities of the citizens”). As enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights against the States which, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-executing. Cf. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 325 (discussing Fifteenth Amendment). The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.”
[City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)]

4. Civil Status v. Legal Status

4.1. Legal status of PROPERTY

1. PROPERTY does not have a domicile, but rather a SITUS.
2. PROPERTY does not have a CIVIL STATUS, but rather a LEGAL STATUS.
3. Legal actions against property are called “in rem” rather than “in personam”.
4. Legal status changed or affected by either CONSENT of the OWNER OR injuries the OWNER causes.
5. Cannot have obligations or rights of its own.
6. Examples:
   6.1. “Nonresident alien” in 26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1)(B).
   6.2. “Effectively connected to a trade or business” on 1040-NR return.

4.2. Civil status of PERSONS

1. Are associated exclusively with DOMICILE (Form #05.002) within the civil jurisdiction of the grantor of the PUBLIC right.  Nonresidents cannot have a civil status.  See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17.
2. Only humans or artificial entities can have a civil status.
3. Legal actions against humans who consented to be surety for CIVIL PERSONS are called “in personam” rather than “in rem”.
4. Can have both obligations and rights.  The OBLIGATIONS PAY FOR and DELIVER the RIGHTS, in fact.
5. Examples:
   5.1. “U.S. Person” (26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(30)).
   5.2. “person” (Form #08.023), “taxpayer” (Form #08.008), “citizen” (Form #05.006), “resident”.

4.3. A “nonresident alien” is NOT a CIVIL STATUS, but a LEGAL STATUS

1. Does not have a domicile in the forum or represent an office that has a domicile there. Thus, it has a FOREIGN domicile, not a FOREIGN nationality.
2. Actions against it are “in rem” rather than “in personam”.
3. A “nonresident alien” ISN’T MENTIONED in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) as having a civil status.  His PROPERTY has a LEGAL status, not a CIVIL status, and he as the owner is the only one who can CONVEY that status unless he injures someone in the foreign jurisdiction that he is nonresident in respect to.  He CONVEYS that status by his signature on tax forms.
4. THIS is why the I.R.C. doesn’t actually define “nonresident alien”, but only describes it.  And why its a described in the negative, unlike U.S. person.
5. That is ALSO why this article says some people DO NOT have a civil status and explains HOW they acquire one.
6. Reasons for the above are explained in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878):

“So the State, through its tribunals, may subject property situated within its limits owned by non-residents to the payment of the demand of its own citizens against them; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty of the State where the owners are domiciled. Every State owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-residents deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its citizens. It is in virtue of the State’s jurisdiction over the property of the non-resident situated within its limits that its tribunals can inquire into that non-resident’s obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then be carried only to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property. If the non-resident 724*724 have no property in the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals can adjudicate.

[. . .]

 “It is true that, in a strict sense, a proceeding in rem is one taken directly against property, and has for its object the disposition of the property, without reference to the title of individual claimants; but, in a larger and more general sense, the terms are applied to actions between parties, where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein. Such are cases commenced by attachment against the property of debtors, or instituted to partition real estate, foreclose a mortgage, or enforce a lien. So far as they affect property in the State, they are substantially proceedings in rem in the broader sense which we have mentioned.“

[Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723-724, 734 (1878);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13333263776496540273]

5. Effect of FRANCHISES on CIVIL STATUTORY “status”

Some law operates purely by contract or quasi-contract independent of domicile. Franchises (which are contracts) and contracts generally fall in this category. A civil statute that operates purely upon contract conveys status and rights INDEPENDENT of or IN ADDITION to the CIVIL/DOMICILED Citizen*++D status. The following cite from the American Jurisprudence Legal Encyclopedia admits this:

“In a legal or narrower sense, the term “franchise” is more often used to designate a right or privilege conferred by law, [1]   and the view taken in a number of cases is that to be a franchise, the right possessed must be such as cannot be exercised without the express permission of the sovereign power [2]   –that is, a privilege or immunity of a public nature which cannot be legally exercised without legislative grant. [3]   It is a privilege conferred by government on an individual or a corporation to do that “which does not belong to the citizens [NATIONALS or “nationals of the United States” who are nonresident aliens] of the country generally by common right.” [4] For example, a right to lay rail or pipes, or to string wires or poles along a public street, is not an ordinary use which everyone may make of the streets, but is a special privilege, or franchise, to be granted for the accomplishment of public objects [5]  which, except for the grant, would be a trespass. [6]    In this connection, the term “franchise” has sometimes been construed as meaning a grant of a right to use public property, or at least the property over which the granting authority has control. [7]”
[American Jurisprudence 2d, Franchises, §1: Definitions (1999)]

---

FOOTNOTES:

[1]  People ex rel. Fitz Henry v. Union Gas & E. Co. 254 Ill. 395, 98 N.E. 768; State ex rel. Bradford v. Western Irrigating Canal Co. 40 Kan 96, 19 P. 349; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N.Y. 611; State ex rel. Williamson v. Garrison (Okla), 348 P.2d. 859; Ex parte Polite, 97 Tex Crim 320, 260 S.W. 1048.

The term “franchise” is generic, covering all the rights granted by the state.  Atlantic & G. R. Co. v. Georgia, 98 U.S. 359, 25 L.Ed. 185.

A franchise is a contract with a sovereign authority by which the grantee is licensed to conduct a business of a quasi-governmental nature within a particular area.  West Coast Disposal Service, Inc. v. Smith (Fla App), 143 So.2d. 352.

[2] The term “franchise” is generic, covering all the rights granted by the state.  Atlantic & G. R. Co. v. Georgia, 98 U.S. 359, 25 L.Ed. 185.

A franchise is a contract with a sovereign authority by which the grantee is licensed to conduct a business of a quasi-governmental nature within a particular area.  West Coast Disposal Service, Inc. v. Smith (Fla App), 143 So.2d. 352.

[3]  State v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 595; Brooks v. State, 3 Boyce (Del) 1, 79 A. 790; Belleville v. Citizens’ Horse R. Co., 152 Ill. 171, 38 N.E. 584; State ex rel. Clapp v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. 40 Minn 213, 41 N.W. 1020.

[4] New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co., 115 U.S. 650, 29 L.Ed. 516, 6 S.Ct. 252; People’s Pass. R. Co. v. Memphis City R. Co., 10 Wall (US) 38, 19 L.Ed. 844; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet (U.S.) 519, 10 L.Ed. 274; Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 75 P. 832; Higgins v. Downward, 8 Houst (Del) 227, 14 A. 720, 32 A. 133; State ex rel. Watkins v. Fernandez, 106 Fla. 779, 143 So. 638, 86 A.L.R. 240; Lasher v. People, 183 Ill. 226, 55 N.E. 663; Inland Waterways Co. v. Louisville, 227 Ky. 376, 13 S.W.2d. 283; Lawrence v. Morgan’s L. & T. R. & S. S. Co., 39 La.Ann. 427, 2 So. 69; Johnson v. Consolidated Gas E. L. & P. Co., 187 Md. 454, 50 A.2d. 918, 170 A.L.R. 709; Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass 522; Poplar Bluff v. Poplar Bluff Loan & Bldg. Asso., (Mo App) 369 S.W.2d. 764; Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d. 697, 1 A.L.R.2d. 1160, cert den  332 U.S. 761, 92 L.Ed. 346, 68 S.Ct. 63; Shaw v. Asheville, 269 N.C. 90, 152 S.E.2d. 139; Victory Cab Co. v. Charlotte, 234 N.C. 572, 68 S.E.2d. 433; Henry v. Bartlesville Gas & Oil Co., 33 Okla 473, 126 P. 725; Elliott v. Eugene, 135 Or. 108, 294 P. 358; State ex rel. Daniel v. Broad River Power Co. 157 S.C. 1, 153 S.E. 537; State v. Scougal, 3 S.D. 55, 51 N.W. 858; Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Public Serv. Com., 101 Utah 99, 118 P.2d. 683.

A franchise represents the right and privilege of doing that which does not belong to citizens generally, irrespective of whether net profit accruing from the exercise of the right and privilege is retained by the franchise holder or is passed on to a state school or to political subdivisions of the state.  State ex rel. Williamson v. Garrison (Okla), 348 P.2d. 859.

Where all persons, including corporations, are prohibited from transacting a banking business unless authorized by law, the claim of a banking corporation to exercise the right to do a banking business is a claim to a franchise.  The right of banking under such a restraining act is a privilege or immunity by grant of the legislature, and the exercise of the right is the assertion of a grant from the legislature to exercise that privilege, and consequently it is the usurpation of a franchise unless it can be shown that the privilege has been granted by the legislature.  People ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns (NY) 358.

[5] New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co., 115 U.S. 650, 29 L.Ed. 516, 6 S.Ct. 252; People’s Pass. R. Co. v. Memphis City R. Co., 10 Wall (US) 38, 19 L.Ed. 844; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet (U.S.) 519,  10 L.Ed. 274; Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 75 P. 832; Higgins v. Downward, 8 Houst (Del) 227, 14 A. 720, 32 A. 133; State ex rel. Watkins v. Fernandez, 106 Fla. 779, 143 So. 638,  86 A.L.R. 240; Lasher v. People, 183 Ill. 226, 55 N.E. 663; Inland Waterways Co. v. Louisville, 227 Ky. 376, 13 S.W.2d. 283; Lawrence v. Morgan’s L. & T. R. & S. S. Co., 39 La.Ann. 427, 2 So. 69; Johnson v. Consolidated Gas E. L. & P. Co., 187 Md. 454, 50 A.2d. 918, 170 A.L.R. 709; Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass 522; Poplar Bluff v. Poplar Bluff Loan & Bldg. Asso. (Mo App) 369 S.W.2d. 764; Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d. 697,  1 A.L.R.2d. 1160, cert den  332 U.S. 761,  92 L.Ed. 346,  68 S.Ct. 63; Shaw v. Asheville, 269 N.C. 90, 152 S.E.2d. 139; Victory Cab Co. v. Charlotte, 234 N.C. 572, 68 S.E.2d. 433; Henry v. Bartlesville Gas & Oil Co., 33 Okla 473, 126 P. 725; Elliott v. Eugene, 135 Or. 108, 294 P. 358; State ex rel. Daniel v. Broad River Power Co. 157 S.C. 1, 153 S.E. 537; State v. Scougal, 3 S.D. 55, 51 N.W. 858; Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Public Serv. Com., 101 Utah 99, 118 P.2d. 683.

A franchise represents the right and privilege of doing that which does not belong to citizens generally, irrespective of whether net profit accruing from the exercise of the right and privilege is retained by the franchise holder or is passed on to a state school or to political subdivisions of the state.  State ex rel. Williamson v. Garrison (Okla), 348 P.2d. 859.

Where all persons, including corporations, are prohibited from transacting a banking business unless authorized by law, the claim of a banking corporation to exercise the right to do a banking business is a claim to a franchise.  The right of banking under such a restraining act is a privilege or immunity by grant of the legislature, and the exercise of the right is the assertion of a grant from the legislature to exercise that privilege, and consequently it is the usurpation of a franchise unless it can be shown that the privilege has been granted by the legislature.  People ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns (NY) 358.

[6] People ex rel. Foley v. Stapleton, 98 Colo. 354, 56 P.2d. 931; People ex rel. Central Hudson Gas & E. Co. v. State Tax Com. 247 N.Y. 281, 160 N.E. 371, 57 A.L.R. 374; People v. State Tax Comrs. 174 N.Y. 417, 67 N.E. 69, affd  199 U.S. 1, 50 L.Ed. 65, 25 S.Ct. 705.

[7] Young v. Morehead, 314 Ky. 4, 233 S.W.2d. 978, holding that a contract to sell and deliver gas to a city into its distribution system at its corporate limits was not a franchise within the meaning of a constitutional provision requiring municipalities to advertise the sale of franchises and sell them to the highest bidder.

A contract between a county and a private corporation to construct a water transmission line to supply water to a county park, and giving the corporation the power to distribute water on its own lands, does not constitute a franchise.  Brandon v. County of Pinellas (Fla App), 141 So.2d. 278.

Black’s Law Dictionary REPEATS the above requirement that a franchise is “which does not belong to the citizens [NATIONALS or “nationals of the United States” who are nonresident aliens] of the country generally by common right.” under the definition of “privilege” as follows:

Privilege.  A particular benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person, company, or class beyond the common advantages of other citizens. An exceptional or extraordinary power or exemption.  A peculiar right, advantage, exemption, power, franchise, or immunity held by a person or class, not generally possessed by others.

[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1197]

Thus, to acquire a civil status subject to regulation or taxation requires only CONSENT to the contract, which then imputes a civil status under the franchise contract.

An example of the use of contracts or franchises to create civil statuses and enforcement jurisdiction is implemented in the imposition of the income tax in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1. The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that the income tax is “quasi-contractual” and thus behaves as a contract or franchise rather than purely and solely upon consensual domicile as it does in the case of states of the Union.

“Even if the judgment is deemed to be colored by the nature of the obligation whose validity it establishes, and we are free to re-examine it, and, if we find it to be based on an obligation penal in character, to refuse to enforce it outside the state where rendered, see Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 292, et seq. 8 S.Ct. 1370, compare Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 S.Ct. 641, still the obligation to pay taxes is not penal. It is a statutory liability, quasi contractual in nature, enforceable, if there is no exclusive statutory remedy, in the civil courts by the common-law action of debt or indebitatus assumpsit. United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U.S. 250, 31 S.Ct. 155; Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492, 46 S.Ct. 180; Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227; and see Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, 542; Meredith v. United States, 13 Pet. 486, 493. This was the rule established in the English courts before the Declaration of Independence. Attorney General v. Weeks, Bunbury’s Exch. Rep. 223; Attorney General v. Jewers and Batty, Bunbury’s Exch. Rep. 225; Attorney General v. Hatton, Bunbury’s Exch. Rep. [296 U.S. 268, 272]   262; Attorney General v. _ _, 2 Ans.Rep. 558; see Comyn’s Digest (Title ‘Dett,’ A, 9); 1 Chitty on Pleading, 123; cf. Attorney General v. Sewell, 4 M.&W. 77. “

[Milwaukee v. White, 296 U.S. 268 (1935)]

The POLITICAL citizen* status of those ELIGIBLE to participate in the income tax franchise quasi-contract is POLITICAL/TERRITORIAL “citizens*” defined in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(c) as a “citizen”.

26 CFR §1.1-1 – Income tax on individuals.

§ 1.1-1 Income tax on individuals.

(c) Who is a citizen. 

Every person born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction is a citizen. For other rules governing the acquisition of citizenship, see chapters 1 and 2 of title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1401–1459). For rules governing loss of citizenship, see sections 349 to 357, inclusive, of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1481–1489), Schneider v. Rusk, (1964) 377 U.S. 163, and Rev. Rul. 70-506, C.B. 1970-2, 1. For rules pertaining to persons who are nationals but not citizens at birth, e.g., a person born in American Samoa, see section 308 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1408). For special rules applicable to certain expatriates who have lost citizenship with a principal purpose of avoiding certain taxes, see section 877. A foreigner who has filed his declaration of intention of becoming a citizen but who has not yet been admitted to citizenship by a final order of a naturalization court is an alien.

They use the phrase “subject to ITS jurisdiction” to indicate that the party subject to the income tax is subject to EXCLUSIVE jurisdiction of the United States rather than only the subject matter jurisdiction of those residing within the exclusive jurisdiction of the States mentioned in the constitution.

Notice also that the Secretary DID NOT say “who is a citizen of the United States”, but “who is a citizen”. Consistent with American Jurisprudence Legal Encyclopedia and Blacks Law Dictionary above, 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(b) then LAYERS “of the United States****” to the END of the singular word “citizen”, and thus makes this a FRANCHISE status that looks confusingly similar to a mere POLITICAL citizen* ONLY in order to deceive the reader and encourage equivocation that facilitates THEFT and false presumption by the national government and protects them in doing so with plausible deniability.

26 CFR §1.1-1 – Income tax on individuals.

§ 1.1-1 Income tax on individuals.

(b) Citizens or residents of the United States liable to tax. 

In general, all citizens of the United States, wherever resident, and all resident alien individuals are liable to the income taxes imposed by the Code whether the income is received from sources within or without the United States. Pursuant to section 876, a nonresident alien individual who is a bona fide resident of a section 931 possession (as defined in § 1.931-1(c)(1) of this chapter) or Puerto Rico during the entire taxable year is, except as provided in section 931 or 933 with respect to income from sources within such possessions, subject to taxation in the same manner as a resident alien individual. As to tax on nonresident alien individuals, see sections 871 and 877.

So what the Secretary is saying is that only POLITICAL/TERRITORIAL citizens* under 8 U.S.C. §1401-1489 and listed in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(c) are then ELIGIBLE to VOLUNTEER to be THE “citizen* of the United States****” (federal corporation and not geography) FRANCHISEE made “liable TO” rather than “liable FOR” the income tax. How do we know this? Because:

1. The ONLY type of “citizen” described in 8 U.S.C. §1401-1489 is the POLITICAL/TERRITORIAL citizen* one at 8 U.S.C. §1401. Fourteenth Amendment citizens are NOWHERE expressly recognized in these statutes and therefore excluded under the rules of statutory construction.

2. The tax is nongeographical by virtue of using the phrase “wherever resident” in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(b).

3. Domicile is geographical, so the tax is NOT based on domicile.

4. It is a maxim of law that ONLY debt and contract are NONGEOGRAPHICAL and operate ANYWHERE. Every OTHER type of civil law is geographical and territorial if it depends on DOMICILE alone, which is always geographical:

“Debitum et contractus non sunt nullius loci. Debt and contract are of no particular place.”

[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856; https://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

So the “United States” in the phrase “of the United States****” in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(b) can ONLY mean the LEGAL/CORPORATE United States. This is is also consistent with the following description of a CORPORATION as a “citizen”:

“A corporation is a citizen, resident, or inhabitant of the state or country by or under the laws of which it was created, and of that state or country only.”
[19 Corpus Juris Secundum, Corporations, §886 (2003)]

In other words, the “citizen* of the United States****” is a political citizen REPRESENTING the United States corporation as an OFFICER of said corporation by virtue of income tax quasi-contract while ABROAD, for instance. This is also consistent with the following description of franchises and/or privileges by the court:

“Is it a franchise? A franchise is said to be a right reserved to the people by the constitution, as the elective franchise. Again, it is said to be a privilege conferred by grant from government, and vested in one or more individuals, as a public office. Corporations, or bodies politic are the most usual franchises known to our laws.”
[People v. Ridgley, 21 Ill. 65, 1859 WL 6687, 11 Peck 65 (Ill., 1859)]

Black’s Law Dictionary and even American Jurisprudence are very careful to the requirement of an OFFICE to the lawful exercise of all franchises so you won’t be able to connect all the dots. The only place you will find it is in court rulings or REALLY old legal books. In the case of the income tax, the OFFICE created by the income tax as a “quasi-contract” is called “citizen of the United States****” (corporation not geography), “taxpayer”, and “person” (26 U.S.C. §6671(b) and 26 U.S.C. §7343).

The OFFICE of “taxpayer” and the VOLUNTEER OFFICER who is surety for the office have domiciles INDEPENDENT of each other. This is recognized in 26 C.F.R. §301.7701(b)-2(c), for instance.

Ultimately though, Uncle wants to FOOL you into believing that the OFFICE and the OFFICER are synonymous so they don’t have to talk about how you had to VOLUNTEER for the OFFICE of “taxpayer”. We must remember, however, the following maxim of law:

“Quando duo juro concurrunt in und person, aequum est ac si essent in diversis. When two rights concur in one person, it is the same as if they were in two separate persons. 4 Co. 118.”

[Bouvier’s Maxims of law, 1856; https://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

If you exercise the OFFICE of “taxpayer” under the authority of the I.R.C. franchise contract, you have become SURETY for said office but are not SYNONYOUS with the office. You can still exercise PRIVATE rights and have PRIVATE property while OFF DUTY and not representing the office. Only when you are handling PUBLIC property VOLUNTARILY connected to the SSN franchise mark are you exercising said office. We know this can be difficult to wrap your head around, but it is absolutely true.

To give you an example how the DUAL status operates in private affairs, consider that you simultaneously have multiple roles in relation to people around you. You can be a husband, a father, an employee, a friend. Each of these is a franchise status and an office of sorts. Whether you are acting in any one of these offices is determined by WHO you are talking to and whether ownership of the PROPERTY you are handling is shared with the person you are talking to. Some shared property interest is required to exercise the office. That shared property interest is called a “privity” in law. These legal concepts are INVISIBLE to the common man but the legal field has lots of terms to describe how these offices and statuses are exercised.

Lastly, an incomplete understanding of this section can INEVITABLY lead to a LOT of problems successfully challenging income tax enforcement. VERY VERY few freedom fighters in the past understand the content of this section, and because of this, consistently sabotage their ability to challenge jurisdiction by incorrectly:

1. Renouncing their Fourteenth Amendment citizenship, which is UNNECESSARY.
2. Claiming that they are a “natural born citizen”.
3. That they are a state citizen.

Understanding the VERY important content of this section and how to property aver your status in the court record is the ONLY way to avoid the above “sovereign citizen” clearly frivolous arguments and pitfalls. That subject is covered in the following article on this site:

How to Aver Your Status as a Fourteenth Amendment “nonresident alien”, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/how-to-aver-your-status-as-a-fourteenth-amendment-nonresident-alien/

6.  Effect of domicile on CIVIL STATUTORY “status”

The law of domicile is almost exclusively the means of determining one’s “civil status” under the civil statutory laws of a given territory:

§ 29. Status

It may be laid down that the ,status- or, as it is sometimes called, civil status, in contradistinction to political status – of a person depends largely, although not universally, upon domicil. The older jurists, whose opinions are fully collected by Story I and Burge, maintained, with few exceptions, the principle of the ubiquity of status, conferred by the lex domicilii with little qualification. Lord Westbury, in Udny v. Udny, thus states the doctrine broadly: “The civil status is governed by one single principle, namely, that of domicil, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining civil status. For it is on this basis that the personal rights of the party – that is to say, the law which determines his majority and minority, his marriage, succession, testacy, or intestacy-must depend.” Gray, C. J., in the late Massachusetts case of Ross v. Ross, speaking with special reference to capacity to inherit, says: “It is a general principle that the status or condition of a person, the relation in which he stands to another person, and by which he is qualified or made capable to take certain rights in that other’s property, is fixed by the law of the domicil; and that this status and capacity are to be recognized and upheld in every other State, so far as they are not inconsistent with its own laws and policy.”
[A Treatise on the Law of Domicil, National, Quasi-National, and Municipal, M.W. Jacobs, Little, Brown, and Company, 1887, p. 89]

We have already established that civil law attaches to one’s VOLUNTARY choice of civil domicile.Civil law, in turn, enforces and thereby delivers certain “privileges” against those who are subject to it.  In that sense, the civil law acts as a voluntary franchise or “protection franchise” that is only enforceable against those who voluntarily consent to avail themselves of its “benefits” or “protections”.  Those who voluntarily and consensually avail themselves of such “benefits” and who are therefore SUBJECT to the “protection franchise” called domicile, in turn, are treated as public officers within the government under federal law, as is exhaustively established in the following memorandum:

The key thing to understand about all franchises is that the Congressionally created privileges or “public rights” they enforce attach to specific STATUSES under them. An example of such statuses include:

1. “person” or “individual“.
2. “Alien”.
3. “Nonresident alien”.
4. “Driver” under the vehicle code of your state.
5. “Spouse” under the family code of your state.
6. “Taxpayer” under the Internal Revenue Code at 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(14).
7. “Citizen”, “resident”, or “inhabitant” under the civil laws of your state.

The above civil statutory statuses:

1. Are contingent for their existence on a DOMICILE in the geographical place or territory that the law applies to. Hence, a “nonresident alien” or even “alien” civil status within the Internal Revenue Code, for instance, only applies if one is PHYSCIALLY PRESENT on federal territory or consensually domiciled there.  If you are not physically on federal territory and not domiciled there, you CANNOT be ANYTHING under the Internal Revenue Code.
2. Are TEMPORARY, because your domicile can change.
3. Extinguish when you terminate your domicile and/or your presence in that place.
4. Are the very SAME “statuses” you find on ALL government forms and applications, such as voter registrations, drivers’ license applications, marriage license applications, etc.  The purpose of filling out all such applications is to CONTRACT to PROCURE the status indicated on the form and have it RECOGNIZED by the government grantor who created the privileges you are pursuing under the civil law franchises that implement the form or application.

The ONLY way to AVOID contracting into the civil franchise if you are FORCED to fill out government forms is to:

1. Define all terms on the form in a MANDATORY attachment so as to EXCLUDE those found in any government law.  Write above your signature the following:
   

   “Not valid, false, fraudulent, and perjurious unless accompanied by the SIGNED attachment entitled __________, consisting of ___ pages.”

2. Indicate “All rights reserved, UCC-1-308” near the signature line on the application.
3. Indicate “Non assumpsit” on the application, or scribble it as your signature.
4. Indicate “duress” on the form.
5. Resubmit the form after the fact either in person or by mail fixing the application to indicate duress and withdraw your consent.
6. Ask the government accepting the application to indicate that you are not qualified because you do not consent and consent is mandatory.  Then show that denial to the person who is trying to FORCE you to apply.
7. Submit a criminal complaint against the party instituting the duress to get you to apply.
8. Notify the person instituting the unlawful duress that they are violating your rights and demand that they retract their demand for you to apply for something.

Below is an example of this phenomenon as explained by the U.S. Supreme Court:

In Udny v. Udny (1869) L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 441, the point decided was one of inheritance, depending upon the question whether the domicile of the father was in England or in Scotland, he being in either alternative a British subject. Lord Chancellor Hatherley said: ‘The question of naturalization and of allegiance is distinct from that of domicile.‘ Page 452. Lord Westbury, in the passage relied on by the counsel for the United States, began by saying: ‘The law of England, and of almost all civilized countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or conditions,—one by virtue of which he becomes the subject [NATIONAL] of some particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance, and which may be called his political status; another by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political status.‘ And then, while maintaining that the civil status is universally governed by the single principle of domicile (domicilium), the criterion established by international law for the purpose of determining civil status, and the basis on which ‘the personal rights of the party—that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy, or intestacy— must depend,’ he yet distinctly recognized that a man’s political status, his country (patria), and his ‘nationality,—that is, natural allegiance,’—’may depend on different laws in different countries.’ Pages 457, 460. He evidently used the word ‘citizen,’ not as equivalent to ‘subject,’ but rather to ‘inhabitant’; and had no thought of impeaching the established rule that all persons born under British dominion are natural-born subjects.
[United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 656-657, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898) ;
SOURCE: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3381955771263111765]

The protections of the Constitution and the common law, on the other hand, attach NOT to your STATUTORY status, but to the LAND you stand on at the time you receive an injury from either the GOVERNMENT or a PRIVATE human being, respectively:

“It is locality that is determinative of the application of the Constitution, in such matters as judicial procedure, and not the status of the people who live in it.”
[Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8956361016270671048]

The thing that we wish to emphasize about this important subject are the following VERY IMPORTANT facts:

1. Your STATUS under the civil STATUTORY law is exclusively determined by the exercise of your PRIVATE, UNALIENABLE right to both contract and associate, which are protected by the First Amendment  to the United States Constitution.
2. The highest exercise of your right to sovereignty is the right to determine and enforce the STATUS you have CONSENSUALLY and VOLUNTARILY acquired under the civil laws of the community you are in.
3. Anyone who tries to associate a CIVIL statutory status with you absent your DEMONSTRATED, EXPRESS, WRITTEN consent is:

   3.1. Violating due process of law.

   3.2. STEALING property or rights to property from you. The “rights” or “public rights” that attach to the status are the measure of WHAT is being “stolen”.

   3.3 Exercising eminent domain without compensation against otherwise PRIVATE property in violation of the state constitution.  The property subject to the eminent domain are all the rights that attach to the status they are FORCING upon you.  YOU and ONLY YOU have the right to determine the compensation you are willing to accept in exchange for your private rights and private property.

   3.4. Compelling you to contract with the government that created the franchise status, because all franchises are contracts.

   3.5. Kidnapping your legal identity and moving it to a foreign state, if the STATUS they impute to you arises under the laws of a foreign state. This, in turn is an act of INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM in criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. §2331(1)(B)(iii).

4. All de jure government civil law is TERRITORIAL in nature and attaches ONLY to the territory upon which they have EXCLUSIVE or GENERAL jurisdiction. It does NOT attach and CANNOT attach to places where they have only SUBJECT matter jurisdiction, such as in states of the Union.
   

   “The canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, Blackmer v. United States, supra, at 437, is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained. It is based on the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions. We find nothing in the Act itself, as amended, nor in the legislative history, which would lead to the belief that Congress entertained any intention other than the normal one in this case. The situation here is different from that in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, where we held that by specifically declaring that the Act covered “possessions” of the United States, Congress directed that the Fair Labor Standards Act applied beyond those areas over which the United States has sovereignty and was in effect in all “possessions.” This Court concluded that the leasehold there involved was a “possession” within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act.”

   
   

   [Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6379131599355318274]

   
   

   “The laws of Congress in respect to those matters [outside of Constitutionally delegated powers] do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government.”

   [Caha v. U.S., 152 U.S. 211, 215 (1894); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17952967183827344130]

   
   

   “In Foley Bros. v. Filardo,[12] we had occasion to refer to the “canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . .” That presumption, far from being overcome here, is doubly fortified by the language of this statute and the legislative purpose underlying it.”

   [U.S. v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 at 222; SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8108676741530631850]

5. The prerequisite to having ANY statutory STATUS under the civil law of any de jure government is a DOMICILE within the EXCLUSIVE jurisdiction of the specific government that enacted the statute.
6. You CANNOT lawfully acquire a statutory STATUS under the CIVIL laws of a foreign jurisdiction if you have:

   6.1.Never physically been present within the exclusive jurisdiction of the foreign jurisdiction.

   6.2.Never EXPRESSLY consented to be treated as a “citizen”, “resident”, or “inhabitant” within that jurisdiction, even IF physically present there.

   6.3.NOT been physically present in the foreign jurisdiction LONG ENOUGH to satisfy the residency requirements of that jurisdiction.

7. Any government that tries to REMOVE the domicile prerequisite from any of the franchises it offers by any of the following means is acting in a purely private, commercial capacity using PRIVATE and not PUBLIC LAW and the statutes then devolve essentially into an act of PRIVATE contracting.  Methods of acting in such a capacity include, but are not limited to the following devious methods by dishonest and criminal and treasonous public servants:

   7.1.Treating EVERYONE as “persons” or “individuals” under the franchise statutes, INCLUDING those outside of their territory.

   7.2.Saying that EVERYONE is eligible for the franchise, no matter where they PHYSCIALLY are, including in places OUTSIDE of their exclusive or general jurisdiction.

   7.3.Waiving the domicile prerequisite as a matter of policy, even though the statutes describing it require that those who participate must be “citizens”, “residents”, or “inhabitants” in order to participate.  The Social Security does this by unconstitutional FIAT, in order to illegally recruit more “taxpayers”.

8. When any so-called “government” waives the domicile prerequisite by the means described in the previous step, the following consequences are inevitable and MANDATORY:

   8.1.The statutes they seek to enforce are “PRIVATE LAW”.

   8.2.It is FRAUD to call the statutes “PUBLIC LAW” that applies equally to EVERYONE.

   “Municipal law, thus understood, is properly defined to be “a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.”

   [. . .]

   It is also called a rule to distinguish it from a compact or agreement; for a compact is a promise proceeding from us, law is a command directed to us. The language of a compact is, “I will, or will not, do this”; that of a law is, “thou shalt, or shalt not, do it.” It is true there is an obligation which a compact carries with it, equal in point of conscience to that of a law; but then the original of the obligation is different. In compacts we ourselves determine and promise what shall be done, before we are obliged to do it; in laws. we are obliged to act without ourselves determining or promising anything at all. Upon these accounts law is defined to be “a rule.”
   [Readings on the History and System of the Common Law, Roscoe Pound, Second Edition, 1925, p. 4]

   8.3.They agree to be treated on an equal footing with every other PRIVATE business.

   8.4.Their franchises are on an EQUAL footing to every other type of private franchise such as McDonalds franchise agreements.

   8.5.They implicitly waive sovereign immunity and agree to be sued in the courts within the extraterritorial jurisdiction they are illegally operating under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. Chapter 97.  Sovereign immunity is ONLY available as a defense against DE JURE government activity in the PUBLIC interest that applies EQUALLY to any and every citizen.

   8.6.They may not enforce federal civil law against the party in the foreign jurisdiction that they are illegally offering the franchise in.

   8.7.If the foreign jurisdiction they are illegally enforcing the franchise within is subject to the constraint that the members of said community MUST be treated equally under the requirements of their constitution, then the franchise cannot make them UNEQUAL in ANY respect.  This would be discrimination and violate the fundamental law.

Consistent with the above, below is how the U.S. Supreme Court describes attempts to enforce income taxes against NONRESIDENT parties domiciled in a legislatively foreign state, such as either a state of the Union or a foreign country:

“The power of taxation, indispensable to the existence of every civilized government, is exercised upon the assumption of an equivalent rendered to the taxpayer in the protection of his person and property, in adding to the value of such property, or in the creation and maintenance of public conveniences in which he shares — such, for instance, as roads, bridges, sidewalks, pavements, and schools for the education of his children. If the taxing power be in no position to render these services, or otherwise to benefit the person or property taxed, and such property be wholly within the taxing power of another state, to which it may be said to owe an allegiance, and to which it looks for protection, the taxation of such property within the domicil of the owner partakes rather of the nature of an extortion than a tax, and has been repeatedly held by this Court to be beyond the power of the legislature, and a taking of property without due process of law. Railroad Company v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262 ; State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Tappan v. Merchants’ National Bank, 19 Wall. 490, 499 ; Delaware &c. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341, 358 . In Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, it was held, after full consideration, that the taking of private property [199 U.S. 203] without compensation was a denial of due process within the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102; Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417; Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 519.“
[Union Refrigerator Transit Company v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 202-203 (1905); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14163786757633929654]

An example of how the government cannot assign the statutory status of “taxpayer” upon you per 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(14) is found in 28 U.S.C. §2201(a), which reads:

United States Code
TITLE 28 – JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
PART VI – PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 151 – DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Sec. 2201. Creation of remedy

(a) In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, a proceeding under section 505 or 1146 of title 11, or in any civil action involving an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding regarding a class or kind of merchandise of a free trade area country (as defined in section 516A(f)(10) of the Tariff Act of 1930), as determined by the administering authority, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.

Consistent with the federal Declaratory Judgments Act , federal courts who have been petitioned to declare a litigant to be a “taxpayer” have declined to do so and have cited the above act as authority:

Specifically, Rowen seeks a declaratory judgment against the United States of America with respect to “whether or not the plaintiff is a taxpayer pursuant to, and/or under 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(14).” (See Compl. at 2.) This Court lacks jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment “with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,” a code section that is not at issue in the instant action. See 28 U.S.C. §2201; see also Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d. 531, 536-537 (9th Cir. 1991)  (affirming dismissal of claim for declaratory relief under § 2201 where claim concerned question of tax liability). Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and the instant action is hereby DISMISSED.
[Rowen v. U.S., 05-3766MMC. (N.D.Cal. 11/02/2005)]

The implications of the above are that:

1. The federal courts have no lawful delegated authority to determine or declare whether you are a “taxpayer”.
2. If federal courts cannot directly declare you a “taxpayer”, then they also cannot do it indirectly by, for instance:

   2.1. Presuming that you are a “taxpayer”.  This is a violation of due process of law that renders a void judgment. Presumptions are not evidence and may not serve as a SUBSTITUTE for evidence.

   2.2. Calling you a “taxpayer” before you have called yourself one.

   2.3. Arguing with or penalizing you if you rebut others from calling you a “taxpayer”.

   2.4  Quoting case law as authority relating to “taxpayers” against a “nontaxpayer”.  That’s FRAUD and it also violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b).

   2.5  Quoting case law from a franchise court in the Executive rather than Legislative branch such as the U.S. Tax Court against those who are not franchisees called “taxpayers”.

   2.6. Treating you as a “taxpayer” if you provide evidence to the contrary by enforcing any provision of the I.R.C. Subtitle A  “taxpayer” franchise agreement against you as a “nontaxpayer”.

   “They [the revenue laws] relate to taxpayers, and not to nontaxpayers. The latter are without their scope. No procedure is prescribed for nontaxpayers, and no attempt is made to annul any of their rights and remedies in due course of law. * * * [Id. 281 F. at 238.]

   
   

   [Economy Plumbing & Heating v. U.S., 470 F.2d. 585, 589 (1972); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16344066800236734362]

Authorities supporting the above include the following:

“Congress cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly.”
[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 1856 WL 8721 (1856)]

_______________________________________________

“In essence, the district court used attorney’s fees in this case as an alternative to, or substitute for, punitive damages (which were not available). The district court cannot do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly.”
[Simpson v. Sheahan, 104 F.3d. 998,  C.A.7 (Ill.) (1997)]

_______________________________________________

“It is axiomatic that the government cannot do indirectly (i.e. through funding decisions) what it cannot do directly.”
[Com. of Mass. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 899 F.2d. 53, C.A.1 (Mass.) (1990)]

_______________________________________________

“Almost half a century ago, this Court made clear that the government “may not enact a regulation providing that no Republican … shall be appointed to federal office.” Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100, 67 S.Ct. 556, 569, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947). What the *78 First Amendment precludes the government**2739 from commanding directly, it also precludes the government from accomplishing indirectly. See Perry, 408 U.S., at 597, 92 S.Ct., at 2697 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d. 1460 (1958)); see supra, at 2735.”
[Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, U.S.Ill. (1990)]

_______________________________________________

“Similarly, numerous cases have held that governmental entities cannot do indirectly that which they cannot do directly. See *841 Board of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674, 116 S.Ct. 2342, 135 L.Ed.2d. 843 (1996) (holding that the First Amendment protects an independent contractor from termination or prevention of the automatic renewal of his at-will government contract in retaliation for exercising his freedom of speech); El Dia, Inc. v. Rossello, 165 F.3d. 106, 109 (1st Cir.1999) (holding that a government could not withdraw advertising from a newspaper which published articles critical of that administration because it violated clearly established First Amendment law prohibiting retaliation for the exercising of freedom of speech); North Mississippi Communications v. Jones, 792 F.2d. 1330, 1337 (5th Cir.1986) (same). The defendants violated clearly established Due Process and First Amendment law by boycotting the plaintiffs’ business in an effort to get them removed from the college.”
[Kinney v. Weaver, 111 F.Supp.2d 831, E.D.Tex. (2000)]

If you would like further evidence proving that it is a violation of your constitutional rights for the government to associate any civil status against you without your consent, see:

7. Four methods of acquiring a civil status [1]

There are four methods of lawfully acquiring a civil status:

1. Physical presence in the venue without a domicile.  This triggers common law jurisdiction.  If the venue is protected by the constitution, it also triggers constitutional jurisdiction.
2. Physical presence WITH a consensual domicile.  This triggers civil statutory jurisdiction.  If the venue is protected by the constitution, it also triggers constitutional jurisdiction.
3. Not physically present in the venue but purposefully and consensually doing business in the venue.  This triggers common law jurisdiction.  This ordinarily does NOT trigger constitutional jurisdiction, even if the venue is protected by the constitution.
4. Not physically present in the venue but domiciled in the venue.  This triggers statutory jurisdiction.  This ordinarily does NOT trigger constitutional jurisdiction, even if the venue is protected by the constitution.

Those who don’t fit any of the criteria must be considered by the civil courts to be:

1. “nonresidents”.
2. “transient foreigners”.
3. “stateless” but not civil statutory “persons”.
4. “in transitu”.
5. “transient”.
6. “sojourner”.
7. “civilly dead”.

Below is a table summarizing the above:
Table 4:  Four method of acquiring civil status

NOTES:

1. Constitutional protection attaches to land and not to the civil status of the people physically ON that land.

“It is locality that is determinative of the application of the Constitution, in such matters as judicial procedure, and not the status of the people who live in it.”
[Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)]

2. Common law jurisdiction is the default law system applying equally to all in the absence of express or implied consent of the party.  See:

3. Domicile and civil statutory protection are synonymous. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b).

4. Domicile and common law jurisdiction are mutually exclusive and cannot exist in the same place at the same time.  This is because domicile is consensual and anything you consent to cannot form the basis for a common law injury:

“Volunti non fit injuria.

He who consents cannot receive an injury. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2279, 2327; 4 T. R. 657; Shelf. on mar. & Div. 449.

Consensus tollit errorem.

Consent removes or obviates a mistake. Co. Litt. 126.

Melius est omnia mala pati quam malo concentire.

It is better to suffer every wrong or ill, than to consent to it. 3 Co. Inst. 23.

Nemo videtur fraudare eos qui sciunt, et consentiunt.

One cannot complain of having been deceived when he knew the fact and gave his consent. Dig. 50, 17, 145.”

[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856;

SOURCE:  http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

5. Accepting a “benefit” or claiming the “benefit” of a civil statute while physically outside the venue but domiciled there causes a waiver of constitutional rights in the context of ONLY the statutes administering the “benefit”, if the granting authority is not physically located on land protected by the Constitution.  The District of Columbia, by the way, IS protected by the constitution.  See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251, 21 S.Ct. 770, 773, 45 L.Ed. 1088 (1901).

The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:

[. . .]

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.FN7 Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124 U.S. 581, 8 S.Ct. 631, 31 L.Ed. 527; Wall v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co., 244 U.S. 407, 411, 412, 37 S.Ct. 609, 61 L.Ed. 1229; St. Louis Malleable Casting Co. v. Prendergast Construction Co., 260 U.S. 469, 43 S.Ct. 178, 67 L.Ed. 351.

FOOTNOTES:

FN7 Compare Electric Co. v. Dow, 166 U.S. 489, 17 S.Ct. 645, 41 L.Ed. 1088; Pierce v. Somerset Ry., 171 U.S. 641, 648, 19 S.Ct. 64, 43 L.Ed. 316; Leonard v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., 198 U.S. 416, 422, 25 S.Ct. 750, 49 L.Ed. 1108.

[Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936)]

6. You CANNOT accept a statutory “benefit” without a domicile in the location granting the benefit.

6.1. This is because you cannot claim the benefit without a civil status there and you can’t have a civil status WITHOUT a domicile:

“There are certain general principles which control the disposition of this case. They are, in the main, well settled; the difficulty lies in their application to the particular facts of the case in hand. It is elementary that “every state has an undoubted right to determine the status, or domestic and social condition, of the persons domiciled within its territory, except in so far as the powers of the states in this respect are restrained, or duties and obligations imposed upon them by the constitution of the United States.” Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 93. Again, the civil status is governed universally by one single principle, namely, that of domicile, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining the civil status; for it is on this basis that the personal rights of a party, — that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy, or intestacy, — must depend. Udny v. Udny, L.R., 1 H. L. Sc. 457.

[Woodward v. Woodward, 11 S.W. 892, 87 Tenn. 644 (Tenn., 1889)]
“domicile. A person’s legal home.  That place where a man has his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning.  Smith v. Smith, 206 Pa.Super. 310, 213 A.2d. 94.  Generally, physical presence within a state and the intention to make it one’s home are the requisites of establishing a “domicile” therein.  The permanent residence of a person or the place to which he intends to return even though he may actually reside elsewhere.  A person may have more than one residence but only one domicile.  The legal domicile of a person is important since it, rather than the actual residence, often controls the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities and determines where a person may exercise the privilege of voting and other legal rights and privileges.“

[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 485]

6.2. A government that offers or enforces a “benefit” to nonresidents with no domicile is a DE FACTO government as described in:

De Facto Government Scam, Form #05.043
https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

7. You have a common law right to NOT receive or pay for a “benefit” or to terminate eligibility of a “benefit” you previously consented to at any time.  You also have a right to define HOW you consent to receive the benefit and can specify how that consent is procured.

Cujus est commodum ejus debet esse incommodum.

He who receives the benefit should also bear the disadvantage.

Que sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus.

He who derives a benefit from a thing, ought to feel the disadvantages attending it. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1433.

Hominum caus jus constitutum est.

Law is established for the benefit of man.

Injuria propria non cadet in beneficium facientis.

One’s own wrong shall not benefit the person doing it.

Privatum incommodum publico bono peusatur.

Private inconvenience is made up for by public benefit.

“Invito beneficium non datur.

No one is obliged to accept a benefit against his consent. Dig. 50, 17, 69. But if he does not dissent he will be considered as assenting. Vide Assent.

Non videtur consensum retinuisse si quis ex praescripto minantis aliquid immutavit.

He does not appear to have retained his consent, if he have changed anything through the means of a party threatening. Bacon’s Max. Reg. 33.”

[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856;
SOURCE:  http://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

___________________

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Source:  Your Exclusive Right to Declare or Establish Your Civil Status, Form #13.008, Section 5; https://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm.