SOURCE: Why the Federal Income Tax is a Privilege Tax Upon Federal Property, Form #04.404, Section 3;
The Public Rights Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court is the starting point for determining whether a right is PRIVATE or PUBLIC, and in what court disputes over the right may be heard. This section will discuss this doctrine and the foundation of it, which is “publici juris”. We also discuss the dividing line between PUBLIC and PRIVATE and how to distinguish each in the following course on our site.
|Private Right or Public Right? Course, Form #12.044
The term “publici juris”, which is Latin for “public right” is defined as follows:
“PUBLICI JURIS. Lat. Of public right. The word “public” in this sense means pertaining to the people, or affecting the community at large; that which concerns a multitude of people; and the word “right,” as so used, means a well-founded claim; an interest; concern; advantage; benefit. State v. Lyon, 63 Okl. 285, 165 P. 419, 420.
This term, as applied to a thing or right, means that it is open to or exercisable by all [CIVIL STATUTORY] persons [but not CONSTITUTIONAL “persons”]. It designates things which are owned by “the public:” that is, the entire state or community, and not by any private person. When a thing is common property, so that any one can make use of it who likes, it is said to be publici juris; as in the case of light, air, and public water. Sweet.
[Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1397]
They use Latin in the definition to disguise the term “public right” because they are trying to pull a fast one on the mainstream populace. Whenever a court or a legal dictionary uses Latin, guaranteed they are trying to deceive or mislead you to disguise their LACK of lawful authority.
Notice the phrase in the above “owned by the public”, and by that they mean PUBLIC property. The word “benefit” also betrays a privilege as well. “Common property” implies COLLECTIVE control and ownership, rather than PERSONAL ownership.
They use the phrase “it is open to or exercisable by all persons”, but they can ONLY mean all human beings consensually domiciled in the forum and EXCLUDING those who are NOT. In other words, VOLUNTARY CLUB MEMBERS. Otherwise, involuntary servitude and a Fifth Amendment taking of property would be the result. See:
|Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent, Form #05.002
STATUTORY persons always require a domicile within the CIVIL jurisdiction of a geographical region. That domicile must be CONSENSUAL (Form #05.003). If you don’t consent to a domicile (Form #05.002) in the forum or venue, the only CIVIL protection you have is the CONSTITUTION and the COMMON LAW and STATUTORY CIVIL law (Form #05.037) DOES NOT and CANNOT APPLY. See:
|Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons, Form #05.037
The definition of “PUBLIC RIGHT/PUBLICI JURIS” is therefore deceptive and equivocates (Form #05.014), because the TWO contexts for “persons” are not identified or qualified and are MUTUALLY exclusive:
- CONSTITUTIONAL “persons”: Human beings protected by the Bill of Rights and the common law and NOT statutory civil law.
- STATUTORY “persons”: Fictional creations of Congress (“Straw men”, Form #05.042) which only have the limited subset of CONSTITUTIONAL rights entirely defined and controlled by Congress.
- Either you have CONSTITUTIONAL rights (Form #10.002) in a given context, or you have STATUTORY privileges (Form #05.030).
- If you claim STATUTORY privileges, you SURRENDER CONSTITUTIONAL rights.
“The words “privileges” and “immunities,” like the greater part of the legal phraseology of this country, have been carried over from the law of Great Britain, and recur constantly either as such or in equivalent expressions from the time of Magna Charta. For all practical purposes they are synonymous in meaning, and originally signified a peculiar right or private law conceded to particular persons or places whereby a certain individual or class of individuals was exempted from the rigor of the common law. Privilege or immunity is conferred upon any person when he is invested with a legal claim to the exercise of special or peculiar rights, authorizing him to enjoy some particular advantage or exemption. “
[The Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship, Roger Howell, PhD, 1918, pp. 9-10;
See Magill v. Browne, Fed.Cas. No. 8952, 16 Fed.Cas. 408; 6 Words and Phrases, 5583, 5584; A J. Lien, “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States,” in Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, vol. 54, p. 31.
They are therefore DELIBERATELY deceiving you at the very entry point of asserting PUBLIC CIVIL jurisdiction. They want you to UNKNOWINGLY surrender CONSTITUTIONAL rights by FALSELY believing that CONSTITUTIONAL “persons” and STATUTORY ”persons” are equivalent, even though they are MUTUALLY exclusive and non-overlapping.
The “Brandeis Rules” of the U.S. Supreme Court describe EXACTLY how you transition from a PRIVATE/CONSTITUTIONAL “person” to a PUBLIC/STATUTORY CIVIL “person”:
“The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:
[. . .]
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.FN7 Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124 U.S. 581, 8 S.Ct. 631, 31 L.Ed. 527; Wall v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co., 244 U.S. 407, 411, 412, 37 S.Ct. 609, 61 L.Ed. 1229; St. Louis Malleable Casting Co. v. Prendergast Construction Co., 260 U.S. 469, 43 S.Ct. 178, 67 L.Ed. 351.
FN7 Compare Electric Co. v. Dow, 166 U.S. 489, 17 S.Ct. 645, 41 L.Ed. 1088; Pierce v. Somerset Ry., 171 U.S. 641, 648, 19 S.Ct. 64, 43 L.Ed. 316; Leonard v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., 198 U.S. 416, 422, 25 S.Ct. 750, 49 L.Ed. 1108.
[Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936)]
NOTE: For the court to suggest in Ashwander that you can’t raise a constitutional issue is to tell you that:
- You are NO LONGER a CONSTITUTIONAL “person”.
- You have VOLUNTARILY exchanged PRIVATE/CONSTITUTIONAL rights for PUBLIC STATUTORY PRIVILEGES.
- You are a GOVERNMENT WHORE of the kind described by the Bible in the following article:
Are You “Playing the Harlot” with the Government?, SEDM
- You have SURRENDERED all constitutional remedies.
Notice in the Brandeis Rules THAT:
- He was in effect MAKING LAW, because he cited NO AUTHORITY for the rules.
- The judge was operating in a POLITICAL capacity, which real judges cannot do.
- Because he was operating in a political capacity and “making law” that directly SURRENDERS all of your constitutional rights, then He was in effect REPEALING the entire Bill of Rights and thus violating his oath to “support and defend the constitution”.
- He admitted that the court has DELIBERATELY OBFUSCATED the Separation Between Public and Private (Form #12.025). Confusing these two is the MAIN method of tyranny, in fact, and they can’t hand the prisoners the key to their prison cell!
Here’s another example:
“The distinction between public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in our precedents. Nor is it necessary to do so in the present cases, for it suffices to observe that a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise “between the government and others.” Ex parte Bakelite Corp., supra, at 451, 49 S.Ct., at 413. In contrast, “the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined,” Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 51, 52 S.Ct., at 292, is a matter of private rights. Our precedents clearly establish that only controversies in the former category may be removed from Art. III courts and delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies for their determination. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 450, n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 1266, n. 7, 51 L.Ed.2d. 464 (1977); Crowell v. Benson, supra, 285 U.S., at 50-51, 52 S.Ct., at 292. See also Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv.L.Rev. 894, 917-918 (1930).FN24Private-rights disputes, on the other hand, lie at the core of the historically recognized judicial power.”
[. . .]
Although Crowell and Raddatz do not explicitly distinguish between rights created by Congress [PUBLIC RIGHTS] and other rights, such a distinction underlies in part Crowell’s and Raddatz’ recognition of a critical difference between rights created by federal statute and rights recognized by the Constitution. Moreover, such a distinction seems to us to be necessary in light of the delicate accommodations required by the principle of separation of powers reflected in Art. III. The constitutional system of checks and balances is designed to guard against “encroachment or aggrandizement” by Congress at the expense of the other branches of government. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 122, 96 S.Ct., at 683. But when Congress creates a statutory right [a “privilege” or “public right” in this case, such as a “trade or business”], it clearly has the discretion, in defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies; it may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate that right must do so before particularized tribunals created to perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right. FN35 Such provisions do, in a sense, affect the exercise of judicial power, but they are also incidental to Congress’ power to define the right that it has created. No comparable justification exists, however, when the right being adjudicated is not of congressional creation. In such a situation, substantial inroads into functions that have traditionally been performed by the Judiciary cannot be characterized merely as incidental extensions of Congress’ power to define rights that it has created. Rather, such inroads suggest unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial power of the United States, which our Constitution reserves for Art. III courts.
More on judges unconstitutionally “making law” at:
- How Judges Unconstitutionally “Make Law”, Litigation Tool #01.009
- Courts Cannot Make Law
On the subject of judges “making law”, Montesquieu who designed our three branch system of government with separation of powers (Form #05.023) in his famous book “The Spirit of Laws” STERNLY WARNED BEFORE the Constitution was even written(!) the following:
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression [sound familiar?].
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.”
[. . .]
In what a situation must the poor subject be in those republics! The same body of magistrates are possessed, as executors of the laws, of the whole power they have given themselves in quality of legislators. They may plunder the state by their general determinations; and as they have likewise the judiciary power in their hands, every private citizen may be ruined by their particular decisions.”
[The Spirit of Laws, Charles de Montesquieu, 1758, Book XI, Section 6;
What the U.S. Supreme Court has done, through “The Public Rights Doctrine”, is in effect the following POLICY that is not LAW but which has the practical EFFECT and FORCE of law:
- Government can do no wrong PROVIDED that it is operating within its statutory and constitutional limits, and therefore cannot be sued as a wrongdoer, unless the statute they are administering is or has been declared unconstitutional.
- Disputes between TWO private parties protected by the Constitution must be heard in Constitutional, Article III courts.
- Disputes between a PRIVATE party and the GOVERNMENT must be heard in:
- Legislative franchise courts in the LEGISLATIVE or EXECUTIVE Branch if no Constitutional wrong is implicated, because you are seeking a privilege against Uncle.
- A constitutional Article III court if a Constitutional violation is implicated.
- Any privilege or right originating from a civil statute that is not in the Constitution is, by definition a public right AGAINST the government. Thus, it is a PRIVILEGE that can be regulated by the government and heard in a franchise court. Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1983)
- Franchise courts, also called “legislative franchise courts”:
- Are legislatively created creatures of Congress which can only hear disputes relating to federal property coming under 5 U.S.C. §553(a)(2).
- Cannot hear constitutional issues or rights violations.
- Cannot hear disputes of those not partaking of the civil statutory privileges or franchise they were created to administer.
- Are part of what now deceased Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia called “The FOURTH Branch of government”, implying that they are unconstitutional. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
- If you wish to invoke your constitutional rights against a government actor who injured your constitutional rights:
- That dispute is against THE INDIVIDUAL ACTOR, not against the government.
- You must satisfy the burden of proof that the tortious actor was acting OUTSIDE of their delegated constitutional or statutory authority. Usually, this means that your status or your earnings did NOT fall within the STATUTORY definitions provided in the civil statute they were administering using the strict rules of statutory construction and interpretation documented in Form #05.014.
- The Department of Justice can overrule you by simply declaring, absent ANY proof, that they were operating WITHIN their authority, even if the definitions say they were NOT. See 28 U.S.C. §2679(d)(3).
- If the tortious actor was acting outside their delegated authority, they are NOT entitled to free representation by the Department of Justice.
- If you file the action against the tortious actor in STATE court, then the action cannot be removed to FEDERAL court WITHOUT the defendant proving that federal property OF SOME KIND listed in 5 U.S.C. §553(a)(2)is involved, and thus, that a “federal question” is at issue.
- The COURT which allows for removal from state to federal court itself is committing a tort WITHOUT enforcing the requirement of the defendant to prove “federal question” and FEDERAL PROPERTY is at issue. See 28 U.S.C. §1652, which is deliberately vague to protect UNLAWFUL removals and IDENTITY THEFT that they facilitate, as documented in:
Government Identity Theft, Form #05.046
- Lastly, there are cases where even though the offending party in the government who you are suing INDIVIDUALLY caused an unlawful taking of PRIVATE property, the property is still in the CUSTODY of the government.
- Suing the corrupt individual will not return the property and you have to sue the PROPERTY and indirectly the party possessing it at the time, which is usually the government.
- The action to return the property must be filed as an “in rem” action against the PROPERTY and NOT the government as an assumpsit.
- In rem actions against the government for property unlawfully in their custody ARE permitted and are NOT privileges, but RIGHTS and NO STATUTE is necessary to reclaim the property WRONGFUILLY in government possession. Property taken from a “nontaxpayer” under the color but without the actual authority of law is not “taxes”, but THEFT, and therefore would NOT come under the Internal Revenue Code, which only governs interactions with CONSENTING STATUTORY “taxpayers”:
“The revenue laws are a code or system in regulation of tax assessment and collection. They relate to taxpayers, and not to nontaxpayers. The latter are without their scope. No procedure is prescribed for nontaxpayers, and no attempt is made to annul any of their rights and remedies in due course of law. With them Congress does not assume to deal, and they are neither of the subject nor of the object of the revenue laws…”
[Long v. Rasmussen, 281 F. 236 (1922)]
“Revenue Laws relate to taxpayers and not to non-taxpayers [American Citizens/American Nationals not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government]. The latter are without their scope. No procedures are prescribed for non-taxpayers and no attempt is made to annul any of their Rights or Remedies in due course of law. With them[non-taxpayers] Congress does not assume to deal and they are neither of the subject nor of the object of federal revenue laws.”
[Economy Plumbing & Heating v. U.S., 470 F2d. 585 (1972)]
“A claim against the United States is a right to demand money from the United States.  Such claims are sometimes spoken of as gratuitous in that they cannot be enforced by suit without statutory consent.  The general rule of non-liability of the United States does not mean that a citizen cannot be protected against the wrongful governmental acts that affect the citizen or his or her property. If, for example, money or property of an innocent person goes into the federal treasury by fraud to which a government agent was a party, the United States cannot [lawfully] hold the money or property against the claim of the injured party.”
[American Jurisprudence 2d, United States, §45 (1999)]
“When the Government has illegally received money which is the property of an innocent citizen and when this money has gone into the Treasury of the United States, there arises an implied contract on the part of the Government to make restitution to the rightful owner under the Tucker Act and this court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit.90 Ct.Cl. at 613, 31 F.Supp. at 769.”
California Civil Code
“One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he or she has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it.”
“The United States, we have held, cannot, as against the claim of an innocent party, hold his money which has gone into its treasury by means of the fraud of its agent. While here the money was taken through mistake without element of fraud, the unjust retention is immoral and amounts in law to a fraud of the taxpayer’s rights. What was said in the State Bank Case applies with equal force to this situation. ‘An action will lie whenever the defendant has received money which is the property of the plaintiff, and which the defendant is obligated by natural justice and equity to refund. The form of the indebtedness or the mode in which it was incurred is immaterial.“
 United States ex rel. Angarica v. Bayard, 127 U.S. 251, 32 L.Ed. 159, 8 S.Ct. 1156, 4 AFTR 4628 (holding that a claim against the Secretary of State for money awarded under a treaty is a claim against the United States); Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567, 29 L.Ed. 940, 6 S.Ct. 870; Manning v. Leighton, 65 Vt. 84, 26 A 258, motion dismd 66 Vt. 56, 28 A 630 and (disapproved on other grounds by Button’s Estate v. Anderson, 112 Vt. 531, 28 A.2d. 404, 143 A.L.R. 195).
 Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.S. 439, 40 L.Ed. 1032, 16 S.Ct. 853.
 Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 51 L.Ed. 351, 27 S.Ct. 233.
 Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 79 L.Ed. 1421, 55 S.Ct. 695, 35-1 USTC ¶ 9346, 15 AFTR 1069; United States v. State Bank, 96 U.S. 30, 96 Otto 30, 24 L.Ed. 647.
More on the Public Rights Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court and the subject of “Publici juris” at:
|Sovereignty and Freedom Topic, Section 6: Private and Natural Rights and Natural Law, Family Guardian Fellowship