Residuum-Quasi-Sovereignty
INTRODUCTION:
This argument demonstrates that the “Mellon Bar” is a constitutional relic that cannot survive the combined logic of:
- Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11905500281632424090 - Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4671607337309792720
By stripping the federal government of the “general common law” power to define the relationship between a sovereign and its people, Erie restored the residuum of sovereignty as the only valid source of civil or criminal protection for a state citizen.
Legal Argument:
The Restoration of the State Citizen Residuum
I. The Constitutional Foundation: Coyle v. Smith and the Residuum
Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, every state possesses a “residuum of sovereignty” that is co-equal to all other states. As held in Coyle v. Smith, this residuum is “beyond the control of Congress” and ensures that the federal government cannot “shorn away” the inherent authority of the State.
This residual power includes the state’s primary relationship with its state citizen, a relationship that exists before and independent of federal procedural labels.
II. The Erie Correction: Abolishing the Federal “Parent”
The Mellon decision (1923) relied on an assumed federal general common law to declare the United States as the “ultimate parent” (parens patriae) of every state citizen. However, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) declared that “there is no federal general common law.”
For the Equal Footing Baby: Their status as a state citizen is defined by state common law (jus soli). Since there is no federal common law to override this, the state’s residuum over this state citizen is absolute.
- For the Naturalized State Citizen: While their status involves the 14th Amendment, they are still “discrete” state citizens. Erie prevents the federal government from using “general principles” to swallow that state identity into a federal collective.
- For the Federal Baby (14th Amendment): Even those born into federal citizenship are simultaneously state citizens. Erie ensures that the substantive laws governing their lives are state-driven, reinforcing the state’s residual authority.
III. The Failure of “Quasi-Sovereignty” and the Mellon Bar
Post-Erie, the “quasi-sovereign” doctrine can no longer be used as a tool of subordination. If the federal government lacks the common law power to claim “parentage,” then it lacks the power to bar a state from protecting its state citizen via the Mellon rule.
- The “Non-Mix” Principle: Because the sovereignties of the State and the United States “do not mix,” the federal government cannot use its own powers to “cancel out” the state’s duty to its state citizen.
- The Result: The Mellon bar is effectively overruled by Erie. When a state sues to protect a state citizen, it is not asking for a federal “quasi” favor; it is exercising its Equal Footing residuum.
Conclusion
By combining Coyle and Erie, we see that the state citizen is shielded by a residuum of sovereignty that the federal government cannot penetrate. The “quasi-sovereign” doctrine, as a limiting principle, died with federal general common law. Today, whether a state citizen is “natural born” or naturalized, they remain under the protective residuum of the state, rendering the Mellon bar unconstitutional.